R v Edney [2025] EWCA Crim 1247: Mental Disorder, Sentencing Guidelines and the Threshold for Extended Sentences in Online Child Grooming Cases

1. Introduction

R v Edney [2025] EWCA Crim 1247 is a significant decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) on the proper approach to sentencing offenders with recognised mental disorders or neurodevelopmental conditions for sexual offences involving online grooming and attempted meetings with underage children.

The case concerns a transgender woman, aged 30 at sentence, who pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Lewes to:

• Two counts of attempting to engage in sexual communication with a child (counts 1 and 3), and
• Two counts of attempting to meet a girl under 16 following grooming (counts 2 and 4).

The offending arose from so-called “paedophile hunter” operations where adult volunteers created fake social media profiles of underage girls and engaged with suspected groomers. The appellant communicated in explicitly sexual terms with what she believed to be 13- and 14-year-old girls and then attempted to meet them; on the second occasion she arrived with handcuffs and a self-defence spray.

At first instance, the judge imposed an extended sentence of 9 years on count 4 (4 years’ custody plus a 5-year extended licence), with shorter concurrent terms on the remaining counts. On appeal:

• The Court refused to extend time to appeal conviction and confirmed that the guilty pleas were safe; but
• It granted an extension of time and leave to appeal sentence, ultimately quashing the extended sentence and substituting a determinate sentence of 3 years and 2 months.

The decision is most important for:

• Clarifying the sequence of analysis in sentencing where an extended sentence is contemplated;
• Emphasising the central role of the Sentencing Council Guideline on Mental Disorders, Developmental Disorders or Neurological Impairments (“the Mental Disorders Guideline”) at step 1 of sentencing; and
• Restating the principle that the involvement of “decoy” children does not negate criminal liability but may warrant a measured reduction in sentence.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Outcome on Conviction

The Court refused a 211-day extension of time to appeal against conviction and dismissed the conviction appeal.

The appellant alleged that:

• She had been “coerced” into offending by paedophile hunters; and
• She had been coerced into pleading guilty by her solicitors.

She further argued that:

• The evidence was “false” because there were no real children involved; and
• Her autism and learning difficulties meant she did not understand right from wrong.

The Court held (agreeing with the Single Judge) that:

• There was no arguable entrapment or fabrication of evidence;
• The appellant was fit to plead and understood the wrongfulness of her conduct;
• A guilty plea, advised upon but ultimately made by the appellant, was not forced; and
• The use of decoy children affects sentence but not criminal liability.

Accordingly, there was no merit in the conviction appeal and no justification for extending time.

2.2 Outcome on Sentence

By contrast, the Court found that the original sentencing exercise contained material errors:

• The judge appeared to have started from an assumption that an extended sentence was necessary because of dangerousness;
• He did not clearly show how he applied the Sentencing Council offence-specific guidelines and the Mental Disorders Guideline to arrive at a “just and proportionate” custodial term; and
• The path from the guideline starting point to a notional sentence of 5 years (reduced to 4 with 20% credit) was insufficiently explained and appeared excessive once the appellant’s reduced culpability was fully factored in.

The Court of Appeal therefore:

• Re-did the sentencing exercise, explicitly applying:
  • The guideline for meeting a child following grooming;
  • The guideline for sexual communication with a child;
  • The Mental Disorders Guideline; and
  • The Totality Guideline.
• Concluded that properly applying those guidelines produced:
  • A total after-trial sentence of no more than 4 years; and
  • After 20% credit for plea, a sentence of 3 years and 2 months.
• Held that, because the “just and proportionate” custodial term was below 4 years, the statutory threshold for an extended sentence was not met, despite the real risk to the public.

The extended sentence on count 4 was quashed and replaced by a determinate sentence of 3 years and 2 months, with all other sentences and orders left undisturbed.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, a transgender woman with long-term learning disability and autism, was living in supported accommodation with supervised internet access. Despite restrictions, she secretly saved money to purchase a second-hand laptop to access the internet unsupervised.

Two separate episodes of offending occurred, each involving:

• A decoy social media profile of a purported teenage girl; and
• Explicit sexual messaging followed by an attempt to meet.

