R v Corner [2025] EWCA Crim 1647: Mental Health, Voluntary Intoxication and Sentencing for Domestic Attempted Murder

1. Introduction

This commentary analyses the decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v Corner [2025] EWCA Crim 1647, a case concerning:

a serious domestic attempted murder involving multiple stab wounds with a kitchen knife;
a concurrent conviction for possession of a bladed article;
the interaction between mental health difficulties and voluntary intoxication in sentencing;
the Court’s approach to psychiatric evidence and the requirement of expert impartiality; and
the proper application of the Sentencing Council guidelines on attempted murder, domestic abuse, and mental disorders.

The applicant, Steven Corner, aged 53, pleaded guilty to attempted murder of his long-term partner, Ms Sarah Coulson, and to having an article with a blade or point. The sentencing judge (HHJ Paul Sloan KC, at Newcastle upon Tyne Crown Court) imposed:

20 years' imprisonment for attempted murder; and
12 months' imprisonment concurrently for the bladed article offence.

Mr Corner sought leave to appeal his sentence, arguing essentially that:

insufficient weight was given to his mitigation, especially his long-standing mental health difficulties;
the sentencing judge placed too much weight on the fact that he had "taken a knife to the scene" and insufficient weight on the short distance involved; and
the harm was wrongly assessed as “Category 2” under the attempted murder guideline.

The single judge refused permission on the papers. The application was then renewed to the full court, represented by Mr J Smith pro bono. MR JUSTICE MURRAY, delivering the court’s judgment, refused the renewed application.

Note: This commentary is for academic and informational purposes only. It is not legal advice.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 The offending

The parties had been in a four-year domestic relationship, living together in South Shields. The relationship deteriorated following the applicant’s loss of employment, onset of anxiety, and heavy alcohol use. Prior to the index offence there were episodes of controlling and physically intrusive behaviour (e.g. blocking Ms Coulson from leaving; forcing entry on Christmas Eve), described as “manhandling” but not involving punches or slaps.

The applicant attended residential alcohol rehabilitation shortly before the incident and returned home on the understanding that he would abstain from alcohol. On 19–20 January 2024 he relapsed, drinking heavily through the night. When confronted by Ms Coulson, she ended the relationship and indicated the house would be sold.

Later that day, after further drinking, the applicant:

took an 8-inch kitchen knife from a cupboard;
told her in a deadpan tone, “I’m not going to let you go Sarah”;
prevented her using her phone by grabbing it from her;
chased her into the street and stabbed her repeatedly, including twice in the back and several times to the arms, described as “ferociously”; and
had to be stopped by neighbours who intervened at some personal risk.

Medical evidence showed at least seven knife wounds and a fractured little finger. The wounds narrowly missed vital body cavities “by a matter of millimetres”. They initially received conservative treatment but later required surgery under general anaesthetic, including nerve repair. She was left with permanent scarring and a mild finger deformity. Psychologically, she described herself as “broken”, unable to function, off work for six months, with long-term loss of strength, resilience and confidence.

The applicant fled, hiding in outbuildings and then at his caravan, where he was arrested the next day. In interview he answered “no comment”. He had no previous convictions and was otherwise of positive good character.

2.2 Sentencing at first instance

At the Crown Court the judge had a full suite of pre-sentence material, including:

a pre-sentence report;
prosecution and defence psychiatric reports (Dr Chakrabarti for the Crown; Dr Kahtan for the defence), each with an addendum;
a detailed victim personal statement;
mitigation materials and character references; and
photographic and medical evidence of the injuries.

Key sentencing findings were:

The offence fell within culpability category B (high culpability) under the Sentencing Council’s Attempted Murder guideline, because the applicant had taken a knife to the scene and used it.
The harm was Category 2 (serious harm, but not the very highest level in Category 1) given the number and seriousness of wounds, the need for surgery, and profound psychological effects.
For a B2 attempted murder the guideline gives a starting point of 25 years’ custody and a range of 20–30 years.
The judge reduced the sentence somewhat below the starting point to reflect the short distance the knife was carried from the house to the precise location of the attack.

