R v DCB [2025] EWCA Crim 1253: Late Appeals, Counsel Criticism, and Sexual Bad Character Evidence

R v DCB [2025] EWCA Crim 1253:
Late Appeals, Counsel Criticism, and Propensity-Based Bad Character in Sexual Offence Trials

Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

Citation: [2025] EWCA Crim 1253

Date: 11 September 2025

Parties: R v DCB (applicant/appellant)

1. Introduction

This judgment concerns conjoined applications by DCB to:

  • Appeal his convictions from two Crown Court trials (August 2022 and January 2023);
  • Appeal the overall sentence imposed in January 2023; and
  • Obtain substantial extensions of time, representation orders, and bail.

The case is important not because it alters the substantive law of sexual offences, but because it:

  • Reaffirms the stringent approach of the Court of Appeal to very late appeals grounded on:
    • Alleged failures or disloyalty by trial solicitors and counsel; and
    • Unspecified “exculpatory” unused material said to have been ignored or concealed.
  • Clarifies, in a concrete factual setting, the legitimate use of previous sexual convictions as bad character evidence under section 101(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to demonstrate propensity in a subsequent child sexual abuse trial.
  • Reinforces the threshold for imposing an extended sentence on the basis of “dangerousness” in serious sexual offending, and the relatively limited role of prior bail conditions as mitigation.

A further feature is the court’s careful adherence to reporting restrictions under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992, illustrating contemporary judicial practice on victim anonymity and reducing the risk of “jigsaw identification”.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The Sexual Offending – Trial 1 (Complainant A)

The first set of offences (Trial 1) concerned complainant A, a 15-year-old child. The applicant, then aged 20, met A through social media and a mutual friend. The prosecution case, accepted by the jury in part, was:

  • On 22 February 2020, they met in a park and engaged in some sexual activity which A said was consensual.
  • On 24 February 2020, the applicant persuaded A to stay home from school and went to her house.
  • Further sexual activity occurred there, including vaginal rape.

A later complained to a friend, was spoken to by police on 21 June 2020, and gave an ABE (Achieving Best Evidence) interview on 23 June 2020.

In a police interview on 8 July, the applicant:

  • Accepted he had been to A’s house;
  • Initially denied that any sexual activity had occurred;
  • Later, in an amended defence statement, accepted sexual activity but claimed it was consensual and that he believed A was at least 16.

At trial, the core jury issues were:

  • For the sexual activity with a child counts (counts 4, 5, 6 and 8):
    • Did the acts occur as A alleged?
    • If so, did the applicant reasonably believe A was at least 16 years old?
  • For the rape count (count 7):
    • Did A consent?
    • If not, did the applicant honestly and reasonably believe she did?

He was convicted of four counts of sexual activity with a child and one count of rape, and acquitted on three other sexual counts.

2.2 The Sexual Offending – Trial 2 (Complainants B and C)

The second trial involved intrafamilial child sexual abuse of two younger female relatives, B and C. The offending began when the applicant himself was aged 13 and continued over many years.

  • B: aged 10 at the start of the offending. The applicant began by touching and moved to digital penetration.
  • C: aged 5 at the start. The offending escalated from touching to digital penetration and ultimately rape.

Key allegations concerning C included:

  • The first occasion of rape when she was 10–12, with the applicant aged 18–20.
  • A further rape in early 2022, when C was 14 and the applicant around 22.

The applicant was arrested in July 2022 and denied all of these allegations. In Trial 2, the jury’s central task was whether the alleged acts occurred as B and C described. Importantly, the trial judge permitted the jury to be told of the applicant’s convictions from Trial 1 as bad character evidence, an issue later attacked on appeal.

The jury convicted him of:

  • Assault of a child under 13 by penetration (count 2);
  • Rape of a child under 13 (count 3);
  • Sexual assault of a child under 13 (count 4);
  • Rape (count 6).

He was acquitted on two further sexual assault counts.

