1. Introduction

This commentary analyses the Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Bajwa [2025] EWCA Crim 1496, a sentence appeal concerning online sexual offending against an eight‑year‑old child abroad, involving sexual communications and incitement to create indecent images.

The case is important for how it:

• applies and interprets the Sentencing Council guidelines for causing/inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity and sexual communication with a child;
• clarifies when the guideline factor of “severe psychological harm” is made out, particularly in borderline cases;
• clarifies that a victim aged eight is not, without more, automatically “particularly vulnerable due to extreme youth” for guideline purposes where the offence itself is confined to children under 13;
• illustrates the proper structuring of sentence where multiple sexual offences occur in a single course of conduct on one day, using the totality principle and a lead count.

The decision does not introduce an entirely new legal doctrine, but it develops and refines the application of existing sentencing principles in a way that will be of clear relevance to future cases involving online child sexual offending and psychological harm.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The offending

The index offences all occurred on 28 January 2021. The complainant, then aged 8, lived in Sweden with her family. She was at home and unwell, while her father worked from home. He became concerned because she repeatedly went to the bathroom with her mobile phone.

On checking the device, the father discovered sexually explicit communications between the appellant, then aged 19 and based in Reading, and his daughter via Snapchat. He took screenshots and identified that the appellant attended Reading College. The child’s mother contacted the police in Sweden and supplied the images.

On 4 March 2021, UK police arrested the appellant at his home. Multiple devices, including a mobile phone, were seized. In interview he:

• claimed the female he was messaging said she was 18; and
• denied asking for digital penetration, although he admitted asking to see her breasts.

He otherwise answered “no comment”. Forensic analysis of his phone revealed the incriminating material.

2.2 The counts

On 2 September 2024 the appellant pleaded guilty on an accepted basis (all offending on the single day, 28 January 2021) to six counts:

1. Sexual communication with a child – asking if she wanted to see his penis, requesting videos of her genitals and breasts, and further sexualised exchanges.
2. Inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity – responding “Yeah” when the complainant asked if he wanted her to digitally penetrate herself.
3. Inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity – suggesting she have “something to suck on like a banana”; she then sent a photograph of herself sucking a banana in a sexualised way.
4. Inciting/causing a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity – asking the complainant to take and send indecent images of herself, which she did.
5. Permitting indecent photographs to be taken of a child – one category B moving indecent image.
6. Permitting indecent photographs to be taken of a child – two category C moving indecent images.

2.3 Sentence at first instance

On 1 November 2024, HHJ Rowley at Reading Crown Court imposed the following concurrent sentences:

• Count 1: 9 months’ imprisonment;
• Counts 2 and 3: 3 years’ imprisonment each;
• Count 4: 4 years’ imprisonment;
• Count 5: 2 months’ imprisonment;
• Count 6: 1 month’s imprisonment.

The effective term was therefore 4 years’ imprisonment. In addition:

• a Sexual Harm Prevention Order (SHPO) for 10 years was made;
• a deprivation order was made in relation to a mobile phone;
• the appellant became subject to indefinite notification requirements (sex offenders’ register); and
• a statutory victim surcharge was imposed.

The appellant was 23 at sentence, of previous good character, and there were reports on him: a pre-sentence report and a psychological assessment indicating communication limitations and autism‑related/neurodevelopmental features.

2.4 Grounds of appeal

With leave of the single judge, the appellant appealed against sentence (not conviction). Initially, he argued the sentence should have been two years or less, so as to permit suspension. By the time of the appeal hearing, his counsel, Mr Phillips, accepted that an immediate custodial sentence was inevitable, and realistically sought a sentence in the region of 3 years’ imprisonment.

The central complaint was not about how much discount was given for the guilty plea or mitigation, but about the judge’s starting points and categorisation under the Sentencing Council guidelines, in particular:

• whether there was adequate evidence of “severe psychological harm” to justify higher harm categories; and
• whether the complainant, merely by being 8, could be treated as “particularly vulnerable due to extreme youth”.

