R v Cobley [2025] EWCA Crim 1592: Genuine Intent vs Sexual Fantasy in Online Child Sex Stings and Sentencing Where the “Child” Is Fictitious

1. Introduction

R v Cobley [2025] EWCA Crim 1592 concerns the modern policing of child sexual offences in an online environment and the criminal law’s response to “sting” operations using fictitious children. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), presided over by Lewis LJ, refused Jonathan Cobley’s renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction and dismissed his appeal against sentence.

The case is important in three main respects:

It clarifies the distinction between sexual “fantasy” talk and genuine criminal intent in the context of internet communications, and limits the application of earlier authorities such as R v Hedgcock and R v G.
It confirms that in an offence of arranging or facilitating the commission of a child sexual offence with a fictitious child, the sentencing judge may properly assess seriousness by reference to the intended underlying offence and the vulnerability which the offender believed the child to have.
It approves the admission of bad character evidence (including uncharged overseas sexual conduct) both as propensity evidence and to rebut a false impression created by the defendant in police interview, and upholds an indefinite Sexual Harm Prevention Order (SHPO) even for a first-time offender in a “single episode” case.

2. Background and Facts

In February 2022 the appellant contacted a website offering adult sexual services, responding to an advert for “fresh, fun girls”. The number advertised led to an undercover police officer, operating as “Veronica”, in an operation designed to detect men prepared to arrange underage sexual services.

Key facts included:

Initial contact (8 February 2022):
- “Veronica” told the appellant there were “young teens” available.
- He rang back on a withheld number, asked what ages that meant, and was told underage girls were available.
- He suggested ages 12, 13 and 14. “Veronica” said a 13-year-old was available.
- He requested “full service” but then hung up.
Further contact (15 February 2022):
- The appellant again called on a withheld number.
- He asked specifically for a 12-year-old brunette.
- When asked to confirm the activities he wanted the girl to perform, he replied: “sex, oral, shower and massage”.
- A fee of £250 for unprotected sex with the 12-year-old was agreed.
- A location was arranged for the meeting.
- He later called to say he was on his way, but he never attended the location.

In police interview, without a solicitor, the appellant:

Accepted the calls but claimed he believed “Veronica” was part of a vigilante or entrapment group.
Said he was “curious” and that his participation was a “wind up”.
Insisted he had no sexual interest in children and no intention to meet or pay for an underage girl.
Pointed out that he had not withdrawn the agreed £250; bank checks confirmed no such transaction on his account.

It was common ground that, had the arrangements been carried out with a real 12-year-old, the conduct would have constituted rape of a child under 13 contrary to section 5 Sexual Offences Act 2003.

The Crown’s case on intent relied on a number of features said to support an inference that he genuinely meant to commit the offence, including:

The deliberate, realistic tone of the conversations, with no obvious fantasy or hyperbole.
The choice of a local agency, making attendance practical.
The fact that he called the number 39 times in a short period, indicative of persistent genuine interest.
Providing details of his car and stating he was travelling to the location.

In addition, the Crown sought to admit bad character evidence of an earlier Skype conversation with a woman in the Philippines, during which a fee was negotiated to see a 7‑year‑old girl naked. The Crown argued that this:

Showed a sexual interest in young girls (propensity), and
Rebutted the false impression given in interview that the appellant had no such sexual interest.

The trial judge:

Rejected a defence submission of “no case to answer” at the end of the prosecution case.
Admitted the bad character evidence.

The appellant did not give evidence. He called character witnesses. He was:

Convicted of arranging or facilitating the rape of a child under 13, and
Acquitted of another count.

He received:

6 years’ imprisonment, and
An indefinite Sexual Harm Prevention Order (SHPO).

