R v Abdi [2024] EWCA Crim 1649: Self‑Inflicted Loss of Representation and Voluntary Absence Do Not Render a Trial Unfair

Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

Neutral citation: [2024] EWCA Crim 1649

Judgment date: 12 December 2024

Judge giving judgment: Sir Robin Spencer

1. Introduction

R v Abdi concerns a renewed application for leave to appeal against a conviction for street robbery. The case raises a cluster of important and recurring issues in criminal practice:

How far a defendant can insist on repeated changes of publicly funded solicitors.
When a trial remains fair if the defendant is ultimately unrepresented as a result of his own conduct.
The use of section 36 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 to prohibit an unrepresented defendant from personally cross‑examining a complainant.
The role and status of a court‑appointed advocate to conduct cross‑examination.
The circumstances in which a Crown Court trial may properly proceed in the defendant’s voluntary absence.

Although the Court of Appeal ultimately refused leave to appeal and found no arguable ground to challenge the safety of the conviction, the judgment is valuable in clarifying the principle that:

A defendant who, by his own repeated misconduct and refusal to cooperate, loses legal representation and absents himself from trial cannot later rely on those consequences as demonstrating that the trial was unfair or the conviction unsafe.

The decision therefore reinforces and illustrates the limits of a defendant’s ability to manufacture or exploit “unfairness” in order to attack an otherwise properly conducted trial.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Procedural posture

The applicant, Abdi (aged 31), was convicted by a jury at Snaresbrook Crown Court on 14 March 2024 of a street robbery committed in February 2022 and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment ([2]). He had been unrepresented at trial after a series of breakdowns with four different sets of solicitors over the preceding year ([3]–[4]).

A single judge of the Court of Appeal had refused leave to appeal. Abdi renewed his application for leave before the full court. Sir Robin Spencer, delivering the judgment, considered the extensive grounds of appeal but declined to rehearse them all, having nonetheless considered each in turn ([16]).

2.2 Essential facts

The underlying allegation was straightforward:

The complainant, a university student, stepped outside his home at about 4 a.m. to smoke.
He was approached by Abdi and co‑defendant Jibiril Ibrahim Jama, who either believed or pretended to believe that the complainant wanted to buy drugs ([5]).
When the complainant denied this, both men searched his pockets and took his mobile phone, performing a “magic trick” style exchange of hands and denying they had the phone ([6]).
When the complainant demanded his phone back, Abdi threatened him: “Don’t touch me or I’ll smack you.” The two men walked away with the phone ([6]).
The complainant reported the incident and identified Abdi. The phone was found on Abdi when he was arrested and searched shortly thereafter ([7]).

Jama had pleaded guilty to the robbery. The defence case, set out in a defence statement served by the fourth set of solicitors, was that:

The complainant had approached them to buy drugs.
There was an encounter, but Jama took the phone on his own initiative.
Abdi allegedly tried to stop Jama and there was no joint plan to rob the complainant ([8]).

2.3 Key procedural features at trial

Three principal features at trial were later relied upon as grounds of appeal:

Loss of representation: The trial judge refused to permit yet another transfer of legal aid to a fifth firm after four previous firms had withdrawn due to breakdowns with Abdi, including refusal to cooperate and abusive conduct ([3]–[4], [17]).
Section 36 YJCEA 1999 order: Given Abdi’s behaviour and his self‑representation, the prosecution successfully applied to prohibit him from personally cross‑examining the complainant. The judge granted the application, adjourned the case, and appointed independent counsel, Mr Poulier, to conduct the cross‑examination ([9]). Abdi refused to allow him to do so, despite clear warnings from the judge about the consequences. Ultimately, there was no cross‑examination on Abdi’s behalf, though the judge asked some questions himself to maintain balance ([10]).
Trial in Abdi’s absence: After objecting to the fairness of the proceedings, Abdi announced he would no longer attend court ([12]). He refused to leave his prison cell the next day ([13]). The judge sent him a detailed written document explaining precisely what had occurred, warning that the trial would continue in his absence if he did not attend, and clarifying that:
- His absence would not be treated as an admission of guilt; but
- He would lose the opportunity to give evidence and to answer the prosecution case ([13]).
Abdi nonetheless chose not to attend, and the judge allowed the trial to proceed in his voluntary absence ([14]).