First episode (CG – 13-year-old decoy)

In May 2022, the appellant contacted “Charlotte Grey” (CG), a fake Facebook profile set up by a child protection team “Secrets and Lies Confronted” depicting a 13-year-old girl. CG immediately indicated she was 13. Over the following week:

• The appellant represented herself as a support worker and CEO;
• She invited CG for McDonald’s and to stay at her house;
• She instructed CG what to wear (including school uniform and no underwear when they met);
• She discussed sexual acts in graphic terms, including:
  • sexual positions;
  • use of restraints;
  • sex with and without protection; and
  • pregnancy at age 13 being “okay”;
• She requested sexualised images, including in underwear and of CG’s breasts and genitals; and
• She said she could not wait to “shag” her.

On 14 May 2022, she attended a meeting believing she would meet CG and was arrested (count 2). She answered “no comment” in interview.

Second episode (ES – 14-year-old decoy)

Months later, using a Facebook profile in the name “Ariana” linked to her by business details, the appellant contacted “Ellie Shooter” (ES), a 14-year-old decoy created by “Predators Exposed Sting Team”. In these communications:

• The appellant claimed to be a bounty hunter and CEO of “Sussex Bail Bonds”;
• She sent a photo wearing a faux police vest, giving an impression of authority;
• She asked ES to be her girlfriend and professed love;
• She requested “sexy pictures” and images of ES in school uniform;
• She discussed what ES would wear for their meeting, again suggesting no underwear; and
• She described sexual positions and sex without condoms.

She was arrested when attempting to meet ES (count 4) and found in possession of handcuffs and a self-defence spray.

Personal and medical background

The pre-sentence report and psychiatric report by Dr Lyall (20 March 2023) painted a complex picture:

• Removal into foster care from age 2 to 15;
• Support from a Community Learning Disability team in adulthood;
• Diagnosed autism (since 2007) and mild to moderate learning disability;
• Very low IQ compared to peers;
• Depression and anxiety, treated with antidepressants;
• Difficulties distinguishing fantasy from reality;
• Restrictions on unsupervised internet use due to lack of capacity.

The appellant told professionals:

• The offences flowed from a “rocky childhood” and the impact of being transgender on her ability to form relationships;
• She had been sexually abused by a man at primary school and felt more attracted to females;
• She “regrettably” chose to “go down the under-16 path”.

Both the probation officer and Dr Lyall assessed her as:

• Motivated by sexual gratification;
• Fully aware that she was dealing with underage, vulnerable individuals;
• At high risk of:
  • similar reoffending;
  • further serious sexual offences; and
  • causing serious harm to children;
• Vulnerable in custody and likely to be bullied and exploited.

Dr Lyall also emphasised the central role of fantasy in her life – e.g., styling herself as a bounty hunter and business owner despite needing a high level of support – with the internet as a key medium for “playing out” those fantasies.

3.2 Legal Framework

3.2.1 Offences: sexual communication and meeting after grooming

The appellant pleaded to:

• Attempting to engage in sexual communication with a child – reflecting sustained sexually explicit messaging to individuals she believed to be aged 13 and 14; and
• Attempting to meet a child under 16 following grooming – by arranging and attending meetings with the same supposed children.

Even though no real children existed (only adult decoys), these remain offences because:

• Attempt liability focuses on the defendant’s intent and acts going beyond mere preparation;
• Impossibility due to the facts (e.g. the “child” being fictional or an adult) does not negate an attempt where the defendant believes the necessary facts exist.

The Court underscores that the “decoy” nature is a sentencing factor (lesser actual harm) but does not affect criminality.

3.2.2 Sentencing Council Guidelines

Four guidelines were central (para 20):

1. The offence-specific guideline for meeting a child following sexual grooming;
2. The offence-specific guideline for sexual communication with a child;
3. The Mental Disorders Guideline (“Sentencing Offenders with Mental Disorders, Developmental Disorders or Neurological Impairments”); and
4. The Totality Guideline.

Offence-specific guidelines generally require the judge to:

1. Assess culpability (Culpability A–D or similar) and harm (Category 1–3);
2. Identify a starting point sentence and a sentencing range; then
3. Adjust up or down for aggravating/mitigating factors.

The Mental Disorders Guideline interacts with these at two stages:

• At Step 1, where an impairment linked to the offending may reduce culpability; and
• At Step 2, where an impairment may still be relevant as mitigation even if not causally linked to culpability.