2.3 The Robbery

Separately, on 7 April 2022 the applicant participated in a robbery at a shop:

  • He was one of three males; one of the others carried a hammer.
  • The group threatened staff, smashed glass cabinets, and stole phones.
  • Staff pursued and detained the applicant until police arrived.

He pleaded guilty to robbery and accepted an offence of failure to surrender to bail.

2.4 Sentencing

On 31 January 2023, the Crown Court (Birmingham) sentenced DCB in relation to all matters.

2.4.1 Robbery and Failure to Surrender

  • Robbery: 2-year determinate custodial sentence.
  • Failure to surrender: 14 days’ imprisonment, concurrent with the robbery term.

2.4.2 Sexual Offences – Extended Sentence

The judge imposed a single global extended sentence for the sexual offences, to run consecutively to the robbery sentence. That extended sentence totalled 20 years, composed of:

  • A 12-year custodial term, followed by
  • An 8-year extension period on licence.

He passed:

  • Concurrent 20-year extended sentences on each of the rapes:
    • Rape of A (Trial 1, count 7);
    • Rape of C (Trial 2, count 6).
  • A concurrent 16-year extended sentence for rape of a child under 13 (Trial 2, count 3).
  • Various concurrent determinate sentences of different lengths for the remaining sexual offences.

In effect, the overall sentence was:

  • 2 years (robbery) + 14 days (failure to surrender, concurrent); followed by
  • 12-year custodial portion of the extended sentence; then
  • 8 years on licence under the extended sentence regime.

He was also made subject to ancillary orders (not detailed in the appellate judgment).

2.5 The Appeal Applications and Delays

The applicant sought:

  • Trial 1 convictions: Extension of time of 240 days to apply for leave to appeal, plus bail and representation order.
  • Trial 2 convictions: Extension of time of 89 days to apply for leave to appeal, plus bail and representation order.
  • Sentence (all offences): Extension of time of 80 days to appeal, plus bail and representation order.

The single judge had refused all applications. The present judgment concerns the renewed applications to the full court. The Court of Appeal took the unusual but increasingly common course of requesting the applicant to waive legal professional privilege so his trial solicitors and counsel could respond to his serious criticisms. He did so, and the court had detailed responses from all practitioners involved.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal:

  • Refused all applications for extensions of time to appeal conviction (both trials).
  • Refused the application for an extension of time to appeal sentence.
  • Declined to grant bail or representation orders.

The court:

  • Adopted in full the reasoning of the single judge, stating it could “not improve upon” those reasons.
  • Held that the criticisms of trial solicitors and counsel were:
    • Highly generalised;
    • Unsupported by evidence;
    • Explicitly refuted by the professionals criticised; and
    • Raised only after significant delay, undermining their credibility.
  • Rejected the assertion that unused text messages existed which demonstrated fabrication by complainant A, noting:
    • The text material had run to some 600 pages and was properly disclosed;
    • There was no documentary evidence supporting the applicant’s claim about specific exculpatory messages;
    • The Crown’s contention that no such admission of fabrication existed was uncontradicted.
  • Upheld the admission in Trial 2 of the applicant’s Trial 1 convictions as bad character evidence, holding that:
    • It was properly admitted under section 101(1)(d) Criminal Justice Act 2003 as showing propensity;
    • It was relevant to establishing a sexual interest in girls under 16 and a willingness to engage in sexual activity irrespective of consent.
  • Confirmed that:
    • The judge’s dangerousness finding was “essentially inevitable” given the facts;
    • The total extended sentence of 20 years was not “remotely excessive”; and
    • The burden of stringent bail conditions before sentence offered no, or only very slight, mitigation.

Overall, the convictions were not arguably unsafe, and the sentence was not manifestly excessive.

4. Legal Analysis

4.1 Reporting Restrictions and Anonymity

At the outset, the court draws attention to the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. This statute grants lifetime anonymity to complainants in sexual offence cases: no publication may contain material likely to identify a complainant as the victim of such an offence unless the statutory conditions for lifting anonymity are satisfied.