3. Issues Before the Court of Appeal

The appeal raised four main issues:

Conviction – sufficiency of evidence / “no case to answer”: Whether the judge should have withdrawn the case from the jury on the basis that the communications might have been sexual fantasy or a “wind up” rather than evidence of real intent to commit rape, relying in particular on R v Hedgcock [2007] EWCA Crim 3486 and R v G [2012] EWCA Crim 1756.
Conviction – admissibility of bad character: Whether it was unfair and unduly prejudicial to admit evidence of the Skype conversation involving a 7‑year‑old in the Philippines, given that it was only a single incident and had resulted in no conviction.
Sentence – approach to harm and vulnerability: Whether the sentencing judge was wrong to:
- Treat a non-existent 12-year-old as a “particularly vulnerable” victim for guideline purposes, and
- Use the guideline for completed child rape (with a ten-year starting point) before making a reduction.
Sentence – proportionality and SHPO: Whether:
- The reduction to six years’ imprisonment was sufficient to reflect personal mitigation and the fact that the appellant did not attend the meeting, and
- An indefinite SHPO was justified in a case involving a single episode and a man of previous good character.

4. Summary of the Judgment

Lewis LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, held:

No case to answer: The trial judge was entitled to leave the case to the jury. This was not a “fantasy” case of the kind considered in Hedgcock or G; the commercial, realistic nature of the negotiations and the surrounding circumstances were capable of supporting an inference of genuine intent.
Bad character: The evidence of the Skype conversation with the woman in the Philippines was properly admitted. It was relevant to show sexual interest in young girls (propensity) and to rebut the false impression that the appellant had no such interest. Its weight was a matter for the jury.
Sentence:
- It was correct to assess the seriousness by reference to the intended offence of child rape, using the applicable guideline (category 2B, starting at 10 years).
- The sentencing judge was entitled to treat the notional victim as particularly vulnerable by reason of the circumstances as believed by the appellant (a prostituted 12‑year‑old exploited for adult sexual gratification).
- The reduction from 10 years to 6 years to reflect non-completion, desistance, and personal mitigation amounted to a “substantial reduction”; the sentence was not manifestly excessive.
- The indefinite SHPO was justified given the seriousness of what the appellant had sought to arrange; the absence of previous convictions and the short episode did not make an indefinite order wrong in principle.

The renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused, and the appeal against sentence was dismissed.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 The Offence of Arranging or Facilitating a Child Sexual Offence

Although the judgment does not quote the statutory provision, the relevant offence is that of arranging or facilitating the commission of a child sexual offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (section 14 or a related provision). The prosecution must prove, broadly:

That the defendant arranged or facilitated something, and
That he did so intending that what he arranged or facilitated would involve the commission of a child sexual offence, here rape of a child under 13 (section 5).

A crucial feature of such offences is that the child need not exist, and no sexual act need actually be performed. It is enough that:

The defendant believes a child is or will be involved, and
Intends that the sexual offence will be committed.

Cobley therefore concerned an inchoate offence—criminalising steps taken towards a grave sexual offence, even where the victim is a police fiction.

5.2 Sufficiency of Evidence and the “Fantasy” Defence

5.2.1 The Appellant’s Argument

On appeal the principal attack on the conviction was that the judge should have upheld a submission of “no case to answer” at the close of the prosecution case. The defence argument, led by Mr Bhatia KC, proceeded on these lines:

The communications were capable of being interpreted as sexual fantasy or a “wind up”, not as genuine criminal planning.
The appellant’s explanation in interview—that he believed he was engaging with vigilantes or an entrapment group and was simply arousing or testing them—could not be ruled out.
Other explanations inconsistent with intent to commit a real offence could not be safely discounted on the evidence before the jury.
Applying the reasoning in R v Hedgcock and R v G, it would be unsafe to allow a jury to infer real intent from the online or telephonic exchanges alone, absent solid extraneous evidence pointing to execution of the plan.

5.2.2 The Court’s Response

The Court of Appeal rejected that submission. Although the well-known test in R v Galbraith is not cited, the court’s reasoning tracks its logic: the question is whether a properly directed jury could safely convict on the evidence, not whether the court considers it likely.

Lewis LJ emphasised that this was not a case of two paedophiles exchanging fantasies online. The court highlighted:

The commercial context—the appellant had telephoned a number on a website advertising sexual services; the conversation was framed as a client negotiating with a supplier, not as two individuals mutually arousing each other with imagined scenarios.
The nature and tone of the discussions: “deliberate and realistic”, “no obvious fantasy or hyperbole”.
The fact that the appellant:
- Expressly requested a 12-year-old for sexual purposes,
- Negotiated the price, including a premium for unprotected sex,
- Specified the sexual acts (“sex, oral, shower and massage”),
- Agreed a location and claimed he was en route,
- Chose a local agency—making attendance realistic, and
- Rang the number 39 times within a week.

