R v Hamad [2025] EWCA Crim 1503: Escort Status of Complainant and “Borderline” Dangerousness in Extended Sentences for Sexual Offences

R v Hamad [2025] EWCA Crim 1503: Escort Status of Complainant and “Borderline” Dangerousness in Extended Sentences for Sexual Offences

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in Hamad, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 1503, a renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence. The case concerns a man convicted after trial of:

  • Assault by penetration (count 1), and
  • Intentional strangulation (count 2).

The applicant received an extended determinate sentence (“EDS”) of 12 years (7-year custodial term plus a 5-year extended licence) for the assault by penetration, with a concurrent 18 months’ imprisonment for intentional strangulation.

On renewal to the full Court after refusal by the single judge, the Court of Appeal upheld the sentence and refused leave. The judgment, while brief, is significant in three main respects:

  1. It makes explicit that the complainant’s status as an escort is legally irrelevant to the seriousness of sexual offending and cannot be relied on to reduce sentence.
  2. It confirms that a case described in the pre-sentence report as “borderline” for dangerousness may nevertheless properly justify an extended sentence, particularly where there is an escalation in seriousness and entrenched attitudes to consent.
  3. It emphasises that ordinary delay in proceedings, in the absence of particular prejudice, will not materially affect sentence for serious sexual offences.

The decision thus consolidates existing principles on dangerousness and extended sentences, and firmly rejects any suggestion that sex-working status diminishes the gravity of a sexual offence.

2. Background and Facts

2.1 The Incident

The complainant, a Spanish national working as an escort, was booked by an agency to attend the applicant’s address on 7 April 2023. She was driven there by an agency driver, who remained outside. The complainant’s anonymity is protected under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992.

Key features of the facts (paras 5–10) include:

  • The applicant repeatedly asked her age and commented he “really liked young girls”.
  • He led her into a dark, apparently derelict flat, stating there was no light.
  • After some preliminary conversation, and despite her clear anxiety and attempt to leave (“I left something in the car”), he:
    • Pushed her against a wall and ripped her one-piece outfit.
    • Penetrated her vagina with his fingers against her will, despite attempts to resist.
    • Pushed her to the floor, continuing the assault and placing his hand on her throat, amounting to intentional strangulation.
  • She tried to call her agency, screamed for help, and managed to open the flat door.
  • The applicant pulled her back by her hair and jacket on the stairs as she tried to flee; she eventually escaped and ran down the stairs.
  • Later, after seeing him leave the block, the complainant struck him in the face with a perfume bottle.

Following the incident, she reported:

  • Foot pain, and
  • A burning sensation in her vagina.

2.2 The Applicant’s Response

Police attended shortly before 2 a.m. They found the applicant nearby with a laceration on his cheek. He claimed to have fallen. In interview:

  • He claimed memory loss due to alcohol.
  • He said that, as far as he knew, no one had come to his house that night.
  • When charged, he commented: “This isn't even a sexual offence. That girl is an escort. I was drunk.” (para 11).

This last remark later featured in the sentencing judge’s assessment of his attitudes to consent and victim empathy.

2.3 Pre-sentence Report and Risk Assessment

The pre-sentence report (PSR) recorded (paras 12–13):

  • Previous convictions for:
    • Robbery,
    • Using threatening words and behaviour, and
    • Possession of an offensive weapon.
  • The current offences marked a clear escalation in seriousness.
  • He showed:
    • A lack of regard for consent,
    • Distorted thinking around sex,
    • Concerns about his ability to form appropriate relationships, and
    • Lack of consequential thinking and victim empathy.

Critically, the report assessed him as:

“a high risk of sexual harm to adult women” and, although describing the case as “borderline” for dangerousness, the author concluded that he had the potential to plan and commit a further serious sexual offence and thus did satisfy the dangerousness criteria.

3. Sentencing at First Instance

3.1 Guideline Starting Point and Aggravation

For the offence of assault by penetration, the judge applied the Sentencing Council guideline. He treated the case as Category 2B (para 14), which involves:

  • Category 2: relating to harm (physical or psychological), and
  • Category B: relating to culpability (level of blameworthiness, including features such as use of force).

From the guideline starting point of 6 years’ custody, the judge:

  • Identified aggravating factors:
    • The separate conviction on count 2 for intentional strangulation, and
    • His previous convictions, including for violence and weapons (para 15).
  • After weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, increased the custodial term to 7 years (para 14).

3.2 Dangerousness and Extended Sentence

The judge then considered dangerousness (paras 13, 16). Under section 279 of the Sentencing Act 2020, if an offender is:

  • Convicted of a specified offence (which assault by penetration is), and
  • Assessed as dangerous (i.e. presenting a significant risk of serious harm by further specified offences),

the court may impose an extended determinate sentence (EDS), adding an extended licence period to manage that risk.