3. Summary of the Court of Appeal’s Judgment

The Court of Appeal (Tippels J giving judgment) allowed the appeal in part, holding that while the offending was undoubtedly serious and merited an immediate custodial sentence, the total term of 4 years was manifestly excessive.

The key conclusions were:

1. Count 4 (causing/inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity) was rightly treated as the lead and most serious offence.
2. On the evidence from the mother’s detailed victim impact statement, the complainant had suffered severe psychological harm within the meaning of the guideline; therefore count 4 was properly in harm category 2 and, with culpability A, fell into category 2A, which has an 8‑year starting point and a 5–10 year range.
3. However, the evidence of severe psychological harm was “just sufficient” to cross the threshold, so the starting point of 8 years required a downwards adjustment to around 6 years.
4. The Court rejected the prosecution’s contention (accepted by the judge) that the child was “particularly vulnerable due to extreme youth” simply by virtue of being eight. On the facts, this aggravating factor was not made out.
5. Counts 2 and 3 were correctly categorised as 2B (category 2 harm, culpability B) under the guideline for causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity; count 1 as 1B under the guideline for sexual communication with a child.
6. For purposes of totality, the Court considered that:
   • a properly adjusted starting point for count 4 would be around 6 years;
   • the other counts on the same day should be treated as aggravating that lead offence, yielding a notional pre-mitigation total of around 6½ years;
   • applying appropriate reductions for youth and neurodevelopmental factors, together with credit for guilty plea, the just and proportionate sentence was 3 years 3 months’ imprisonment.
7. The Court therefore quashed the original sentences on counts 2, 3 and 4 and substituted:
   • Count 2: 2 years 6 months’ imprisonment;
   • Count 3: 2 years 6 months’ imprisonment;
   • Count 4: 3 years 3 months’ imprisonment;
   all to run concurrently. The overall effective sentence is thus 3 years 3 months.

The sentences on counts 1, 5 and 6, and the ancillary orders (SHPO, deprivation, notification, surcharge) were not disturbed.

4. Legal Framework and Authorities

4.1 Statutory anonymity under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992

The judgment opens by reminding readers that the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 applies. This statute grants automatic lifelong anonymity to complainants in sexual offence cases:

• no matter likely to identify the complainant as a victim may be published during their lifetime;
• the restriction can be waived only in accordance with section 3 of the 1992 Act (for example, where the complainant consents).

This is standard in such appeals but is a useful reminder of the statutory protection of victims’ privacy.

4.2 Sentencing Council Guidelines

The Court’s reasoning is built almost entirely on the correct application of the Sentencing Council’s definitive guidelines, in particular:

• Sexual communication with a child (covering count 1);
• Causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity (covering counts 2–4);
• Sentencing offenders with mental disorders, developmental disorders or neurological impairments (referred to by the judge as part of mitigation);
• Guidelines on indecent images of children (for counts 5 and 6), though these played a minor role on appeal.

Of central importance is the harm/culpability matrix used in the sexual offences guidelines, producing categories such as “2A” and “3B”, where:

• the number (1, 2, 3, etc.) reflects harm; and
• the letter (A, B, sometimes C) reflects culpability.

The Court directly cites the explanatory text on the Sentencing Council’s website regarding psychological harm, stressing that:

“The sentence levels in the guideline take into account a basic level of psychological harm which is inherent in the nature of the offence… expert evidence is not necessary for a finding of psychological harm, including severe psychological harm. A sentencer may assess that such harm has been suffered on the basis of evidence from the victim, including evidence contained in a Victim Personal Statement (VPS)…”

This citation anchors the Court’s approach to evaluating the victim’s mother’s evidence and justifies the finding of severe psychological harm without requiring medical or expert proof.

4.3 Case law precedents

Within the excerpted judgment, no previous cases are expressly cited by name. Instead, the Court of Appeal proceeds by:

• applying the general appellate test – whether a sentence is “manifestly excessive” or based on a misapplication of principles; and
• interpreting the Sentencing Council guidelines as the key normative framework.