The judge then summed up “with commendable brevity”, giving clear, proper directions, including a warning that no adverse inference should be drawn from Abdi’s absence, his self‑representation, or his refusal of the court‑appointed advocate ([15]). The central question for the jury was whether Abdi and Jama were “in it together” ([15]). The jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict in minutes.

2.4 Disposition

The Court of Appeal rejected all six grounds of appeal:

Ground 1 (refusal to transfer legal aid) – no merit: the trial judge was fully entitled to refuse a fifth transfer in light of the repeated breakdowns and abusive conduct ([17]).
Ground 2 (prevention from cross‑examining complainant) – no merit: the judge was fully justified in making a section 36 order and appointing independent counsel ([18]).
Ground 3 (alleged incompetence of court‑appointed advocate) – no merit: there was no evidence of incompetence; contemporaneous notes and the respondent’s notice described him as professional, competent and prepared ([19]).
Ground 4 (being prevented from speaking on day one and from making an opening speech) – no merit: as a matter of law, Abdi had no entitlement to address the jury at that stage, and, since he was calling no witness other than himself, no right to make an opening speech ([20]).
Ground 5 (prosecution allegedly misled the jury and misnamed Abdi as “Mohammed”) – no merit: the prosecution’s description of “collective acts” reflected the joint enterprise allegation; “Mohammed” was one of Abdi’s names, the indictment correctly used “Bukari”, and any error was unintentional and immaterial ([21]).
Ground 6 (complaints about the fourth firm of solicitors) – no merit: whatever the rights and wrongs of the breakdown, the fact of repeated breakdowns justified refusing yet another transfer ([22]).

The court was:

“quite satisfied that there is no arguable ground of appeal. It is not arguable that the conviction is unsafe or that the trial was in any way unfair.” ([23])

The renewed application for leave to appeal was accordingly refused ([24]).

3. Analysis

3.1 The key principle: self‑inflicted unfairness

The central, unifying theme in the Court of Appeal’s reasoning is that Abdi’s unrepresented status, lack of cross‑examination, and absence from trial were the products of his own choices and conduct, not failings of the court:

He repeatedly fell out with four firms of solicitors, refusing to cooperate and abusing staff.
He refused to allow a competent court‑appointed advocate to cross‑examine the complainant.
He chose not to attend the trial, after being explicitly warned of the consequences.

The court’s approach reflects a longstanding principle in criminal procedure: a defendant cannot engineer procedural difficulties or disrupt proceedings and then invoke those self‑created difficulties as proof that the trial was unfair. Put another way, the law does not allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong.

This judgment does not invent a new doctrine; rather, it squarely applies and clearly articulates it in a modern context involving legal aid, special measures under the YJCEA 1999, and voluntary absence.

3.2 Legal aid, choice of solicitor, and refusal of further transfers

(a) Factual pattern

Abdi’s relationship with four successive firms of solicitors collapsed over a 12‑month period. Each withdrew because of a “breakdown in their relationship” with him, with the last firm reporting that he:

Refused to cooperate with them; and
Had been abusive towards members of staff ([4]).

On 7 March 2024, shortly before the trial, a judge refused Abdi’s application to transfer legal aid to yet another firm ([3]–[4]).

(b) Legal principles: right to representation vs right to choose

Under Article 6(3)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights and domestic law, a defendant has:

A right to legal representation where the interests of justice so require; and
In privately funded cases, a meaningful right to choose his lawyer.

But where representation is state‑funded (legal aid), the right to choose or change solicitors is not absolute. Courts have consistently held that:

The grant and transfer of legal aid is subject to the efficient administration of justice and the protection of public funds.
A defendant cannot repeatedly dismiss or alienate publicly funded lawyers and then assert a right to an endless succession of replacements.

Earlier case law (not cited in this judgment but consistent with it) stresses that a defendant may be required to proceed unrepresented if his own conduct has made representation impossible, provided the court takes steps to ensure fairness. The Court of Appeal in Abdi endorses that stance in robust terms.

(c) Application in Abdi

In rejecting Ground 1, the Court of Appeal held unequivocally:

“There is no merit in that ground. It was the fourth time that he had fallen out with his solicitors. The judge was fully entitled to refuse a transfer to a fifth new firm in circumstances where his existing solicitors told the court that he refused to cooperate with them and had been verbally abusive to them.” ([17])

Two elements of the court’s reasoning are important:

Pattern and context: It was not a single isolated breakdown but a sustained pattern with four firms over a year. That pattern made it reasonable to infer that the problem lay primarily with Abdi.
Conduct‑based justification: The fourth firm’s report of refusal to cooperate and abusive behaviour supplied a rational, objective basis for refusing further transfers.