Aggravating features included:

voluntary intoxication, despite recent rehabilitation and explicit warnings from the victim;
the domestic context, amounting to an abuse of trust and power in the victim’s home;
preventing the victim calling for help by seizing her phone;
the public nature of the attack in the street in front of neighbours; and
persistence in the attack despite the victim’s pleas and initial neighbour intervention.

Mitigating factors included:

previous good character and positive references;
some limited mitigation from longstanding anxiety and depression, albeit exacerbated by alcohol;
absence of “significant planning or premeditation”, though some premeditation was accepted;
the short distance the knife was carried; and
genuine remorse and constructive use of time in custody.

On mental health, the judge applied the Sentencing Council guideline on offenders with mental disorders and concluded that the applicant’s mental health did not reduce his culpability. The predominant cause of the offence was his voluntary alcohol consumption, which worsened his existing mental health problems. The mental health issues therefore amounted only to “some limited mitigation”.

The judge:

fixed a notional post-trial sentence below the 25-year starting point;
allowed a little over 13% credit for a late guilty plea on re-arraignment shortly before trial; and
imposed 20 years’ imprisonment for the attempted murder.

He made the bladed article sentence concurrent, imposed an indefinite restraining order to protect Ms Coulson, and a deprivation order in relation to the knife. He concluded that the statutory “dangerousness” test was not met and that a determinate sentence provided adequate public protection.

2.3 The appeal and its outcome

On appeal, the applicant argued that:

the judge gave insufficient weight to the cumulative mitigation (good character, remorse, mental health, short distance of knife, etc.);
the judge should have treated his mental disorder as more substantially reducing culpability, particularly in light of defence psychiatrist Dr Kahtan’s evidence that earlier intervention might have prevented the offence;
the judge did not sufficiently reduce the sentence to recognise the short distance over which he carried the knife; and
the judge was wrong to categorise the case as Category 2 harm and should have treated it as between Category 2 and Category 3.

The single judge refused permission, characterising the 20-year term as perhaps “on the stern side” but not excessive. The full court agreed:

There was no arguable error in assessing the harm as serious Category 2 harm, given the number of stab wounds and profound psychological effects.
The sentencing judge was entitled to find that the root cause of the offending was voluntary drinking, not mental illness, and to regard the mental health aspects only as limited mitigation.
The court endorsed the judge’s preference for the prosecution psychiatrist’s evidence, criticising the defence report as “prolix, unfocused, and [displaying] a lack of impartiality”.
After back-calculating the sentence without plea discount, the court noted that the resulting 23-year figure was still below the 25-year guideline starting point.
In light of the guideline range (20–30 years) and the aggravating and mitigating features, the 20-year sentence was “clearly within the range that was open to [the judge]”.

The Court of Appeal therefore refused the renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence.

3. Precedents and Normative Frameworks Applied

3.1 Absence of named case law, reliance on guidelines

The judgment as provided does not cite specific earlier appellate decisions by name. Instead, it relies heavily on Sentencing Council guidelines and well-established general appellate principles.

Nevertheless, the structure of the reasoning clearly reflects:

the Attempted Murder guideline (culpability/harm matrix and 25-year starting point for B2 offences);
the guideline on Domestic Abuse (emphasising abuse of trust and the sanctity of the home);
the guideline on Sentencing Offenders with Mental Disorders, Developmental Disorders or Neurological Impairments; and
the Possession of Bladed Articles and Offensive Weapons guideline (used for the secondary count).

In addition, the Court’s approach reflects the usual appellate principles that:

an appeal against sentence will succeed only if the sentence is wrong in principle or manifestly excessive, or if the judge misapplied or departed from guidelines without justification;
it is not enough that the sentence is merely “stern” or that the appellate court might have chosen a slightly different figure;
sentencing is a matter of judgment within a reasonable range, and appellate courts respect the trial judge’s advantage in assessing the facts and mitigation in context.

