R v Davis [2025] EWCA Crim 1485: Road Rage, Child Passengers and Guilty Plea Credit in Causing Serious Injury by Dangerous Driving

1. Introduction

R v Davis [2025] EWCA Crim 1485 is a Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) decision dealing with sentencing for the offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving in a road rage context. The judgment is significant for three main reasons:

It illustrates how the Sentencing Council guideline for causing serious injury by dangerous driving is to be applied in road rage scenarios where there is highly dangerous but brief driving.
It emphasises the in the offender’s vehicle, especially where the child is placed in direct danger by the driving.
It clarifies the approach to credit for a guilty plea where the defendant was first charged with different offences (here, wounding with intent and dangerous driving) and later pleads guilty to a new, lesser count (causing serious injury by dangerous driving).

The appellant, aged 31, had pleaded guilty to causing serious injury by dangerous driving and was sentenced in the Crown Court at Croydon to three years’ imprisonment, with a three and a half year driving disqualification and extended re-test requirement. The incident arose from a road rage altercation in which the appellant, driving a white transit van with his six‑year‑old daughter in the front passenger seat, drove directly at another motorist, Mr Lawal, striking both the victim and his vehicle and then leaving the scene.

The appellant appealed only against the custodial sentence (not the disqualification) with leave of the single judge. He argued that:

the trial judge’s starting point under the sentencing guideline was too high, and that proper account of mitigation should have led to a downward rather than an upward adjustment from the guideline starting point; and
the judge gave insufficient credit for his guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed the appeal, upholding the three‑year sentence as “entirely appropriate” and not manifestly excessive.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Factual background

On 27 October 2024, a road rage incident unfolded on Stafford Road in Croydon between the appellant and the victim, Mr Moshood Lawal, who was driving a goods vehicle. The events, mostly captured on CCTV and dashcam, can be summarised as follows:

Mr Lawal believed the appellant had cut him up and struck his vehicle.
Both men exited their vehicles and there was a confrontation: pushing and shoving, with the greater physical aggression from Mr Lawal.
The appellant threatened Mr Lawal, saying words to the effect that he would stab him, and told him to “Pull over at the next traffic lights and see what I do to you”.
The appellant then tailed Mr Lawal, following at an unsafe distance.
When Mr Lawal pulled over, there was a further verbal exchange; Mr Lawal said, “Go for it”, in reference to the appellant’s earlier threat.
As Mr Lawal returned to his vehicle, with his door open, the appellant revved his engine and drove directly at him at speed, striking both Mr Lawal and the door of his vehicle, and then drove away without stopping.

The crucial impact phase was clearly captured on CCTV and described by the Court as “shocking”, as evidenced by the reactions of passers‑by.

Mr Lawal suffered a large laceration to his left arm requiring surgical closure, soft tissue damage, and an ankle injury which impaired mobility and forced him to sleep downstairs for three weeks. He also experienced symptoms consistent with post‑traumatic stress disorder and required sleeping medication. In a Victim Personal Statement, he detailed substantial ongoing impacts on his day‑to‑day life.

2.2 Sentencing at first instance

The appellant had six previous convictions for ten offences, including a 2017 community order for assaulting two police officers in the context of a vehicle stop while he was driving uninsured. The sentencing judge had character references highlighting his role as a family man and the impact of his remand on his family and business. No pre‑sentence report was prepared.

Applying the Sentencing Council guideline for causing serious injury by dangerous driving, the judge found:

Culpability: Category A – a deliberate choice to ignore the rules of the road; not a case of fleeing or trying to escape danger; the appellant deliberately drove at the victim.
Harm: Category 2 – the lower harm bracket for the offence.

This placed the offence in category A2, with a guideline starting point of 3 years’ custody and a range of 2–4 years.

The judge identified several aggravating factors:

Previous convictions;
Failure to stop after colliding with the victim;
Presence of the appellant’s six‑year‑old child in the front passenger seat;
Use of a goods vehicle.