The court treated the trial judge’s decision as a discretionary case‑management decision that was plainly within the reasonable range of responses. There was no suggestion that the refusal of a fifth transfer infringed Abdi’s fair trial rights; rather, his own conduct had brought about the loss of representation.

3.3 Section 36 YJCEA 1999 and prohibition on personal cross‑examination

(a) The statutory framework

Section 36 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 allows the court to prohibit a defendant from cross‑examining a witness in person where:

The witness’s evidence quality would be diminished (e.g. due to fear or distress) by such cross‑examination; and
The prohibition would improve the quality of the witness’s evidence, and is in the interests of justice.

If the court makes such an order and the defendant is not represented, the court must arrange for a qualified legal representative to conduct the cross‑examination on the defendant’s behalf (funded from central funds). This interacts with the Criminal Procedure Rules, which require the judge to manage the process carefully and explain the consequences to an unrepresented defendant.

(b) What happened in this case

Here:

The prosecution applied under section 36 to prohibit Abdi, who was now representing himself, from personally cross‑examining the complainant ([9]).
The judge granted the application and adjourned the case to the following day so independent counsel could be appointed ([9]).
Mr Poulier from the Public Defender’s Office was appointed and held a conference with Abdi to take instructions and prepare questions ([10]).
Abdi then informed the court that he did not wish Mr Poulier to cross‑examine and persisted in that stance ([10]).

The judge:

Warned Abdi, in line with the Criminal Procedure Rules, that if there was no cross‑examination, the complainant’s account would go unchallenged and not putting his case would be treated as tacit acceptance of that evidence ([10]).
Nevertheless, respected Abdi’s decision; there was no cross‑examination on his behalf.
To preserve fairness, the judge himself put a few questions to the complainant that he thought Abdi might have asked ([10]).

(c) Court of Appeal’s assessment

Ground 2 alleged that Abdi was wrongly prevented from cross‑examining. The Court of Appeal dismissed this succinctly:

“There is no merit in this ground. The judge was fully justified in granting the section 36 application and an independent advocate was appointed by the court whom the applicant refused to accept.” ([18])

This encapsulates two important propositions:

Justified restriction: The court accepted that the statutory threshold for a section 36 order was satisfied. Although the judgment does not spell out the evidential basis (e.g. fear or distress of the complainant), it is implicit that the trial judge had sufficient grounds – the Court of Appeal’s endorsement would otherwise be unlikely.
Refusal of representation is the defendant’s choice: Once a competent advocate had been appointed, Abdi’s refusal to accept his services did not undermine the fairness of the trial. The absence of cross‑examination was a direct consequence of Abdi’s own decision, not the section 36 order itself.

In this sense, Abdi reaffirms that:

Section 36 orders are compatible with fair trial rights where a substitute advocate is appointed and the defendant is properly warned.
The defendant cannot complain that his case was not put to the complainant when he has refused to permit a court‑appointed advocate to do so.

3.4 Competence of the court‑appointed advocate

Ground 3 alleged that Mr Poulier was not properly focused, was slow in taking instructions, and that his proposed questions were not in Abdi’s interests ([19]).

The Court of Appeal rejected this complaint emphatically:

“There is nothing whatsoever to indicate that Mr Poulier was incompetent. The respondent's notice confirms that he appeared professional, competent and well‑equipped to deal with the issues.” ([19])

The judgment notes that, in a document prepared for Abdi, the judge recorded that:

Mr Poulier had prepared the case, read the defence statement, and prepared his own questions.
He had amended and supplemented those questions after discussions with Abdi ([19]).

The key point is evidential: the only “evidence” of incompetence came from Abdi’s assertions, which were flatly contradicted by the judge’s contemporaneous record and by counsel’s professional conduct as observed in court.

Practically, Abdi reinforces that allegations of ineffectiveness or incompetence of appointed counsel must be:

Supported by some objective material; and
Viewed against the contemporaneous assessment of the trial judge, who is usually best placed to evaluate counsel’s performance.

3.5 Limits on an unrepresented defendant’s right to address the jury

Ground 4 complained that, on the first day of the trial, the judge prevented Abdi from speaking and denied him an opening speech, and that he was prevented from referring to the complainant’s witness statement after the complainant had given evidence ([11]–[12], [20]).