Two key points emerge:

  • The court refers to the risk of “jigsaw identification”. Even where complainants are not named, combining different fragments of publicly available information can sometimes reveal identity. To minimise that risk, the applicant is identified only by randomly generated initials “DCB”, and the complainants are anonymised as A, B and C.
  • The approach underscores modern judicial sensitivity to the need for robust victim protection in sexual cases, particularly where there are intrafamilial dynamics or young complainants whose privacy is especially vulnerable.

Whilst not the core of the appellate reasoning, this opening section exemplifies the court’s strict adherence to the statutory anonymity regime and demonstrates the balancing of open justice with protection of sexual offence complainants.

4.2 Extensions of Time and Late Appeals Based on Counsel Criticism

The judgment is particularly significant in its handling of the applicant’s late appeal applications, which rest heavily on post hoc criticisms of his own legal team.

4.2.1 The Applicant’s Explanations for Delay

The applicant advanced a personal, largely emotional, explanation:

  • He had been under severe stress and “thinking of giving up on everything”.
  • He felt his “life was over” once sentenced.
  • He alleged that his original solicitor and counsel:
    • Did the “minimum” to help him;
    • Withheld information;
    • Told him there was “no point” in appealing.
  • He claimed that only after speaking to another, unnamed solicitor was he told he had grounds to appeal and that the prosecution had “kept evidence hidden”.

The single judge, and the Court of Appeal, found these explanations unpersuasive. Important features were:

  • The considerable length of the delays (up to 240 days) before formulating complaints.
  • The absence of any contemporaneous complaint to the trial judge or to the solicitors’ firm about alleged failures.
  • The vague reference to an unnamed solicitor’s encouraging view, with no documentary support.

The court explicitly accepted the single judge’s observation that the long delays “impacted the credibility” of the complaints. However, adopting a cautious approach, the Court of Appeal still considered each ground to see if any nonetheless disclosed an arguable basis for appeal.

4.2.2 Waiver of Privilege and Responses from Trial Lawyers

A notable procedural step is the court’s request that the applicant waive legal professional privilege to allow his trial solicitors and counsel to answer allegations of misconduct or incompetence.

When an appellant claims that their legal team:

  • Failed to disclose material;
  • Discouraged them from appealing;
  • Acted in collusion or undue friendliness with the prosecution;

the court ordinarily insists on the opportunity for those professionals to respond. Here:

  • Privilege was waived.
  • All involved lawyers provided detailed responses.
  • Those responses squarely refuted the applicant’s allegations.

The Court of Appeal read these responses and accepted that they undermined the applicant’s criticisms. It is clear that such professional responses carry considerable weight in appellate assessment where specific failings are alleged.

4.2.3 Generalised, Unsupported Allegations

The court repeatedly characterises the applicant’s complaints as:

  • “Highly generalised”;
  • “Without any supporting evidence”;
  • Not revealing any basis for concluding the trial was unfair or the conviction unsafe.

For both trials, the recurring theme is the allegation that the defence lawyers were too “friendly” with the prosecution and did not have the applicant’s interests at heart. The court:

  • Notes that this is firmly denied by the practitioners.
  • Emphasises that such broad accusations, without specification of actual prejudicial acts or omissions, are insufficient.
  • Finds that even if some rapport existed between counsel and the prosecution (which is common and professionally acceptable), that by itself does not establish unfairness.

In effect, the court underscores a key principle: an appeal cannot sensibly be founded on vague assertions of counsel’s disloyalty or lack of zeal, particularly when contradicted by the lawyers and unsupported by objective evidence.

4.3 The Unused Material Complaint (Trial 1)

4.3.1 The Applicant’s Case on Alleged Exculpatory Text Messages

The linchpin of the applicant’s attempt to challenge the Trial 1 convictions is his assertion that the unused prosecution material contained text messages from A which:

  • Demonstrated she had lied about the rape;
  • Showed she was motivated by a desire for revenge (“she only did this because she hated being second best”);
  • Indicated she loved the applicant and was upset that he rejected her because he had a girlfriend.