Mitigation included:

Positive character references;
Impact of custody on the appellant’s family and business;
Good conduct and progress in custody.

The judge concluded that aggravating factors outweighed mitigation, and determined that, after trial, an appropriate sentence would have been 43 months imprisonment. He then applied a 15% reduction for the guilty plea, resulting in the imposed sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment.

2.3 Grounds of appeal

The appeal advanced two grounds:

Guideline starting point and adjustment: While conceding that category A2 was available, the appellant argued that:
- The incident was brief, not prolonged or sustained;
- The appellant acted in a highly stressful and provocative context in response to Mr Lawal’s aggression;
- Personal mitigation (family circumstances, character references, good behaviour in custody) justified a downwards or at least not an upwards adjustment from the 3‑year starting point.
He also suggested possible double counting of the fact that the vehicle was a goods vehicle, both in culpability categorisation and as an aggravating factor.
Credit for guilty plea: The appellant contended that:
- The offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving was not on the original indictment at the Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing (PTPH);
- He pleaded guilty as soon as that charge was added (offered on 23 April 2025, formally entered on 30 April 2025);
- In light of the late amendment of the indictment, his early offer to plead, and a change of representation, a higher reduction than 15% should have been given.

2.4 Decision of the Court of Appeal

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The key holdings were:

The trial judge was “undoubtedly right” to categorise the case as A2 and his factual findings, based on CCTV, were “unimpeachable”.
The appellant’s suggestion that he was trying to withdraw from danger or protect his daughter was rejected; he had instead deliberately driven at the victim and thereby also placed his child at serious risk.
The trial judge’s balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors was “faultless”, and a post‑trial sentence of 43 months was comfortably within the guideline range.
The 15% guilty plea credit was appropriate. The appellant had initially denied all criminality and maintained not guilty pleas to wounding with intent and dangerous driving; he did not plead guilty to dangerous driving at an earlier stage and therefore could not claim to have pleaded at the first realistic opportunity.
The ultimate sentence of three years’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive and stood.
On the driving disqualification and extended re‑test, the Court saw no error on the face of the record and declined to interfere.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Evidential assessment and findings of fact

The Court of Appeal’s analysis begins with a clear reaffirmation of the trial judge’s fact‑finding role, particularly where objective evidence such as CCTV exists. The Court:

Accepted that the earlier exchanges had elements of mutual aggression (pushing and shoving not wholly one‑sided);
Emphasised that the critical issue was what occurred at the moment the appellant drove at Mr Lawal;
Considered the CCTV footage to leave “no room for doubt” that the appellant:
- Deliberately drove directly at Mr Lawal;
- Veered to do so;
- Accelerated, having not previously been driving at high speed; and
- Struck the open door of the victim’s vehicle in circumstances where that collision, and the risk to the victim, was inevitable.

The Court rejects the defence narrative that the appellant was merely reacting to escalating aggression. By the time of the dangerous driving, Mr Lawal was near his own vehicle, with the door open, and was not at that moment contributing to escalation.

The Court also rejects any suggestion that the appellant’s behaviour could be framed primarily as an attempt to protect his daughter from a dangerous situation. Instead, it stresses that:

The appellant followed closely behind the victim’s vehicle, thereby prolonging the confrontation;
He then made a deliberate manoeuvre that exposed his child, sitting nearest the point of impact, to “real danger”.

This factual platform is crucial as it underpins both the culpability assessment and the weight given to the presence of the child as an aggravating factor.

3.2 Application of the Sentencing Council guideline

The offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving is governed by a Sentencing Council definitive guideline, which broadly structures the exercise into:

Assessing culpability (A–C);
Assessing harm (1–2);
Locating the case in a culpability/harm category (e.g. A1, A2, B1, etc.) with a corresponding starting point and range;
Adjusting for aggravating and mitigating factors;
Applying credit for a guilty plea;
Considering totality and ancillary orders (such as disqualification).