(a) Speeches by defendants in person

The Criminal Procedure Rules and long‑standing practice set clear limits:

Opening speeches are usually made by counsel for the prosecution and, if the defence calls evidence beyond the defendant himself, by defence counsel.
If the defendant is unrepresented and calls no witness other than himself, he has no right to make an opening speech: his “case” is put through his own evidence and in his closing speech (if allowed by the rules).

The Court of Appeal endorsed the trial judge’s explanation to Abdi:

“The judge explained that he could not do so until the end of the prosecution case, and that if he was not proposing to call any witnesses apart from himself he was in any event not permitted to make an opening speech.” ([11])

The court concluded:

“The judge was correct in law to answer the applicant's request as he did. The applicant had no entitlement to address the jury at that stage, or to open his case to the jury in due course as he was calling no witness but himself.” ([20])

(b) Use of witness statements

Abdi also wanted to rely on the complainant’s witness statement after the complainant had finished giving evidence. The judge refused, explaining that any inconsistency or challenge should have been put during cross‑examination ([11]).

This reflects the basic rule of trial fairness: a witness must be given a chance to answer any challenge to their account at the time they are in the witness box. Using their statement afterwards, when they cannot respond, is improper. Since Abdi had refused to allow any cross‑examination, he had himself foreclosed that opportunity.

3.6 Trial in the defendant’s voluntary absence

(a) The legal framework

The Crown Court has a long‑established power at common law, confirmed by appellate authority, to continue a trial in the defendant’s voluntary absence where:

The defendant knows the trial is ongoing and of the implications of non‑attendance.
The judge is satisfied that the absence is voluntary or deliberate.
Proceeding is in the interests of justice, balancing fairness, the rights of witnesses, and the administration of justice.

Key appellate guidance (although not cited in the judgment) emphasises the need for careful judicial consideration and a tailored direction to the jury that no adverse inference should be drawn merely from the defendant’s absence.

(b) Steps taken by the trial judge

Abdi notified the judge on 12 March that he would not attend for the remainder of the trial ([12]). The following day:

He refused to leave his prison cell, asserting that he was not having a fair trial ([13]).
The judge sent the jury away for the day ([13]).
The judge drafted a detailed written document for Abdi, setting out:
- Exactly what had happened at each stage of the trial so far.
- A clear warning that if he did not attend the next day, the trial would proceed in his absence.
- An explanation that the jury would be told his absence was not an admission of guilt.
- A warning that his absence would deprive him of the opportunity to give evidence and that the prosecution case would go unanswered ([13]).
The judge took particular care to ensure this document reached Abdi at the prison ([13]).

Abdi still chose not to attend. The judge was satisfied that he was voluntarily absent and acceded to the prosecution’s application to continue the trial without him ([14]).

(c) Summing up and jury direction

In summing up, the judge:

Directed the jury that they should not treat Abdi’s absence as any admission of guilt ([15]).
Gave similar warnings about his self‑representation and refusal of the court‑appointed advocate.
Framed the central issue as whether the two defendants were “in it together” ([15]).

The Court of Appeal praised the summing up as clear, concise, and fair:

“His directions to the jury were clear and helpful and his summary of the evidence fair and accurate.” ([15])

In upholding the conviction, the Court implicitly accepted that:

The judge’s written warning and efforts to communicate with Abdi were a model of good practice.
Abdi knowingly and deliberately absented himself, thereby waiving his right to be present.
The jury direction neutralised any risk of unfair prejudice from his absence.

This part of the judgment thus exemplifies proper judicial management of voluntary absence, reinforcing that a defendant cannot refuse to attend and then complain that the trial was unfair because it proceeded without him.

3.7 Prosecution conduct, joint enterprise, and misnaming

Ground 5 alleged that the prosecution:

Misled the jury by suggesting the two defendants blamed each other.
Attributed collective acts indiscriminately to both defendants.
Referred to Abdi as “Mohammed” instead of “Bukari” ([21]).

The Court of Appeal rejected each element:

No improper suggestion of mutual blame: There is no indication that the prosecution mischaracterised the positions; indeed, Jama had pleaded guilty and Abdi’s own defence statement accepted an encounter, blaming Jama alone.
Collective acts and joint enterprise: Describing the conduct of both men jointly was consistent with a standard joint enterprise robbery allegation – that they were acting together to rob the complainant.
Use of “Mohammed”: “Mohammed” was one of Abdi’s names; the indictment correctly identified him as “Bukari”. Any occasional use of a different given name was:
- Unintentional; and
- Incapable of affecting the safety of the conviction ([21]).

