Anonymised Summary of Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from convictions and sentences imposed following an incident of stabbing at a bus station on 20 November 2023 in The City. Two individuals, referred to here as Appellant A and Appellant B, were charged in an indictment dated 17 April 2024. Proceedings in the Crown Court resulted in convictions on a count of attempted murder (count 1) for each appellant; Appellant A was also convicted on a separate count of having an article with a blade or point in a public place (count 3) after an earlier guilty plea to that count and to an alternative count of grievous bodily harm with intent (count 2) that the Crown did not accept as an alternative to attempted murder. Appellant B was also convicted on a count of failing to disclose a key to protected information (count 4), contrary to section 53 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
Sentences were imposed on 8 October 2024 in The Crown Court. Appellant A was sentenced to 24 years' detention in a young offender institution on count 1 and a concurrent term of six months' detention on count 3. Appellant B was sentenced to 24 years' imprisonment on count 1 and a consecutive term of nine months' imprisonment on count 4. Leave to appeal against the sentence on count 1 was granted for each appellant.
The factual matrix, as found by the jury and the sentencing judge, was that the appellants went to the bus station in the early evening. The victim was present with his girlfriend, Witness. Appellant A was 17 years and three months old at the time and had a large serrated knife; Appellant B had just turned 21. A confrontation occurred, during which Appellant A stabbed the victim repeatedly, causing multiple serious injuries including a fractured rib, a collapsed lung, damage to the liver and a kidney which was later removed. The victim required hospital treatment for about two months and continued to suffer pain and mobility limits nine months later. The offence occurred in the presence of members of the public, including a young child. The appellants were later observed disposing of clothing and a large kitchen knife. In custody, Appellant A boasted about his actions.
Pre-sentence and psychiatric reports were prepared for both appellants. Appellant A had prior convictions (including robbery and knife possession offences) and had been assessed as vulnerable, diagnosed with ADHD, found to have a low IQ by a consultant psychiatrist, and recognised as a victim of modern slavery. Appellant B had no previous convictions and had immigration-related difficulties in schooling years prior to the offence.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to Appellant A's youth, vulnerabilities and mental health when imposing a sentence of 24 years' detention for attempted murder.
- Whether the sentencing judge was required to set out numerically the increase applied to the starting point to reflect aggravating factors (i.e., whether failure to disclose a specific numerical uplift was material).
- Whether the sentencing judge failed to set out with transparency the discount applied (if any) for Appellant A being under 18 at the time of the offending.
- Whether the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to Appellant B's youth, troubled background and lack of previous convictions so as to render his sentence of 24 years' imprisonment manifestly excessive.
- Whether the consecutive sentence on the separate count of failing to disclose a key to protected information (count 4) was inappropriate.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant A's Arguments
- The judge did not attach sufficient weight to Appellant A's youth, vulnerability, low IQ, mental health (including ADHD) and status as a victim of modern slavery.
- The judge failed to set out numerically the uplift applied to the guideline starting point to reflect aggravating factors.
- The judge failed to set out transparently what discount was allowed for Appellant A being under 18 at the time of the offence.
Appellant B's Arguments
- The judge did not give sufficient weight to Appellant B's youth (just turned 21), lack of previous convictions and troubled background.
- The consecutive sentence on count 4 (failing to disclose the PIN to his mobile phone) should not have been imposed as consecutive to the sentence for attempted murder.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Case A ([2025] EWCA 199; [2025] 4 WLR 33) |
Affirms that, as a general proposition, a sentencing judge is not obliged to attribute specific percentage values or figures to individual factors taken into account in sentencing. |
The court relied on this authority to reject Appellant A's second and third grounds that the judge was required to give numeric uplifts or specify the discount for youth in percentage terms. |
| Case B ([2024] EWCA Crim 1498) |
Provided an example of the principle that judges are not required to attribute specific numerical values to individual sentencing factors. |
Referenced in support of the same sentencing transparency principle cited from Case A and applied to dismiss the argument that numerical values were required. |
| Case C ([2023] EWCA Crim 1509) |
Guidance on imposing or not imposing separate custodial sentences where different types of custody are involved and on when exceptional circumstances justify not imposing a mandatory minimum term. |
The court applied this guidance to order that no separate penalty be imposed on the alternative count (count 3) for Appellant A, because the long custodial sentence imposed on count 1 of a different kind constituted an exceptional circumstance. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by identifying the applicable sentencing guideline category for attempted murder: category B2, with a starting point of 25 years' custody and a range from 20 to 30 years. The judge had considered aggravating and mitigating factors and arrived at 24 years' custody for each appellant. The judge explained that he had afforded a discount to Appellant A for youth and had afforded a similar overall discount to Appellant B for different reasons.
The court reviewed aggravating features that applied to both appellants: the seriousness of the injuries (including loss of a kidney), the presence of the offence in public (including a young child), evidence of planning/premeditation, and that a weapon was taken to the scene and used. For Appellant A an additional aggravating factor was previous convictions for violent and knife-related offending. The court treated these matters as placing the offending at the higher end of the category 2 harm range and as evidence of high culpability.
The court then considered the mitigating factors. For Appellant A these were principally his youth (17 years and three months at the time), diagnosed mental health conditions (including ADHD), low IQ as assessed by a consultant psychiatrist, vulnerability, status as a child in care and recognition as a victim of modern slavery. For Appellant B, the principal mitigating factors were his lack of previous convictions and his age (just 21), together with early difficulties on arrival in the country many years before the offending.
On the procedural issue of whether the sentencing judge had to state numerical uplifts or percentages, the court referred to authorities (Case A and Case B) confirming that sentencing judges are not obliged to attribute specific percentage values to individual factors. That principle disposed of Appellant A's second and third grounds that turned on numerical transparency.
Applying the facts to the law, the court concluded that although Appellant A's offending was highly culpable in some respects, his mitigating features significantly outweighed the aggravating factors in his case. The 24-year detention was therefore found to be manifestly excessive. For Appellant A the court quashed the sentence and substituted a sentence of 18 years' detention under section 250 of the Sentencing Act 2020. The court also quashed the concurrent six-month sentence on count 3: section 250 did not apply to that offence and, following the guidance in Case C, it was inappropriate to impose two different types of custodial sentence; the long custodial sentence for count 1 constituted an exceptional circumstance justifying not imposing the mandatory minimum term on count 3.
In relation to Appellant B, the court found that while there were mitigating factors, the judge had been entitled to conclude they did not outweigh the aggravating features sufficiently to make the imposed sentence manifestly excessive. The challenge to the consecutive sentence on count 4 was dismissed: the offence under section 53 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 was separate to the attempted murder and a consecutive sentence was plainly appropriate, subject to observance of the totality principle. The court therefore dismissed Appellant B's appeal.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
- Appellant A: The sentence of 24 years' detention on count 1 was quashed and substituted with 18 years' detention under section 250 of the Sentencing Act 2020. The concurrent custodial sentence on count 3 was quashed and no separate penalty was ordered on that count.
- Appellant B: The appeal was dismissed; the sentence of 24 years' imprisonment on count 1 and the consecutive nine months on count 4 were upheld.
Implications: The direct effect of the decision is to reduce Appellant A's custodial term and to remove a separate custodial penalty for the alternative public possession offence, while leaving Appellant B's sentences intact. The court applied established sentencing principles (including the guideline category, assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors, and the totality principle) and authorities on sentencing transparency and the appropriateness of imposing separate custodial sentences. The opinion does not purport to establish a new rule of broad application beyond the application of the cited authorities to the facts of these appeals.