R v Demiraj [2025] EWCA Crim 1468: The Jury’s Role, “Truth”, and Hearsay-Based Convictions

1. Introduction

R v Demiraj [2025] EWCA Crim 1468 is an important Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) decision that clarifies two closely linked areas of criminal procedure:

• The proper way for a trial judge to direct a jury about their role in relation to “truth” and proof of guilt; and
• The fairness of proceedings where crucial prosecution witnesses do not give oral evidence and their accounts are admitted as hearsay under section 116 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, thereby depriving the defence of cross-examination.

The Applicant had been convicted of serious offences involving a drug-related debt, blackmail, and kidnapping. On appeal, he advanced an unusual single ground: that the trial judge’s comments in summing-up about “truth” – including the remark that the jury were not there “to discover what the truth is” – were inconsistent, confusing, and undermined the defence case, particularly in the context of unchallenged hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal rejected that contention, holding that the judge’s directions were proper and comprehensible when read in context, and that there was no arguable risk that the jury had been misled. The Court also refused an extension of time for appealing against conviction, emphasising both delay and the lack of merit in the proposed ground.

While the judgment does not announce a radical doctrinal shift, it is a significant reaffirmation of established principles:

• The jury’s task is not to conduct a free‑ranging inquiry into metaphysical “truth” but to decide, on the evidence properly before them, whether they are sure of guilt on each charge.
• Judges have latitude in the language they use provided the legal effect of the directions is correct and the summing-up is fair and balanced as a whole.
• The absence of cross-examination arising from properly admitted hearsay does not, by itself, render a conviction unsafe.

2. Background and Procedural History

2.1 The parties and the convictions

The Applicant, Demiraj, was tried in the Crown Court at Reading before HHJ Heather Norton and a jury. On 24 August 2023, he was convicted of:

• Conspiracy to blackmail (Count 1); and
• Conspiracy to kidnap (Count 2).

On 12 December 2023 he was sentenced to:

• 14 years’ imprisonment on the conspiracy to kidnap (Count 2);
• 11 years’ imprisonment concurrent on the conspiracy to blackmail (Count 1); and
• A further 2 years’ imprisonment consecutive for perverting the course of justice on another count not tried with the above,

giving a total of 16 years’ imprisonment.

His co‑accused received substantial sentences:

• Lala: pleaded guilty to the conspiracies and to two counts of false imprisonment and one of ABH, sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment.
• Pasha: convicted after trial of all five counts (the conspiracies, two false imprisonments, and ABH), sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment.
• Doci: convicted of the kidnap-related counts and false imprisonments, sentenced to 5 years’ detention in a Young Offender Institution.
• Kica: acquitted of the blackmail count.

2.2 The underlying facts

The case concerned the kidnapping of Mr Shazaib Khan and Mr Cheslyn Nys, and the blackmail of Mr Khan and his parents, Ms Shanaz Khan and Mr Haider Kayani. The prosecution case, broadly, was as follows:

• Mr Khan was said to have taken on a substantial drug debt (eventually said to be around £100,000) connected to the Applicant, known as “Kafu” or “Big Man”.
• Mr Khan and his parents were subjected to threats, including threats to burn down their house.
• Demands for money were made; indeed, they had made payments through October and November 2021 to the Applicant and his associates.
• Mr Khan was kidnapped, detained and assaulted by co‑accused; Mr Nys was also detained and found dehydrated when armed police raided the premises on 13 December 2021.

The prosecution relied on a combination of:

• Witness statements and an ABE interview from Mr Khan (covering the debt, threats, kidnaps and identifications of co‑accused);
• Statements from Ms Khan and Mr Kayani (threats, visits, financial demands, identifications of co‑accused and vehicles);
• Corroborative evidence: vehicle hire records, ANPR, cell site data, photographs, recorded calls, and financial transactions;
• Bad character evidence against the Applicant, showing propensity to use threats to obtain money; and
• Adverse inferences from the Applicant’s failure to give evidence.

Critically, Mr Khan and his parents did not give oral evidence at trial. Their accounts were admitted as hearsay under section 116(2)(e) Criminal Justice Act 2003 (unavailability due to fear). That procedural setting provides the backdrop to the Applicant’s complaint about the judge’s directions on “truth”.