3.2.3 Dangerousness and extended sentences

Under the Sentencing Code’s “dangerous offender” provisions, an extended determinate sentence (EDS) for certain sexual and violent offences is available only if:

• The offender is assessed as dangerous, i.e. there is a significant risk of serious harm from further specified offences; and
• The “appropriate” custodial term for the index offences, assessed on ordinary principles, is at least 4 years.

The Court in Edney re-emphasises a crucial sequencing rule:

• The judge must first work out the “just and proportionate” custodial term by correctly applying the Sentencing Council guidelines; only then may the court ask whether that term meets the 4-year threshold for an extended sentence.

In other words, concerns about dangerousness must not be used to “inflate” the custodial term in order to reach the extended sentence threshold.

3.3 Application of the Law in Edney

3.3.1 The conviction appeal: voluntariness of the guilty pleas

The Court’s short rejection of the conviction appeal rests on well-established principles:

• Where a defendant is fit to plead and properly advised, a guilty plea is highly determinative of guilt.
• To successfully appeal a conviction following a guilty plea, an appellant must generally show that:
  • The plea was not truly voluntary or informed (e.g. serious pressure, incorrect legal advice, or misunderstanding of the charge); or
  • New evidence fundamentally undermines the factual basis of the plea.

In Edney:

• Expert evidence confirmed she was fit to plead and understood her actions were wrong;
• The solicitor-advocate’s account of advising her on the strength of the case and benefits of a plea was accepted; and
• No credible basis was shown for alleging fabrication of evidence or improper coercion.

The Court also confirms that the absence of real children is no defence to attempt offences, and that any perceived injustice in criminalising such conduct is misconceived.

3.3.2 Errors in the original sentencing exercise

The heart of the case is the Court’s critique of the Crown Court’s sentencing methodology.

The sentencing judge had said (para 19):

“These are very serious offences, and they reveal that you are someone who presents a very serious danger potentially to any teenage girl or young woman, and that means I have to deal with deciding on your sentence in a particular way because I must sentence you in such a way as to try and minimise the risk that this sort of offence will happen again...”

The Court of Appeal interpreted this as showing that the judge began from the premise that an extended sentence was necessary because of future risk, rather than:

1. First working out the appropriate determinate sentence via guidelines; and
2. Then considering whether an extended sentence was statutorily open.

It noted two particular problems:

• Lack of transparency in guideline application: It was “unclear” how the judge arrived at a notional post-trial sentence of 5 years (para 23). Although he correctly categorised the “meeting after grooming” offences (counts 2 and 4) as category 2, the route from the starting point to 5 years was not shown.
• Misuse of the Mental Disorders Guideline: The judge accepted that autism and learning disability reduced culpability (para 21) but did not clearly treat this as a step 1 adjustment to the culpability assessment; instead, it appears he treated the impairment primarily as a general mitigating factor.

In addition, some alleged aggravating factors were, on closer analysis, already baked into the guideline categorisation or were of limited aggravating weight:

• Using a false persona (e.g. claiming a caring/professional role) is inherent in the communications and can be part of the basis for placing the case in a higher culpability category; double-counting is impermissible.
• A “significant age difference” is largely inherent in offences involving adults grooming young teens and will only rarely justify additional uplift.

By contrast, other factors were plainly potent aggravators:

• Committing the second set of offences while under investigation for similar conduct (para 27); and
• Attending the second meeting with handcuffs, indicating preparation for physical control and a potentially more serious encounter.

3.3.3 The Court of Appeal’s re-sentencing exercise

The Court set out the correct structured approach (paras 20–27):

1. Apply offence-specific guidelines to each episode of offending:
   • Counts 1 and 3: sexual communications (grooming element);
   • Counts 2 and 4: attempts to meet after grooming.
2. Integrate the Mental Disorders Guideline at step 1:
   • Ask whether autism and learning disability are linked to the offending in a way that reduces culpability.
   • Decide the extent of this reduction within the culpability/harm structure.
3. Identify:
   • Relevant aggravating factors (e.g. reoffending on bail, handcuffs, persistence, explicit sexual nature); and
   • Relevant mitigating factors (no previous convictions, extreme vulnerability in custody, difficult background, decoy “victims”).
4. Apply the Totality Guideline to the two episodes:
   • Treat communications as the grooming element of the attempts;
   • Avoid double-counting but recognise that the two episodes are distinct and can justify consecutive elements.