He asserts that:

  • His solicitors treated this material as “irrelevant” and refused to allow him to see it.
  • Had it been used, it would have helped prove his innocence.
  • He had previously blocked A, so he did not see the messages at the time.

In a later letter, he specifically refers to messages around 28 February 2020, but still fails to produce or identify the actual text content.

4.3.2 The Court’s Assessment of the Unused Material Issue

The Court of Appeal’s reasoning is clear and firm:

  • The suggestion that the solicitor refused to allow him to view material is described as “far-fetched”.
  • Crucially, no complaint was made to the judge at the time of trial about denied access.
  • All trial representatives refute the allegation.

On the content of the unused material itself:

  • The text messages involving A amounted to some 600 pages.
  • They were disclosed in full as unused material in the usual way.
  • The parties later agreed a subset as a trial bundle once relevance was considered.
  • The prosecution explicitly contended that there was no admission of fabrication in the messages.
  • The applicant provided no documentary evidence to support his claim that A admitted lying.

The single judge concluded, and the full court agreed, that:

There is no evidence to contradict the Crown's contention that the applicant is incorrectly suggesting that [A] admitted within these messages that she had fabricated the present allegation as a result of rejection by the applicant… No documentary evidence to support this assertion has been provided.

In substance, the Court of Appeal insists that where a conviction is attacked on the basis of alleged exculpatory unused material:

  • The appellant must provide or at least precisely identify that material.
  • Mere assertion that “somewhere” in large quantities of disclosed text there exists a decisive message is inadequate.
  • The court will place significant weight on:
    • The prosecution’s explanation of the unused material; and
    • The defence lawyers’ account of their review and use of disclosure.

This part of the judgment therefore reinforces a practical but important principle: claims of undisclosed or unused exculpatory material must be substantiated by concrete material, not speculation, especially where extensive disclosure has demonstrably been made.

4.4 Bad Character Evidence in Trial 2 – Propensity in Sexual Offences

The admission of the applicant’s Trial 1 convictions as bad character evidence in Trial 2 is the clearest point of substantive law addressed in the judgment.

4.4.1 Statutory Framework

The court holds that the convictions were properly admitted under section 101(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. In brief, that provision allows prosecution evidence of a defendant’s bad character where:

  • It is relevant to an “important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution”; and
  • Those important matters expressly include whether the defendant has a propensity to commit offences of the kind charged or to be untruthful.

In sexual cases, previous convictions often go to propensity:

  • A propensity for sexual interest in a particular group (e.g. children, adolescents);
  • A propensity for non-consensual conduct; or
  • A propensity to exploit particular relationship dynamics (e.g. grooming-type behaviour).

4.4.2 How the Prior Convictions Were Adduced

The parties used a section 10 Criminal Justice Act 1967 formal admission to place the convictions before the jury without elaborate proof. The agreed facts recorded:

  • The nature of the convictions from Trial 1:
    • Four counts of sexual activity with a child (s.9 Sexual Offences Act 2003);
    • One count of rape (s.1 Sexual Offences Act 2003).
  • That the victim was a 15-year-old girl with whom he had formed a social media relationship in 2020.
  • That:
    • On one occasion they engaged in consensual digital penetration and oral sex performed on him;
    • On a second occasion, he was convicted of rape: after consensual oral sex, he raped her before having intercourse a second time which she “acquiesced” in rather than truly consented to.

This carefully structured admission ensured the jury:

  • Was informed of the essence of the prior offending;
  • Understood its sexual and non-consensual nature; and
  • Could use it only in a limited and legally directed way (propensity), not as proof that he was guilty merely because of past behaviour.

4.4.3 Relevance to Trial 2 – Sexual Propensity

The Court of Appeal endorses the trial judge’s reasoning that these earlier convictions demonstrated:

  • A sexual interest in girls under the age of 16; and
  • A willingness to engage in sexual activity with them disregarding their consent or lack of consent.