The Court held that these features together plainly entitled the trial judge to leave the case to the jury. A reasonable jury could properly regard the appellant’s “wind up” explanation as implausible and find, beyond reasonable doubt, that he intended the rape of a 12‑year‑old.

5.2.3 Distinguishing R v Hedgcock and R v G

The Court engaged directly with the authorities relied on by the appellant:

R v Hedgcock [2007] EWCA Crim 3486:
- Concerned two men discussing online the rape (and killing) of the nieces of one of them.
- Each masturbated during the discussion; the exchanges were highly sexualised and elaborate.
- The Court of Appeal there concluded that, in the “highly unusual circumstances” of that case, the conversations showed the men were engaged in fantasy only.
- The court held that the conversations alone (“the discs upon their own”) could not sustain an inference of genuine intent to carry out the offences, and there was no extraneous evidence suggesting they would act on the fantasies.
R v G [2012] EWCA Crim 1756:
- Also involved online communications between two men about having sex with a young boy.
- On the particular facts, the Court of Appeal concluded the evidence did not safely support an inference that they intended actually to carry out the plan.

Lewis LJ stressed that Hedgcock and G turned on their exceptional facts. They involved:

Private conversations between paedophiles,
Highly elaborated sexual storytelling,
Mutual sexual arousal, and
A lack of real-world steps consistent with actual execution.

By contrast, Cobley involved:

A client–service provider style negotiation in an apparently genuine commercial setting.
No collaborative storytelling or mutual arousal, but focused negotiation of sexual services and price.
Objective behaviour (multiple calls, location agreement, claim of travelling) consistent with real implementation.

Accordingly, the Court held that the “fantasy” analysis in Hedgcock and G does not translate to this kind of undercover operation. Those authorities require “extraneous evidence” only in their unusual context. Here, the commercially realistic nature of the communications themselves, coupled with the surrounding conduct, was enough for the jury to consider and infer intent.

5.2.4 Resulting Principle

Cobley cements the following proposition:

Where a defendant negotiates for sexual access to a purported child in a realistic, commercial context (such as contacting a sexual services website and agreeing terms with a supposed organiser), the nature and context of those negotiations, together with objective features such as repeated contact, local proximity, and provision of travel details, can themselves provide sufficient evidence from which a jury may infer genuine intent to commit a child sexual offence. Such cases are not properly characterised as “fantasy” cases under Hedgcock and G.

In practical terms, the decision:

Restricts the scope for defendants in undercover operations to argue that online or telephonic negotiations were “just fantasy” in the absence of overt acts such as withdrawing money or actually arriving at the meeting place.
Confirms that in commercial sting operations, the jury is ordinarily entitled to assess the conversations as evidence of genuine criminal intent.

5.3 Bad Character Evidence: Propensity and Rebutting False Impression

5.3.1 The Evidence and the Challenge

The Crown relied on a prior Skype conversation in which the appellant negotiated a fee with a woman in the Philippines to see a 7-year-old girl naked. This was used to show:

A sexual interest in young girls, i.e. a propensity towards such offending, and
To contradict the appellant’s assertions in interview that he had no sexual interest in children.

The defence argued on appeal that:

The incident was isolated and had not led to any conviction.
Its prejudicial effect on the jury’s evaluation of the appellant’s character was so great that it rendered the trial unfair.
It should therefore have been excluded, even if marginally relevant.

5.3.2 The Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to admit this evidence. Two key rationales were identified:

Relevance to a live issue (propensity):
- Whether the appellant had a sexual interest in young girls was central to the case, because it bore directly on whether he intended to go through with the arrangement.
- The Skype conversation tended to make it more likely that he did have such an interest, undermining his explanation that the calls with “Veronica” were merely a “wind up”.
Rebuttal of a false impression:
- In interview, the appellant stated he had no sexual interest in children.
- These comments, later implicitly supported by character witnesses, constituted a “false impression” of himself as someone without any sexual interest in minors.
- Bad character provisions (under the Criminal Justice Act 2003) allow the prosecution to adduce evidence that corrects or rebuts such an impression once the defendant has chosen to advance it.
- The Court rejected the suggestion that the interviews should simply have been edited to remove the denial of sexual interest; that denial was legitimately part of the appellant’s own account to police and part of the evidential picture.

