Introduction

In R v Godlova [2025] EWCA Crim 1296, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), per Lewis LJ, allowed an appeal against sentence by a young adult offender who had received 24 weeks’ detention in a young offender institution for two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (ABH). Although the sentencing judge accepted that there was a realistic prospect of rehabilitation and acknowledged the offender’s youth and troubled background, he nevertheless concluded that “the only appropriate punishment can be achieved by custody” and refused to suspend the sentence.

The appeal presented two tightly focused grounds: (i) the sentencing judge did not properly take into account the appellant’s personal mitigation—immaturity, deprived background, and mental health difficulties—as documented in pre-sentence and psychiatric reports; and (ii) the judge failed to factor that mitigation into the decision whether to suspend. The Court’s decision clarifies how Sentencing Council guidelines—particularly those on offenders with mental disorders and on the imposition of community and custodial sentences—must be applied when deciding whether immediate custody is necessary or whether the sentence can be suspended.

The central legal significance lies in the Court’s insistence that a sentencer must expressly consider how reduced culpability arising from mental disorder and youth bears on the “appropriate punishment” limb of the suspension test. The Court reaffirms that “18 is not a cliff edge,” and that strong personal mitigation and realistic prospects of rehabilitation can, even where the custody threshold is passed, require suspension in order to align punishment with rehabilitative needs and reduced responsibility.

Summary of the Judgment

The appellant, aged 18 at the time of the ABH offences and 19 at sentence, committed assaults during an episode of acute emotional dysregulation at home and later at a police station. She bit her mother (who did not support the prosecution) and later bit a police officer; several assaults on emergency workers also occurred. An earlier incident of group violence eight months before resulted in no separate penalty. She had one prior conviction (at 17) for being drunk and disorderly and assaulting an emergency worker, resulting only in compensation, not punishment.

The judge categorized the ABH counts as culpability B, harm 2 under the assault guideline, with a starting point of 36 weeks’ custody (range: high-level community order to 18 months). He added aggravation for offences committed on police bail (to 40 weeks), then reduced for youth and background (to 36 weeks), and finally applied one-third credit for early guilty pleas, imposing 24 weeks’ detention, concurrent on each ABH. He considered but rejected suspension, citing that only immediate custody would meet the justice of the case.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that:

• The judge erred by not properly factoring the appellant’s strong personal mitigation—youth, mental disorder, trauma history, and impulsive conduct—into the suspension decision.
• There was a realistic prospect of rehabilitation; there was no assessed risk to the public; and there was no history of poor compliance with court orders.
• In those circumstances, and given the reduction in culpability required by the mental disorder guideline, appropriate punishment did not require immediate custody.

The Court substituted a suspended sentence: 24 weeks’ detention suspended for 24 months, with 40 days’ rehabilitation activity requirement (RAR). Given the three weeks already served in custody, the Court declined to add unpaid work, recognizing that the time served had already delivered a degree of punishment.

Analysis

Precedents and Guidance Considered

While the judgment does not cite case authorities by name, it turns on the careful application of three Sentencing Council guidelines and an established principle concerning young adult offenders:

• Assault guideline (ABH): The judge adopted culpability B/harm 2, leading to a 36-week starting point with a potential range from a high-level community order to 18 months’ custody. This framework sets the custodial baseline but is expressly subject to adjustment for aggravation, mitigation, and plea.
• Guideline on offenders with mental disorders, developmental disorders, or neurological impairments: This directs sentencers to assess culpability in light of the offender’s condition, asking whether the disorder contributed to the offence and therefore reduces moral blameworthiness. It also invites consideration of disposals and requirements that enable treatment and rehabilitation.
• Guideline on the imposition of community and custodial sentences: This governs both the custody threshold and the test for suspension. It lists factors indicating that suspension may be inappropriate (e.g., risk to the public; history of poor compliance; where only immediate custody can achieve appropriate punishment) and those indicating that suspension is appropriate (e.g., realistic prospect of rehabilitation; strong personal mitigation; risk of significant harm to others if immediate custody is imposed).
• “No cliff edge at 18”: The judge explicitly referred to the recognized principle that turning 18 does not eliminate the relevance of youth and immaturity. The Court of Appeal’s approach aligns with that established understanding: youth and developmental maturity continue to bear on culpability and on the suitability of a community-based disposal.

