R v Amini [2025] EWCA Crim 1621: Clarifying “Extreme” Harm, Abduction and Dangerousness in Rape Sentencing

1. Introduction

The decision in R v Amini [2025] EWCA Crim 1621 is an important Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) judgment on sentencing for rape of a child aged 13–15 and on the proper use of the unduly lenient sentence (“ULS”) reference procedure.

The case concerned a 20‑year‑old offender who had been convicted after trial of:

• Rape contrary to s.1 Sexual Offences Act 2003 (count 1); and
• Sexual assault contrary to s.3 of the same Act (count 2),

in relation to a 13‑year‑old girl whom he coerced from a busy high street into a side alley and compelled to perform oral sex. The Crown Court imposed a sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment for the rape, with a concurrent 1‑year term for the sexual assault, as well as a 10‑year Sexual Harm Prevention Order (SHPO).

His Majesty’s Solicitor General referred the sentence to the Court of Appeal under s.36 Criminal Justice Act 1988, arguing that it was unduly lenient. The reference raised three principal questions:

1. Whether the sentencing judge misapplied the Sentencing Council guideline for rape by categorising harm as Category 2B instead of Category 1B (involving a lower starting point of 8 rather than 12 years).
2. Whether the judge erred in failing to impose an extended determinate sentence on the basis that the offender was a “dangerous offender”.
3. Whether the 7‑year term was, in overall effect, unduly lenient given the facts and aggravating features.

Lord Justice Edis, Vice President of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), delivering the judgment of the court, granted leave to refer but ultimately refused to interfere with the sentence. In doing so, the Court clarified several significant points:

• The meaning of “extreme” harm for the purpose of elevating a rape case from Category 2 to Category 1.
• The distinction between treating conduct as “abduction” at the categorisation stage and dealing with the same conduct as an aggravating factor at step 2.
• The proper approach to dangerousness and extended sentences where the only material is the index offence and a lack of full acceptance of responsibility.
• The weight to be given to prosecution concessions on categorisation at first instance, in light of R v Stewart [2016] EWCA Crim 2238.

The judgment also reiterates the importance of lifetime anonymity for complainants in sexual cases and acknowledges good case management where trials are heard swiftly within custody time limits.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Outcome

Although the Court granted leave to the Solicitor General to bring the reference, it declined to increase the sentence. The original sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment on the rape count (with 1 year concurrent on the sexual assault) was upheld.

2.2 Core holdings

• The sentencing judge correctly categorised the offence as harm Category 2 / culpability B (B2) under the rape guideline, with a starting point of 8 years and a range of 7–9 years.
• The presence of:
  • particular vulnerability due to age, and
  • significant (but not “extreme”) psychological harm,
  did not compel elevation to Category 1. The guideline’s requirement that Category 1 be reserved for cases where the nature or combination of Category 2 factors is “extreme” was emphasised.
• The movement of the victim from the high street into an alleyway, while a seriously aggravating feature, was appropriately treated as an aggravating factor at step 2 (location/degree of isolation), rather than as “abduction” justifying Category 1 harm.
• The judge’s increase from 8 to 9 years at step 2 (to reflect aggravation such as use of cannabis and location) and subsequent reduction to 7 years for mitigation (youth, lack of previous convictions, background) fell within the proper sentencing range and was not unduly lenient.
• The judge was entitled to conclude that the offender was not a “dangerous offender” for the purposes of imposing an extended determinate sentence. A probation assessment labelling the offender “high risk” but based solely on the index offence and his denial did not, on its own, justify an extended sentence.
• While the prosecution’s concession at trial that the correct category was B2 did not bind the Solicitor General or the Court of Appeal, such concessions, especially when accepted by the judge, are a powerful indication that the categorisation was within the proper evaluative range, per R v Stewart.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Factual background relevant to sentencing

The offence occurred at about 8 p.m. on 4 August 2024 in Croydon town centre. The 13‑year‑old victim, staying with her grandparents, was permitted to go out to the shops. She encountered the 20‑year‑old offender on the high street. Much of what followed was captured on CCTV, which the sentencing judge had carefully reviewed during the trial.

