R v Madhi & Anor [2025] EWCA Crim 1401: Disapplying the s315 Minimum and Avoiding Mixed Youth Custody Regimes Where s250 Detention Is Imposed

Introduction

This Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) decision addresses sentencing for a brutal attempted murder committed by two offenders of markedly different ages and profiles: a 17-year-old child (Mahdi) and a 21-year-old young adult (Geravandian). The case engages multiple strands of sentencing law: youth sentencing principles and the weight to be given to immaturity and vulnerability; the approach to aggravating and mitigating factors within the Attempted Murder Guideline (category B2); the transparency expected of sentencing remarks; the totality principle and the propriety of consecutive sentences for a separate offence under section 53 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (refusal to disclose a phone’s PIN); and, critically, the interaction between detention under section 250 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (serious offences by children) and the mandatory minimum regime for bladed articles under section 315 of the Sentencing Act 2020.

Central issues included whether the trial judge gave sufficient weight to Mahdi’s youth and vulnerabilities, whether he was required to quantify uplifts and discounts numerically, whether Geravandian’s sentence was manifestly excessive given his age and background, and whether a separate custodial sentence should run consecutively for the section 53 RIPA offence. The Court also considered the proper approach to a secondary bladed article offence alongside a long section 250 sentence for the index offence, and identified when “exceptional circumstances” justify disapplying the mandatory minimum under section 315 SA 2020.

Summary of the Judgment

Both appellants were convicted of attempted murder (category B2 guideline; starting point 25 years, range 20–30 years). Mahdi was 17 at the time; Geravandian had just turned 21.
Mahdi’s sentence on count 1 was reduced from 24 years’ custody to 18 years’ detention under section 250 of the Sentencing Act 2020, the Court holding that his youth, low IQ, ADHD, vulnerability and immaturity significantly outweighed the aggravating factors, making 24 years manifestly excessive.
Mahdi’s concurrent six-month sentence for the bladed article offence (count 3) was quashed. The Court held it is inappropriate to impose two different custodial regimes on a single offender (DTO for the bladed article count and section 250 detention for the attempted murder). Applying R v Kovalkov [2023] EWCA Crim 1509, the Court substituted “no separate penalty.”
Section 315 SA 2020’s mandatory minimum for the bladed article count would ordinarily apply, but the Court held that the imposition of a long custodial sentence of a different kind (the section 250 detention) constitutes an exceptional circumstance justifying not imposing the minimum on count 3.
Geravandian’s 24-year sentence for attempted murder was upheld. His mitigating factors (no previous convictions; 21 years old) did not render the sentence manifestly excessive given planning, weapon involvement, and the context of his older age relative to a vulnerable child co-offender. The nine-month consecutive sentence on the section 53 RIPA count was upheld as plainly appropriate, subject to totality.
Grounds alleging a requirement to state numerical uplifts or explicit percentage discounts were rejected, reaffirming that sentencing judges are not required to quantify each factor: R v Hallam [2025] EWCA 199; [2025] 4 WLR 33 at [26(iii)], approving R v Ratcliffe [2024] EWCA Crim 1498 at [81].

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

R v Hallam [2025] EWCA 199; [2025] 4 WLR 33 at [26(iii)] (relying on R v Ratcliffe [2024] EWCA Crim 1498 at [81]): The Court reaffirmed that a sentencing judge is not obliged to attribute specific numerical values (percentages or figures) to individual factors such as aggravating features or youth discounts. This directly disposed of Mahdi’s grounds of appeal premised on a lack of numerical transparency. The emphasis remains on reasoned judgment rather than arithmetic formulae.
R v Kovalkov [2023] EWCA Crim 1509: The Court drew on Kovalkov’s guidance when quashing the concurrent term on Mahdi’s bladed article count and ordering “no separate penalty.” Kovalkov supports the approach that, where a long custodial sentence is imposed for the index offence, additional short terms for secondary counts can be marked by “no separate penalty,” especially to avoid juridical or administrative conflict between different custodial regimes and to respect totality.

