Provisional Medical Attribution as “Date of Knowledge” under the Statute of Limitations: Commentary on Kmiec v Noonan Services Group Ltd [2025] IEHC 694

1. Introduction

The High Court decision in Magdalena Kmiec v Noonan Services Group Limited [2025] IEHC 694 is a significant application of the “date of knowledge” provisions in the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 1991 to an occupational illness claim.

Ms Kmiec, a Polish national employed as a cleaner by Noonan Services Group since around 2009, alleged that she developed respiratory problems, including asthma, as a result of long-term exposure to cleaning chemicals in University Hospital Limerick. She ceased work on 21 March 2022 after an acute episode of shortness of breath and later brought personal injuries proceedings alleging negligence and breach of duty by her employer in failing to protect her from harmful chemical exposure.

The defendant applied to dismiss the proceedings on the basis that they were statute-barred: proceedings were issued on 27 March 2023, and the defendant contended that Ms Kmiec’s “date of knowledge” under the 1991 Act pre-dated 4 November 2020, such that the two-year limitation period had already expired by the time the claim was lodged with the Personal Injuries Assessment Board (PIAB) in November 2022.

The core issues before O’Higgins J were:

• When, on the evidence, did the plaintiff first have knowledge that:
  • her injury was significant (s.2(1)(b), 1991 Act), and
  • her injury was (at least potentially) attributable to her work and to the defendant’s acts or omissions (s.2(1)(c))?
• Whether, taking the plaintiff’s case “at its height” but in light of objective medical and documentary records, there was any realistic prospect of her defeating a Statute of Limitations defence at trial.
• Assuming the proceedings were dismissed as statute-barred, how should the court exercise its statutory discretion on costs under ss.168–169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015?

Although the judgment is ex tempore, it is notable both for its rigorous use of medical records to fix an early date of knowledge, and for its nuanced costs ruling: the defendant succeeds entirely on limitation yet does not obtain its costs.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Factual and procedural background

• The plaintiff worked as a cleaner for the defendant from around 2009 at University Hospital Limerick.
• She left work on 21 March 2022 after a “sudden onset of respiratory symptoms and shortness of breath” and has not worked since.
• Her Personal Injury Summons, issued on 27 March 2023, pleads that this episode arose:

  “as a result of ongoing respiratory issues including, inter alia, recurrent cough, wheeze and shortness of breath at minimal exertion, as a result of being exposed over a continuous period, to chemical agents during the course of her employment with the Defendant.”

• She further indicated (through replies to particulars and PIAB documentation) that this was not merely an exacerbation of pre‑existing problems, but a stand‑alone injury without prior relevant conditions.
• The case was first resisted by the defendant through affidavits from its solicitor, Mr Neal Boland. Initially, the only replying affidavit was from the plaintiff’s solicitor, Mr Kieran O’Brien. The court adjourned the hearing to enable an affidavit from the plaintiff herself; she subsequently swore an affidavit on 19 June 2025, largely mirroring her solicitor’s earlier evidence.
• PIAB “put the claim on hold” on 3 November 2022. Both parties accepted that, for limitation purposes, the critical cut-off date was 4 November 2020: if the plaintiff’s date of knowledge was before this, the claim was statute‑barred.

2.2 Key medical chronology relied upon by the court

The judgment extracts several objective medical and documentary milestones (all predating November 2020):

• 2018 – According to the plaintiff’s own replies to particulars, she first reported her injuries to the defendant and first sought medical attention around this time.
• February 2019 – GP records show prescription of anti‑inflammatory asthma medication for chest soreness and a significant cough, with a discharge diagnosis of asthma exacerbation.
• Winter 2019 – Per Professor Burke’s later report (12 November 2022), the plaintiff’s symptoms were “well‑established by the winter 2019”, and she had to stop during a 10km run due to breathlessness.
• “March 2019” / early 2020 – The plaintiff attended A&E in Limerick University Hospital with breathlessness; she was treated with medications and returned to work.
• 28 February 2020 – GP referral to consultant respiratory physician, recording shortness of breath on exertion and noting that she worked as a cleaner. The GP observed that chronic cough or wheeze “may be related to chemical exposure at work”.
• 3 March 2020 – A crucial letter from the plaintiff’s GP (Dr Liam Holmes) directly to the defendant, stating:
  • She complained of shortness of breath for the previous six months;
  • She had been referred for further investigations and was under specialist care but there was as yet no confirmed diagnosis;
  • It would be helpful if she could avoid exposure to respiratory irritants; and
  • The GP requested a review of the chemical agents with which she worked and restrictions on any agents identified as respiratory irritants.
• 18/19 March 2020 – Consultant physician Dr Heather Holloway wrote to Dr Holmes describing the plaintiff’s “chronic cough and wheeze which may be related to chemical exposure at work” and confirming treatment with steroids and inhaled asthma medication.