The Court regarded the weight and significance of that Skype incident as matters for the jury’s assessment, not as reasons to exclude the evidence outright.

5.3.3 Broader Implications on Bad Character Law

Cobley reinforces several practical points about bad character evidence in sexual offences:

Even a single prior incident of sexualised conduct involving minors, especially online, may legitimately be admitted as evidence of propensity where it directly addresses a central contested issue.
Defendants should be cautious about making blanket denials (e.g., “I have no sexual interest in children”) in interviews or through character witnesses; doing so may open the door for the Crown to adduce otherwise inadmissible material to rebut that impression.
The Court is prepared to prioritise relevance and fairness to the fact-finding process over the risk of prejudice, provided that the material goes to a real issue and is not merely “smearing” the defendant.

5.4 Sentencing for Arranging Child Rape with a Non-existent Victim

5.4.1 Framework Used by the Sentencing Judge

The appellant was 40, of good character, with no previous convictions, in stable employment, and the primary carer for his father. The judge had a pre-sentence report and a psychiatric report. The sentencing analysis proceeded in two stages:

Step 1 – Identify seriousness by reference to the intended substantive offence:
- The judge asked: What would be the sentencing position if the offence had actually been completed?
- The relevant guideline was for rape of a child under 13 (section 5 SOA 2003).
- For a category 2B offence under that guideline:
  - Starting point: 10 years’ custody.
  - Range: 8–13 years.
- The judge considered that, if the rape had occurred as planned, it would be a category 2 harm case, because the 12-year-old girl was being used and exploited as a prostitute for grown men and would thereby be particularly vulnerable.
Step 2 – Downward adjustment for incompletion and mitigation:
- The judge then made a “substantial downward adjustment” from the 10-year starting point to 6 years, to reflect:
  - The fact that the rape did not in fact occur.
  - The fact that the appellant did not attend the agreed meeting point.
  - His lack of previous convictions.
  - His positive good character, stable work history, and caring responsibilities.

5.4.2 Treatment of the Notional Victim’s Vulnerability

A central point of challenge was the judge’s conclusion that the non-existent child was to be treated as “particularly vulnerable by reason of her personal circumstances”. Mr Bhatia argued that:

There was no real victim; the girl was entirely fictitious.
The judge erred in effectively treating a notional child as a particularly vulnerable, prostituted 12‑year‑old.
The single judge who granted leave had noted that a 12‑year-old is at the top end of the “under 13” band and close to the boundary of a different statutory offence (rape of a child aged 13–15).

The Court of Appeal firmly rejected this argument. The key reasoning was:

What matters for the seriousness of an inchoate child sexual offence is the harm intended and believed by the offender, not the fact that the victim is fictitious.
The “fact is that the appellant asked for a girl aged 12” and believed he was arranging unprotected sex with a child “prostituted or exploited by others to provide sexual gratification for adults”.
On those beliefs, the notional victim would indeed have been “particularly vulnerable by reason of her personal circumstances”, justifying category 2 harm.

Thus, the Court endorsed an approach in which:

For an inchoate offence involving a fictitious child, the court assesses harm and vulnerability as if the intended victim actually existed in the circumstances as believed and intended by the offender.

5.4.3 Credit for Non-completion and Desistance

The Court accepted that the most important mitigating factor was that:

The offence was not carried through, and
Crucially, the appellant did not turn up at the arranged location.

Lewis LJ observed that this warranted a “substantial, not merely modest, reduction” from the starting point of 10 years. A 40% reduction (10 to 6 years) was viewed as substantial and properly reflective of:

Desistance (for whatever reason) before the actual offence could begin.
The absence of previous convictions.
Other personal mitigation.

The Court did not treat the fictitious nature of the child as a separate ground for further reduction, beyond the fact that the intended harm was not realised.