The Court concluded that:

• The appellant’s autism and learning difficulties did reduce culpability, but not so drastically as to take the offences out of category 2: they should be seen as at the lower end of that middle category (para 26).
• For the first episode (the earlier set of offences), properly balancing aggravation and mitigation (including mental disorder and decoy victims), a post-trial sentence of more than about 18 months could not be justified (para 27).
• For the second episode, taking into account the added aggravation of committing the offences while under investigation and the possession of handcuffs, together with reduced effect of previous good character, a post-trial sentence of more than about 2½ years was not justified (para 27).
• Consecutively, these produce a total after-trial term of 4 years.
• Applying a 20% guilty plea discount (equivalent to a plea between PTPH and trial, as the judge had allowed), the appropriate custodial term was 3 years and 2 months (para 27).

Crucially:

• This term is below the 4-year minimum threshold for an extended sentence (para 28); and
• Therefore, despite the significant assessed risk of serious further harm, an extended sentence was not legally open to the court.

The Court explicitly acknowledges the risk identified by the probation and psychiatric evidence but stresses that the statutory precondition for an extended sentence cannot be bypassed by artificially increasing the custodial term.

3.4 Precedents and Guideline-based “Precedent”

The judgment, as extracted, does not cite earlier cases by name. Instead, it relies heavily on the Sentencing Council guidelines, which in modern English sentencing practice perform a similar normative role to case-law precedents for determining starting points and structure.

The key “precedent-like” sources are:

• Offence-specific guidelines for:
  • Meeting a child following sexual grooming; and
  • Sexual communication with a child.
• The Mental Disorders Guideline, quoted at length (para 24), which sets out:
  • The need for a careful causal analysis between impairment and offending;
  • The duty of the sentencing judge to make an independent assessment, while “often” valuing expert evidence;
  • The requirement to state clearly whether and to what extent culpability is reduced.
• The Totality Guideline, directing how multiple offences should be sentenced so that the overall sentence is proportionate to the entirety of the criminality.

The Court also applies the statutory framework for extended sentences (dangerous offenders), which requires a just and proportionate custodial term of at least 4 years before an extended licence can be considered.

Although no case-law is directly cited, the approach is aligned with:

• Long-standing authority that impossibility due to factual circumstances (e.g. a decoy child) does not prevent liability for attempts, where the defendant believes the facts to be otherwise; and
• Appellate guidance that Sentencing Council guidelines are to be followed unless it is contrary to the interests of justice to do so, and that any departure must be reasoned.

3.5 Treatment of Mental Disorder, Autism and Learning Disability

A key doctrinal development in Edney is the Court’s insistence on proper integration of the Mental Disorders Guideline into the sentencing exercise.

The Guideline (quoted at para 24) emphasises:

• The need for a causal link between impairment and offending behaviour for culpability to be reduced at step 1;
• The wide range of possible outcomes: from significantly reduced culpability to no impact at all, depending on the facts; and
• The duty of the judge to reach their own conclusion, even if departing (with reasons) from expert assessment.

In this case:

• Autism and learning disability clearly affected:
  • The appellant’s understanding of social cues;
  • Her ability to grasp how her communications were perceived; and
  • The centrality of internet-based fantasy to her emotional life.
• However, she:
  • Engaged in sustained sexual messaging;
  • Knew the purported ages of the “children”;
  • Planned meetings, including saving up for a laptop and bringing handcuffs; and
  • Was assessed as fit to plead and knowing that her conduct was wrong.

The Court therefore held that:

• Culpability was indeed reduced, but within the existing category 2 band (i.e. towards its lower end), rather than enough to push the offending into a wholly lower category (para 26);
• The previous judge erred by effectively treating impairment mainly at step 2 (general mitigation) rather than at step 1 (culpability).

This is more than a technical point. Locating the impact of mental disorder at step 1:

• Directly affects the starting point and range;
• Structures the overall sentencing rationale; and
• Prevents the offender being placed at a culpability level that does not adequately reflect their reduced mental capacity, even if some further mitigation is applied later.