The broader point is that not every minor irregularity, slip, or infelicity at trial comes close to rendering a conviction unsafe. There must be a realistic possibility of prejudice or distortion of the fact‑finding process. Here there was none.

3.8 Complaints against solicitors and the “blame” question

Ground 6 attacked the conduct of the fourth firm of solicitors, alleging that they:

Failed to attend court.
Refused to attend video conferences.
Terminated their retainer only when Abdi sought to transfer legal aid, falsely citing his conduct as aggressive and unacceptable ([22]).

The Court of Appeal’s response was striking:

“Whatever the rights and wrongs of the breakdown of the relationship between the applicant and the solicitors, the fact is that there was such a breakdown. The judge was rightly not prepared to grant yet another transfer of legal aid following yet another breakdown of the solicitor/client relationship.” ([22])

This articulates an important practical rule:

For the purposes of deciding whether to allow further transfers of legal aid (and on appeal, whether the trial was unfair), the cause of the breakdown is often less important than the fact that a pattern of breakdowns exists.
Where repeated breakdowns have occurred, a judge is entitled to conclude that continued transfers are no longer justified, regardless of which side is “at fault” in any individual dispute.

In other words, fairness does not require the criminal courts to conduct detailed satellite inquiries into every solicitor‑client disagreement in order to apportion blame. Where the pattern of relationships collapsing is clear, a limit can legitimately be set.

4. Precedential Significance and Impact

4.1 Consolidation of the “self‑inflicted unfairness” principle

R v Abdi serves as a clear and current reaffirmation that:

Defendants cannot deliberately or recklessly sabotage their own representation.
They cannot refuse to engage with appointed advocates or to attend their own trials.
They cannot later invoke the resulting absence of representation or presence as evidence that their trial was unfair or their conviction unsafe.

The judgment will likely be cited in future where defendants:

Seek to appeal on the basis that they were unrepresented at trial after multiple breakdowns with solicitors.
Complain on appeal that no cross‑examination took place, despite the court having imposed a section 36 prohibition and appointed competent counsel.
Argue that their absence from trial rendered the proceedings unfair, when they had been warned and chose not to attend.

4.2 Guidance for trial judges

The judgment implicitly endorses several aspects of the trial judge’s handling as good practice:

Refusal of further transfers of legal aid:
- Where there have already been multiple breakdowns with different solicitors;
- Where there is objective evidence of refusal to cooperate and abusive behaviour;
- Where granting further transfers would risk delay and undermine efficient justice.
Use of section 36 YJCEA:
- Granting the application where necessary to protect the complainant and the quality of evidence.
- Adjourning to appoint a court‑funded advocate.
- Ensuring the defendant is given a fair opportunity to instruct that advocate.
Documenting events for the defendant:
- Preparing a written note summarising what has happened and the consequences of non‑attendance.
- Ensuring that the note reaches the defendant (particularly when in custody).
Managing voluntary absence:
- Carefully considering whether absence is voluntary.
- Giving the jury robust directions that no adverse inference may be drawn.
Judicial intervention to preserve fairness:
- Asking a limited number of questions of a key witness where the defendant, by his own choice, offers no cross‑examination, purely to maintain balance and fairness ([10]).

Appellate endorsement of such practices provides practical reassurance and guidance to trial judges dealing with similarly difficult and disruptive defendants.

4.3 Implications for defence practitioners and defendants

For defence solicitors and counsel, Abdi underscores the importance of:

Keeping clear, contemporaneous records of client behaviour and communications, especially where relationships break down.
Informing the court promptly and accurately about any refusal to cooperate or abusive conduct.
Advising clients that:
- Repeatedly dismissing solicitors or refusing to cooperate can lead to a situation where the court will not grant further transfers;
- They may be required to proceed unrepresented, and that this is compatible with a fair trial if appropriate safeguards are in place.

For defendants, the case is a stark warning:

Abusing or refusing to engage with solicitors has real consequences; the court is not obliged to indulge an endless sequence of new lawyers.
Refusing to permit an appointed advocate to cross‑examine, or refusing to attend trial, can significantly weaken the defence and will not, of itself, provide grounds for appeal.