2.3 The hearsay ruling

The prosecution applied to have the statements of Mr Khan and his parents admitted as hearsay on the basis that they refused to testify out of fear. The defence opposed, suggesting:

• The evidence did not truly show “fear” but rather a desire, especially on Mr Khan’s part, to avoid cross‑examination that might expose lies and inconsistencies;
• Mr Khan was unreliable and had given differing accounts of the origin of the debt, including in his own defence statement in a separate drug prosecution;
• His parents were “selective” in their evidence.

The judge conducted a voir dire, questioned the witnesses, and concluded:

• Ms Khan and Mr Kayani were clearly in fear; they confirmed the truth of their statements and explained their refusal to testify. Their evidence was important but capable of being tested by independent evidence (CCTV, recordings, transactions, etc.).
• Mr Khan’s position was more difficult to assess (particularly given late disclosure of material concerning his own criminality), but the judge found that fear was a principal reason for his refusal. She expressly noted that fear need not be the only reason, merely a substantial one.
• There was extensive supporting material against which the reliability of Mr Khan’s account could be assessed.
• Admission was in the interests of justice under the statutory framework; nor was exclusion justified under section 126 Criminal Justice Act 2003 or section 76 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

Significantly, the judgment expressly notes that the hearsay ruling itself was not challenged on appeal (paras 25–28, 36(2)). The Applicant’s ground instead targeted how the judge later spoke to the jury about truth and proof.

2.4 Defence case at trial

The Applicant did not give evidence. The defence argument was essentially that:

• The Crown could not prove its case to the requisite standard, given the absence of live testimony from the three key witnesses.
• The jury’s ability to assess credibility and truth was severely limited by the lack of cross‑examination.
• Mr Khan was a criminally involved, unreliable witness whose accounts varied materially; his parents, likewise, omitted or shaped their evidence.
• In recorded calls, the Applicant appeared to present himself as trying to help the family; that assertion had not been challenged in real time, which the defence suggested pointed away from culpability for the kidnapping.
• There were “too many unanswered questions” for the jury to be sure of guilt.

Defence counsel emphasised the classic Wigmorean proposition that cross-examination is “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth”, using it rhetorically to underline the perceived unfairness of convicting on uncross‑examined hearsay.

2.5 Procedural posture on appeal

The Applicant applied out of time (by 288 days) for leave to appeal against conviction. A single judge (Jefford J) refused both the extension of time and leave. The Applicant renewed his application before the full Court of Appeal.

The only ground pursued was the alleged inconsistency and confusion in the judge’s directions about “truth” in her summing‑up, especially in light of:

• The admission of hearsay evidence;
• The prominence of truth and cross-examination in defence submissions; and
• The judge’s own remarks about truth in her (separate) hearsay ruling.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal:

• Refused the extension of time and the renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction.
• Held that the trial judge’s remarks about the role of the jury and “truth” were:
  • Not inappropriate;
  • Not inconsistent with her other directions; and
  • Not confusing or misleading to the jury.
• Accepted that:
  • The jury were correctly directed that their function was to decide whether they were sure of guilt, not to undertake a broad inquiry into “truth” in the abstract;
  • This did not contradict directions requiring them to assess whether particular witnesses were truthful or whether particular facts were established.
• Considered the judge’s engagement with the Wigmore quote (on cross-examination as “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth”) to be a harmless and legitimate observation that did not undermine the defence case or misdirect the jury.
• Emphasised that the hearsay ruling was not under challenge and that the judge had in any event given proper, unchallenged directions about how the jury should treat hearsay evidence.
• Agreed with the single judge that, against the background of extensive supporting evidence, there was “nothing unsafe” about the convictions (para 36(1)).

In short, the Court upheld the convictions and closed off an avenue of attack based solely on the judge’s choice of language regarding “truth” in circumstances where the legal directions as a whole were correct and fair.