3.2 “Taking a knife to the scene” – high culpability

Both the sentencing judge and the Court of Appeal treated the case as falling within Culpability B (high culpability) because the applicant had taken a knife to the scene and used it. This phrase is standard within the attempted murder guideline and has been elaborated in earlier case law, though those cases are not named here.

The core principle is:

if an offender arms himself in advance (even with a household knife) and then goes on to use it in a serious assault, this shows a higher level of culpability than a spontaneous, unarmed assault where a weapon is not pre-armed;
the “scene” need not be a distant location; taking the knife from inside the home to outside the door or street can suffice.

What is relatively nuanced in this case is the judge’s use of the short distance the knife was carried as a mitigating factor within the B2 category. The Court of Appeal endorsed that approach: the fact that the knife was fetched from the kitchen and carried only a short distance outside justified a modest reduction from the 25-year starting point, but did not dislodge the case from the B2 categorisation.

3.3 Mental disorders guideline and voluntary intoxication

The sentencing judge expressly applied the Sentencing Council guideline on offenders with mental disorders. That guideline requires:

examination of whether the disorder genuinely impaired the offender’s ability to understand their conduct, form rational judgment, or exercise self-control; and
an assessment of how far this impairment caused or contributed to the offence in a way that should reduce culpability.

The Court of Appeal endorsed the judge’s evaluation that:

the applicant’s anxiety and depression were exacerbated by his voluntary consumption of alcohol;
the “root cause” of the offending was that drinking, particularly given the recent detoxification and warnings; and
the mental health difficulties therefore afforded limited mitigation only, not a substantial reduction in culpability.

This is fully consistent with the established principle that voluntary intoxication, especially when it aggravates an existing condition, will rarely justify a large reduction in culpability, although it may, in some cases, contribute to personal mitigation (where, for example, the substance misuse is itself tightly bound up with underlying mental health problems). Here, the court took the view that drink, not illness, was the main driver.

4. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.1 Threshold for appellate intervention in sentence

Although not spelt out in formal terms, the Court applied the orthodox standard: it asked whether the sentencing judge’s decision was outside the range of sentences properly open to him, having regard to the guidelines and case facts.

Key features of the Court’s reasoning on this point were:

The guideline range for a B2 attempted murder is 20–30 years, with a 25-year starting point.
After allowing plea credit of “a little over 13%”, the judge reached 20 years. Working backwards, this implies a post-trial sentence of about 23 years.
The Court expressly noted that 23 years is below the 25-year starting point, indicating that the judge had already moved downwards to reflect mitigation, including the short distance the knife was carried.
In that context, and given the significant aggravating factors, the chosen figure of 20 years could not be considered excessive or outside the guideline range.

This method—reverse-calculating the after-trial sentence from the final sentence and the plea discount—is common in appellate sentencing review and allows the court to check whether the sentencer has meaningfully engaged with guideline starting points, ranges, and mitigating factors.

4.2 Assessment of harm: Category 2 versus lower

The defence sought to characterise the harm as between Category 2 and Category 3, on the basis that the injuries ultimately were not life-threatening and that there had been no long-term physical disability.

The Court firmly rejected that submission:

There were at least seven stab wounds, including two to the back, delivered with significant force.
The wounds missed vital body cavities by millimetres; the lack of fatal or catastrophic injury was attributed implicitly to good fortune rather than lack of intent or seriousness.
There was significant surgical intervention, including general anaesthetic and nerve repair.
The psychological harm was described as profound, leading to six months off work and long-term emotional consequences.

On these facts, the Court found it was not arguable that the harm was anything less than serious harm (Category 2). This illustrates an important point: the seriousness of harm is assessed holistically, taking into account:

the nature and number of injuries;
how close the victim came to more serious harm or death;
the extent of medical treatment; and
lasting psychological effects.

The fact that the victim did not die or suffer catastrophic physical disability does not preclude a Category 2 assessment where the overall picture is so grave.