3.6 The Role of “Paedophile Hunters” and Decoy Victims

The appellant heavily criticised the use of evidence from voluntary “paedophile hunter” groups and argued that the absence of real children made the evidence false or inadmissible.

The Court’s response is clear:

• There was no evidence that the communications or attempts to meet were fabricated;
• The fact that the recipients were adult decoys does not undermine the criminality of attempted sexual communication or attempted meeting with a “child” – the law of attempt focuses on intention and steps taken, not on whether the intended victim actually exists as believed;
• This factor rightly informs sentence by attenuating the harm caused, and so can justify a “measured” reduction, but it does not render the conduct lawful.

The Court explicitly treats the absence of real victims as a mitigating factor that must be balanced against:

• The high persistence of the appellant’s conduct;
• The explicit sexual nature of the messages;
• The deliberate arranging of meetings; and
• The planning involved in circumventing internet restrictions.

3.7 Impact and Significance

Edney will likely be cited in future sentencing appeals and Crown Court arguments for several propositions:

• Sequencing extended sentences: Judges must explicitly:
  • Apply offence-specific and mental disorder guidelines to arrive at a just and proportionate custodial term;
  • Only then consider whether:
    • the offender is dangerous; and
    • the custodial term meets or exceeds 4 years.
  The risk of serious harm, however grave, does not entitle a court to “work backwards” from an extended sentence threshold.
• Centrality of the Mental Disorders Guideline: The judgment reinforces that:
  • Culpability reductions due to impairment belong primarily at step 1, not just in step 2 mitigation; and
  • Sentencing remarks must expressly address whether culpability is reduced and by how much, with reasons, especially where expert evidence is available.
• Approach to online decoy cases: The Court confirms the now-settled position that:
  • Decoy operations do not undermine criminal liability for attempted grooming offences; and
  • They properly attract some sentencing reduction for absence of actual child victims, but the reduction is limited where there is clear sexual intent, persistence and planning.
• Sentencing of neurodiverse offenders: The case is likely to be cited by defence and prosecution alike in:
  • Emphasising the need for careful psychiatric assessment of autism and learning disability;
  • Arguing that such conditions can significantly reduce culpability, especially where fantasy and social misunderstanding are central to the offending; yet
  • Recognising that reduced culpability does not automatically equate to low risk of serious harm.
• Judicial transparency in guideline application: The Court’s criticism of the lack of a clear path from the guideline starting point to the final sentence underscores the need for judges to:
  • Show their workings: categorisation, starting point, adjustments for aggravation/mitigation, effect of mental disorder and totality;
  • Ensure that appellate courts can follow the “arithmetical” and evaluative reasoning that leads to the final term.

Finally, the case is a practical reminder that high levels of risk may need to be addressed through:

• Ancillary orders (e.g. notification requirements, Sexual Harm Prevention Orders);
• Multi-agency public protection arrangements; and
• Targeted treatment and supervision in the community,

where the statutory conditions for an extended sentence are not satisfied.

4. Complex Concepts Explained

4.1 Extended Sentences

An extended determinate sentence (EDS) is a type of sentence for certain sexual or violent offences. It consists of:

• A custodial term (as with an ordinary determinate sentence); and
• An additional period of licence (“the extension period”) during which the offender is supervised and can be recalled to prison.

An EDS can only be imposed if:

1. The offence is one of the qualifying sexual/violent offences; and
2. The court finds the offender dangerous, meaning there is a significant risk of serious harm from further specified offences; and
3. The appropriate custodial term for the index offences, assessed on normal guidelines, is at least 4 years.

In Edney, although condition (2) (dangerousness) was arguably met, condition (3) was not, once the Court properly applied the Sentencing Council guidelines, so an extended sentence was unavailable.

4.2 Sentencing Council Guideline Methodology

Most Sentencing Council guidelines follow a structured two-step process:

1. Step 1 – Determining the offence category and starting point:
   • Assess culpability (how blameworthy the offender was – level of planning, exploitation, role, sophistication, etc.);
   • Assess harm (actual harm and risk of harm – impact on victims, vulnerability, number of victims, duration, etc.);
   • Combine those to identify a starting point and a sentencing range.
2. Step 2 – Adjustment for aggravating and mitigating factors:
   • Aggravating factors increase the sentence within the range (e.g. previous similar convictions, offending on bail, use of restraints, grooming, etc.);
   • Mitigating factors reduce it (e.g. young age, helpful admissions, genuine remorse, mental disorder not affecting culpability, vulnerability in prison, no previous convictions).