Legal Reasoning

(1) Categorisation and aggravating features. The attempted murder fell within category B2 of the Sentencing Council’s Attempted Murder Guideline (starting point 25 years; range 20–30 years). The Court accepted multiple aggravating features:

High culpability: the offender took a knife to the scene intending to commit an offence and used it; and there was planning or premeditation of murder.
Serious harm: multiple stab wounds; a fractured rib; a collapsed lung; damage to the liver; the loss of a kidney; prolonged hospitalization; near-death during surgery; lasting disability. The Court described this as at the higher end of category 2 harm.
Public setting: the attack occurred in a bus station and in the presence of members of the public, including a young child. The appellants were seen disposing of clothing and a large kitchen knife.
For Mahdi: previous convictions including robbery and two knife possession offences.

(2) Youth mitigation and vulnerabilities: Mahdi. The Court placed very considerable weight on Mahdi’s youth (17 years and 3 months), immaturity, low IQ, ADHD, vulnerability and his status as a looked-after child with a background of trauma. These factors collectively diminished culpability on well-established youth sentencing principles. Notably, the Court held that Mahdi’s mitigating factors “significantly outweigh” the aggravating features in his case. Accordingly, the 24-year term was “manifestly excessive” and was replaced with 18 years’ detention under section 250 of the Sentencing Act 2020. The Court’s approach underscores that even in high-culpability attempted murder, the combination of youth and specific vulnerabilities can require a substantial downward adjustment from adult benchmarks.

(3) No mixed youth custodial regimes; “no separate penalty” and s315 SA 2020. The Court quashed the concurrent sentence on the bladed article count and ordered “no separate penalty.” Two important propositions emerge:

Incompatibility of regimes: It is inappropriate to impose two different types of custodial sentence on a child. A detention and training order (DTO) for the bladed article count would sit awkwardly beside a long section 250 detention for the attempted murder. The Court adopted a coherent, single-regime approach by removing the DTO and marking the offence with “no separate penalty.”
Exceptional circumstances under s315 SA 2020: Although the bladed article offence was subject to the mandatory minimum provisions in section 315 SA 2020, the Court held that the existence of a long custodial sentence “of a different kind” on the principal count constitutes an exceptional circumstance justifying non-imposition of the minimum. This is a clear, practical articulation of the exceptional circumstances gateway in the context of concurrent youth custodial regimes and totality.

(4) Young adult mitigation; secondary party culpability: Geravandian. Geravandian was just 21 at the time, with no previous convictions. He was convicted as a secondary party; however, the Court cautioned that his being a secondary participant must be seen in context: he was much older than his vulnerable child co-defendant. The Court therefore did not treat secondary participation as materially diminishing culpability in the circumstances. His 24-year term was not manifestly excessive given the planning, the weapon’s role, and the harm caused. Youthful age (18–25) can mitigate, but not to the same degree as childhood, and the absence of mental health vulnerabilities reduced the weight of mitigation in his case.

(5) Consecutive sentencing for the section 53 RIPA offence. The Court affirmed the propriety of a consecutive sentence for the section 53 RIPA offence (refusal to disclose a PIN). This offence is separate from the attempted murder and properly attracts distinct punishment. The totality principle remains the check against disproportion, but consecutive sentencing is the norm for such discrete wrongdoing that hampers investigation.

(6) No requirement to quantify uplifts and discounts numerically. The Court rejected submissions that the sentencing judge was bound to assign percentages or numerical increments for aggravation, or to set out an explicit “youth discount” figure. Reaffirming Hallam and Ratcliffe, the Court emphasised that reasoned evaluation, not arithmetic, is required to show that the relevant factors have been weighed.