In Trial 2, where the applicant was charged with:

  • Rape and sexual offences against much younger family members (B and C), and
  • He wholly denied that the conduct occurred,

these earlier convictions were plainly relevant to:

  • Whether he had a propensity to commit sexual offences against children; and
  • Whether it was more likely that the alleged intrafamilial abuse had occurred in the way described.

The court notes that:

No credible basis has been advanced to support the argument that the introduction of this evidence was either wrong in law or unfairly prejudiced the fairness of the applicant's trial.

Accordingly, the admission fully satisfied section 101(1)(d). There is no hint of unfairness or an unbalanced exercise of the trial judge’s discretion.

4.5 Dangerousness, Extended Sentences and Pre-Sentence Reports

4.5.1 Dangerousness Assessment

The Crown Court judge found the applicant to be “dangerous” in the statutory sense. The appellate court strongly endorses that assessment.

The sentencing judge concluded that the applicant:

  • Posed a significant risk of serious harm to younger women and girls;
  • Exhibited predatory behaviour towards adolescent and younger females;
  • Was highly likely to commit further serious sexual offences if not subject to extended control.

The Court of Appeal remarks that the finding of dangerousness was “essentially inevitable”:

  • The offending involved:
    • Multiple victims;
    • Escalating intrafamilial abuse over many years;
    • Rape of a child under 13 and repeated rapes of a vulnerable complainant;
    • Serious psychological harm, as reflected in victim personal statements.
  • There were no meaningful protective factors suggesting a low risk of future harm.

Although the judgment does not recite the statutory provisions governing extended sentences, it is clear that the court considered the statutory test for imposing such a sentence to be fully satisfied: the applicant’s risk profile, combined with the gravity of the offences, justified a long custodial term and a lengthy period of licence.

4.5.2 Pre-Sentence Reports and Alleged Bias

The applicant asserted that the judge’s dangerousness conclusion was improperly influenced because:

  • Two different probation officers prepared pre-sentence reports;
  • They became “biased” after contacting the prosecution; and
  • This allegedly led the judge to a more severe sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismisses this ground as “not credible”. Key points:

  • It is entirely normal and proper for probation officers to seek information from the prosecution when preparing pre-sentence reports, especially in serious sexual cases.
  • The reports were described by the judge as “very helpful and wise”, and nothing in the appellate record suggests partiality or impropriety.
  • The judge explicitly stated he would have found the applicant dangerous based solely on the facts of the offences:
    I would have reached that conclusion on my own on the basis of the facts of these cases, but I am buttressed in that conclusion by the analysis in the very helpful and wise pre-sentence report.

Thus, even if some theoretical flaw existed in the reports (and the court found none), the dangerousness assessment was independently founded on the offending itself.

4.5.3 The Overall Sentence and “Manifestly Excessive” Test

Appellate interference with sentence requires that the sentence be:

  • Wrong in principle; or
  • Manifestly excessive.

Here, the court holds that:

  • Given the multiplicity, gravity and persistence of the sexual offences, including intrafamilial child rape, a 12-year custodial term as part of a 20-year extended sentence was well within the proper range.
  • Making the extended sentence consecutive to the robbery sentence was justified; the sexual offending and the robbery were distinct episodes of serious criminality.
  • The judge was entitled to go “outside the guidelines” for the custodial element, reflecting the exceptional seriousness and pattern of offending.

The Court of Appeal concludes that the sentence is “not remotely excessive”, decisively rejecting any suggestion of undue severity.

4.6 Bail Conditions as Mitigation

The applicant argued that the stringent bail conditions he endured from June 2020–2022 – notably signing on four times a week, leading to job losses – should have been treated as significant mitigation.

The court’s response is firm:

  • Such factors offer no or very slight mitigation only.
  • Pre-trial restrictions, even if onerous, do not equate to punishment in the same sense as a custodial sentence.
  • At most, they might marginally influence sentence in borderline cases, but in a case of this seriousness they could not credibly render the sentence manifestly excessive.