Key factual features included:

• The offender persistently pestered and followed the victim, attempting to talk to her and putting his arms around her shoulders as she tried to pull away.
• He asked her age. She said she was 13; he refused to accept this, insisting she was 16, and falsely described himself as 17.
• He was smoking a cannabis spliff and pressed her about smoking “weed”.
• The victim described feeling afraid of physical harm, including fear of being stabbed, particularly after he referenced a stabbing by a friend the previous day. She believed she might be hurt or killed if she did not comply.
• Under this coercion she moved with him from the busy high street into a relatively deserted alleyway – an important feature both for the alleged “abduction” and as an aggravating factor.
• In the alley, he attempted to kiss her and touched her chest and waist; she resisted and told him to stop. He asked if she was a virgin; she again said she was 13 and asserted her privacy.
• He then controlled her physically, holding her face, back and waist so that she could not get away, pulled down his trousers, exposed his erect penis, and forced her head onto his penis, causing her to gag.
• After a short period of penile penetration of her mouth, he withdrew and ejaculated on the floor. She described spitting and feeling sick, with the taste in her mouth.
• He then ran away (seen on CCTV). She returned to her grandparents’ home, disclosed the attack, and the police were called.
• Forensic analysis found semen in the alleyway with his DNA; the CCTV footage also showed him clearly. He fled to Liverpool but was traced via his phone and arrested. He made no comment in interview.

Victim personal statements from the complainant (January 2025) and her mother (February 2025) described profound psychological impact, including:

• Sleep disturbance and flashbacks;
• Self‑disgust, misplaced self‑blame and withdrawal;
• Depression and an attempted suicide;
• Exclusion from school, high levels of anger and family breakdown.

A pre‑sentence report (PSR) confirmed the seriousness of the harm and suggested the effects were likely to be long‑lasting, particularly given her youth. The report also assessed the offender as presenting a high risk of serious sexual harm, especially to children, but explicitly based that assessment solely on the commission of this offence and his continued assertion of consent.

The offender was of previous good character, aged 20 at the time of the offence and sentence, and had experienced background difficulties referred to in the PSR. Both prosecution and defence counsel at first instance agreed that the appropriate categorisation under the rape guideline was B2, and the judge adopted that approach.

3.2 Legal framework: rape guideline and “dangerousness”

3.2.1 The rape sentencing guideline

The Sentencing Council’s guideline for rape requires the court to classify the offence by reference to:

• Culpability (A or B), and
• Harm (Category 1 or 2).

In this case there was no dispute that culpability was Category B (B1 or B2), reflecting significant seriousness but not at the very highest level of culpability.

For harm, the guideline:

• Lists a series of Category 2 harm factors, including:
  • Particular vulnerability due to personal circumstances;
  • Severe psychological or physical harm;
  • Abduction.
• Provides that Category 1 should be used where:

  “the extreme nature of one or more category 2 factors or the extreme impact caused by a combination of category 2 factors may elevate to category 1.”

For B2 (harm Category 2 / culpability B), the guideline gives a starting point of 8 years and a range of 7–9 years. For B1 (harm Category 1 / culpability B), the starting point increases sharply to 12 years, with a range of 10–15 years.

3.2.2 Dangerous offenders and extended determinate sentences

Under the “dangerous offender” provisions of the Sentencing Code (Sentencing Act 2020), a court may impose an extended determinate sentence (EDS) if:

• The offender is convicted of a specified offence (which rape is); and
• The court finds a significant risk that the offender will commit further specified offences causing serious harm to members of the public.

In making that assessment, courts consider:

• The present offence (its nature and circumstances);
• Any previous convictions or pattern of behaviour;
• Information in pre‑sentence reports and other assessments;
• Any other relevant evidence.

An EDS has two components:

• A custodial term (the “punitive” part); and
• An extended licence period (during which the offender can be recalled to prison).

The Solicitor General argued that the index offence and the PSR’s “high risk” assessment demanded such a sentence in Amini.