4.3 Culpability and the “short distance” factor

Under the guideline, taking a knife to the scene presumptively places the case in Culpability B. The defence accepted that this was technically so but argued that the very short distance involved should have generated a more significant reduction in sentence.

The judge expressly:

classified the case as B2 because the applicant took a knife from inside the house to outside;
acknowledged that the knife was carried only a short distance (from kitchen cupboard to just outside the property); and
indicated that he would reduce the notional sentence below the 25-year starting point to reflect this.

The Court of Appeal endorsed this approach: the short distance was a moderating factor, but it did not displace the case from high culpability. In other words:

Once an offender arms himself and then pursues the victim with the weapon, the culpability is already high.
The fact that the weapon came from an adjoining part of the same premises, rather than a more distant location, lightens but does not transform the assessment.

4.4 Treatment of mental health and voluntary intoxication

A central issue was whether the applicant’s mental health difficulties should have substantially reduced his culpability.

There were two psychiatric reports:

Dr Chakrabarti (for the prosecution), whose evidence was considered measured, focused, and impartial; and
Dr Kahtan (for the defence), whose reports the Court described as “prolix, unfocused, and [displaying] a lack of impartiality”, particularly the addendum which devoted a long section to rebutting the author of the pre-sentence report.

The Court held that the sentencing judge was entitled to prefer the evidence of Dr Chakrabarti and to conclude:

the applicant suffered from anxiety and depression, especially in relation to work and physical health;
however, these difficulties were not of a severity or nature that reduced his criminal responsibility for the offence;
the offending was primarily driven by his voluntary decision to drink excessively, knowing the risks given his history, recent detoxification, and the victim’s clear boundaries; and
accordingly, the mental health factors were properly treated as limited mitigation rather than a substantial reduction of culpability.

The Court rejected the suggestion that it could interfere with this evaluative judgment: the sentencing judge’s conclusion “was open to him on the evidence”, and there was no proper basis to disturb it.

4.5 Expert impartiality and the role of psychiatric evidence

Of broader significance is the Court’s comment on the defence psychiatric report:

“We … found [Dr Kahtan’s reports] to be prolix, unfocused, and to display a lack of impartiality. This was especially notable in his addendum prepared for sentencing where he spent paragraphs 6 to 24 of the addendum seeking, in effect, to argue with and to rebut the conclusions of the author of the pre-sentence report.”

This reinforces established principles under the Criminal Procedure Rules and the common law that:

an expert’s primary duty is to the court, not to the instructing party;
expert evidence should be objective, reasoned and fair, not advocacy in disguise;
reports should be focused on relevant clinical and forensic issues, not extended polemics against other professionals; and
where a report is plainly partisan or unbalanced, a sentencing judge is fully entitled to give it limited weight or prefer another expert.

The case therefore serves as a cautionary tale for defence experts in criminal proceedings: strategic or adversarial tone can undermine rather than assist the client’s position.

4.6 Domestic abuse and aggravating factors

The Court emphasised several features as aggravating in line with the Domestic Abuse guideline:

The victim was the applicant’s long-term partner, living with him in what should have been a place of safety.
The attack followed a period of controlling and unsettling behaviour linked to his drinking.
The offender exploited the intimate, domestic context and her vulnerability within that context.
He seized her phone, preventing her from calling for help—a recognised aggravating feature in many guidelines (obstruction of assistance / trapping the victim).
The ultimate attack took place in the street, in front of neighbours, causing further alarm, and the offender persisted despite cries for help and initial public intervention.

These factors demonstrate a pattern of:

escalating domestic abuse; and
continuing determination to cause very serious harm or death until physically interrupted by third parties.

The Court appears to accept, without needing to verbalise it in doctrinal terms, that but for the intervention of neighbours, the victim might well have been killed. This understanding informs the seriousness with which the case is treated.

4.7 Dangerousness and extended sentences

The sentencing judge decided not to impose an extended sentence or discretionary life sentence. He found that the statutory test for “dangerousness” was not met—namely, he was not satisfied that there was a significant risk of the applicant committing further specified offences.