2.3 The plaintiff’s position on date of knowledge

The plaintiff contended that:

• Her awareness of a significant injury, and of a probable claim against her employer, only crystallised after the acute episode on 21 March 2022, which led to an overnight hospital admission and treatment with an inhaler, steroids and codeine.
• Before that, she had interpreted her symptoms as akin to a chest infection or flu, and did not appreciate them as serious or permanent.
• She was never told by any doctor to leave work or go on sick leave; she did not receive a clear diagnosis of asthma or a clear statement that her work caused her condition until much later.
• Although her GP may have communicated suspicions or possibilities (e.g. in letters to consultants), those messages were directed at other medical professionals rather than to her.
• Given her limited English and the absence of any workplace action following Dr Holmes’ March 2020 letter, she inferred that the problem was not serious.

2.4 Decision on limitation

Applying the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 1991 and the leading appellate authorities, O’Higgins J held:

• The limitation period for a personal injuries action is two years from the date on which the cause of action accrued or the plaintiff’s “date of knowledge”, whichever is later (s.3(1) of the 1991 Act).
• “Date of knowledge” under s.2(1) requires the plaintiff to know that:
  1. she had been injured;
  2. the injury was significant;
  3. the injury was attributable in whole or part to the acts or omissions alleged to constitute negligence/breach of duty;
  4. the identity of the defendant; and
  5. (where relevant) the identity of any other tortfeasor.
• The “battleground” was s.2(1)(b) (significance) and s.2(1)(c) (attributability).
• On the evidence, and having regard to both actual and constructive knowledge, the plaintiff either knew or ought reasonably to have known that:
  • her respiratory condition was a significant injury, and
  • it was capable of being attributed to her work‑related exposure to chemicals,
  by March 2020 at the latest, if not earlier.
• As March 2020 is earlier than 4 November 2020, the two-year limitation period had expired before the PIAB application of 2 November 2022, and thus before the issue of proceedings in March 2023.
• The plaintiff’s claim was therefore “doomed” and should be dismissed at this preliminary stage as having no reasonable chance of success on limitation grounds.

2.5 Decision on costs

Notwithstanding the defendant’s complete success, the court decided to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event and made no order as to costs.

In exercising its discretion under ss.168–169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, and guided by the Supreme Court in Little v Chief Appeals Officer [2024] IESC 53, O’Higgins J emphasised:

• The defendant had succeeded entirely and, ordinarily, would receive its costs.
• However, several unusual features justified departure from the default:
  • The apparent substantive strength of the plaintiff’s underlying negligence claim, based particularly on Professor Burke’s report implicating occupational chemical exposure as the likely cause of her asthma.
  • Unchallenged evidence that the defendant apparently failed to act on Dr Holmes’ clear letter of 3 March 2020 requesting a review of chemical agents and avoidance of respiratory irritants.
  • The possibility that this failure may have had adverse health consequences for the plaintiff.
  • The plaintiff’s full and candid disclosure to her medical advisers, with no suggestion of obfuscation or bad faith.
• Balancing the plaintiff’s delay and the defendant’s procedural success against the employer’s apparent inaction in response to medical warnings, the court found it just to make no order as to costs.