Collectively, these normative sources obliged the sentencer to carry forward the reality of reduced culpability and rehabilitative prospects into the question of immediate custody versus suspension.

Legal Reasoning

The Court undertook a structured analysis rooted in the guidelines and the facts:

• Culpability reduction: The psychiatric report identified mental and behavioural disorder with emerging emotionally unstable personality traits, plus longstanding trauma and reliance on negative coping mechanisms. The guideline on mental disorder requires sentencers to reflect such impairment in reduced culpability where it contributed to the offending. The Court concluded that these features did reduce culpability for the ABH offences.
• Youth and immaturity: The appellant was only 18 at the time of the ABH. Youth and lack of maturity are personal mitigation that reduce culpability and speak directly to the choice of a rehabilitative sentence. The judge acknowledged this but did not carry it through to the suspension decision.
• Nature and context of offending: The violence was impulsive and occurred during an emotionally volatile episode, not a pre-planned attack. The Court stressed that the assaults, while serious, needed to be assessed in context—particularly the lashing out during attempts to remove the appellant from her mother’s home and the subsequent dysregulated conduct in custody.
• Suspension criteria properly applied: The guideline’s key factors favoring suspension were present:
  • Realistic prospect of rehabilitation: Affirmed by both the judge and the pre-sentence materials.
  • Strong personal mitigation: Youth, mental disorder, trauma history, and impulsivity.
  • Absence of countervailing factors: No current risk assessment indicating danger to the public and no history of failing to comply with court orders.
  On these facts, the guideline logic pointed toward suspension rather than immediate incarceration.
• “Appropriate punishment” reconsidered: The judge’s assertion that only immediate custody could achieve appropriate punishment was found to be an error in principle. Where culpability is reduced and rehabilitation prospects are good, community-based punishment (including RAR days and, as appropriate, treatment) can achieve punishment and the statutory purposes of sentencing without the disbenefits of short custodial terms—especially for young adults with significant mental health needs.
• Fresh information: The Court had an updated report showing no mental health support had been provided in the young offender institution. Although the judge did not have that information, the Court considered it relevant background, reinforcing that immediate custody was not serving the rehabilitative needs identified by the guideline.
• Modality, not length: Importantly, the Court did not disturb the length of the custodial term (24 weeks after credit). It changed the modality to a suspended sentence for 24 months with 40 RAR days, and deliberately omitted unpaid work because three weeks had already been served in custody—recognizing that punishment had partially been delivered and avoiding double-counting.

Read together, the reasoning insists on a linked, not siloed, approach to guideline application: the culpability reduction demanded by the mental disorder guideline must be carried through to the suspension decision rather than parked at the earlier categorization stage.

Impact and Future Application

The decision has several important implications for sentencing practice:

• Young adults with mental disorders: Courts must explicitly analyze how mental disorder and immaturity reduce culpability and then ask how that reduction alters the “appropriate punishment” inquiry when deciding whether to suspend. This case underlines that immediate custody is not the default for short custodial terms involving impulsive violence by young adults in crisis.
• Suspension when custody threshold is passed: Even where the assault guideline indicates a custodial starting point, suspension may be mandated by the combination of reduced culpability, realistic rehabilitation prospects, and an absence of risk or compliance concerns. This re-balances emphasis away from a punitive reflex towards principled, guideline-driven calibration.
• Assaults on emergency workers: While serious, such offending still demands contextual analysis. The decision reminds courts not to elide the existence of such counts with an inexorable need for immediate custody—especially when the lead offences are ABH and the AEW counts attract no separate penalty within a proper totality approach.
• Practical sentencing architecture: The Court’s refusal to impose unpaid work in light of time already served highlights a pragmatic approach to proportionality. Sentencers should consider how pre-appeal custody or remand interacts with community-based requirements to avoid disproportionate double-punishment.
• Availability and efficacy of support in custody: Although not determinative, the Court took note of the lack of mental health support in the young offender institution. This may encourage sentencers to consider, where evidence permits, whether viable and timely interventions are more realistically deliverable in the community when weighing suspension.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (ABH): A criminal offence where the victim suffers injuries more than transient or trifling; commonly charged under section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Here, biting injuries amounted to ABH.
• Assault on an emergency worker (AEW): An offence reflecting the special status of emergency workers (e.g., police), often aggravating seriousness; but sentencing must still observe totality and avoid double punishment.
• Culpability and harm categories: Sentencing Council assault guidelines assess the offender’s blameworthiness (culpability) and the seriousness of the impact/injury (harm) to determine a starting point and range for sentence.
• Mental disorder guideline: Requires courts to ask whether the offender’s condition contributed to the commission of the offence. If so, the offender’s culpability is reduced; this can affect sentence length and type (e.g., enabling community-based interventions).
• Custody threshold: The point at which the offending is so serious that only a custodial sentence is justified. Passing the threshold does not automatically require immediate custody; the sentence may be suspended if criteria are met.
• Suspended sentence: A custodial sentence that is not activated immediately. The offender remains in the community under conditions (e.g., rehabilitation activity days). If they breach conditions or reoffend, the custodial term can be activated.
• Rehabilitation Activity Requirement (RAR): A community requirement obliging the offender to complete rehabilitative activities up to a specified number of days, typically tailored to address criminogenic needs (e.g., mental health and coping strategies).
• “18 is not a cliff edge”: A shorthand principle that turning 18 does not erase youth-related mitigation. Courts still assess maturity, impulsivity, and developmental factors when sentencing young adults.
• “Appropriate punishment” test for suspension: Under the imposition guideline, a court may deem suspension inappropriate if only immediate custody can achieve appropriate punishment. Godlova clarifies that reduced culpability and strong mitigation may mean appropriate punishment can be achieved with a suspended sentence and community-based measures.

Key Principles Clarified by Godlova

• Reduced culpability from mental disorder and youth must be expressly carried into the decision whether to suspend a custodial sentence, not confined to earlier categorization stages.
• Where there is a realistic prospect of rehabilitation, strong personal mitigation, no assessed risk to the public, and no history of poor compliance, suspension will often be appropriate even if the custody threshold is passed.
• The “appropriate punishment can only be achieved by immediate custody” conclusion requires careful justification. In cases of reduced culpability, community-based punishment with rehabilitative requirements may adequately and more proportionately meet the statutory purposes of sentencing.
• Time already served in custody should be considered when setting additional community requirements upon suspension, to avoid disproportionate duplication of punitive burdens.

Practical Guidance

For Sentencers

• Apply the mental disorder guideline to assess and record how culpability is reduced.
• Carry that reduction into the suspension analysis under the imposition guideline; do not treat suspension as a discrete or detached step.
• Make explicit findings on the suspension factors: risk to the public; history of compliance; rehabilitation prospects; strength of personal mitigation; any significant harm to others from immediate custody.
• Consider whether community-based interventions (e.g., RAR; treatment requirements where feasible) can credibly deliver punishment and rehabilitation, especially for young adults.
• Account for any time already served when calibrating additional community requirements to avoid disproportionate overall punishment.

For Defence Practitioners

• Ground the mental health/trauma evidence in the mental disorder guideline: show causative contribution to offending and how this reduces culpability.
• Propose a structured, realistic community plan (treatment access, RAR activities, accommodation) to evidence a credible prospect of rehabilitation.
• Address risk and compliance proactively; highlight absence of prior non-compliance and any positive indicators.
• If there has been time served pre-appeal, invite the court to reflect this in the design of community requirements to avoid double-punishment.

Conclusion

Godlova refines the practical application of Sentencing Council guidelines at the juncture where courts decide between immediate custody and suspension. It reinforces that reduced culpability from mental disorder and youth is not a marginal consideration but a central determinant in the “appropriate punishment” assessment. Where, as here, realistic prospects of rehabilitation coexist with strong personal mitigation and no risk or compliance obstacles, suspension will often be the principled outcome even after the custody threshold is crossed.

The decision also models proportionality in tailoring community requirements once a suspended sentence is chosen, taking account of time already served. Its broader signal is unmistakable: for young adults whose offending is closely intertwined with mental ill-health and immaturity, the sentencing focus must integrate punishment with rehabilitation, and in many such cases, community-based orders—rather than short terms of immediate custody—will better serve justice and public protection over the long term.

Note: The judgment refers to considering “grounds 1 and 12 together,” which is plainly a typographical error for “grounds 1 and 2.”