This reaffirms that whilst bail conditions may sometimes be mentioned in mitigation, they generally carry , particularly where the underlying offending is extremely grave.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Legal Professional Privilege and Waiver

Legal professional privilege protects confidential communications between a client and their lawyers. Normally, neither can be required to reveal those communications.

However, when a convicted person later alleges:

  • That their lawyers concealed evidence;
  • Failed to follow instructions; or
  • Acted improperly with the prosecution,

the court may require the appellant to waive privilege so that the lawyers can respond. Without waiver:

  • The court may be unable to test the truth of the allegations;
  • An appeal based on such claims is unlikely to succeed.

In DCB’s case, privilege was waived, and the lawyers’ responses were a crucial part of the court’s rejection of his complaints.

5.2 Bad Character and Propensity Evidence

“Bad character” evidence broadly means evidence of a defendant’s misconduct (usually previous convictions or discreditable behaviour) not directly related to the current charge.

Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, such evidence can sometimes be admitted to show:

  • Propensity to commit offences of the kind charged (e.g. a pattern of similar sexual offending);
  • Propensity to be untruthful; or
  • Other matters in issue (e.g. absence of accident, pattern of behaviour).

In sexual offence trials, previous sexual convictions may be admitted to show that:

  • The accused has a sexual interest in particular types of victim (e.g. children);
  • He has a history of ignoring the need for genuine consent.

The judge must still ensure the trial remains fair and that the jury is properly directed:

  • They cannot convict simply because of bad character;
  • They must use it only in the limited ways the judge explains.

5.3 Section 10 Admissions

Under section 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, parties can formally admit facts so they do not have to be proved by calling evidence. For example:

  • Admitting the existence and nature of previous convictions;
  • Agreeing basic undisputed facts about timelines or relationships.

This streamlines the trial, avoids unnecessary evidence, and reduces the risk of prejudice arising from over-elaborate descriptions of prior offences. In DCB’s Trial 2, the parties used a section 10 admission to set out his Trial 1 convictions in an agreed, carefully worded form.

5.4 Extended Sentences and Dangerousness

An extended sentence is used for certain serious violent or sexual offences where the court finds that:

  • The offender poses a significant risk of serious harm to the public; and
  • A standard determinate sentence would not provide sufficient protection.

The sentence has two parts:

  • A custodial term – the time actually served in prison (subject to release provisions);
  • An extension period – extra years on licence in the community, during which the offender can be recalled to prison if they breach licence conditions or present risk.

“Dangerousness” is a statutory concept that involves assessing:

  • The nature and circumstances of the offences;
  • Any pattern of behaviour;
  • Background, including previous convictions;
  • Expert reports (e.g. probation, psychological) on risk.

In DCB’s case, multiple rapes and sexual assaults on children, including intrafamilial abuse persisting over many years, made a finding of dangerousness highly likely and an extended sentence appropriate.

5.5 “Manifestly Excessive” Sentences

When sentencing is appealed, the Court of Appeal does not simply ask whether it would have passed the same sentence. The question is stricter: is the sentence wrong in principle or so high that it can be said to be “manifestly excessive”?

“Manifestly excessive” means:

  • Well outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge; or
  • Clearly disproportionate to the seriousness and circumstances of the offending, when compared to similar cases and relevant guidelines.

In DCB’s case, considering:

  • Multiple victims;
  • Child rapes;
  • Intrafamilial abuse over many years;
  • Additional serious robbery;

the Court of Appeal had no hesitation in finding that the sentence was not merely within the permissible range but was not remotely excessive.

5.6 Jigsaw Identification

“Jigsaw identification” occurs where:

  • No single piece of information reveals the identity of a complainant;
  • But combining different pieces (e.g. location, relationship to defendant, age, timing) enables members of the public to work out who the complainant is.