The judge concluded that:

“there is a serious risk, a significant risk, of serious harm being occasioned by the commission of further specified offences, and I am of that opinion.”

He relied on:

  • His own observation of the applicant giving evidence,
  • The PSR,
  • The applicant’s complete lack of remorse or recognition of the seriousness of what he had done, and
  • The revealing attitude encapsulated in “This isn't a sexual offence because she's an escort.”

He further noted that “it remains uncertain when you will be rehabilitated and safe to release” (para 16).

Having considered whether a normal determinate sentence would suffice, the judge held it would not, and imposed a 5-year extended licence, producing the 12-year EDS.

4. The Appeal: Grounds and Decision

4.1 Grounds Advanced

On behalf of the applicant, Mr Tony Montgomery argued (para 17) that the sentence was:

  • Manifestly excessive, given:
    • His age (36) and lack of relevant sexual antecedents,
    • The context of the offence (against an escort),
    • The “short-lived nature” of the incident, and
    • The claimed “relative lack of distress” to the victim.
  • That the judge failed adequately (or at all) to reflect delay in the proceedings.

4.2 Reasons of the Single Judge

The single judge had refused leave, giving three key reasons (para 18):

  1. The trial judge was “well-placed” to assess seriousness. The facts that:
    • The complainant was an escort,
    • She later attacked the applicant, and
    • The applicant had previously paid escorts without incident,

    did not detract from seriousness. The first instance judge had fairly considered all matters in ground 1.

  2. Any delay was not inordinate and was unlikely to make a material difference to sentence, given the gravity of the offending.
  3. The nature of the offending, combined with the applicant’s post-offence comments, entitled the judge to find him dangerous, justifying an extended sentence.

4.3 Court of Appeal’s Conclusion

The full Court essentially adopted the single judge’s reasoning (paras 19–20):

“It is sufficient for us to indicate that we agree with the single judge and with the reasons which she expressed.”

The renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence was therefore refused.

5. Analysis of the Judgment

5.1 Precedents and Legal Framework

The judgment itself cites only statutes and guidelines, not decided cases. However, it operates clearly within a well-established framework of authorities on dangerousness and extended sentences. The relevant sources include:

  • Sentencing Act 2020, particularly s.279 on extended sentences for specified offences.
  • The Sentencing Council guideline on assault by penetration (effective under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009).
  • Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992, ensuring victim anonymity.
  • Case law on dangerousness and extended sentences (under the old Criminal Justice Act 2003 and now consolidated into the Sentencing Act 2020), notably:
    • R v Lang [2005] EWCA Crim 2864 – setting out the structured approach to assessing “dangerousness” and the need for a significant risk of serious harm.
    • R v Johnson and subsequent authorities – emphasising that dangerousness is a forward-looking, risk-based assessment.

Although these authorities are not named in the judgment, the reasoning is entirely consistent with them: the judge assessed:

  • The nature and circumstances of the current offence,
  • The applicant’s previous history, and
  • The contents of the pre-sentence report,

to determine whether there existed a significant risk of serious harm from future offences.

Similarly, the Court’s approach to delay and to the irrelevance of the complainant’s occupation fits comfortably within existing principles:

  • Delay generally mitigates sentence only where:
    • It is exceptional or inordinate, and/or
    • It has caused particular hardship or prejudice to the offender.
  • Sex workers (escorts, prostitutes) are recognised as equally entitled to protection from violence and sexual assault, and it is established that they do not consent to any and all sexual touching; consent must be specific, ongoing and freely given for each act.

5.2 Escort Status as Irrelevant to Seriousness

An important confirmatory point in this case is the explicit rejection of any diminution in seriousness because the complainant was an escort:

  • The applicant’s own remark – “This isn't even a sexual offence. That girl is an escort.” – reflects the very attitude the law rejects: that sex workers’ bodily autonomy is somehow less worthy of respect.
  • The single judge stressed that:
    • The fact that the victim was an escort,
    • Her later physical retaliation against the applicant, and
    • The applicant’s previous uneventful engagements with escorts,
    did not reduce the seriousness of the conduct (para 18(a)).

The Court of Appeal’s endorsement of this view (para 19) underscores and reaffirms a central principle of sexual offences law: all persons, including sex workers, are entitled to the full protection of the criminal law in relation to consent, violence, and sexual autonomy. Nothing about a person’s occupation licences or mitigates sexual assault.

Practically, this means:

  • Defence submissions that “it was only an escort” will find no traction in sentence appeals.
  • Judges are entitled – and expected – to treat such comments as aggravating of risk, insofar as they reveal distorted attitudes to consent.

