Proving Sexual Motivation in Attempted Kidnapping and Upholding Extended Sentences for Dangerousness: R v Enodolomwanyi [2025] EWCA Crim 1295

Introduction

This commentary examines the Court of Appeal’s sentencing decision in R v Enodolomwanyi [2025] EWCA Crim 1295, a case arising from an attempted kidnapping in Chester. The appeal focused on two issues: whether the Recorder was entitled to impose an extended determinate sentence (EDS) on the basis that the appellant was “dangerous” within the statutory regime, and whether the custodial term imposed was manifestly excessive—particularly given the offence was an attempt, the defendant’s mental health, and the Recorder’s finding of sexual motivation. The Court upheld the dangerousness finding and the imposition of an EDS, but held that the Recorder could not properly infer an intention to cause serious sexual harm on the evidence, and consequently reduced the custodial term.

The judgment is significant for three reasons. First, it clarifies that when sexual motivation is to be treated as an aggravating factor in sentencing for attempted kidnapping, it must be proved to the criminal standard and cannot be inferred where psychiatric evidence points to a different (non-sexual) delusional motivation. Second, it reiterates the case-law framework for assessing seriousness in kidnapping (and attempted kidnapping) in the absence of Sentencing Council guidelines applicable at the time of sentencing. Third, it affirms the robust application of the “dangerousness” test and the appropriateness of an EDS notwithstanding reduced culpability due to mental disorder.

Summary of the Judgment

The appellant, aged 52 with no previous convictions and suffering from untreated psychosis at the time of the offence, attempted to force a female victim, Ms Owoeye, into his car, using grabbing and threatening to punch her. Colleagues intervened, police were called, and the victim suffered significant distress, being unable to work for several days.

The Recorder imposed an extended determinate sentence of nine years and six months (five years six months’ custody plus four years’ extended licence). On appeal:

Ground 1 (dangerousness/EDS): Dismissed. The Court held there was a significant risk of serious harm from further specified offences, supported by persistent conduct during the incident and the pre-sentence reports assessing the appellant as high risk, particularly towards women. The EDS was justified.
Ground 2 (manifestly excessive custodial term): Allowed in part. The Court held that the Recorder erred in inferring an intention to cause serious sexual harm; that inference could not be made safely on the psychiatric evidence which suggested a delusional romantic motive. Given the offence was an attempt, lasted 5–10 minutes, involved limited physical violence (albeit with threats), and presented unusual facts, a custodial term in the region of four years was appropriate.

The Court therefore quashed the original EDS of nine years and six months and substituted an EDS of eight years, comprising four years’ custody and a four-year extended licence.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court drew on two leading Attorney General references providing structured guidance for kidnapping cases:

Attorney General’s Reference Nos 92 and 93 of 2014 (R v Atkins and Gibney) [2014] EWCA Crim 2713; [2015] 1 Cr App R (S) 44. This authority emphasises that all kidnappings are serious, but acknowledges a spectrum of seriousness depending on features such as the duration of detention, violence or weapons, planning, number of offenders, victim vulnerability, location, demands or threats to others, humiliation, and the overall effect on the victim.
Attorney General’s Reference (R v Bowskill) [2022] EWCA Crim 1358; [2023] 1 Cr App R (S) 12. Often associated with the “Angel Lynn” case, Bowskill reinforced that even without ransom or organised crime elements, kidnapping involving coercive control, sustained detention, or serious harm is extremely grave; major aggravating features push sentences sharply upward.

The Court affirmed that these factors also apply—appropriately adjusted—to attempted kidnapping. In an attempt, certain factors (particularly duration and extent of detention) require contextual recalibration: the absence of completed detention naturally limits some aggravation but does not eliminate the inherent seriousness of the conduct.

Although the Court noted that Sentencing Council guidelines for kidnapping now exist, they apply only to offences sentenced after 1 April 2025 and were not in force for this case. Nonetheless, the Court observed that the forthcoming guideline largely reflects the factors already articulated in the authorities above, thereby confirming that the case-law approach remains the appropriate framework for pre-guideline cases.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two discrete parts: the assessment of harm/culpability for the base sentence and the dangerousness assessment for an extended sentence.

1) Sentencing the offence: attempt, mental disorder, and sexual motivation

Attempt versus completion: The Recorder correctly acknowledged that the offence was an attempt and that, generally, attempts warrant a reduction compared with completed offences. The incident was persistent and distressing but lasted 5–10 minutes; there was grabbing and a threat to punch, but no weapon use or prolonged detention. Those features place the case on the serious side of the spectrum but not at the highest end.
Mental disorder and culpability: The Recorder also engaged with the Sentencing Council’s overarching guideline on offenders with mental disorders. The psychiatric report indicated untreated psychosis, with auditory hallucinations telling the appellant that the complainant was the woman he sought for a relationship; the voices did not command kidnapping or harm. The Recorder treated this as a limited reduction in culpability, which the Court of Appeal did not disturb.
Sexual motivation finding: This became the decisive error. The Recorder inferred an intention to cause serious sexual harm once the victim was in the car. The Court held that this inference was not supported by the evidence—indeed the psychiatric material suggested a delusional romantic motive rather than sexual predation or intended sexual harm. In the absence of cogent proof to the criminal standard of a sexual intent aggravating feature, such a finding could not lawfully inflate the sentence. That conclusion aligns with the general principle that contested aggravating facts relied upon to increase sentence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt; if they cannot be proved, the court sentences on the basis most favourable to the defendant consistent with the verdict.