The absence of explicit case citations does not mean the Court was operating in a vacuum; rather, the decision is highly guideline‑driven, focusing on:

• how to categorise harm and vulnerability under the guidelines; and
• how to apply the principle of totality for multiple counts arising out of one episode.

Consequently, the judgment’s precedential value lies primarily in its interpretation of the guidelines, rather than in extending or distinguishing prior case law by name.

5. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

5.1 The central issues on appeal

The appeal turned on two interconnected issues:

1. Harm categorisation – whether the judge had sufficient evidential basis to:
   • place count 4 into the “severe psychological harm” category; and
   • treat other counts as involving significant psychological harm or distress.
2. Vulnerability and “extreme youth” – whether an eight‑year‑old victim of an offence limited to children under 13 can automatically be regarded as “particularly vulnerable due to extreme youth”, or whether something more is required.

The Court’s answers to these questions drove both the re‑categorisation of the counts and the reduction of the global sentence from 4 years to 3 years 3 months.

5.2 Severe psychological harm: a borderline but sufficient case

The Court carefully scrutinised the mother’s victim impact statement, which was the main evidence of the complainant’s ongoing psychological difficulties. The mother described:

• the child becoming fearful of everything and “shutting down”;
• a transformation from a confident, happy girl into “somebody we didn’t recognise”;
• a persistent inability to sleep alone, continuing at age 12;
• difficulty attending school “for the next few years” after the incident;
• a need for ongoing support as the child now “reprocesses” the events with increasing maturity;
• the experience being akin to PTSD, described as “like torture”.

The sentencing judge had treated this as amounting to severe psychological harm. On appeal, Mr Phillips argued that, while there was evidence of serious harm, the threshold for “severe” was not met – for example, there was no mention of self‑harm.

The Court of Appeal’s approach was nuanced:

• It accepted that there is a baseline of psychological harm inherent in such offences, as the guideline itself recognises.
• It acknowledged that this case was borderline between harm categories 2 and 3.
• It nonetheless concluded that the evidence “just” crossed the threshold into severe psychological harm – in particular due to:
  • the long‑term, multi‑year impact on schooling and sleep;
  • the ongoing re‑traumatisation as the child grows older and better understands what happened; and
  • the profound and continuing change in personality and behaviour.

Crucially, however, the Court linked the borderline nature of this finding to the level within the category:

“Once placed in category 2A in the guideline the starting point would need to be adjusted downwards to reflect the fact that there was just sufficient evidence to place the case in that category.”

This is an important clarification: a finding that harm is category 2 (severe) does not mechanically fix the sentence at the category starting point. The sentencer must still determine, within that category, where on the spectrum the case lies and adjust up or down accordingly.

5.3 Extreme youth and vulnerability: being 8 is not automatically “particularly vulnerable”

The Crown had argued, and the judge accepted, that the victim was “particularly vulnerable due to extreme youth”, a factor which:

• can increase the harm categorisation; and/or
• acts as an aggravating factor under various guidelines.

On appeal, Mr Phillips submitted that:

• the fact that the child was 8 – within the under‑13 bracket – did not, without more, justify the label “particularly vulnerable due to extreme youth”;
• there was no evidence of exceptional personal circumstances beyond age; and
• thus, the judge had overstated the degree of harm and vulnerability.

The Court agreed:

“The complainant at the age of 8 was not a child who was particularly vulnerable due to extreme youth and/or personal circumstances. We agree. On the facts of this case that is correct.”

This is a significant clarification. It implies that:

• Where an offence is already defined by a narrow age range (here, under 13), the mere fact that a child is within that range – even at 8 – is not enough in itself to trigger the “extreme youth” vulnerability factor.
• To rely on “particularly vulnerable due to extreme youth”, there typically needs to be:
  • an especially low age (e.g., toddler) or
  • additional personal circumstances (e.g., disability, mental health or learning difficulties, situational vulnerability) making the child particularly susceptible.