5.3 Dangerousness and “Borderline” Cases

A central feature is the way the Court treats a PSR which described the case as:

“a borderline case as far as dangerousness is concerned, but … [he] does, in my view, satisfy the dangerousness criteria.” (para 13)

Dangerousness in this context means that the offender presents a significant risk of serious harm to members of the public through the commission of further specified offences. The decision shows:

  • A case can be borderline yet still lawfully justify an extended sentence, provided:
    • The court, having regard to all material (offence, history, PSR), is positively satisfied the criteria are met.
  • The PSR is advisory, not determinative; the judge is not bound by its precise classification.
  • Qualitative features carry weight:
    • Escalation from prior violence/property offending to serious sexual violence;
    • Misogynistic or dismissive attitudes (“she’s an escort, so it’s not really sexual offending”);
    • Total lack of remorse or insight;
    • Uncertainty as to when, if at all, the offender might be safe to release.

Thus, the Court of Appeal’s acceptance of the extended sentence despite the “borderline” language confirms:

Where the overall picture demonstrates a significant risk of serious sexual harm, a judge may properly impose an extended determinate sentence even if the risk assessment is described as borderline.

This will be important for sentencing judges confronted with ambivalent or finely balanced risk assessments: they are permitted – indeed required – to form their own judgment based on:

  • Observations of the offender (in evidence),
  • Nature and escalation of offending,
  • Attitudes revealed in interviews and behaviour, and
  • Expert and probation assessments.

5.4 Delay and Its Limited Mitigating Effect

Mr Montgomery argued that the judge failed to account adequately for delay. The Court, concurring with the single judge, held (para 18(b)) that:

  • The delay was not inordinate, and
  • Given the seriousness of the offending, it was unlikely to make a material difference to sentence.

This reflects existing principles:

  • Routine delay in bringing a serious sexual case to trial, without evidence of exceptional hardship or prejudice, does not usually warrant a substantial reduction in length of sentence.
  • In serious sexual and violent offending, public protection and punishment typically outweigh the limited mitigation provided by ordinary delay.

Practitioners should note that arguments based only on the passage of time, without more (for example, demonstrable impact on mental health well beyond that caused by the offence, or drastically changed personal circumstances over many years), will tend to be given little weight in serious sexual cases.

5.5 The Role of the Complainant’s Retaliation

An unusual feature was the complainant striking the applicant in the face with a perfume bottle after the incident. Defence submissions sought to rely on this and the prior escort–client relationship as mitigating.

The single judge expressly rejected this, and the Court agreed:

  • The complainant’s post-offence act of retaliation does not diminish the seriousness of the prior sexual assault and strangulation.
  • Sentencing focuses on the offender’s conduct and risk, not on whether the victim retaliated or expressed anger afterwards.

This is important to avoid subtle “victim-blaming” in sentencing arguments and ensures that emotional or physical reactions by victims post-offence do not reduce culpability of the offender.

6. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

6.1 Assault by Penetration

Under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, assault by penetration involves:

  • Intentionally penetrating the vagina or anus of another person with a part of the body or anything else;
  • The penetration being sexual in nature;
  • The complainant not consenting; and
  • The defendant not reasonably believing that the complainant consents.

It is treated as one of the most serious non-penetrative-by-penis sexual offences, often attracting sentences close to rape in severity.

6.2 Intentional Strangulation

“Intentional strangulation” is a relatively new specific offence (introduced via the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, creating a new strangulation offence in the Serious Crime Act 2015). It targets:

  • Intentional strangling or suffocation of another
  • Without requiring proof of serious injury.

Its creation recognises that strangulation is often used as a method of coercion and control, with a high risk of serious or fatal outcomes, even where visible injuries are minimal.

6.3 Extended Determinate Sentence (EDS)

An extended determinate sentence under the Sentencing Act 2020 applies where:

  • The offender is convicted of a specified sexual or violent offence;
  • The court assesses them as “dangerous” i.e. presenting a significant risk of serious harm to members of the public from further specified offences; and
  • The seriousness of the offence(s) justifies a substantial custodial term.

The EDS has two parts:

  1. Custodial term: the time actually spent in prison.
  2. Extended licence period: a longer-than-normal period on licence in the community after release, during which the offender can be recalled to prison if they breach conditions or pose renewed risk.

In Hamad:

  • Custodial term: 7 years
  • Extended licence: 5 years

6.4 Dangerousness

“Dangerousness” is a legal term of art. It does not mean the offender is “generally dangerous” in everyday language. Instead, it asks:

Does the offender present a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission of further specified offences?