To avoid this, the Court of Appeal:

  • Uses anonymised initials for the applicant (“DCB”);
  • Refers to the complainants as A, B and C;
  • Avoids giving unnecessary factual details that might inadvertently identify them.

This illustrates the practical application of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 in modern appellate judgments.

6. Impact and Significance

6.1 For Appellants and Criminal Defendants

The judgment sends a clear signal to future appellants:

  • Delay is damaging. Long, unexplained delays before raising complaints about legal representation or unused material will weigh heavily against extensions of time.
  • Generalised dissatisfaction is insufficient. Appeals cannot be grounded in broad assertions that lawyers were “too friendly” with the prosecution or did not “have your back”, particularly where professionals refute such claims.
  • Concrete evidence is essential. If an appellant claims that unused texts, messages, or other material prove fabrication, they must:
    • Produce the material or identify it precisely; and
    • Show that it was either undisclosed or not properly considered.
  • Bail hardships are marginal mitigation. Even stringent pre-trial bail conditions seldom lead to a substantial reduction in custodial terms for very serious offences.

6.2 For Defence Practitioners

The judgment provides reassurance and a reminder:

  • The Court of Appeal recognises that robust, professional relationships between defence and prosecution do not signify collusion or disloyalty.
  • Where privilege is waived, practitioners’ detailed responses to criticisms are carefully considered and can be decisive.
  • Meticulous handling of unused material (especially large volumes of digital messages) is essential. The fact of extensive disclosure and a reasoned decision on relevance will be an important safeguard against later miscarriages-justice allegations.

6.3 For Trial Judges and Prosecutors

The judgment:

  • Endorses the careful and principled use of bad character evidence to prove sexual propensity, especially across multiple trials of serious sexual offences.
  • Confirms that pre-sentence reports may properly involve communication with the prosecution and that such contact is not, without more, evidence of bias.
  • Supports firm dangerousness findings where there is entrenched, escalating child sexual abuse over a prolonged period, especially within a family context.

6.4 For the Development of the Law

R v DCB does not radically reform any area of law. Its value lies more in:

  • Reinforcing the established framework for:
    • Extensions of time and the treatment of counsel-criticism appeals;
    • Admission of previous convictions as bad character evidence in sexual trials;
    • Imposition and appellate review of extended sentences for dangerous offenders.
  • Providing a clear, contemporary example of how these principles are applied in a complex factual case with multiple complainants and trials.

7. Conclusion

R v DCB [2025] EWCA Crim 1253 stands as a robust illustration of the Court of Appeal’s unwillingness to entertain late, unsubstantiated allegations of professional failure and hidden evidence. The court:

  • Affirmed that convictions are not rendered unsafe by broad, unsupported criticisms of trial lawyers, particularly where:
    • Privilege is waived;
    • Lawyers provide detailed rebuttals; and
    • No concrete prejudice to the fairness of the trial is shown.
  • Confirmed that substantial quantities of unused material (such as extensive text logs) do not ground an appeal unless the appellant can identify specific, exculpatory content and demonstrate mishandling.
  • Endorsed the admission of previous sexual convictions under section 101(1)(d) CJA 2003 to show propensity in later child sexual abuse trials, where the earlier offences reveal a sexual interest in children and disregard for consent.
  • Reinforced the appropriateness of extended sentences for dangerous sexual offenders who pose a long-term risk to the public, and the limited role of prior bail hardship as mitigation.

In the broader legal context, the case consolidates key principles governing:

  • The integrity of criminal convictions against retrospective attacks on counsel and disclosure;
  • The controlled, principled use of bad character evidence in sexual litigation; and
  • Sentencing for high-risk, repeat sexual offenders, particularly in intrafamilial contexts.

The court’s analysis reflects a measured balance between the rights of the convicted offender and the powerful public interest in upholding soundly obtained convictions and in protecting vulnerable victims of sexual crime. R v DCB will therefore serve as a reference point in future cases involving late appeals, alleged professional failings, and the management of bad character and dangerousness in serious sexual offending.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

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