Premature Judicial Determination as a Serious Procedural Irregularity in Care Proceedings:
Commentary on C (Children: Premature Determination) [2025] EWCA Civ 1481

1. Introduction

This Court of Appeal decision in C (Children: Premature Determination) [2025] EWCA Civ 1481 is a significant judgment on the proper boundaries of judicial “indications” in ongoing proceedings, and on when premature judicial conclusions amount to a serious procedural irregularity under CPR 52.21(3)(b).

The case arose from protracted care and placement proceedings concerning two young children, R and A. By the time of the impugned hearing in October 2025, the central live issue was whether the younger child, A (then about 3½), should be adopted, placed in long-term foster care, or returned to her mother. During the second day of a listed final hearing, the circuit judge:

• stated in emphatic terms that he would not make an adoption order “whatever” further evidence he heard;
• described further evidence as a “waste of time”;
• announced that he had “made the decision” on that key issue; and
• then stayed the whole of the care proceedings and granted permission to appeal.

The local authority and the Children’s Guardian appealed. They argued that the judge’s statements crossed the line from a permissible, robust indication into predetermination, such that there was a real risk of unfairness: the judge’s mind had closed before all relevant evidence and submissions had been received.

Peter Jackson LJ and Miles LJ (giving a joint judgment) allowed the appeal, characterising the judge’s conduct as an “unmistakeable predetermination” which derailed the trial and deprived the child and the parties of a fair hearing. The matter was remitted to a different judge for urgent determination.

The judgment crystallises and develops several key principles:

• The line between legitimate provisional indications and impermissible premature determination;
• The application of predetermination and apparent unfairness concepts in family proceedings, alongside older bias/recusal authorities;
• The status of Children’s Guardians as a “cornerstone” of the public law system whose evidence must normally be heard on contested welfare issues; and
• The court’s strong disapproval of indefinite stays in urgent children’s cases as “unconscionable”, especially where delay is already extreme.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The family and the proceedings

The mother had six children, none of whom were then in her care. The eldest two had been adopted. Care proceedings issued in June 2023 in respect of the four younger children. By December 2024, special guardianship orders had been made for the two older of that group, placing them with family in Ireland.

The remaining children were R (aged about 5 in 2025) and A (aged about 3½). Both had been in foster care. Originally, the local authority’s care plan was for adoption for both R and A. A five-day final hearing was listed for February 2025 before His Honour Judge Oliver.

At that February hearing:

• Evidence began (independent social worker and psychologist);
• The hearing was adjourned to allow reconsideration of the plan for R; and
• The local authority subsequently withdrew its placement order application for R, who was placed in a residential therapeutic unit in August 2025.

The judge held four further case management hearings over the summer. The resumed final hearing for R and A’s futures was fixed for 6–8 October 2025 with a three-day estimate. Four witnesses were to be called: the allocated social worker, the mother, the family finder (responsible for adoption/fostering placements), and the Children’s Guardian.

2.2 The issues at the resumed hearing

By October 2025 the positions were:

• Local authority: care order for R; care and placement orders for A (adoption).
• Children’s Guardian: originally adoption for both children; now supported the authority’s revised plan (care order for R; adoption for A).
• Mother: sought return of both children; particularly opposed adoption of A.
• Father of A: opposed adoption; R’s father did not participate.

Accordingly, the “realistic options” for A were:

• Return to the mother;
• Long-term foster care; or
• Adoption.

This was the “main issue” for the court. The case was already in Week 122 of the proceedings; A had been waiting for a decision for some 27 months.

2.3 The October hearing and the judge’s “bombshell”

On Monday 6 October:

• The social worker and the mother gave evidence;
• At the end of the day the judge gave an indication that he did not favour adoption for A.

All parties accepted that this initial indication, though not transcribed, was a proper judicial indication of provisional thinking, shared to allow reflection overnight. Had the matter stopped there, the Court of Appeal noted, there would have been no appeal.

On Tuesday 7 October, matters escalated. The hearing record (largely reconstructed from the court recording) shows:

• Two short appearances before the judge (10:30–10:50 and 12:40–12:50);
• During the first appearance, the judge pressing counsel on “how are we going to proceed after I dropped the bombshell yesterday?”;
• The judge then indicating that he would not make a placement order for A regardless of what the remaining witnesses might say.

Crucially, the judge:

• Described hearing further evidence as a “waste of time”;
• Repeatedly said he “could not sleep at night” if he made an adoption order in this case;
• Stated that he could not think of any evidence that could change his view that adoption was wrong for A; and
• Later acknowledged that he had “frankly, made the decision”.

The local authority’s advocate (Mr Coutts) expressed concern that this amounted to a preliminary determination, and invited the judge, if that was indeed his ruling, to make it formal. The Children’s Guardian’s solicitor (Ms Little) similarly made clear that, in light of the judge’s stance, she needed to consider whether there was any point calling the Guardian, given that the judge had said “whatever she says to you won’t make any difference”.