The Court of Appeal did not disturb this conclusion, and indeed it appears to have been unchallenged on appeal. The significance is:

Even in cases of extreme seriousness, where very high determinate sentences are imposed, the dangerousness test remains distinct and is not automatically satisfied;
The applicant’s age, previous good character, and mental health background allowed the judge to take the view that a long determinate sentence alone provided adequate protection without the additional complexities of an extended licence period.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Attempted murder and sentencing categories

Attempted murder involves doing an act that is more than merely preparatory to killing another person, with the intention to kill. Unlike many other offences, it is not sufficient to intend serious bodily harm; the intent must be to cause death.

The Sentencing Council’s Attempted Murder guideline uses a two-dimensional grid:

Culpability (A–D) – how blameworthy the offender is, based on factors like planning, use of weapons, vulnerability of the victim, etc.; and
Harm (1–3) – the level of harm caused or intended, from Category 1 (very high) to Category 3 (lesser harm).

In this case, the court found:

Culpability B – high culpability, mainly because the applicant armed himself with a knife and used it; and
Harm Category 2 – serious physical and psychological harm, but not at the very highest level.

This yields a starting point of 25 years and a guideline range of 20–30 years.

5.2 Harm categories

Very broadly (simplifying):

Category 1: extremely grave harm (e.g. near-fatal injuries, life-changing disabilities, or a combination of multiple grave harms).
Category 2: serious harm, significant injury and/or serious psychological harm, but less than the very worst cases.
Category 3: lesser harm (e.g. some injury or distress but not at the serious or long-lasting level).

Here, multiple stab wounds, surgery, permanent scarring, and profound long-term psychological damage squarely point to Category 2.

5.3 Culpability categories and “taking a knife to the scene”

Culpability looks at factors showing how seriously blameworthy the offender was, including:

planning and premeditation;
use of weapons, particularly if carried to the scene;
targeting vulnerable victims; and
persistence and determination to cause harm.

“Took a knife to the scene” is a shorthand for the offender arming himself in advance of the assault by bringing a knife to where the victim is encountered. In domestic settings, “the scene” can mean moving from one part of the house (e.g. kitchen) to another (e.g. doorway or outside) where the attack is carried out.

5.4 Voluntary intoxication and mental disorder

In sentencing:

Voluntary intoxication (choosing to drink or take drugs) is normally not a mitigating factor. It can be aggravating, especially where the offender has been warned about the dangers.
Mental disorders can, in appropriate cases, reduce culpability if they impair judgment, self-control or understanding. But that reduction depends on severity, causal connection to the offence, and expert evidence.
Where mental health issues are made worse by voluntary substance use, any reduction in culpability may be limited, as here.

5.5 Plea discounts

Under the Sentencing Council’s Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea guideline:

an early guilty plea (at first reasonable opportunity) can attract up to a one-third reduction in sentence;
a plea entered late, close to trial, attracts a smaller discount (typically around 10–20% depending on timing).

The judge allowed “a little over 13%” in this case, reflecting a plea at re-arraignment shortly before trial. The Court considered that generosity “arguably generous” and certainly not erroneous.

5.6 Dangerousness and extended sentences

Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, certain serious offences may attract an extended sentence if:

there is a significant risk that the offender will commit further specified offences; and
an extended licence period is necessary for public protection.

Here, despite the exceptional seriousness of the offence, the judge was not satisfied that such a risk existed, particularly given:

the applicant’s age and background of good character;
his mental health context; and
the judge’s view that a long determinate sentence was sufficient to protect the public.

6. Impact and Broader Significance

6.1 Sentencing for domestic attempted murder

The case reinforces that domestic attempted murder with a knife, involving:

multiple stab wounds;
near-miss life-threatening injuries;
serious psychological consequences; and
aggravating features such as public attack and preventing a call for help,

will attract very long custodial sentences in the 20+ year range, even for a previously law-abiding, well-educated person with good character references.