In practical terms, this guards against double‑counting the same feature:

• Age under 13 is already built into the nature and seriousness of the offence type; and
• the “extreme youth” aggravator is reserved for cases where the victim’s youth presents an additional, exceptional vulnerability beyond what is inherent in the offence definition.

5.4 Correct categorisation of the individual counts

Having clarified the harm and vulnerability issues, the Court re‑examined the categorisation of each count.

5.4.1 Count 4 – causing/inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity

Count 4 was the most serious offence and formed the core of the appellate analysis. The Court held:

• Culpability: There was no dispute; it was a culpability A case because the appellant caused/encouraged the creation and retention of sexual images of the child.
• Harm: Given the evidence of long‑term psychological impact, the case properly fell into harm category 2 (severe psychological harm).
• Accordingly, the guideline category was 2A with a nominal starting point of 8 years (range 5–10 years).
• Because this was a borderline severe case, the Court recalibrated the starting point to 6 years, lower than 8 but still within the category 2 band.

5.4.2 Counts 2 and 3 – inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity

The appellant had argued that these should be placed into 3B (lower harm category 3, culpability B) with a starting point of 2 years. The Court rejected that, holding:

“Counts 2 and 3 should have been categorised as 2B… This is because there are category 2 harm factors present and no category A culpability factors present. That gives a starting point of 6 years’ custody with a category range of 3 to 9 years’ custody.”

Although the Court does not spell this out in detail, the logic is that:

• the same victim suffered severe psychological harm as a result of the overall course of conduct that included counts 2 and 3;
• harm for guideline purposes may be evaluated by taking into account the full impact on the victim, not by siloing each count in isolation; and
• accordingly, harm category 2 applies to counts 2 and 3 as part of the same episode.

5.4.3 Count 1 – sexual communication with a child

The Court found that count 1 should have been categorised as 1B under the relevant guideline:

“This is because there are category harm 1 factors present but no category A culpability factors present. That gives a starting point of 1 year’s custody with a category range of a high-level community order to 18 months’ custody.”

Harm category 1 recognises the inherent seriousness of sexualised communications that lead to or are intended to lead to sexual activity or images, while culpability B reflects the absence of features such as abuse of a significant position of trust or sustained grooming beyond what is already captured.

5.4.4 Counts 5 and 6 – permitting indecent images to be taken

There was no challenge to the categorisation or sentences on counts 5 and 6, which involved one category B and two category C moving images. The Court confirmed that the judge’s approach to those counts was correct and that they did not drive the overall sentence.

5.5 Totality and the use of a lead count

A critical structural point is the way the Court applied the totality principle. Recognising that all the offending occurred on a single day as part of a single course of conduct with one victim, the Court said:

“We consider it would have been preferable to approach the sentencing by taking count 4 as the lead offence. The offending is then aggravated by the five further offences…”

The Court’s method:

1. Identify the most serious count (count 4) and fix a just starting point for it – here, 6 years within category 2A.
2. Treat the remaining counts as aggravating that lead offence, rather than as wholly separate parcels of harm justifying consecutive or nearly additive sentences.
3. Increase the notional starting point modestly (to about 6½ years) to reflect the additional counts within that one‑day episode.
4. Then apply:
   • mitigation, including youth, lack of previous convictions, remorse, and neurodevelopmental factors; and
   • credit for the guilty plea.
5. Stand back to check whether the end result is just and proportionate when looked at in the round.

Applying that approach, and endorsing the judge’s high level of mitigation, the Court fixed on a global sentence of 3 years 3 months.

This illustrates that in multiple‑count sexual cases arising from a single episode, the correct approach is often to:

• avoid double or triple counting of harm; and
• express the overall criminality primarily through a single lead count, with the others reflected in an upward movement within the guideline range and the articulation of aggravating factors.