3.2.1 Culpability: Category A

The Court endorses the trial judge’s assessment that the appellant’s conduct fell within culpability category A. This largely reflects:

A deliberate choice to ignore the rules of the road – here, driving directly at a person and vehicle from a relatively short distance;
The highly dangerous manoeuvre of accelerating towards a pedestrian and an open vehicle door, in a public road with bystanders present.

The Court explicitly rejects characterising the offending as a mere momentary lapse. Although the incident was short, and the decision might have occurred in a split second, the quality of the decision—choosing to drive at a person—was what rendered the culpability high. Duration of driving is not decisive; the Court focuses instead on the intentionality and danger of the manoeuvre.

3.2.2 Harm: Category 2

There was “no issue” that harm was in the lower bracket, category 2. Serious injury occurred and required surgery and caused psychological harm, but the injuries were not at the most severe end (e.g. permanent, catastrophic or life‑changing injury).

The combination of culpability A and harm 2 yields category A2, with:

Starting point: 3 years’ custody
Range: 2–4 years’ custody

The trial judge’s choice to start at the guideline starting point is orthodox and, as the Court of Appeal holds, entirely correct.

3.3 Aggravating and mitigating factors: Was a downward adjustment required?

3.3.1 Aggravating factors

The trial judge identified four key aggravating features, all of which the Court of Appeal endorsed:

Previous convictions
The appellant had six previous convictions for ten offences, including assaults on police officers in a vehicle‑related context. This indicates both a lack of respect for lawful authority and repeat problem behaviour associated with driving.
Failure to stop at the scene
After striking the victim and vehicle, the appellant drove away. This demonstrates a lack of immediate concern for the victim’s welfare, undermines any claim of accident or panic alone, and is a classic aggravating factor in driving cases.
Presence of a child in the vehicle
The Court treats this, in robust terms, as a “very significant aggravating factor”. Rather than being a neutral or mitigating feature (for example, because the appellant is a family man or under stress due to concern for his child), the Court emphasises how the driving actively endangered the child, particularly given her seating position closest to the point of impact.
Use of a goods vehicle
Driving a larger, heavier goods vehicle typically increases the potential for serious harm. The judge considered this as a separate aggravating factor, though the appellant later argued that this might have involved double counting.

3.3.2 Mitigating factors

The Court acknowledges the mitigation that was placed before the judge:

Positive character references from partner and sister, describing him as a family man;
Significant adverse impact on his family and business due to his custody;
Good behaviour in custody and positive prison report;
Relative age of previous convictions, with the last in 2018.

However, it is clear that, in the Court’s view, this mitigation, while real, did not outweigh the seriousness of the offending conduct and the aggravating features. The Court explicitly states that the trial judge’s weighing exercise was “faultless”.

3.3.3 Alleged “momentary” nature and provocation

A central element of the appeal’s first ground was that this was a short‑lived incident in a provocative context. The appellant highlighted:

Mr Lawal’s aggressive behaviour, including pushing and shoving; and
The brief, spur‑of‑the‑moment character of the appellant’s decision to drive off.

The Court accepts the background of mutual aggression but draws a sharp line between that context and the final act of driving at the victim. The key points are:

By the time of the dangerous manoeuvre, there was no longer escalation by the victim; he was by his vehicle with the door open.
The appellant had had an opportunity to drive away safely yet chose to re‑engage.
Even a split‑second decision can be deliberate, highly dangerous conduct for sentencing purposes.

Thus, provocation and brevity of the incident did not justify a downward adjustment from the A2 starting point. The Court instead expressly endorses an upward adjustment to 43 months (pre‑plea), reflecting that the judge was entitled to move up within the A2 range given the aggravation.

3.4 Alleged double counting of the goods vehicle factor

The appellant suggested that the fact he was driving a goods vehicle may have been taken into account twice:

Once in deciding that the offence fell into category A (high culpability); and
Again as an aggravating factor pushing the sentence upwards within the A2 range.