3. Statutory Framework and the “Date of Knowledge” Test

3.1 The Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 1991

The case turns on the interpretation of the 1991 Act, which modified the basic limitation rules in the Statute of Limitations 1957 for personal injuries. Two provisions are central:

1. Section 3(1):

   “An action … claiming damages in respect of personal injuries … shall not be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued or the date of knowledge (if later) of the person injured.”

   This introduces the “later of” test: time runs from the later of (a) accrual of the cause of action, or (b) the plaintiff’s date of knowledge of certain key facts.
2. Section 2(1):

   This defines the “date of knowledge” as the date when the plaintiff first knew:

   1. that the person alleged to have been injured had been injured;
   2. that the injury in question was significant;
   3. that the injury was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission alleged to constitute negligence, nuisance or breach of duty;
   4. the identity of the defendant; and
   5. where relevant, the identity of any other wrongdoer and the additional facts supporting an action against the defendant.

   Knowledge that the acts or omissions did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence is expressly stated to be irrelevant.

3.2 Constructive knowledge

Although not set out verbatim in the judgment, the court expressly references the concept of constructive knowledge: the date when a plaintiff “might reasonably have been expected to acquire” the relevant knowledge if she had taken appropriate steps, with or without expert advice. This derives from s.2(2) of the 1991 Act and has been elaborated in appellate case law.

O’Higgins J stresses that even if a plaintiff’s actual date of knowledge falls within the limitation period, the court must still consider whether she should be imputed with earlier constructive knowledge, based on what a reasonable person in her position would have done.

3.3 Interaction with the PIAB “stop the clock” regime

Personal injury claims in Ireland (with some exceptions) must first be submitted to PIAB. Under the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Acts, the running of the limitation period is suspended (“stopped”) from the date PIAB receives a valid application until a specified later date.

In this case:

• The plaintiff lodged her PIAB application on 2 November 2022.
• PIAB “put the claim on hold” on 3 November 2022.
• The parties accepted that, working back two years from this “stop” date, the critical boundary for date of knowledge was 4 November 2020.
• If Ms Kmiec knew (or ought reasonably to have known) the relevant s.2(1) facts before 4 November 2020, her claim would be outside time notwithstanding the PIAB suspension.

The court accepted this framework and asked, essentially: did the objective records show that the plaintiff’s knowledge—actual or constructive—crystallised no later than March 2020? If so, the claim was necessarily statute‑barred.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

4.1 O’Sullivan v Bon Secours Health System Ltd [2020] 1 I.R. 413 (Supreme Court)

This is the leading modern Supreme Court authority on date of knowledge. Although the judgment in Kmiec does not rehearse the facts, O’Sullivan involved delayed discovery of alleged medical negligence in cancer diagnosis and treatment.

From O’Sullivan, O’Higgins J highlights two key principles:

1. Even if a plaintiff can point to a relatively late actual realisation that they have a claim, this is not the end of the enquiry. The court must also ask when they should reasonably have acquired that knowledge, having taken reasonable steps (constructive knowledge).
2. The focus is on knowledge of material facts – injury, significance, and potential attribution – not on knowledge of legal negligence. The plaintiff need not know the precise medical details; “broad knowledge of the causally relevant acts and omissions” suffices (a phrase later quoted by O’Donnell J and invoked in this judgment).

These principles underpin the High Court’s insistence that the plaintiff’s subjective affidavit evidence could not stand if “wholly undermined” by contemporaneous medical records showing broad awareness of a serious, work‑related respiratory problem more than two years before the PIAB stop date.

4.2 Gough v Neary [2003] 3 I.R. 92 (Supreme Court)

Gough v Neary concerned claims arising from the notorious conduct of gynecologist Dr Michael Neary. The key contribution of Gough was its interpretation of the phrase “attributable to” in s.2(1)(c).

According to the Supreme Court (as summarised by O’Higgins J):

• “Attributable to” is to be read as “capable of being attributed” or “potentially attributable to”.
• A plaintiff does not need certainty that negligence has occurred. It is sufficient that she realises in broad terms that her injury may have been caused by particular acts or omissions of a person now sued as a defendant.

This is central to the outcome in Kmiec. The plaintiff argued that, until late 2022, neither she nor her doctors knew that her asthma was definitively caused by workplace chemicals. The medical records at most recorded that her symptoms “may be related” to chemical exposure.