5.6 Mitigation: youth, good character and neurodevelopmental impairment

The sentencing judge had expressly:

• taken into account the appellant’s youth at the time of offending (19);
• his previous good character and family support;
• a psychological report suggesting autism‑related traits and communication limitations;
• evidence that he had sought professional help (addiction specialist and therapist); and
• his guilty plea.

Notably, the judge sought to explain her sentencing methodology in percentage terms:

“…I’ve looked at the suggested starting points and I have reduced them by a term of 25 per cent to take into account your guilty pleas and a further 25 per cent to take into account your neurological deficiencies… I do have regard to the sentencing guideline for mental disorders and developmental disorders and consider that an appropriate reduction of a further 25 per cent is applicable to your case.”

The Court of Appeal did not criticise this approach. On the contrary, it said:

“We agree with the judge’s approach to the personal mitigation available to the appellant who at the time was only 19.”

This should not necessarily be read as endorsing a formulaic, percentage‑based “double discount” as a general rule of law, but it does signal:

• a willingness to treat neurodevelopmental and mental health factors as capable of substantial downward influence on sentence, over and above guilty‑plea credit, in appropriate cases; and
• acceptance that the guideline on offenders with mental disorders and developmental disorders can justify significant mitigation even where the court does not accept a reduced level of culpability in law.

The key point is that the error the Court identified lay not in the judge’s approach to mitigation, but in her over‑high starting points arising from mis‑application of harm and vulnerability factors.

6. Impact and Significance

6.1 Clarifying the threshold for “severe psychological harm”

This decision provides practical guidance for trial judges and advocates on when it is proper to find severe psychological harm:

• Expert or clinical evidence is not required; a detailed Victim Personal Statement (VPS) or evidence from a parent can suffice.
• However, where the evidence is borderline, the court should:
  • be cautious about pushing the case into a higher harm category; and/or
  • if it does categorise as severe harm, temper the starting point downwards within that category.
• The decision emphasises that within‑category calibration is a crucial part of applying the guidelines; the starting point is not an automatic figure, but a base to be adjusted in both directions.

6.2 Constraining automatic use of “extreme youth” as an aggravator

The explicit acceptance that an eight‑year‑old victim of an “under 13” offence is not automatically “particularly vulnerable due to extreme youth” is likely to influence:

• how prosecutors and judges approach age‑based aggravation in sexual cases; and
• the avoidance of double‑counting age when the statutory offence already reflects the victim’s youth.

In practice, this means that:

• additional aggravation on grounds of “extreme youth” should be reserved for:
  • very young children (e.g., pre‑school) or
  • children whose personal circumstances (disability, dependency, etc.) render them especially vulnerable; and
• mere age within the statutory bracket (e.g., 7, 8, 9 in an “under 13” offence) should not, without more, be used to push a case into a higher harm category.

6.3 Structured use of lead counts and totality in one‑day offending

The Court’s insistence that it would have been preferable to sentence using count 4 as a lead offence, with the others treated as aggravating, reinforces:

• the importance of the totality principle in avoiding excessive effective sentences;
• the need to recognise when multiple counts arise from a single episode and reflect largely the same underlying criminality;
• the utility of identifying a single lead count as the vehicle for expressing the overall seriousness, then modestly enhancing within the guideline range to reflect additional counts.

This is likely to be cited in future cases where sentencing on multiple sexual counts risks double‑counting harm or leading to disproportionate aggregate sentences.

6.4 Emphasis on youth and neurodevelopmental issues in serious sexual sentencing

Although the Court did not lay down a new rule, it is notable that:

• the appellant’s age (19 at the time of the offences) and psychological profile were treated as sufficiently significant to merit a substantial reduction from the guideline-derived starting point; yet
• they did not displace the fundamental conclusion that the offences were so serious that only immediate custody was justified.

This reinforces that:

• youth and neurodevelopmental impairment are potent mitigating factors in sentencing, especially in online sexual cases often committed by younger adults; but
• there is still a clear threshold of seriousness beyond which a suspended sentence will almost never be appropriate, even for a first‑time offender.