In making that assessment, courts consider:

  • Current offence(s): how serious? how violent? any sexual element?
  • Past convictions: pattern or escalation?
  • Behaviour and attitudes: remorse, insight, empathy, attitudes to women/sex/violence.
  • Professional assessments: PSRs, psychological/psychiatric reports.

In this case, despite no previous sexual offending, the court was satisfied that:

  • Escalation from violence/weapons to serious sexual violence with strangulation;
  • Minimisation and denial (no memory, “not really sexual” because she was an escort); and
  • Lack of empathy or remorse,

collectively demonstrated a significant risk of serious sexual harm.

6.5 “Manifestly Excessive” Sentence

On sentence appeal, the test is not simply whether the Court of Appeal would have passed a different sentence. Instead, a sentence is quashed or reduced only if it is:

  • Wrong in principle (for example, misapplication of guidelines, or unlawful structure), or
  • Manifestly excessive – so high that it falls outside the range of sentences a reasonable judge could properly impose.

Here, the Court of Appeal found:

  • The sentencing judge applied the correct guideline starting point.
  • He properly took into account aggravating factors and assessed dangerousness.
  • The resulting 7-year custodial term plus 5-year extension was well within the reasonable range for such serious, escalated sexual offending.

7. Impact on Future Cases and the Law

7.1 Sexual Offences Against Escorts and Sex Workers

While consistent with existing law, the case provides a clear and recent Court of Appeal authority confirming:

  • The status of the complainant as an escort has no mitigating effect on seriousness.
  • Arguments suggesting that consent is somehow broader or assumed because of sex work are not only rejected but may be treated as indicative of distorted and dangerous attitudes to consent.

For prosecuting authorities, this decision:

  • Supports firm resistance to attempts to “downgrade” seriousness by reference to a complainant’s occupation.
  • Encourages the use of defendants’ own comments (e.g. about escorts or sex workers) as relevant to risk and dangerousness.

7.2 Borderline Dangerousness and Judicial Discretion

The judgment clarifies that:

  • A PSR describing a case as “borderline” does not preclude an extended sentence.
  • The sentencing judge’s own assessment, based on:
    • Observation of the offender,
    • Nature of the offence, and
    • Escalation and attitudes,
    can justify a finding of dangerousness.

This may have a practical effect of:

  • Increasing judicial confidence in imposing EDS where risk is high but experts express some hesitation.
  • Limiting scope for sentence appeals arguing that “borderline” wording should have led to a standard determinate sentence instead.

7.3 Limited Role of Delay in Serious Sexual Sentencing

The brief treatment of delay reinforces that:

  • In serious sexual offences involving penetration and violence, routine or moderate delay without exceptional features rarely justifies a meaningful reduction.
  • Appeals based on delay alone, in such cases, are unlikely to succeed.

7.4 Evidential Value of Attitudes and Comments

The sentencing judge’s emphasis on the applicant’s comment that the offence was not “even a sexual offence” because the complainant was an escort shows that:

  • Courts treat expressed attitudes to the victim and to consent as probative of:
    • Remorse (or lack thereof),
    • Insight, and
    • Future risk.
  • Hostile, dismissive or dehumanising language may legitimately contribute to a finding of dangerousness and to an extended sentence.

8. Conclusion

R v Hamad [2025] EWCA Crim 1503, though procedurally a refusal of renewed leave to appeal sentence, makes several important points clear:

  1. Sex workers’ equal protection: A complainant’s status as an escort is wholly irrelevant to the seriousness of sexual offending and cannot mitigate sentence. Comments to the contrary may themselves support an adverse assessment of risk.
  2. Borderline dangerousness can still justify EDS: Where the totality of evidence supports a significant risk of serious sexual harm, an extended determinate sentence under s.279 Sentencing Act 2020 is lawful and appropriate, notwithstanding a PSR’s description of the case as borderline.
  3. Importance of attitudes and remorse: Lack of remorse, denial, and distorted beliefs about consent are central in assessing dangerousness and future risk.
  4. Delay has limited weight in serious sexual cases: Ordinary delay, without more, does not significantly reduce the proper sentence for serious sexual and violent offending.

In the broader legal landscape, the case acts as a firm reminder that:

  • Sex workers are fully entitled to bodily integrity and legal protection;
  • Judges remain empowered to impose extended sentences in finely balanced (“borderline”) dangerousness cases where the risk is, on a careful assessment, significant;
  • Appeals on the basis that such sentences are manifestly excessive will rarely succeed if the sentencing judge has closely followed guidelines and articulated a rational assessment of risk.

Hamad therefore reinforces key principles at the intersection of sexual offences, dangerousness, and the treatment of sex-working complainants, and will likely be cited as a succinct authority confirming that escort status is legally irrelevant to the gravity of non-consensual sexual conduct and to the proper protection of the public through extended sentences.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

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