The Court does not find this argument persuasive. While it does not expressly spell out a detailed double‑counting analysis, its overall endorsement of the judge’s approach implies that:

Any role of the type of vehicle in establishing culpability was minimal; rather, culpability was driven by the deliberate decision to drive at the victim; and
The additional danger inherent in a goods vehicle was legitimately treated as a separate aggravating factor, in line with guideline principles that recognise enhanced risk from larger or more powerful vehicles.

In substance, the Court is satisfied that the judge did not inflate the sentence by improper double counting.

3.5 Guilty plea credit: timing and amended charges

The second key issue is the correctness of the 15% reduction for the guilty plea.

3.5.1 Procedural timeline

PTPH (November 2024): The appellant was charged with:
- Wounding with intent (a serious violence offence); and
- Dangerous driving.
He pleaded not guilty to both and the case was set down for trial.
Later amendment to indictment: The count of causing serious injury by dangerous driving (the eventual offence of conviction) was added at a later stage.
April 2025: After a change of representation, the appellant offered a guilty plea to the new count on 23 April 2025, and formally entered the plea on 30 April 2025.

3.5.2 Appellant’s argument

The appellant argued that, because the specific count of causing serious injury by dangerous driving did not exist at the PTPH, he could not then have pleaded guilty to it, and should be treated as having:

Pleaded guilty at the first realistic opportunity once the correct charge was available; and
Deserved a correspondingly higher discount than the 15% applied.

He further relied on:

The late amendment of the indictment being outside his control;
The earlier offer to plead before formal arraignment on the new count; and
The change of representation as a contributing factor in the timing.

3.5.3 Court’s reasoning on credit

The Court’s response is rooted in the principle that credit for a guilty plea is linked to:

Willingness to admit criminality at an early stage; and
The extent to which the plea saves court time and resources, and spares witnesses the ordeal of trial.

The key points in the Court’s reasoning are:

The appellant had, at the PTPH, not only denied the more serious offence of wounding with intent, but also pleaded not guilty to dangerous driving itself.
The offence for which he was ultimately sentenced – causing serious injury by dangerous driving – is built on the core element of dangerous driving. By denying that he had driven dangerously, the appellant denied the essential factual basis underlying the eventual offence.
The Court comments that the appellant might have had a stronger argument on credit if he had pleaded guilty to dangerous driving earlier. He did not do so; he maintained a positive defence and denied criminality.
Because he denied dangerous driving during the period when the case was being progressed to trial, he could not claim to have been ready to accept his criminality at the earliest reasonable opportunity.

Consequently, the Court holds that the 15% reduction:

Was “entirely appropriate” in the circumstances; and
In fact, in the Court’s view, amounted to “a little over 15%” when reconstructed against the notional 43‑month post‑trial sentence.

This provides a practical illustration of how the guilty plea discount is approached when charges are reframed or downgraded but the defendant previously denied the essential elements now admitted.

3.6 Appellate review of sentence

Although no specific authorities are cited in the judgment, the Court applies the well‑established principles governing appeals against sentence:

The Court will not interfere with sentence unless it is:
- Wrong in principle (for example, misapplication of guidelines, double counting, or failure to consider relevant factors); or
- Manifestly excessive in all the circumstances of the case.
Where a trial judge has correctly applied the guideline structure and completed a rational balancing exercise, the Court of Appeal will show substantial deference to the judge’s evaluation.

Here the Court repeatedly emphasises that:

The judge’s factual findings were the only ones reasonably open to him on the CCTV evidence;
The categorisation of the offence as A2 was plainly correct and “realistically conceded” by the defence;
The balancing of aggravation and mitigation was “faultless” and produced a sentence “well within the range” for A2.

This confirms that the appellate court’s role is not to re‑weigh factors afresh, but to guard against error and excess.

4. Precedential Value and Impact

4.1 Road rage and deliberate targeting with a vehicle

The case is a clear modern example of how the courts will treat road rage incidents where the vehicle is effectively used as a weapon. The key messages for future cases are:

Even if the incident is short and arises from a heated, mutually aggressive situation, deliberately driving at another person will almost inevitably attract:
- High culpability (Category A) under the dangerous driving guidelines; and
- A custodial sentence towards the upper end of the relevant guideline range.
The fact that the confrontation began with aggression by the victim does not excuse turning a vehicle into an instrument of harm. Provocation may provide some background but will not outweigh the intentionality of the dangerous driving.