7. Complex Concepts Explained

7.1 Sentencing “starting point” and “category range”

Under Sentencing Council guidelines:

• The starting point is the sentence for a typical case with the features of the chosen harm/culpability category, before adjusting for aggravating/mitigating factors and guilty plea.
• The category range provides the minimum and maximum sentences normally appropriate for that category.

Judges first identify the correct category (e.g., 2A), then select a point within the range, using the starting point as a reference, not as a fixed rule.

7.2 Harm and culpability categories (e.g., 2A, 3B)

• Harm is graded by the impact on the victim (e.g., psychological harm, physical injury, long‑term consequences).
• Culpability is graded by the offender’s blameworthiness (e.g., planning, coercion, abuse of trust, sophistication).
• A label such as 2A means:
  • “2” – higher harm (here, including severe psychological harm);
  • “A” – higher culpability (e.g., deliberate obtaining/retention of sexual images, grooming).

7.3 “Severe psychological harm” vs. baseline harm

The guidelines state that every sexual offence against a child involves some inherent psychological harm. For “severe” harm:

• the impact must go beyond the inherent baseline; for example, long‑term trauma, serious disruption to everyday life, ongoing fear or inability to function normally;
• evidence can come from:
  • a Victim Personal Statement (VPS);
  • family evidence; or
  • observation of the victim when giving evidence;
• expert evidence can assist but is not mandatory.

7.4 “Particularly vulnerable due to extreme youth or personal circumstances”

Many guidelines treat a victim as especially vulnerable, and therefore aggravating the offence, if they are:

• of extreme youth (e.g., very young children); or
• affected by personal circumstances such as disability, mental ill‑health, dependency or other factors making them especially susceptible to exploitation.

R v Bajwa clarifies that this factor should not be applied automatically just because a victim is within the statutory age bracket of the offence; there must be something additional to justify it.

7.5 The “totality principle”

The totality principle requires that when a court sentences for multiple offences, the overall sentence must be:

• just and proportionate to the totality of offending; and
• not simply the arithmetical sum of individual sentences if that would be excessive.

Courts often:

• identify a lead offence that reflects the gravest aspect of the criminality; and
• run other sentences concurrently and/or modestly increase the lead sentence to reflect additional harm.

7.6 “Manifestly excessive” sentence

On appeal, the Court of Appeal does not simply ask what sentence it would have passed. It intervenes only if:

• the judge made a material error in principle (e.g., misapplied guidelines); or
• the sentence was outside the range reasonably open to the judge – in other words, “manifestly excessive”.

In this case, the miscategorisation of harm and vulnerability pushed the sentence beyond the just range, so the Court re‑sentenced.

8. Conclusion

R v Bajwa [2025] EWCA Crim 1496 is a guideline‑focused sentencing appeal that refines the application of the Sentencing Council’s sexual offences framework in online child sexual cases.

Its key contributions can be summarised as follows:

• It confirms that a detailed Victim Personal Statement can, by itself, justify a finding of severe psychological harm, but where the case is borderline, the starting point within the category should be adjusted downwards.
• It clarifies that a child victim’s age within a statutory bracket (here, under 13) does not automatically make them “particularly vulnerable due to extreme youth”; there must be additional features of unusual vulnerability.
• It illustrates best practice in applying the totality principle for multiple sexual offences committed in a single episode – using a lead count and then modest aggravation to reflect related counts.
• It demonstrates that youth, good character and neurodevelopmental difficulties can justifiably lead to significant reductions from guideline starting points, though not necessarily to suspension where the offending is serious.

For practitioners and judges, Bajwa is a useful authority on:

• how to argue and assess psychological harm in child sexual cases;
• when it is legitimate to invoke extreme youth as an aggravating factor; and
• how to structure sentences in cases involving multiple counts over a very short time frame.

The reduced sentence of 3 years 3 months’ imprisonment still recognises the grave nature of the appellant’s online sexual exploitation of a child, but does so in a way that the Court of Appeal considered properly calibrated to the evidence and consistent with the sentencing framework.