The case therefore provides a clear indicator for future cases:

for B2 domestic attempted murder with comparable features, sentences around 20–25 years (after trial) are within the appropriate range;
the fact that a victim survives or avoids catastrophic injury by chance does not significantly reduce seriousness where intent to kill is clear and the harm is serious.

6.2 Mental health mitigation and alcohol

R v Corner is particularly instructive on the limits of mental health mitigation when the offending is driven mainly by voluntary intoxication:

Longstanding anxiety and depression, though relevant, may provide only modest mitigation unless they directly and significantly impair decision-making or self-control at the time of offending.
Where an offender knows that alcohol exacerbates their mental health difficulties and has been warned about it (as here, with recent detox and the victim’s ultimatum), choosing to drink can be a powerful aggravating factor, not a mitigating one.

The decision is likely to be cited in future to support a cautious approach where defendants seek major sentence reductions on the basis of mental health when substantial voluntary substance abuse is also present.

6.3 Appellate scrutiny of psychiatric evidence

The Court’s criticism of the defence psychiatric report has broader ramifications:

It underlines that expert witnesses who appear to advocate for one side, or engage in extended rebuttals of other professionals rather than focusing on clinical analysis, may see their evidence discounted or rejected.
It confirms that sentencing judges are entitled to choose between competing experts and prefer the one whose report is more balanced, structured and consistent with the totality of the evidence.
For defence practitioners, it is a reminder to ensure that experts are properly briefed on their duty to the court and the need for brevity, focus, and impartiality.

6.4 Domestic abuse as an aggravating context

The judgment is also part of the continuing line of authority that treats domestic abuse as especially serious:

Domestic relationships create particular vulnerabilities, including emotional and financial dependence.
The home should be a place of sanctuary; violence in this setting is, in itself, highly aggravating.
Courts are increasingly explicit in addressing the coercive, controlling and escalating nature of domestic abuse, even if earlier incidents did not involve serious physical injury.

R v Corner fits that narrative: the earlier “manhandling” and erratic behaviour form a backdrop to a final, near-fatal explosion of violence. The sentence reflects society’s insistence on robust protection for victims of domestic abuse.

6.5 Clarifying the role of “stern” but lawful sentences

The single judge acknowledged that the 20-year sentence was “perhaps on the stern side” but ultimately considered it not excessive. The full court agreed.

This distinction is important:

An appellate court does not reduce every sentence that appears severe; it intervenes only where the sentence is wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.
If the sentence is firm but within the guideline range and supported by a reasoned balancing of factors, it will generally be left undisturbed.

This reinforces the trial judge’s margin of appreciation in serious violent cases, particularly where they have carefully engaged with guidelines and supporting material.

7. Conclusion

R v Corner [2025] EWCA Crim 1647 is an important sentencing decision in the context of domestic attempted murder with a knife. Although it does not radically change the law, it clarifies and reinforces several key principles:

Domestic attempted murder with multiple stabbings and serious physical and psychological harm will ordinarily attract very high sentences within the 20–30 year range.
Where an offender has taken a knife to the scene, even over a short distance within or just outside the home, high culpability (B) is appropriate; the short distance may modestly reduce the sentence but does not remove the case from that category.
Mental health difficulties that are exacerbated by voluntary alcohol use will often carry only limited mitigating weight unless there is clear evidence that the disorder substantially impaired culpability independent of the intoxication.
Appellate courts will support sentencing judges who prefer measured and impartial psychiatric evidence over prolix and partisan reports, reaffirming the centrality of expert impartiality.
The presence of domestic abuse, abuse of trust, public attack and prevention of calls for help are all powerful aggravating features that substantially elevate sentence.
A sentence that is “stern” but firmly within guideline ranges, and justified by a careful balancing of aggravation and mitigation, will not be interfered with on appeal.

In the broader legal context, the case provides a clear, modern example of how the Sentencing Council’s guidelines on attempted murder, domestic abuse, and mental disorders interlock in a serious domestic violence scenario, and how appellate courts assess sentencing decisions for such grave offences.