R v Hope (2025): When No Voluntary Desistance, There Is No Presumption of a Lower Sentence for Attempted Offences

R v Hope (2025): When No Voluntary Desistance, There Is No Presumption of a Lower Sentence for Attempted Offences

1. Introduction

R v Hope ([2025] EWCA Crim 855) required the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) to review an 11-year 2-month extended sentence imposed on Paul Hope for:

  • Attempting to cause grievous bodily harm (GBH) with intent, contrary to s 1(1) Criminal Attempts Act 1981.
  • Breach of a restraining order (erroneously cited under s 5(5) Protection from Harassment Act 1997, now correctly s 363(1) Sentencing Act 2020).

The appeal centred on three propositions:

  1. The judge failed to reduce the sentence to reflect that the GBH was attempted, not completed.
  2. The three-year upward adjustment for aggravation was excessive.
  3. The judge wrongly concluded that no mitigation existed beyond the guilty plea.
Mrs Justice Thornton, giving the single judgment, dismissed the appeal (grounds 1 and 3) and refused permission on ground 2. In so doing, the Court crystallised an important sentencing principle: where the defendant’s attack only stops because the victim became unconscious (i.e. there was no voluntary desistance), the ordinary expectation that an “attempt” attracts a lower sentence can be displaced.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • The statutory mis-description of the breach offence was corrected per the transitional provisions in Sch 27 Sentencing Act 2020, following R v Jowett [2022] EWCA Crim 629.
  • The sentencing judge’s categorisation—culpability A, harm category 3—was upheld.
  • No automatic discount was required for “attempt” given the absence of voluntary desistance and the severity of the actual injuries.
  • Aggravating features (domestic context, breach of a court order, previous violence, recent release on licence, use of asphyxiation and weapons) justified the uplift beyond guideline range.
  • Difficult childhood was noted but rightly outweighed by aggravation.
  • Extended sentence for dangerousness remained intact.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Statutory Framework

“Reference in a document to a repealed provision is to be read as a reference to the re-enacted provision.” — Sch 27 ¶4 Sentencing Act 2020
Authority / InstrumentRelevance
R v Jowett [2022] EWCA Crim 629 Provided the procedural mechanism for correcting statutory mis-citations under the 2020 Sentencing Code. Applied to amend the indictment wording for the breach offence.
Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1(1) Defines liability for attempted offences. The general principle (“attempt usually lower than completed offence”) emanates from case-law applying this section.
Sentencing Council Guideline: Assault (including Attempted GBH) 2021 Sets culpability/harm matrices and starting points. Judge used culpability A / harm 3 (starting point 5 years).
Sentencing Council Guideline: Strangulation and Suffocation 2023 Highlights seriousness of repeated strangulation (starting point 2 years 6 months). The Court relied on this to show the inherent gravity of the conduct.
Protection from Harassment Act 1997; Sentencing Act 2020 s 363(1) Creates the offence of breaching a restraining order; exemplifies the need for courts to mark disrespect of court orders.

Although not explicitly cited, the Court’s discussion echoes older authority (e.g., Whybrow [1951] QB 135; Geddes [1996] Cr App R) where “attempt” discounts depend on how close the defendant came to completion and whether desistance was voluntary. Hope reinforces this line in the domestic-violence context.

3.2 Core Legal Reasoning

  1. No voluntary desistance. The appellant stopped only because the victim lost consciousness. This removed the primary moral justification for discounting attempt-based sentences.
  2. Harm already grave. Loss of consciousness, extensive bruising and use of cocktail sticks arguably placed the offence near category 2 harm; the judge’s category 3 assessment was already lenient.
  3. Aggravating features.
    • Breach of a restraining order intended to protect the very victim.
    • Domestic context: victim was the defendant’s mother, enhancing breach of trust.
    • Recent release on licence; prior violent convictions.
    • Use of a knife and prolonged, repeated strangulation.
    Taken together, these justified pushing the sentence “outside range”.
  4. Dangerousness finding. Extended sentence under Criminal Justice Act 2003 ss 226A-B was upheld; the risk of serious harm on future release remained high.
  5. Mitigation. Although the appellant had a deprived upbringing, this factor could not outweigh the multiplicity and weight of aggravating factors.

3.3 Potential Impact on Future Cases

  • Sentencing for Attempts. Hope narrows the perceived gap between completed and attempted offences where the defendant is thwarted only by circumstance or victim incapacity. Practitioners should be slow to assume an “automatic” one-third discount for attempts.
  • Domestic Violence & Strangulation. Citing the 2023 strangulation guideline in an attempted GBH appeal signals the Court’s readiness to treat strangulation as an aggravating anchor even when charged differently. Expect higher sentences where strangulation is present.
  • Administrative Corrections. The reaffirmation of Sch 27 Sentencing Act 2020 simplifies rectifying charging-sheet errors. Courts can, and should, make on-the-record corrections without jeopardising conviction safety.
  • Extended Sentences. The judgment underscores that an extended licence can remain despite successful arguments on individual sentence lengths, provided the offender’s future risk is demonstrably high.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Attempt vs Completed Offence
An “attempt” is an incomplete crime accompanied by intent. Normally, it merits a lower penalty because the harm is less or the offender voluntarily stopped. Hope clarifies that lack of voluntary stopping can neutralise that reduction.
Voluntary Desistance
Stopping out of choice rather than because of outside forces. Courts reward true remorse-based stopping; they do not where assault ends only because the victim is unconscious or help arrives.
Extended Sentence (s 226A Criminal Justice Act 2003)
Comprises a custodial term plus an “extension period” on licence for public protection when the offender is deemed dangerous.
Culpability & Harm Categories
Culpability A = planned, weapon used, high blame.
Harm Category 1–3 = descending scale of seriousness under the Guideline. Category 3 captures “really serious harm not amounting to permanent injury”.
Transitional Provisions (Sch 27 Sentencing Act 2020)
Parliament’s mechanism to ensure that references to repealed legislation are treated as references to the new Code, preventing technical collapses of convictions.

5. Conclusion

R v Hope establishes a clear proposition: the mere label “attempt” does not guarantee a lighter sentence where the defendant’s conduct would have continued to completion but for external factors, especially in a domestic-violence context involving strangulation and weapons. The Court’s willingness to treat prolonged strangulation and breach of protective orders as pivotal aggravators, coupled with the administrative clarity on correcting statutory mis-citations, will influence prosecutorial charging, defence submissions, and judicial sentencing in violent-crime cases. Practitioners should henceforth calibrate plea advice and submissions with Hope in mind: absent genuine voluntary desistance, the sentencing court may justifiably impose penalties approaching those for completed offences.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

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