Practitioners can expect that in similar road rage settings, especially with robust visual evidence, courts will treat “split‑second” decisions to drive at someone as deliberate high‑risk behaviour rather than heat‑of‑the‑moment lapses.

4.2 Child passenger as a significant aggravating factor

The decision underscores the aggravating importance of having a young child in the vehicle:

The presence of a six‑year‑old was not neutral, nor did it support the argument that the appellant was acting to protect his child from hostility.
Instead, by choosing to drive in a highly dangerous way with the child in the front passenger seat, the appellant directly exposed her to danger. This enhanced the gravity of the offence.

For future sentencing, this reinforces that:

Where children are present in an offender’s car, any deliberate or grossly reckless driving will likely be treated as more serious;
Attempts to rely on parental concern as a mitigating narrative will be carefully tested against objective evidence (e.g. CCTV).

4.3 Guilty plea credit where charges change

The ruling offers useful guidance on how credit for a guilty plea operates when the charge is amended or downgraded:

If, at an early stage, the defendant could have admitted the core criminal behaviour (e.g. dangerous driving) but chose not to, that will undermine any claim later that he pleaded guilty at the “first opportunity” to a revised charge that still rests on the same essential facts.
A later guilty plea, even to a new or less serious count, will often merit only a reduced discount (e.g. 15%) if the defendant has previously required the prosecution and the court to prepare for trial and maintained a positive defence.

This has practical implications for both:

Defence practitioners – early advice should focus on whether dangerous driving (or other essential elements) can realistically be denied; if not, it may be tactically wise to secure full credit by early admission and then negotiate over the precise charge.
Prosecutors – when reviewing and amending charges, it will be important to document when the defendant first accepted the core factual basis that underpins the final count, to resist over‑generous credit claims.

4.4 Disqualification and extended re-test

Although a relatively minor aspect, the Court’s brief treatment of the driving disqualification is also instructive:

The Court noted that the record showed a requirement for an extended re‑test and no challenge was raised to length or structure.
Absent evidence that the trial judge had not in fact imposed such a requirement, the Court saw no basis for interference and declined to amend the record.

This reinforces the principle that the Court of Appeal will require clear evidence before altering the recorded terms of sentence, and will not re‑craft ancillary orders unless a real error is shown.

4.5 Treatment of associated summary offences

Finally, the Court mentions “summary only offences” and indicates it is “minded not to take any action” in respect of them, noting that had matters been dealt with correctly no separate penalty would have been imposed and leaving it to the prosecution to consider further action in the magistrates’ court.

This underlines:

The Court’s concern with ensuring that no improper double punishment is imposed for associated lesser matters; and
That procedural defects regarding such summary matters may appropriately be left to be sorted at the magistrates’ court if necessary, rather than being subsumed within the appellate exercise.

5. Explanation of Key Legal Concepts

5.1 Causing serious injury by dangerous driving

This offence involves:

Dangerous driving – driving that falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver, and which would be obviously dangerous to such a driver; and
Serious injury – more than minor or moderate harm, often requiring significant medical treatment or having lasting impact.

It is distinct from:

Simple dangerous driving – where no serious injury results; and
Wounding with intent – a serious non‑driving violence offence focusing on intent to cause grievous bodily harm.

5.2 Culpability and harm categories (A2)

Sentencing guidelines commonly use a grid of:

Culpability (how blameworthy the conduct is); and
Harm (how severe the consequences are).

For causing serious injury by dangerous driving:

Culpability A – very serious or deliberate driving misconduct;
Harm 2 – serious but not the most catastrophic injuries.

Category A2 yields:

A starting point sentence (here, 3 years); and
A range within which the judge can move up or down (here, 2–4 years), depending on aggravating and mitigating factors.