However, applying Gough, the High Court held that such language—“may be related” and similar—is legally enough to start the limitation clock. Once the plaintiff knows that a significant injury might be attributable to work conditions, the s.2(1)(c) requirement is satisfied; she cannot wait for categorical medical confirmation.

4.3 Conway v Bon Secours Hospital [2018] IEHC 93 (Binchy J)

Conway is cited as a High Court application of the Supreme Court’s guidance, particularly on constructive knowledge. While the facts (a hospital negligence claim) differ, the decision illustrates:

• The court’s reluctant but necessary task of identifying a specific date when the plaintiff either did or should have appreciated that the injury was both significant and potentially caused by medical treatment.
• The obligation to weigh subjective averments about what the plaintiff believed against the objective medical record of consultations, referrals, diagnoses and advice.

O’Higgins J follows this approach: he accepts that, on a summary application, the plaintiff’s affidavit must be taken “at its height”, but subject to erosion where contradicted by objective materials such as GP notes, consultant letters and referral forms.

4.4 Kepa v Noonan Services Group Ltd [2024] IEHC 659 (Jackson J)

This relatively recent High Court decision is particularly salient because it involved the same defendant and concerned the interpretation of s.2(1)(b), the requirement that the plaintiff know that the injury is “significant”.

As summarised by O’Higgins J, Kepa confirms that:

• Section 2(1)(b) is concerned with when the plaintiff knows that the injury is significant, not when she knows its full extent or every long‑term consequence.
• “Significant” does not require catastrophic damage. It is enough that a reasonable person would regard the injury as sufficiently serious to justify bringing proceedings or taking legal/medical advice.

This principle is used in Kmiec to reject the argument that the limitation period should only start after the acute episode and overnight admission in March 2022. The court holds that her earlier pattern of recurrent symptoms, GP and A&E attendances, an asthma diagnosis and specialist referral demonstrates that her injury was significant well before November 2020.

4.5 Bolger v O’Brien [1999] 2 I.R. 431 (Hamilton C.J.)

Hamilton C.J.’s dicta in Bolger v O’Brien are cited (via Jackson J in Kepa) for the proposition that s.2(1)(b) does not require knowledge of the “full significance” of an injury.

In practice, this means that a plaintiff cannot delay time running by pointing to later deterioration or new complications if, from an earlier date, it was already apparent that she was suffering from a non‑trivial, persistent condition requiring investigation and treatment.

4.6 Little v Chief Appeals Officer [2024] IESC 53 (Supreme Court – costs)

On costs, O’Higgins J relies on the Supreme Court’s recent guidance in Little concerning the interpretation of ss.168–169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015.

From Little, the relevant takeaways are:

• The 2015 Act codifies and strengthens the presumption that “costs follow the event”. A wholly successful party should normally receive its costs.
• The court retains a discretion to depart from that default where “special” or “good” reasons exist, but such reasons must be specifically identified and justified.
• In exercising this discretion, the court may consider factors such as:
  • the conduct of the parties before and during the proceedings;
  • the nature and importance of the issues;
  • whether the proceedings raised a point of general public importance or clarified the law;
  • any unreasonable behaviour or failure to engage.

In Kmiec, O’Higgins J applies this framework and, after balancing factors on both sides, concludes that the defendant’s complete success is outweighed by other justice considerations—leading to the unusual but carefully reasoned outcome of “no order as to costs”.

5. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

5.1 Approach to a summary dismissal on limitation grounds

The defendant’s motion sought dismissal on the basis that the proceedings had “no reasonable chance of success” because they were clearly statute-barred. While the specific rule of court is not spelled out, the approach mirrors that in applications to strike out or summarily dismiss where:

• The court assumes the plaintiff’s case at its strongest (“at its height”),
• But may rely on incontrovertible, contemporaneous documents (medical records, letters, replies to particulars) that objectively contradict later assertions, and
• Asks whether, in light of that material, any reasonable tribunal could find for the plaintiff on the limitation issue.