4. Analysis

4.1 The Ground of Appeal: “Truth” and the Jury’s Role

The core of the Applicant’s argument was that the judge had made confusing and contradictory statements about the jury’s relationship to “truth”. The key passage challenged (para 30) was:

“It may surprise you to learn that you are not actually here to discover what the truth is; that's not actually your job. You are here to decide whether you are sure that each defendant is guilty of the charge or charges that he faces. That's your job. You're not detectives. You're not here actually to discover what the truth is. In many criminal trials the truth is never actually known. You're here to decide whether or not you are sure that the defendants are guilty.”

The Applicant contended that this sat uneasily with:

• Defence submissions stressing that cross-examination is a key engine for discovering truth;
• Other parts of the directions where the judge, inevitably, referred to whether witnesses were “telling the truth”; and
• The judge’s own emphasis on truth in her hearsay ruling (though that was not heard by the jury).

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument at several levels:

1. Context and comprehension. The Court held that the jury would have understood the judge to be drawing a distinction between:
   • a generalised quest to discover with certainty all aspects of what “really” happened – which is often impossible – and
   • the more constrained legal question: whether the prosecution has proved guilt on each count so that they are sure (i.e. beyond reasonable doubt).
2. Consistency with other directions. The Court saw no inconsistency between:
   • telling the jury it is not their function to uncover the entire “truth” of everything that happened, and
   • inviting them to judge whether specific witnesses are truthful or whether specific facts are established to the necessary standard.

   As the Court put it (para 32), whether or not a particular witness is telling the truth is “a different matter, and any juror would have appreciated that distinction.”

3. Harmless engagement with Wigmore. When defence counsel quoted Wigmore on cross-examination as the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth”, the judge responded:

   “Well, John Wigmore was American, which may explain why he also thought that cross-examination, not trial by jury, was the greatest permanent contribution of the Anglo-American system of law to improve methods of trial procedure. You, as members of the jury, may disagree with that. I think that trial by jury is in fact the greatest and most important contribution, but there it is.”

   The Court of Appeal considered this merely an observation about the relative importance of cross-examination and jury trial, not a dismissal of cross-examination or a criticism of defence counsel. It did not undermine the legitimacy of the defence’s point that the lack of cross-examination was a handicap; nor did it mislead the jury about how to treat hearsay evidence.

4. Irrelevance of the hearsay ruling remarks. Any references to “truth” within the judge’s hearsay ruling were not made in the jury’s presence and thus could not form a basis for jury confusion (para 35).

In essence, the Court declined to elevate particular phrases from the summing-up into grounds of appeal where, viewed holistically, the directions were proper, the legal standards were correctly articulated, and the jury’s function was correctly explained.

4.2 The Single Judge’s Reasoning and the Full Court’s Endorsement

The Court of Appeal reproduced, and agreed with, the single judge’s four-point reasoning at para 36. Key elements include:

• The complaint “takes the Judge's comments wholly out of context” (36(1)).
• The hearsay ruling itself was not challenged; properly admitted hearsay, by its nature, prevents cross-examination, but that cannot of itself ground an appeal (36(2)).
• The legal directions (which were provided in written form and were not criticised) correctly set out the jury’s function and approach to the evidence (36(3)).
• The judge had carefully summarised what the defendants said they would have asked the hearsay witnesses if cross-examination had occurred; she highlighted credibility issues and explained the logic the jury should follow in reaching factual conclusions (36(3)–(4)).
• Against that background, the specific remarks complained of had no realistic capacity to mislead or confuse the jury so as to render the conviction unsafe (36(4)).

The full Court, after its own independent assessment, stated (para 37) that they did not consider the judge to have misdirected the jury “in any of the respects alleged” and that the convictions were not arguably unsafe.

4.3 The Legal Reasoning: “Truth” versus Proof

The judgment implicitly endorses an important conceptual distinction:

• In an idealised or metaphysical sense, “the truth” of an event might involve perfect knowledge of who did what, when, why, and with what internal motivations, free of error, bias, and evidential limitation.
• The criminal trial process, however, works with the imperfect evidence available, filtered through rules of admissibility and fairness. The jury’s task is not to reconstruct every detail of reality but to answer a narrower question: has the prosecution proved each element of the offence so that the jury are sure of guilt?