3.3 Precedent: R v Stewart and prosecution concessions

The Court relied on R v Stewart [2016] EWCA Crim 2238; [2017] 1 Cr App R (S) 48. In Stewart, the Court held that:

“the very fact that counsel for the prosecution has in the court below made a concession as to appropriate categorisation, and indeed the very fact that a judge has accepted and acted on that, may well be a powerful indication that that is indeed our assessment which may be properly made on what is, after all, ultimately an exercise of judgment. This court will thus always have due regard to the sentencing judge’s evaluation of the position. But if ... the categorisation for sentencing purposes has turned out to be wrong and that has materially impacted on the appropriateness of the sentence, then it is the duty of this court ... to say so and, where justified, to intervene...”

In Amini, the prosecution at trial had agreed with the defence that the correct category was B2. On reference, the Solicitor General (represented by different counsel) advanced a higher categorisation of B1. Applying Stewart, the Court of Appeal:

• Affirmed that the earlier concession did not legally bind the law officers or the appellate court; but
• Stressed that such a concession, particularly where accepted by the trial judge, is a “powerful indication” that the categorisation was within the acceptable evaluative range and will ordinarily attract respect and deference.

This underpins the Court’s overall reluctance to re‑categorise the case in the absence of a clear error.

3.4 Harm categorisation: the meaning of “extreme”

The Solicitor General’s primary contention was that three Category 2 harm factors were present:

1. Particular vulnerability due to age and personal circumstances;
2. Severe psychological harm;
3. Abduction.

On this basis, it was said that the “extreme” impact of the combination of factors required harm Category 1, placing the case in B1.

The Court’s response was twofold:

3.4.1 Category 2 factors already denote serious rape

At paragraph 25, the Court emphasised that:

“The relevant guideline for rape offences includes, in category 2, very serious offences of rape. The factors which must be present to place a case into category 2 for harm are seriously aggravating features of rape cases where they are present; in other words, to find itself into category 2 for harm a case of rape must already be a serious case.”

This is a critical clarification: the mere presence of Category 2 factors does not by itself call for Category 1. Category 2 is already reserved for significantly aggravated rapes.

3.4.2 “Extreme” is a high threshold

The Court highlighted the strength of the word “extreme” in the guideline. Only where:

• The nature of a Category 2 factor (e.g., extraordinarily severe psychological harm, or an especially brutal abduction), or
• The combined impact of multiple factors,

can fairly be called “extreme” should harm be elevated to Category 1.

Applying this:

• Vulnerability: The victim’s age (just over 13) plainly made her particularly vulnerable, justifying Category 2. That was not in dispute.
• Psychological harm: The judge, having read the victim’s and mother’s statements and observed the victim at trial, concluded that the harm, though serious, fell “just short of severe”. It was therefore insufficiently “extreme” to justify Category 1, particularly given the relatively short time that had passed between the offence and sentencing and the lack of longer‑term evidence.
• Abduction: The Court ultimately declined to treat the conduct as an “abduction” of the kind that pushes a case into Category 1, preferring to deal with it as an aggravating factor (see below).

The Court expressly recognised that these were evaluative judgments rather than mechanistic box‑ticking (para 27). Amini therefore stands as authoritative confirmation that:

• Sentencers must exercise judgment in deciding whether harm is “extreme”, and
• The presence of more than one Category 2 factor does not automatically trigger Category 1.

3.5 Abduction vs aggravating feature: flexibility in treatment

A central plank of the Solicitor General’s argument was that the victim had been abducted within the meaning of the guideline by being coerced from the high street into the alleyway, and that this should have contributed to a Category 1 harm classification.

The Court accepted that what happened was a seriously aggravating feature: the victim was persuaded under coercion (with implicit threats of violence) to leave a public place where help was available and to enter a secluded alleyway where she was alone with the offender.

However, at paragraph 29, the Court held:

“We consider that on the facts of this case the judge was right not to include abduction as a separate category 1 harm factor… This child was persuaded to walk a few steps up an alleyway where she was attacked... We consider that it was appropriate for the judge to choose to deal with that seriously aggravating feature… as an aggravating factor at a later stage of the process rather than as a factor requiring a classification for harm at category 1.”