The judge acknowledges that there is “a considerable degree of conflict” on the date when the plaintiff first appreciated the significance and potential causation of her injury. However, he concludes that this conflict can be resolved, as a matter of law, by giving primacy to the objective records over subjective recollection where they diverge sharply.

5.2 Significance of the injury – s.2(1)(b)

On “significance”, the court reasons as follows:

1. The plaintiff’s symptoms were recurrent and persistent from at least late 2018:
   • She reported shortness of breath and chronic cough over a period of months.
   • She attended A&E and GP consultations multiple times.
   • She had to abandon a 10km run due to breathlessness.
   • She was prescribed asthma medication and diagnosed with asthma exacerbation.
2. By February/March 2020:
   • Her GP referred her to a respiratory consultant for specialised assessment.
   • She was on inhalers and steroids for ongoing symptoms.
   • Her GP considered it serious enough to write directly to her employer, expressing concern and seeking changes to her work environment.
3. These facts collectively show that her condition was far beyond a trivial or fleeting ailment; it was a chronic, disruptive respiratory problem requiring ongoing medical management.

Against this background, the judge does not accept the plaintiff’s characterisation that, until March 2022, she believed she was merely suffering from chest infections or flu‑like illnesses of no particular significance. He finds that such an interpretation cannot withstand the cumulative medical evidence and legal test of “significant injury” as interpreted in Kepa and Bolger.

Critically, the court emphasises that:

• “Significance” is judged by an objective standard—what a reasonable person with the plaintiff’s symptoms and treatment history would recognise as serious—rather than solely by the plaintiff’s subjective understanding.
• The fact that later, in March 2022, she suffered a particularly acute episode and an overnight hospital stay does not reset the clock; it may show worsening of a known significant condition, not the first realisation of it.

5.3 Knowledge of attribution – s.2(1)(c)

The most legally important aspect of the judgment is the court’s treatment of s.2(1)(c)’s requirement that the plaintiff know the injury was attributable “in whole or in part” to the act or omission alleged to constitute negligence—here, exposure to workplace chemicals.

Applying Gough and O’Sullivan, O’Higgins J reiterates:

• “Attributable to” means “capable of being attributed to” or “potentially attributable to”.
• Only “broad knowledge of the causally relevant acts and omissions” is required.
• Certainty or definitive medical proof is not necessary; suspicion or clear possibility suffices.

He then anchors his analysis in three key documentary strands:

1. GP and consultant letters (February–March 2020):
   • The GP referral to Professor Burke notes:

     “chronic cough or wheeze may be related to chemical exposure at work … works as a cleaner.”

   • Dr Holloway’s consultant letter refers to:

     “chronic cough and wheeze which may be related to chemical exposure at work. She works as a cleaner.”

   Even though couched in provisional language (“may be related”), under the Gough/O’Sullivan standard, this is enough to alert a reasonable person that her injury is potentially work‑related.
2. GP letter to the employer (3 March 2020):
   • Dr Holmes explicitly links the plaintiff’s shortness of breath to respiratory irritants in her workplace environment.
   • He directly requests a review of chemical agents and restrictions on irritants.
   This demonstrates that both patient and GP were sufficiently concerned about occupational causation to seek intervention from the employer.
3. Professor Burke’s later report (November 2022):
   • While authored outside the limitation period, it quotes and synthesises the plaintiff’s earlier medical history, noting that:
     • Her symptoms were “well‑established by the winter 2019”.
     • Her “first significant attack” occurred in March 2019.
   • He ultimately concludes that occupational irritant exposure is the likely cause of the asthma.
   The judge uses these retrospective observations not to set the date of knowledge in 2022, but to corroborate that the condition, and suspicion of workplace linkage, existed at a substantial level well before November 2020.

The plaintiff’s affidavit attempts to counter this by asserting that:

• These were communications between doctors, not clearly explained to her;
• She was not told in plain terms that work was the cause; and
• She felt reassured by the fact that the employer did not change her duties or remove her from exposure after the GP’s March 2020 letter.

However, the court finds that, objectively, a reasonable person in her shoes—repeatedly experiencing serious respiratory symptoms, being referred for specialist assessment, and aware that her GP had written to her employer expressing concern about workplace irritants—either actually knew or ought reasonably to have known that her injury was potentially attributable to her employment no later than March 2020.