Impact

Youth sentencing calibration in serious violence: This case provides a concrete illustration that for child defendants—even in highly aggravated, premeditated attempted murder—the combination of immaturity, cognitive impairment and vulnerability can justify a very substantial reduction from adult guideline starting points. The reduction from 24 to 18 years under s250 will serve as a reference point for future cases with similar profiles.
Young adults (18–25) versus children: The judgment reinforces that youthful age alone, in the absence of specific vulnerabilities or mental health conditions, may carry limited weight for a 21-year-old in the face of extreme aggravation. Practitioners should differentiate sharply between the weight afforded to child defendants and to young adults.
No mixed custodial regimes for children: The Court’s insistence that it is inappropriate to impose two different custodial regimes on a single offender (e.g., DTO and s250 detention) provides clear practical guidance. Where the index offence attracts s250 detention, secondary counts may be best addressed by “no separate penalty,” subject to totality.
Exceptional circumstances and s315 SA 2020: The decision articulates a practical, principled basis for disapplying the mandatory minimum for bladed article possession where a long sentence “of a different kind” is imposed for another offence. This will guide courts in avoiding formalistic adherence to minimum terms that distort the overall sentence structure or create regime conflicts.
Consecutive sentencing for section 53 RIPA: The Court’s endorsement of consecutive terms for refusals to disclose encryption keys (subject to totality) underscores the offence’s independent wrong—impeding investigation—and supports deterrence in digital evidence contexts.
Sentencing remarks: no need for arithmetic breakdowns: Appeals grounded in the absence of numerical uplifts or discounts are unlikely to succeed provided judges explain the factors they have weighed and the reasons for the overall sentence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 45A anonymity order (Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999): Prevents publication of details likely to identify an under-18 witness involved in proceedings. It protects the witness for life.
Attempted Murder Guideline (category B2): A Sentencing Council guideline band indicating seriousness based on culpability and harm. Category B2 carries a starting point of 25 years (adult benchmark) and a 20–30-year range. Courts then adjust for aggravating/mitigating factors and for youth.
Detention under section 250 Sentencing Act 2020: The statutory power to impose long-term detention on children convicted of very serious offences (the modern successor to “section 91” detention). It is distinct from a detention and training order (DTO).
Detention and Training Order (DTO): A short-to-medium youth custodial sentence with a custodial and a community element. The Court held that it is inappropriate to impose a DTO alongside s250 detention on the same offender.
Section 315 Sentencing Act 2020 (mandatory minimum): Provides a statutory minimum term for certain bladed article/offensive weapon offences, subject to an “exceptional circumstances” escape clause. Here, the long s250 sentence for the index offence was an exceptional circumstance justifying not imposing the minimum on the secondary count.
“No separate penalty”: A sentencing outcome used where an offence is proved but a separate sentence would be unnecessary or cause practical/legal conflict, given a principal sentence. The conviction remains recorded.
Totality principle: Ensures the overall sentence for multiple offences is just and proportionate when considering concurrent/consecutive terms.
Secondary party liability: Liability as an aider/abettor/encourager. Being a secondary party can mitigate, but context matters. Where the secondary party is older than a vulnerable child co-offender, that factor may limit mitigation.
Section 53 RIPA 2000: Criminalises failing to disclose encryption keys/passwords when lawfully required. It protects the integrity of criminal investigations, and separate consecutive punishment is commonly appropriate.
“Manifestly excessive”: The appellate standard for sentence appeals. A sentence is altered only if it falls outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge.

Conclusion

Madhi & Anor delivers three important clarifications. First, it demonstrates the real and sometimes decisive weight to be given to youth and vulnerability in sentencing even the gravest violence: for a 17-year-old with significant vulnerabilities, 24 years was excessive; 18 years under s250 was appropriate. Second, it establishes a clear structural rule for youth custody: where s250 detention is imposed for the index offence, it is inappropriate to layer a DTO for a secondary count; courts may instead record “no separate penalty.” In doing so, the Court also articulates that a long custodial sentence of a different kind on another count can constitute an exceptional circumstance justifying the non-imposition of the s315 mandatory minimum for bladed article possession. Third, it reaffirms that judges need not quantify their adjustments numerically, provided their reasoning sufficiently addresses the relevant factors.

For young adult offenders, the decision underscores that age alone, absent specific vulnerabilities, may carry limited mitigation where planning, weapon use and public endangerment are present. The ruling also confirms the propriety of consecutive sentences for section 53 RIPA offences, subject to totality. Overall, the judgment strengthens principled, coherent sentencing for children and young adults, promotes practical sentence construction that avoids conflicting regimes, and provides a measured benchmark for adjusting the Attempted Murder Guideline in cases involving child defendants with substantial vulnerabilities.