Two important points follow:

1. Nature and seriousness of “abduction” matters:
   The guideline’s reference to “abduction” is not binary. Some cases of abduction—such as prolonged detention, transportation to a remote location, or sophisticated planning—may be so grave as to be “extreme” and justify Category 1. Others, involving shorter or less dramatic movement, may be better treated as step‑2 aggravation.
2. Sentencers have flexibility:
   The judge’s choice to treat this conduct as a major aggravating factor rather than a harm‑category determinant was within the scope of permissible judgment. The Court endorsed this approach, underscoring that guidelines permit different legitimate routes to reflect the same feature, so long as the overall sentence is proportionate.

In practical terms, Amini will be cited for the proposition that not every movement of a victim to a more secluded area in a short space of time must be labelled “abduction” for harm categorisation purposes; it can properly be left to aggravation at step 2.

3.6 Psychological harm and timing of victim impact evidence

The victim and her mother provided powerful victim personal statements, including reference to a suicide attempt. Yet the judge concluded the psychological harm was just short of “severe” for guideline purposes.

The Court’s reasoning is sensitive to the timing of the evidence:

• The statements were prepared only a few months after the offence;
• While they demonstrated very serious harm, there was limited evidence of the likely long‑term trajectory of the victim’s mental health;
• The pre‑sentence report suggested likely long‑lasting effects but did not provide a detailed psychiatric prognosis.

At paragraph 30, the Court held that in the absence of more developed evidence “suggesting that there was going to be extreme harm over a long period of time”, it was “appropriate and reasonable” for the judge to assess the harm as he did.

This strikes a careful balance:

• It does not downplay the seriousness of the impact, which the Court recognises as grave;
• But for the specific question of guideline categorisation, the Court insists on evidence of “extreme” and enduring harm, especially where the case is being sentenced relatively soon after the offence.

3.7 Mitigation and young adult offenders

After selecting B2 and moving from the 8‑year starting point to 9 years to reflect aggravation (notably the secluded location and cannabis use), the judge reduced the sentence to 7 years on account of mitigation, namely:

• The offender’s age (20 at the time of offending and sentence);
• His lack of previous convictions;
• Personal background difficulties described in the PSR.

The Court accepted that this two‑year reduction was “perhaps generous” (para 31) but found it remained within the field of reasonable sentencing discretion and therefore did not render the sentence unduly lenient.

Crucially, the Court stressed that:

“The age of this offender at the time of the offence (namely, 20 years old) was a significant factor which did require a significant downward adjustment to the sentence which would have been imposed had he been a few years older.”

This reinforces the now entrenched principle that young adults (typically 18–24/25) are entitled to a meaningful reduction to reflect their ongoing maturation and greater capacity for change, even in very serious offences such as rape of a child. Amini thus provides support for substantial age‑related mitigation in future cases involving 18–21‑year‑old defendants.

3.8 Dangerousness and extended determinate sentences

The Solicitor General also submitted that the offender should have been found “dangerous” and an extended determinate sentence imposed. The pre‑sentence report had described him as posing a high risk of serious sexual harm, particularly to children.

The Court, however, carefully examined the basis of that assessment. It emerged that:

• The PSR’s high‑risk conclusion was **entirely grounded** in:
  • the commission of the present offence; and
  • the offender’s continued assertion that the sexual activity was consensual.
• There were no previous convictions and no other extraneous material (such as allegations of past behaviour or evidence of a pattern) pointing to ongoing dangerousness.

At paragraph 32 the Court held that, having properly sought a PSR, the judge was entitled to conclude that:

“if all that is known about him is that he has committed this offence and that he was 20 years old when he committed it with the capacity for further maturation and growth, then it was reasonable… not to deal with him as a dangerous offender.”