5.4.4 Overall Assessment of the 6-Year Term

The appeal court held that the 6-year term was not manifestly excessive. In essence:

The starting point of 10 years was correct for the intended completed offence (rape of a particularly vulnerable 12‑year‑old).
A sizeable discount for non-completion and personal mitigation was properly granted.
The remaining term still needed to reflect the gravity of intending to rape a child, particularly a child believed to be under the control of others and prostituted.

Cobley therefore implicitly approves a sentencing methodology where, in serious inchoate sexual offences against children:

The court starts from the guideline for the intended completed offence, and
Then applies a substantial reduction to recognise non-completion and mitigation.

5.5 Sexual Harm Prevention Order (SHPO)

The SHPO imposed at first instance was expressed to last “until further order”, i.e. effectively indefinite unless varied or discharged by the court later. On appeal, the defence argued that:

This was a relatively short, isolated episode of criminal conduct.
The appellant had no previous convictions and had complied with bail conditions.
An indefinite order was excessive.

Lewis LJ accepted that the arguments were “persuasive” in form but rejected them in substance. The reasoning was:

Given the nature of the offending—arranging to rape a 12-year-old prostituted girl and the use of underage sexual imagery and negotiation in the Skype incident—the risk profile justified robust, long-term management.
The statutory purpose of an SHPO is preventive and protective, not punitive; it aims to reduce the risk of sexual harm to the public.
On the facts of this case, the judge did not err in opting for an order to last until further order.

This confirms that:

Even for a first-time offender with a single proven episode of online-arranged child sexual offending, the court may legitimately impose an indefinite SHPO where the nature of the conduct reveals a serious risk of sexual harm.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 “No Case to Answer”

At the end of the prosecution case, the defence can submit that there is “no case to answer”. In simple terms:

The judge asks whether, taking the prosecution evidence at its highest, a reasonable jury properly directed could convict.
If not, the judge must stop the case, and the defendant is acquitted.
If yes, the case goes to the jury, even if there are alternative explanations that might be accepted at the end of all the evidence.

In Cobley, the Court held that the prosecution evidence did meet this threshold; the realistic, commercial negotiations and surrounding conduct were capable of supporting conviction, so the judge was right to reject the no-case submission.

6.2 “Bad Character” and “False Impression”

Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, “bad character evidence” covers evidence of a person’s misconduct other than the offence charged (e.g., previous offending or discreditable behaviour).

Two key gateways relevant here are:

Propensity (similar behaviour):
- Evidence of previous similar behaviour may be admissible to show a tendency—here, a sexual interest in children.
Rebutting a false impression:
- If a defendant gives a misleadingly favourable picture of himself (e.g., “I have no sexual interest in children”), the prosecution is entitled to present contrary evidence showing that this is untrue.

Cobley illustrates both: the Skype incident was used to show sexual interest in young girls (propensity) and to disprove the defendant’s claimed lack of such interest (rebutting false impression).

6.3 Inchoate Offences and Fictitious Victims

An “inchoate” offence is one that punishes conduct falling short of a completed crime—such as:

Conspiracy,
Attempts, or
Encouraging or assisting (including arranging or facilitating).

In many modern child sexual offences, the child may be:

A real child,
An undercover officer posing as a child, or
Entirely fictitious (a persona created by law enforcement).

The law focuses on what the offender believed and intended. The absence of a real child does not negate guilt where:

The defendant believed they were dealing with a child, and
Intended that a child sexual offence would be committed.

Cobley confirms that this principle also applies in sentencing: the court may treat the “notional child” as if she had the vulnerabilities and circumstances the defendant believed she had.

6.4 Sentencing Categories and “Category 2B / 3B”

Sentencing guidelines often classify offences along two axes:

Harm (Category 1–3, for example) – how serious the consequences are or would have been.
Culpability (A–C) – how blameworthy the offender’s conduct was (planning, targeting, use of power, etc.).

A “Category 2B” assault, for instance, is harm category 2 with culpability B. Each cell in the matrix has:

A starting point (what a typical case would attract), and
A range within which the sentence may move up or down depending on aggravating and mitigating features.

In Cobley:

The judge treated the intended offence (rape of a prostituted 12‑year‑old) as category 2 harm, with culpability B, so the starting point was 10 years.
He then reduced that substantially to 6 years for the incomplete nature of the offence and mitigation.