4.4 Fair trial and Article 6 ECHR

While the judgment does not explicitly cite Article 6 ECHR, its reasoning is clearly framed by fair trial considerations:

The trial judge took active, concrete steps to protect Abdi’s rights:
- Appointing independent counsel under section 36.
- Explaining the consequences of refusing cross‑examination.
- Preparing a written explanatory document before proceeding in his absence.
- Giving careful jury directions to avoid improper inferences.
The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the trial was not in any way unfair ([23]) implies that:
- Abdi’s rights under Article 6(1) and 6(3) were sufficiently protected.
- Any limitations on his ability to personally cross‑examine or to attend the trial were the result of his own choices, amounting to a voluntary waiver of those procedural rights.

Thus, Abdi can be read as a contemporary example of how courts balance the defendant’s procedural rights with his own conduct, concluding that rights can be effectively waived or lost through voluntary, informed behaviour.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

This section briefly explains some of the legal concepts used in the judgment in more accessible terms.

5.1 Legal aid and transfer of solicitors

Legal aid is public funding for a lawyer if you cannot afford one and the case is serious.
Transfer of legal aid means moving that funding from one firm of solicitors to another.
Courts may refuse repeated transfers if:
- They cause delay and waste public money; or
- The defendant keeps falling out with different firms for similar reasons.

5.2 Section 36 YJCEA 1999

This law allows a court to stop a defendant from personally cross‑examining a particular witness, usually to protect the witness from fear or distress.
Instead, the court appoints an independent lawyer to ask questions on the defendant’s behalf, free of charge to the defendant.
The defendant can give instructions to that lawyer about what to ask.

5.3 Court‑appointed advocate

Where the defendant has no lawyer and the court bars him from personal cross‑examination under section 36, the court chooses a barrister or solicitor‑advocate to step in.
This lawyer is not the defendant’s general representative; they are appointed only for the limited job of questioning certain witnesses.

5.4 Joint enterprise

This is a legal concept where two or more people are treated as acting together to commit a crime.
Even if one person physically takes the property (here, the mobile phone), another can be guilty of robbery if:
- They were acting together; or
- They encouraged or assisted the robbery, knowing what was happening.

5.5 Trial in absence

Usually, a defendant has the right to be present at their trial.
But if a defendant:
- Knows about the trial, and
- Chooses not to attend (for example, refuses to leave their prison cell),
the judge can decide to carry on without them.
The judge must:
- Warn the defendant about this; and
- Tell the jury not to assume guilt from the defendant’s absence.

5.6 “Safety” of the conviction

On an appeal against conviction, the Court of Appeal does not simply ask whether it would have decided the case the same way.
Instead, it asks whether the conviction is “unsafe” – meaning there is a real possibility that something went wrong that makes the guilty verdict unreliable.
Procedural irregularities only matter if they might have affected the outcome or the fairness of the trial in a meaningful way.

5.7 Single judge and renewed application

Most criminal appeals require permission (“leave”) to appeal.
A single judge first reads the papers and decides whether to grant or refuse leave.
If leave is refused, the applicant can ask the full Court of Appeal to reconsider – this is a renewed application.
Here, both the single judge and the full court concluded there was no arguable ground of appeal.

6. Conclusion

R v Abdi [2024] EWCA Crim 1649 is a concise but important judgment that:

Reaffirms that self‑inflicted loss of representation – through repeated breakdowns with solicitors caused by the defendant’s own conduct – does not render a trial unfair, nor does it make a conviction unsafe.
Confirms that properly‑made section 36 YJCEA orders, coupled with the appointment of an independent advocate, are compatible with a fair trial, even when the defendant refuses to cooperate.
Illustrates best practice in managing a defendant who voluntarily absents himself from trial: clear written warnings, careful record‑keeping, and robust directions to the jury.
Clarifies the limited procedural entitlements of unrepresented defendants regarding opening speeches and the use of witness statements.
Emphasises that allegations about prosecutorial misdescription and minor naming errors will only matter on appeal if they realistically risked prejudicing the jury or undermining the safety of the conviction.

Taken together, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning sends a clear message: the criminal justice system will protect defendants’ fair trial rights, but it will not allow those rights to be manipulated or weaponised by defendants who, through their own choices and misconduct, seek to create the very unfairness they then invoke on appeal. The trial judge in Abdi is explicitly commended for careful, balanced case management, and the conviction is firmly upheld as both safe and fair.