The Court also emphasised that:

• The offender would serve two‑thirds of his 7‑year sentence before release;
• He would be on licence for the remainder and subject to recall;
• A 10‑year Sexual Harm Prevention Order provided an additional layer of public protection;
• Any future serious offending would attract “further severe punishment”.

The key principle emerging is that:

• An extended determinate sentence is a serious step and must be justified by a properly evidenced finding of “significant risk” of future serious harm.
• A single serious offence, combined with a lack of full admission or insight, does not automatically establish dangerousness, particularly in a young first‑time offender.
• Courts must interrogate the basis of any PSR “high‑risk” assessment and should not treat it as conclusive if it is not supported by broader evidence.

3.9 Unduly lenient sentence references and appellate deference

Although the Court did not restate the test in detail, the unduly lenient sentence (“ULS”) regime under s.36 Criminal Justice Act 1988 is well established: the Court will interfere only if the sentence falls outside the range of sentences which the judge, applying the correct principles, could reasonably have imposed.

In Amini, the Court’s approach reflects a high degree of deference to the trial judge’s evaluative judgments, especially where:

• The judge had presided over the trial and seen both the CCTV evidence and the live testimony of the victim and offender;
• Both counsel at first instance agreed on the harm categorisation (B2), and the judge adopted that view;
• The judge followed the guideline structure, articulated his reasoning on harm, aggravation and mitigation, and considered dangerousness with the benefit of a PSR.

The Court acknowledged that some aspects of the sentence—particularly the level of mitigation—were “perhaps generous”, but emphasised that generosity within the proper range does not equate to undue leniency. Unless an error of principle or an obviously inadequate outcome is shown, the Court will not substitute its own view.

In essence, Amini reaffirms that the ULS jurisdiction is not a platform for fine‑tuning what are, in substance, defensible sentencing judgments. It is reserved for clearly wrong or seriously inadequate sentences.

4. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

4.1 Anonymity for complainants in sexual cases

Under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, complainants in sexual offence cases are entitled to lifelong anonymity. This means nothing may be published that is capable of identifying the victim as the complainant, unless a court orders otherwise (for example, at the victim’s request). In Amini, the Court reminds all concerned that this protection remains in place for life.

4.2 Rape and sexual assault (Sexual Offences Act 2003)

• Rape (s.1) involves intentional penetration with a penis of another person’s vagina, anus or mouth without consent, and without a reasonable belief in consent.
• Sexual assault (s.3) involves intentional touching of another person, the touching being sexual, where the victim does not consent and the offender does not reasonably believe in consent.

In this case, the rape was by oral penetration and the separate sexual assault was by sexual touching of the victim’s body.

4.3 Sentencing guidelines, categories and starting points

The Sentencing Council issues guidelines that judges must follow unless it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so. For rape, a matrix links:

• the offender’s culpability (how blameworthy the conduct is), and
• the degree of harm caused to the victim,

to a starting point prison term and a range within which the final sentence should normally fall. Judges then adjust up (for aggravating features) or down (for mitigation) within or, in unusual cases, outside that range.

4.4 Unduly lenient sentence (ULS) references

For certain serious offences, the Attorney General or Solicitor General can ask the Court of Appeal to review a sentence thought to be too low. The Court:

• Does not simply decide what sentence it would have passed itself;
• Intervenes only if the sentence is “unduly lenient”, meaning it falls well below the range of sentences reasonably open to the judge, or if significant errors of principle occurred.

4.5 Dangerous offenders and extended determinate sentences

An offender is legally “dangerous” if a court concludes there is a significant risk of serious harm from future offending of a similar nature. If so, and certain other conditions are met, the court may impose an extended determinate sentence, adding extra licence time and greater recall powers beyond a normal sentence.

In Amini, the Court held that one serious offence, coupled with denial, in a 20‑year‑old first‑time offender, was insufficient to reach that threshold.

4.6 Sexual Harm Prevention Order (SHPO)

A SHPO is a civil order made on conviction, imposing conditions to protect the public from sexual harm. Breaching a SHPO is a criminal offence. In this case, a 10‑year SHPO was imposed, adding to public protection after release.