5.3 “Starting point” and “range”

The starting point is the sentence that a judge should generally impose for a case with standard features within that category, after trial and before plea discount. The range is the bracket within which the judge can move to reflect individual case factors.

In Davis, the judge:

Started at the guideline starting point of 3 years for A2; then
Moved upwards within the range to 43 months post‑trial due to aggravation; then
Applied a 15% discount for the guilty plea, resulting in 36 months.

5.4 “Manifestly excessive” and appellate intervention

When reviewing sentence, the Court of Appeal asks:

Was the sentence wrong in principle? (e.g. wrong guideline, miscalculated range, double counting); or
Even if correct in principle, is it so high that it can be said to be “manifestly excessive” given the facts?

If not, the sentence will stand, even if the Court might personally have imposed a slightly different term. In Davis, the Court firmly holds that 3 years was not manifestly excessive within the A2 range.

5.5 Credit for a guilty plea

Under the Sentencing Council’s guideline on guilty pleas, maximum credit (usually up to one‑third) is given where the defendant pleads guilty at the first reasonable opportunity, typically the first court hearing. As time passes and trial preparation progresses, the available discount reduces.

Factors considered include:

How early the defendant accepts guilt;
Whether their plea saves witnesses from giving evidence;
The stage of the criminal process when the plea is entered.

In Davis:

The appellant had denied dangerous driving at the PTPH, thereby denying the core behaviour later admitted;
He only pleaded guilty after the addition of the new count, which still relied on dangerous driving;
A 15% discount therefore reflected a relatively late plea in the process.

5.6 Home Detention Curfew (HDC)

The prison report noted that the appellant was on home detention curfew. HDC allows certain prisoners to be released early on licence, subject to an electronic tag and curfew, provided statutory and risk‑based criteria are met. It does not alter the length of the sentence imposed by the court, but affects the period served in custody versus in the community.

5.7 Extended re-test

The driving disqualification included a requirement for an extended re‑test, meaning that, before the appellant can regain his licence after disqualification, he must:

Pass a more demanding driving test than an ordinary learner test; and
Demonstrate a higher standard of driving competence.

This requirement is commonly imposed in serious driving cases to ensure public protection.

5.8 Summary only offences and magistrates’ court

“Summary only” offences can only be tried in the magistrates’ court. The Court of Appeal’s reference to such offences in this case indicates that:

There were additional minor matters linked to the incident; and
The Court did not impose any separate penalty or adjust them, leaving it to the prosecution to consider any steps in the magistrates’ court.

6. Conclusion

R v Davis [2025] EWCA Crim 1485 confirms and clarifies several important points in the law of sentencing for serious driving offences:

Road rage and vehicles as weapons: Deliberately driving at another road user, even in a short‑lived incident, will almost certainly be viewed as high culpability conduct under the causing serious injury by dangerous driving guideline.
Limits of provocation: Earlier aggression or provocation by the victim does not excuse or substantially mitigate the deliberate decision to use a vehicle in a highly dangerous way once an opportunity to withdraw exists.
Children as aggravating factors: The presence of a young child in the offender’s vehicle, particularly where they are exposed to risk, is a substantial aggravating factor that can justify sentences towards the upper end of the guideline range.
Guilty plea credit and amended charges: Defendants cannot typically secure “first opportunity” credit merely because a lesser or differently framed charge is added later, if they previously denied the essential criminal behaviour (such as dangerous driving) on which the final offence is based.
Appellate restraint: Where a sentencing judge correctly applies the guidelines, makes rational findings on objective evidence, and conducts a balanced assessment of aggravation and mitigation, the Court of Appeal will be slow to interfere.

In sum, Davis stands as a robust affirmation of firm sentencing for dangerous road rage incidents, a clear warning about the weight attached to endangering child passengers, and a practical illustration of how guilty plea discounts operate when a defendant has delayed accepting the core facts of their offending. It will be a useful reference point for judges, prosecutors and defence practitioners alike in cases of causing serious injury by dangerous driving and in negotiating and assessing late pleas following amended indictments.