5.4 Balancing subjective and objective evidence

A recurring theme is the tension between:

• The plaintiff’s subjective state of mind and recollection, as set out in her affidavit, and
• The objective documentary record generated contemporaneously by healthcare professionals and the plaintiff’s own communications with them.

O’Higgins J accepts the general principle that, in a summary judgment context, the plaintiff’s version must be given generous weight. But he also endorses and applies the caveat that purely subjective claims can be rejected if “wholly undermined by objective records.”

In practice, this means:

• The court carefully reads the plaintiff’s affidavit, including her explanations of why she did not regard her symptoms as serious and why she did not appreciate the work‑related nature of her illness.
• It then sets these assertions against:
  • the timing and content of GP and consultant letters;
  • the initiation of specialist referral and asthma‑specific treatments;
  • her replies to particulars admitting early reporting and medical attention from 2018; and
  • Professor Burke’s retrospective narrative of symptom onset and progression.
• Where the written record contradicts later claims of ignorance or trivialisation, the court gives primacy to the contemporaneous evidence.

On this basis, the plaintiff’s assertion that she only realised she had a significant, possibly work‑related injury after the March 2022 episode is held to be unsustainable. The judge concludes that, even taking her case at its height, “the objective evidence warrants the dismissal of the proceedings.”

5.5 The decisive finding: date of knowledge by March 2020

Having applied the above principles, the court identifies March 2020 as the decisive point in time:

“In my view, by March 2020, if not before, that the injury was significant and that it was potentially attributable to exposure to chemicals in her employment was or should have been apparent.”

Since March 2020 is more than two years before the PIAB stop date of 3 November 2022, the two-year limitation period had expired. The action was therefore out of time and without a reasonable prospect of overcoming a Statute of Limitations defence, justifying dismissal at this interlocutory stage.

6. Costs: Departing from “Costs Follow the Event”

6.1 Statutory framework and default position

Sections 168–169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 now govern costs in civil proceedings. They embed the traditional rule that “costs follow the event”, while preserving a judicial discretion to depart from that rule where justice so requires.

Drawing on Little v Chief Appeals Officer, O’Higgins J accepts that:

• The strong default is that the wholly successful party receives its costs.
• To depart from this default, the court must identify specific reasons grounded in justice and fairness.

6.2 Factors weighing in favour of the defendant’s costs

The following considerations supported an order of costs in favour of the defendant:

• The defendant was wholly successful in the proceedings; the action was dismissed in its entirety.
• The plaintiff had previously sought an adjournment to place her own affidavit before the court; while the court accommodated this, the judge noted that such an affidavit “should have been before the court on the first occasion.”
• The motion was “keenly fought” and involved substantial documentation and court resources.

6.3 Factors leading the court to depart from the default rule

Despite this, O’Higgins J identifies two principal groups of factors that, in combination, justify a departure from the costs‑follow‑the‑event principle.

6.3.1 Apparent substantive strength of the plaintiff’s claim

First, the court expresses concern—bordering on disquiet—about the merits of the underlying negligence case, notwithstanding its dismissal on technical limitation grounds.

Specifically, from Professor Burke’s 12 November 2022 report, the court notes that:

• The plaintiff likely had asthma;
• She was exposed, on her account, to “significant irritant chemicals” in the workplace;
• She was so exposed without any industrial hygiene protective measures such as a mask;
• The exposures often occurred in confined spaces with poor ventilation; and
• There were no obvious alternative risk factors pointing to another cause of her asthma.

Professor Burke’s conclusion, which the court finds “a cause of particular concern”, was that these factors collectively implicate occupational exposure as the likely cause of her condition.

The judge remarks that this gives rise to a “most unfortunate situation” where:

“the substance of the plaintiff’s case appears strong and yet the case is knocked out under the laws of the land, by reason of falling outside the statutory period.”

While the court properly refrains from making formal findings on negligence, this apparent strength of the claim weighs heavily against penalising the plaintiff in costs.