5. Impact and Significance

5.1 Clarifying when harm becomes “extreme”

Amini is significant in reinforcing that:

• Category 2 harm already captures serious rapes involving major aggravating features.
• Elevation to Category 1 requires something qualitatively more serious—the “extreme” nature of one or more factors or their combined effect.
• Multiple Category 2 factors do not automatically require Category 1; sentencers must make a holistic evaluative judgment.

Prosecutors will need to think carefully before contending for Category 1 based solely on an accumulation of Category 2 features, and defence advocates will be able to rely on Amini to resist unwarranted elevations.

5.2 Treatment of abduction and location

By approving the decision to treat the brief movement into an alleyway as an aggravating factor rather than as an “abduction” mandating Category 1 harm, the Court has:

• Confirmed that not every movement to a more secluded spot amounts to Category 1‑level abduction; and
• Affirmed sentencers’ flexibility to decide whether to capture such conduct in the harm categorisation or at step 2.

This is likely to be important in the frequent class of cases where sexual offending starts in public and then moves to a nearby but more secluded location.

5.3 Deference to trial judges and the role of prosecution concessions

Amini sits alongside Stewart as a reminder that:

• Sentencing involves evaluation and judgment, not simple arithmetic;
• Prosecution concessions at trial on categorisation are non‑binding but influential, especially when the judge accepts them;
• The Court of Appeal will be slow to interfere in borderline categorisation cases on a ULS reference unless the outcome is clearly wrong.

For law officers deciding whether to refer, the message is that appeals focused primarily on re‑classifying harm in the absence of obvious error face a high hurdle.

5.4 Dangerousness and the evidential basis for risk

The judgment also has important implications for risk assessments:

• Pre‑sentence reports labelling an offender as “high risk” must be anchored in a credible evidential foundation beyond the index offence, especially where that offence is already being punished with a substantial custodial term.
• Youth and lack of prior offending remain powerful counter‑indicators against an EDS, even in very serious cases.
• Public protection can often be adequately addressed by a standard determinate sentence, licence conditions, and orders such as SHPOs.

This serves as guidance both to probation authors (to explain clearly the basis for any “high risk” label) and to sentencing judges (to scrutinise that basis rather than treating it as determinative).

5.5 Young adult sexual offenders

The Court’s express endorsement of a “significant downward adjustment” due to the offender being 20 confirms and strengthens the approach that:

• Those in the 18–21 (and more broadly 18–25) age range are not treated as fully mature adults;
• In serious sexual cases, meaningful mitigation can and should still be given for age‑related factors such as impulsivity, under‑developed judgment and capacity for rehabilitation.

Defence practitioners are likely to rely on Amini to support calls for substantial mitigation for young adults, while prosecutors may seek to argue that age should carry less weight where there are particular aggravating features.

6. Conclusion

R v Amini is a careful and nuanced judgment that applies, and subtly refines, existing principles on sentencing for rape of a child aged 13–15 and on the use of the unduly lenient sentence reference procedure.

Its key contributions can be summarised as follows:

• It reinforces that harm Category 2 in the rape guideline already captures very serious cases; Category 1 is reserved for the truly extreme, and the presence of multiple Category 2 factors does not automatically justify elevation.
• It clarifies that not every movement of a victim to a more secluded spot constitutes “abduction” requiring Category 1 harm; such conduct may properly be treated instead as a step‑2 aggravating factor.
• It upholds the importance of evaluative judgment by the sentencing judge, particularly where counsel have agreed a category and the judge has presided over the trial and seen the key evidence.
• It insists on a robust evidential basis for findings of “dangerousness” and the imposition of extended determinate sentences, especially in the case of young first‑time offenders.
• It confirms that generous mitigation for young adult offenders within the guideline range will not readily be overturned on a ULS reference.

Collectively, these points strengthen principled, guideline‑compliant sentencing in sexual offence cases, affirm appellate restraint in the face of arguable but not clearly wrong decisions, and underscore the careful balance between reflecting the gravity of child rape and recognising youth, potential for rehabilitation and the limits of the dangerousness regime.