The judge’s statement that “you are not actually here to discover what the truth is” must be read against that background. Properly understood, it reminds jurors:

• They must not speculate about evidence that was not presented, or about hypothetical scenarios.
• They need not resolve every discrepancy or unanswered question about the events in order to reach a verdict.
• The central task is to apply the standard of proof to the evidence they do have, and ask whether the Crown has persuaded them to the point of being sure.

There is nothing in that formulation that prevents the jury from:

• Deciding between competing factual accounts;
• Assessing whether a witness is lying or mistaken; or
• Making findings of fact as part of the route to a verdict.

This aligns with longstanding appellate guidance that summing-ups are to be read as a whole, and that judges are entitled to some flexibility in phraseology so long as they:

• Correctly convey the law (especially the burden and standard of proof); and
• Do not mislead the jury or unfairly prejudice either side.

4.4 Cross-Examination, Hearsay and Fairness

The Wigmore quotation about cross-examination reflects a deep-seated principle: cross-examination is normally one of the most powerful tools for exposing lies and testing reliability. The defence strategy sought to leverage this by arguing:

• That conviction on the basis of crucial hearsay evidence, without any cross-examination of Mr Khan and his parents, significantly compromised the jury’s ability to “discover the truth”; and
• That the judge’s apparent downgrading of “truth seeking” undermined the force of this critique.

The Court’s response is not to deny the importance of cross-examination. Instead, it emphasises:

1. Hearsay is a legislatively sanctioned exception. Section 116 CJA 2003 expressly permits the admission of hearsay where witnesses are unavailable through fear, provided the statutory tests (including the “interests of justice”) are satisfied. In such situations:
   • The lack of cross-examination is inherent in the statutory scheme;
   • The trial judge must provide appropriate directions about how the jury should approach hearsay; but
   • The mere fact of hearsay and the consequent absence of cross-examination do not automatically render a trial unfair or a conviction unsafe.
2. Compensating safeguards. The judge took several steps to mitigate the loss of cross-examination:
   • She scrutinised the witnesses’ reasons for absence in a voir dire and ensured the statutory threshold for fear was met.
   • She left to the jury the issue of reliability, pointing them to extensive independent evidence (CCTV, cell site, ANPR, car hire records, bank transfers, recorded calls, identification procedures, etc.) which could corroborate or undermine the statements.
   • In her summing-up, she rehearsed the challenges the defence said they would have put to those witnesses had cross-examination been possible, thereby giving those points prominence despite the absence of live testimony.
3. Centrality vs. exclusivity of hearsay. The Court notes that Mr Khan was a “decisive but not a sole witness” (para 27). The presence of substantial corroborative evidence reduces (though does not eliminate) the concerns that arise when a conviction rests predominantly or exclusively on untested hearsay.

This approach is broadly consistent with the wider jurisprudence (both domestic and in the European Court of Human Rights) which accepts that:

• Convictions can, in principle, be based in part on hearsay evidence;
• The absence of cross-examination requires careful judicial management and appropriate directions; and
• The more decisive the hearsay is, the stronger the counterbalancing safeguards must be.

The Court of Appeal in Demiraj therefore reinforces the message that, where:

• Hearsay has been properly admitted under the statutory scheme; and
• The judge has given clear and correct directions about how to treat that evidence;

an appeal cannot succeed merely by re‑labelling the same complaint as a purported misdirection about “truth”.

4.5 Extension of Time and Strength of the Case

The Court also addressed the application for an extension of time (288 days) to seek leave to appeal. The reasons advanced for the delay concerned serious family and personal difficulties affecting counsel and junior counsel. The Court observed that the application was already out of time by the time of sentence, when such difficulties were not suggested (para 6).

Although sympathetic to counsel’s circumstances, the Court’s underlying point is straightforward: where an appeal lacks merit, it is particularly difficult to justify a substantial extension of time. The single judge’s assessment that:

“There was extensive evidence against you and there is nothing unsafe in your conviction.”

weighs heavily against granting an extension. The full Court agreed that no arguable misdirection had been shown and therefore refused both the extension and leave.

5. Precedents and Doctrinal Context

While R v Demiraj does not cite specific earlier authorities by name in the extracts provided, its reasoning sits coherently within several established strands of criminal appellate jurisprudence.