6.3.2 The defendant’s apparent failure to respond to GP warnings

Secondly, the court is troubled by what appears to be a lack of adequate response by the defendant to the 3 March 2020 letter from Dr Holmes.

In that letter, the GP:

• Highlighted ongoing shortness of breath over six months;
• Indicated that there was as yet no confirmed diagnosis, but the problem remained;
• Requested that the employer review the chemical agents and restrict any respiratory irritants;
• Effectively put the employer on notice that exposure to workplace chemicals was a suspected driver of the plaintiff’s symptoms.

The plaintiff averred, without apparent contradiction, that:

• The defendant did not provide Dr Holmes with a review of chemical agents;
• No meaningful steps were taken to prevent or limit her exposure to irritants;
• She continued in her work as before.

O’Higgins J notes:

“The court is left in a situation of not knowing what level of engagement that letter prompted. There appears to be unchallenged evidence from the plaintiff herself that there was no proper engagement with that letter…”

He infers that:

• The defendant may have failed to act on clear medical advice intended to protect the plaintiff’s health.
• This failure may have had adverse consequences for her respiratory condition.

These factors, when weighed against the plaintiff’s own delay in bringing proceedings, justify tempering the costs consequences of her procedural defeat.

6.4 The ultimate costs order

Having considered all relevant matters, the judge concludes:

• The plaintiff must “take the consequences” of failing to act within the limitation period, in the sense of losing her case.
• However, as a matter of justice, the defendant should not be rewarded in costs where:
  • Its own apparent failure to act on medical warnings may have contributed to the plaintiff’s harm; and
  • The plaintiff’s underlying claim appears substantively strong, and there is no suggestion of bad faith or concealment.

Accordingly, while acknowledging that the court must be “slow to depart from the normal rule”, he decides that the “unusual circumstances” justify an exception and makes no order as to costs.

7. Impact and Future Implications

7.1 Occupational disease and early medical suspicion

The case is especially important for occupational disease claims, where symptoms may emerge gradually and where their causation can be complex and contested.

Kmiec reinforces that:

• Once a plaintiff’s medical advisers have recorded a plausible suspicion that the condition may be related to workplace exposures, and the plaintiff is sufficiently aware of this concern (e.g. through workplace letters, discussions, or referrals), the limitation period is likely to start.
• Claimants cannot safely wait for:
  • definitive diagnoses;
  • robust scientific proof; or
  • full appreciation of the long-term consequences of the illness.
• Acute episodes or hospitalisations occurring later in the disease course will not reset the clock if the underlying condition was already significant and suspected to be work-related.

Practitioners acting for employees with potential occupational illnesses should therefore:

• Obtain and scrutinise early GP and hospital records for any reference to work-related causation (“may be related to work”, “works as a cleaner”, “exposed to chemicals”, etc.).
• Advise clients promptly about the risk that such references start the two-year limitation period.
• Commence PIAB applications and proceedings without awaiting definitive expert opinions where there are early indications of possible occupational causation.

7.2 Significance threshold and chronic symptoms

The judgment also underscores the relatively low threshold for an injury to be deemed “significant” under s.2(1)(b):

• Chronic respiratory symptoms, multiple medical attendances, specialist referrals and ongoing medication almost certainly place the injury beyond triviality.
• Once such a threshold is crossed, the limitation period may start regardless of whether the plaintiff subjectively downplays the problem or attributes it to less serious causes like a recurring flu.

Future cases involving gradual or fluctuating conditions (e.g. repetitive strain injury, noise‑induced hearing loss, other chemical sensitivities) are likely to see defendants citing Kmiec to argue that the significance threshold was crossed earlier than the plaintiff contends.

7.3 Weight of objective records versus subjective recollection

On procedure, Kmiec illustrates a robust willingness to resolve limitation disputes at a preliminary stage where:

• There is a rich documentary trail of medical notes, referrals, and communications, and
• The plaintiff’s later sworn evidence conflicts sharply with those records.

While courts remain cautious about striking out claims summarily where factual issues are genuinely contested, this decision confirms that:

• Objective, contemporaneous records can, in an appropriate case, render the plaintiff’s subjective narrative untenable as a matter of law;
• In such cases, dismissal as “doomed to fail” may be appropriate, sparing parties and the court the cost of a full trial.