Where the Mental Disorders Guideline applies, it overlaps with both steps:

• If the impairment is causally linked to the offending, it affects Step 1 (culpability);
• If not directly linked to culpability, it can still be a mitigation at Step 2.

4.3 Mental Disorder and Culpability

“Culpability” refers to the offender’s moral blameworthiness. A mental disorder can:

• Reduce culpability if it:
  • Impairs understanding of the wrongfulness of the conduct;
  • Impairs the ability to control impulses; or
  • Otherwise contributes directly to the decision to offend.
• Have no effect on culpability where the offending is deliberate and purposeful and the offender understands its wrongfulness despite their diagnosis.

In Edney:

• Autism and learning disability clearly contributed to:
  • Fantasy-based self-presentation (e.g. bounty hunter, CEO);
  • Misunderstanding social norms;
  • Reliance on the internet as a fantasy outlet.
• However, there was also intentional, persistent grooming behaviour with clear sexual intent and planning, showing that her understanding of what she was doing and its wrongfulness remained intact.

Accordingly, culpability was reduced within category 2 rather than enough to move the case into a lower category.

4.4 The Totality Principle

The Totality Guideline requires the court, when sentencing for multiple offences, to ensure that:

• The overall sentence is just and proportionate to all the offending taken together; and
• There is no “overloading” by simply adding up separate sentences without recognising overlap in criminality.

Typically:

• Offences forming part of the same incident or course of conduct may attract concurrent sentences; but
• Clearly separate incidents may justify consecutive sentences, subject to totality.

In Edney, the Court:

• Regarded the sexual communications as part of the grooming element of the attempts to meet (overlapping criminality), so they could not significantly increase the sentence beyond what was justified by the meeting counts themselves; but
• Treated the two episodes (earlier and later grooming/meeting) as sufficiently distinct to justify consecutive elements in arriving at the total sentence.

4.5 Attempt and Decoy Victims

Under the law of attempt:

• A person is guilty of an attempt if, with intent to commit an offence, they take steps more than merely preparatory to committing it.
• It is generally no defence that the commission of the full offence was impossible, so long as the defendant believed the requisite facts existed.

In the context of online grooming:

• If a defendant believes they are communicating with a 13-year-old child and arranges a sexual meeting, they can be guilty of attempt offences even if the “child” is in fact an adult decoy or a fictional persona.
• Actual harm (there is none to a real child); and
• Thus, the severity of sentence; but
• Not the underlying criminal liability.

5. Conclusion

R v Edney [2025] EWCA Crim 1247 is a significant appellate decision on the intersection of:

• Online child grooming attempts involving decoy “children”;
• Sentencing of offenders with autism, learning disability and other mental disorders; and
• The lawful use (and limits) of extended determinate sentences for dangerous sexual offenders.

The Court of Appeal:

• Affirmed the safety of convictions obtained by guilty pleas where there is no credible evidence of coercion or fabrication, and where the offender is fit to plead;
• Clarified that the absence of real child victims does not negate attempt offences but is a sentencing factor, warranting only a measured reduction;
• Insisted that the Mental Disorders Guideline be properly used at step 1 to calibrate culpability, not merely as general mitigation; and
• Reasserted that an extended sentence is only available where the correctly calculated “just and proportionate” custodial term is at least 4 years – dangerousness cannot be used to inflate that term.

On the facts, a careful guideline-based re-sentencing exercise led to a total post-plea sentence of 3 years and 2 months, below the extended sentence threshold, even though the appellant remained assessed as a high risk to children. This outcome illustrates the principle that the sentencing court must operate within statutory limits, using guidelines faithfully and transparently, while addressing public protection concerns through other legal mechanisms where extended sentences are not lawfully available.

Edney will therefore stand as an important authority on:

• The structured application of sentencing guidelines in sexual grooming cases;
• The nuanced treatment of mental disorder in assessing culpability and risk; and
• The disciplined, sequential reasoning required before imposing extended sentences under the dangerous offender provisions.