5.1 Summing-Up and Jury Directions

Appellate courts have consistently emphasised that:

• A summing-up must be considered as a whole; individual sentences or phrases should not be “microscopically examined” in isolation.
• The question is whether, viewed fairly and in context, the summing-up may have misled the jury as to the law or caused serious unfairness.
• Judges may comment, explain, and even express cautious views on the evidence, so long as the decision is clearly left to the jury and the legal directions are correct.

Demiraj exemplifies this approach. The Court resists an attempt to pull out a single remark about the jury not being there to “discover the truth” and instead places it back into the overall structure of a summing-up that:

• Correctly explained the burden and standard of proof;
• Highlighted the limitations of hearsay evidence;
• Reflected the defence’s theories and critiques; and
• Directed the jury to logical ways of analysing the evidence.

5.2 Hearsay, Fear and Fair Trial Rights

The case also exemplifies the application of the CJA 2003 hearsay framework in a manner compatible with fair trial principles:

• Section 116(2)(e) permits hearsay where a witness is unavailable because of fear.
• Section 116(4) and related provisions require consideration of the “interests of justice”, including the importance of the evidence and whether its reliability can be tested by other means.
• Section 126 allows exclusion of hearsay where its admission would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.

Demiraj demonstrates:

• Judicial willingness to probe and test claims of fear, rather than accepting them at face value; and
• Judicial emphasis on the availability of corroborative or testing material (here, extensive independent corroboration) when weighing the fairness of admitting hearsay.

Although the European authorities are not expressly mentioned in the judgment, the approach is in harmony with the general principle that where a conviction is substantially based on untested statements, “counterbalancing safeguards” (such as strong corroboration and careful directions) are required to maintain fairness.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 “Unsafe” Conviction

In the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), a conviction can be quashed if it is “unsafe”. That is not the same as rehearing the case or asking whether the Court itself has doubts about the verdict. The focus is on whether:

• Some legal error, misdirection, procedural unfairness, or new evidence undermines confidence in the correctness of the jury’s verdict.

In Demiraj, the Court concluded there was nothing unsafe about the conviction because:

• The judge’s directions were legally sound;
• The jury were properly informed about the limitations of the evidence;
• There was extensive corroborative evidence supporting the prosecution case; and
• The alleged misdirection about “truth” was, at most, a mischaracterisation of a harmless explanatory remark.

6.2 Section 116 CJA 2003: Hearsay Due to Fear

Ordinarily, a witness is expected to come to court, take an oath or affirmation, and be questioned by both sides. Hearsay is an exception: it is an out-of-court statement admitted for the truth of its contents.

Section 116(2)(e) allows this where a witness is “in fear” and therefore cannot or will not attend. But:

• The court must be satisfied that fear is a real and substantive reason;
• Fear does not have to be the only motive, but it must be significant (a point the judge explicitly made in relation to Mr Khan);
• The judge must also consider whether it is in the “interests of justice” to allow the hearsay, taking into account factors such as the importance of the evidence, whether there is supporting evidence, and whether the defence can still challenge credibility in other ways.

In Demiraj, that calculus led to the admission of the statements, with the assurance that they could be tested by other, independent evidence and by the defence’s ability to challenge their reliability through submissions.

6.3 Standard of Proof: “Sure” versus “Truth”

The jury are directed that they must only convict if they are “sure” the defendant is guilty – the modern expression of “beyond reasonable doubt”. This does not mean:

• They must know, beyond all possible doubt, that all aspects of the story presented are literally true in every detail; or
• They must be able to reconstruct the entire truth of everything that happened.

Rather, they must be sure that the elements of the offence have been proved: for example, that there was a conspiracy to blackmail and that the defendant joined that conspiracy.

The judge’s statement that they were “not actually here to discover what the truth is” is a way of keeping jurors focused on that narrower, legal question and dissuading them from wandering into speculation about matters not supported by evidence.

6.4 Extension of Time

Criminal appeals must be lodged within strict time limits (typically 28 days from conviction or sentence, depending on the type of appeal). An “extension of time” is permission to file the appeal late.