7.4 Costs and corporate defendants in limitation cases

The costs ruling has a potentially noteworthy signalling effect:

• Corporate defendants who succeed on technical or procedural grounds, particularly limitation, cannot assume an automatic entitlement to costs.
• Where the underlying allegations suggest genuine wrongdoing or serious failings, and where there is credible evidence that the defendant ignored medical warnings or safety obligations, courts may regard it as unjust to impose full costs on an unsuccessful but bona fide plaintiff.
• This may encourage more careful corporate responses to early medical warnings; failure to engage appropriately could later influence judicial discretion on costs even where the defendant prevails.

At the same time, Kmiec does not dilute the limitation rules themselves: the plaintiff still loses her claim entirely. The message is that:

• Substantive rights can be lost irretrievably through delay, even where negligence appears likely; but
• Costs sanctions may be moderated where the defendant’s behaviour contributed to the underlying harm.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

8.1 “Date of knowledge”

This is the date when the injured person first knew enough about the injury and its possible cause to justify taking legal action. It is not the date of the accident or exposure itself, but the date when key facts become known.

In personal injury claims, the two‑year limitation period usually starts from this “date of knowledge”.

8.2 “Significant” injury

Under s.2(1)(b) of the 1991 Act, the injury has to be “significant” to start time running. This does not mean:

• life‑threatening;
• catastrophic; or
• permanently disabling.

It simply means more than trivial—a reasonable person would see it as serious enough to:

• seek medical attention;
• miss work; or
• consider making a claim.

Repeated doctor visits, ongoing medication, and hospital referrals are strong indicators that an injury is significant.

8.3 “Attributable to” the defendant’s acts or omissions

The law does not require the plaintiff to know with certainty that the defendant was negligent. She only needs to know that her injury is:

• capable of being attributed to; or
• possibly caused by

the defendant’s acts or omissions.

So if doctors say “this may be related to workplace chemicals” or “could be due to your work”, that is generally enough to trigger s.2(1)(c).

8.4 Constructive knowledge

“Constructive knowledge” means knowledge the law will treat a person as having, even if they say they did not actually know it, because a reasonable person in their position would have known it had they taken proper steps (such as asking doctors questions or following up on concerning symptoms).

In Kmiec, even if the plaintiff did not fully appreciate what her doctors were thinking, the court held that a reasonable person with her symptoms, referrals and GP letters to the employer would have realised, by March 2020, that:

• she had a serious respiratory condition; and
• it might be caused by workplace chemicals.

8.5 “Costs follow the event” and “no order as to costs”

“Costs follow the event” means that the loser pays the winner’s legal costs. This is the starting point in Irish civil litigation.

A “no order as to costs” outcome means that each side bears its own costs regardless of who won. The court can make such an order if it believes that justice requires an exception—e.g. where:

• the losing party had a strong underlying case but failed on a technicality; or
• the winning party’s conduct contributed significantly to the dispute or harm.

9. Conclusion

Kmiec v Noonan Services Group Ltd [2025] IEHC 694 is a carefully reasoned High Court application of the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 1991 in the context of an occupational asthma claim. It illustrates, with unusual clarity, how:

• Early medical suspicion of a work‑related cause—even expressed tentatively as “may be related”—can be enough to start the limitation period.
• Chronic, medically‑investigated symptoms meet the “significant injury” threshold long before dramatic acute episodes occur.
• Objective medical and documentary records can override a plaintiff’s later subjective account of their knowledge for limitation purposes.

At the same time, the judgment’s treatment of costs demonstrates a principled willingness to temper the harshness of a limitation bar where:

• The underlying negligence case appears strong;
• The defendant may have disregarded clear medical warnings; and
• The plaintiff has acted candidly and without abuse of process.

The decision sends a dual message: potential claimants must act promptly once serious, possibly work‑related symptoms arise, but successful defendants cannot always expect a costs windfall where their own failings have arguably contributed to the injury that, though now time‑barred, appears very real.