Stripping out the impermissible sexual harm inference, the Court concluded that a custodial term “in the region of four years” better reflected the totality of aggravating and mitigating features on these very unusual facts. The original five years six months was therefore manifestly excessive.

2) Dangerousness and the Extended Determinate Sentence

Statutory test: The “dangerousness” regime requires the court to find a significant risk of serious harm to members of the public through the commission of further specified offences. Attempted kidnapping is within the scope of the specified violent offences regime.
Basis for risk finding: The Court endorsed the Recorder’s reliance on the pre-sentence reports (both the initial and addendum), which assessed the appellant as high risk, especially towards women. The Court also pointed to the offending conduct itself—persistence (turning the car around and returning), limited planning (knowing the victim’s workplace), and concerning post-offence indicators (a reported desire to contact the victim and a lack of insight into the behaviour).
EDS justified and calibrated: Given those features, the Recorder was entitled to conclude that the extended licence was necessary to protect the public. The Court therefore upheld the EDS structure and the four-year extension on licence (noting that for violent specified offences, the maximum extension is five years), while reducing only the custodial term to four years.

Impact and Prospective Significance

Proof of sexual motivation: The decision draws a clear line—where sexual intent or an intention to cause serious sexual harm is contested and would materially aggravate sentence, it must be proved to the criminal standard. Psychiatric evidence pointing to an alternative (non-sexual) delusional purpose can preclude such an inference. This will guide sentencing courts in cases where delusional romantic ideation, rather than sexual predation, is advanced on credible expert evidence.
Attempted kidnapping calibration: The judgment provides a worked example of how to adjust seriousness factors to an attempted kidnapping, emphasising persistence, threats, limited violence, and duration, while also recognizing that some factors (like detention length) naturally carry less weight in an attempt.
Mental disorder: The case illustrates the dual effect of mental illness in sentencing—mitigating culpability in relation to the core offence while potentially exacerbating risk in the dangerousness assessment if the disorder contributes to a pattern of concerning behaviour and lack of insight.
Endorsing EDS for risk to women: The Court’s affirmation of an EDS underscores that the public protection tail of sentencing remains robust even when the court moderates the custodial term for culpability reasons. Pre-sentence risk assessments, if cogent and supported by the facts, can carry significant weight.
Relationship with the 2025 kidnapping guideline: Although not applicable to this case, the Court’s reasoning dovetails with the new guideline’s factor-based approach. Going forward, the principle that sexual motivation must be proved (rather than inferred from gendered targeting alone) will likely inform how “motivation” and “harm” aggravation is applied under the guideline.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Attempt versus completed offence: An attempt is when a defendant, with intent to commit an offence, does an act more than merely preparatory. Attempted kidnapping does not require proof of completed detention. Sentences for attempts are generally lower than for completed offences, but remain serious where there is persistence, violence, or threats.
Aggravating features and proof: Facts that would significantly increase sentence (e.g., sexual motivation) must be proved beyond reasonable doubt if disputed. If the court is not sure, it must not use them to aggravate sentence.
Dangerousness: Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 regime, a court may find an offender “dangerous” if there is a significant risk to the public of serious harm from committing further specified offences. If so, and a standard determinate sentence would not sufficiently protect the public, the court can impose an Extended Determinate Sentence.
Extended Determinate Sentence (EDS): An EDS combines a custodial term with an extended licence period. The extension for violent specified offences can be up to five years (and longer for sexual specified offences). The extended licence is designed to manage risk in the community for longer than an ordinary determinate sentence would allow.
Psychiatric mitigation: Mental disorder can reduce culpability if it impairs rational judgment or self-control at the time of the offence. However, it may simultaneously support a finding of dangerousness if the condition contributes to persistent, risky behaviour and limited insight.
Manifestly excessive: On sentence appeals, the Court of Appeal intervenes only if the sentence is wrong in principle or manifestly excessive (i.e., it falls outside the range of sentences reasonably open to the judge on the facts).

Conclusion

R v Enodolomwanyi provides an important clarification at the intersection of attempted kidnapping, psychiatric evidence, and public protection sentencing. The Court of Appeal draws a principled boundary around sexual motivation: it cannot be conjectured or inferred where credible psychiatric evidence points in a different (non-sexual) direction, especially in the face of unusual facts. At the same time, the case exemplifies that the dangerousness test remains focused on future risk to the public, and where that risk is significant and borne out by both behaviour and professional assessment, an EDS will be sustained.

The key takeaways are:

Sexual intent or an intention to cause serious sexual harm must be proved to the criminal standard if it is to aggravate sentence; it cannot be inferred in the teeth of contrary psychiatric evidence.
Attempted kidnapping remains inherently serious, but sentence must account for the attempt nature, duration, level of violence, and the totality of circumstances.
Mental disorder can mitigate culpability without negating a finding of dangerousness; extended sentences for public protection are appropriate where risk is significant and evidence-based.
The decision harmonises the established case-law factors (Atkins and Gibney; Bowskill) with a careful, evidence-led approach to aggravation—an approach that will resonate under the new 2025 kidnapping guideline.

In sum, this judgment refines the evidential threshold for sexual-motivation aggravation in attempted kidnapping while reaffirming the proper ambit of the dangerousness regime and the role of extended sentences in protecting the public.