In deciding whether to grant an extension, the Court looks at both:

• The reasons for the delay; and
• The merits of the proposed appeal.

Where a proposed ground is weak or unarguable, even good reasons for delay may not secure an extension. Conversely, in a case of clear injustice, the Court may be more generous.

In Demiraj, the delay was substantial (288 days) and partly unexplained for earlier periods. More importantly, the Court considered the appeal unarguable on the law, and so refused the extension.

7. Impact and Significance

7.1 For Trial Judges: Latitude in Explaining the Jury’s Role

Demiraj confirms that trial judges retain reasonable latitude in how they explain the jury’s function, provided that:

• The burden and standard of proof are correctly stated;
• The jury are told that factual decisions are theirs alone;
• Any comments about the evidence are balanced and clearly marked as guidance, not direction; and
• The summing-up is fair as a whole.

Judges need not avoid every potentially debatable turn of phrase about “truth”, so long as the essential message is clear: the jury must decide, on the evidence, whether they are sure of guilt.

7.2 For Defence Lawyers: Limits of “Linguistic” Appeals

For defence practitioners, Demiraj is a cautionary tale about appeals that focus narrowly on isolated lines of a summing-up. Unless a specific phrase can be shown to:

• Misstate the law (e.g., reversing the burden of proof); or
• Cause real unfairness in the context of the directions as a whole;

appellate courts are unlikely to intervene. The Court’s forthright endorsement of the single judge’s characterization of the ground – as taking the judge’s comments “wholly out of context” – underscores this.

7.3 For Hearsay-Based Prosecutions

The case also has implications for prosecutions heavily reliant on hearsay due to witness fear:

• It reinforces that such prosecutions are lawful and can result in safe convictions where the statutory tests are met and adequate safeguards are applied.
• It illustrates a model approach:
  • Careful judicial assessment of fear;
  • Explicit acknowledgement of the difficulties for the defence;
  • Stressing the need for corroboration and the availability of corroborating material; and
  • Summing up the defence challenges to the hearsay evidence despite the lack of live witnesses.
• It confirms that the mere absence of cross-examination, when it follows from a lawful hearsay ruling, does not automatically establish unfairness.

Future appellants will find it difficult to challenge convictions in similar circumstances purely on the basis that the jury could not “discover the truth” about hearsay witnesses.

7.4 Conceptual Clarification: Legal Proof versus Historical Truth

Perhaps the most enduring contribution of Demiraj is the clear articulation (albeit in everyday language) of the difference between:

• Legal proof: whether the jury are sure that the elements of the offence are satisfied on the admissible evidence; and
• Historical truth: a complete, perfectly accurate account of what actually occurred in every detail.

By reaffirming that the jury’s role is focused on the former, not an impossible quest for the latter, the Court supports realistic, disciplined fact-finding within the trial’s evidential constraints. This helps prevent speculation and keeps jurors within their proper constitutional role.

8. Conclusion

R v Demiraj [2025] EWCA Crim 1468 is not a landmark in the sense of reshaping doctrine, but it is a valuable and timely clarification of several important themes in criminal practice:

• The Jury’s Function: Jurors are not detectives tasked with uncovering the entire “truth”; their responsibility is to decide, on the evidence, whether they are sure of guilt on each charge.
• Language in Directions: Isolated phrases in a judge’s summing-up will not found a successful appeal where the directions are, taken as a whole, clear, accurate, and fair.
• Hearsay and Fairness: Properly admitted hearsay, especially when buttressed by substantial corroboration and sophisticated directions, can safely underpin serious convictions even in the absence of cross-examination of key witnesses.
• Appeals and Time Limits: Weak grounds of appeal will not justify lengthy extensions of time, particularly where the evidence against the appellant was strong.

For judges, the case endorses a pragmatic, context-sensitive approach to explaining the jury’s task and managing hearsay evidence. For practitioners, it signals the limits of appellate tolerance for attempts to recast rhetorical disagreement with a judge’s language as a legal misdirection. And for the law more broadly, Demiraj reinforces a central truth about criminal adjudication: the aim is not to achieve omniscient certainty about all events, but to reach just and reliable conclusions about guilt by applying a demanding standard of proof to the lawfully admitted evidence.