6.5 Sexual Harm Prevention Orders (SHPOs)

An SHPO is a civil order made by a criminal court designed to protect the public from sexual harm. It can:

Impose prohibitions (e.g., on internet access, contact with children, foreign travel).
Last for a fixed period of at least 5 years, or until further order (effectively indefinite).

The key test is whether the order is necessary and proportionate to protect the public from risk of sexual harm posed by the defendant.

In Cobley, despite the appellant’s lack of previous convictions, the court regarded the seriousness and nature of his conduct (including the Skype incident) as justifying an indefinite order.

7. Impact and Future Significance

7.1 Clarifying the Limits of the “Fantasy” Defence

Cobley sends a clear signal that the “fantasy” label used in Hedgcock and G is confined to quite exceptional scenarios involving mutual sexualised storytelling without realistic steps towards commission. Where:

The defendant engages in commercial-style negotiations for sexual access to a child,
With agreed acts, price, and location, and
Objective behaviour consistent with intending to follow through,

the courts will generally treat those communications as capable of evidencing genuine intent. The bar for a successful “no case to answer” submission in such circumstances remains high.

7.2 Undercover Operations and Fictitious Children

The judgment provides a strong endorsement of undercover policing techniques using fictitious child personas:

The absence of a real child is no barrier to conviction.
For sentencing, courts can assess harm and vulnerability by reference to the intended scenario, not what actually occurred.

This will support continued reliance on such operations to detect and deter those willing to arrange serious child sexual abuse.

7.3 Bad Character and Interview Strategy

From a defence perspective, Cobley highlights substantial forensic risks:

Overbroad denials (e.g., insisting on having no sexual interest in children) can open the gateway to damaging bad character evidence that might otherwise have been excluded.
Evidence of uncharged, overseas, or online misconduct can be admitted where it directly undermines such denials and is relevant to intent.

For prosecutors, Cobley confirms the value of:

Identifying prior communications or conduct evidencing sexual interest in children.
Using this both to demonstrate propensity and to rebut false impressions given in interviews or through defence witnesses.

7.4 Sentencing Consistency and Desistance

Cobley provides guidance on:

Anchoring the sentence for inchoate child sexual offences to the completed offence guideline, then discounting for non-completion and mitigation.
Recognising voluntary non-attendance or desistance as a factor warranting a substantial reduction, but not to the point of minimising the gravity of the intended harm.

The case thus contributes to consistency in sentencing for online-arranged child sexual offences where no child in fact exists, but the intended conduct is extremely serious.

7.5 SHPOs and Risk Management

Finally, the affirmation of an indefinite SHPO in a first-offender, single-episode case underscores that:

The court’s primary concern is the risk of serious sexual harm, not simply the number of prior convictions.
Serious, deliberate steps towards child rape can justify long-term, open-ended protective measures.

8. Conclusion

R v Cobley is a significant modern authority in the law of child sexual offences for three principal reasons:

It clarifies that realistically framed, commercial negotiations for sexual access to an underage child—especially with repeated calls, agreed acts, price and location—can readily support an inference of genuine criminal intent. The “sexual fantasy” reasoning of Hedgcock and G is confined to highly unusual contexts and does not protect defendants in typical undercover “sting” operations.
It confirms that in offences of arranging or facilitating child sexual offences with a fictitious child, courts may legitimately assess harm by reference to the intended and believed circumstances of the child, including vulnerability arising from being prostituted or exploited, and sentence by reference to the guideline for the intended completed offence with substantial, but not overwhelming, discounts for non-completion and desistance.
It endorses robust use of bad character evidence to demonstrate sexual interest in children and to rebut false impressions, and upholds the imposition of an indefinite SHPO where the nature of the conduct demonstrates serious risk, notwithstanding previous good character and a single episode of proven offending.

Taken together, these aspects make Cobley an important point of reference in future prosecutions and sentencing of online child sexual offences, particularly those arising from undercover operations with non-existent victims. It strengthens the legal framework’s capacity to intervene before a child is harmed, while clarifying the limits of defences based on alleged fantasy and the scope of protective orders aimed at preventing future offending.