After a break, the local authority formally applied (by email) for permission to appeal, on the basis of predetermination. They did not ask for recusal or for the judge to reconsider; they sought permission to appeal his stance.

On the parties’ return, the judge:

• Granted permission to appeal immediately, without seeking the views of other parties;
• Stayed the proceedings entirely; and
• Stood down the family finder and effectively prevented the Guardian from being called.

The remainder of the three-day listing was thereby lost; A was left without any determination of her future, and no further timetable was set.

2.4 The appeal

The local authority took 20 days to issue its Appellant’s Notice, despite the urgency. The Guardian (who had been the children’s Guardian throughout the proceedings) filed a Respondent’s Notice with additional grounds of appeal and later obtained permission to appeal in her own right.

On appeal:

• Local authority (Mr Bain): The judge had plainly crossed the line from permissible indication to impermissible predetermination, thereby depriving A of a full, holistic welfare analysis. The exclusion of adoption from consideration before hearing all the evidence made the trial unfair.
• Children’s Guardian (Ms Ferris): The judge’s mind had clearly closed; his approach had ignored the imperative to avoid further delay for A, failed to consider properly the Guardian’s recommendations, and did not apply the welfare checklist in a balanced way.
• Mother (represented by Ms Mir): The judge had given a robust indication, not a predetermination. His earlier willingness to hear the Guardian suggested his mind was not closed.
• Father of A (Ms Sultan): Rehearing before a new judge would cause further delay and disadvantage. The judge’s comments were trenchant but within the bounds of robust judicial expression; the local authority and Guardian could have continued with the evidence and sought to persuade him.

The Court of Appeal treated the appeal as a procedural appeal under CPR 52.21(3)(b), concerned not with the merits of adoption or placement but with whether the process had been fair.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals of both the local authority and the Children’s Guardian, and:

1. Formally granted the Guardian permission to appeal;
2. Held that the judge’s approach amounted to premature determination and a serious procedural irregularity rendering the trial unfair; and
3. Remitted the proceedings to the Central Family Court for early determination by a different judge, starting with an urgent case management hearing.

Key findings include:

• The judge’s statements went far beyond a permissible indication. He had, in his own words, “made the decision”, could not “in all conscience” make an adoption order, and considered further evidence a “waste of time”. This was “an unmistakeable predetermination by a judge who had closed his mind” to the case for adoption ([36]).
• Parties are entitled to expect that the court will keep an open mind until all relevant evidence and submissions have been heard; they are not required to “argue” for that basic right ([37]).
• Once the judge had so firmly declared his hand, a fair trial became impossible, and the only way the hearing could have continued was if the local authority and Guardian “fell in with his view” ([38]).
• The indefinite staying of these already severely delayed care proceedings was “unconscionable”, particularly in the light of A’s urgent need for a decision ([40]).
• The judge’s failure to hear from the Children’s Guardian—“a cornerstone of our public law system”—before determining the crucial issue was “obviously procedurally unfair” ([42]).
• The procedural irregularity lay not only in what the judge ultimately ordered (staying proceedings and granting permission to appeal) but in the underlying manner in which he had prematurely determined a central issue without hearing all the evidence.

The Court of Appeal emphasised that they were saying nothing about the substantive merits of adopting or not adopting A. Their task was to secure a fair process and a timely decision, not to predetermine the eventual outcome.

4. Legal Framework

4.1 CPR 52.21(3): Grounds for allowing an appeal

Civil Procedure Rule 52.21(3) provides that the appeal court will allow an appeal where the decision of the lower court was:

1. wrong; or
2. unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court.

The decision under appeal was formally the order staying the proceedings and granting permission to appeal. However, the Court of Appeal looked at that decision in the context of the judge’s prior conduct and statements, which had effectively “brought the proceedings to a halt” ([3]) by prematurely determining the key issue.

4.2 Predetermination and fair hearing

The judgment draws on the concept of predetermination, as distinguished from lawful “pre-disposition” or provisional views:

• Predetermination: when a decision-maker reaches a final conclusion before being in possession of all relevant evidence and arguments.
• Permissible indication: where a judge shares their current, provisional thinking to assist the parties, while remaining open to persuasion and emphasising that the view is not final.

The overarching question in cases of alleged unfairness during ongoing proceedings is whether “a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts in the context of the proceedings as a whole, would conclude that there was a real possibility that a party would not receive a fair hearing” ([5], echoing the standard bias/recusal test).

4.3 Welfare and adoption decision-making

Although not set out in detail in the judgment, the background legal framework is the familiar Children Act 1989 / Adoption and Children Act 2002 regime:

• In care and placement proceedings, the court must conduct a holistic, welfare-based comparison of realistic options (adoption vs long-term fostering vs return to parents, etc.).
• The judge referred explicitly to the “section 1 subsection 4(f) checklist” ([20])—this is the statutory welfare checklist that guides decisions affecting a child’s future.
• A final welfare decision, particularly involving adoption (a lifelong severance of parental legal ties), must normally be made only after hearing all relevant professional and lay evidence, including that of the Children’s Guardian.

The case illustrates how a failure to follow that process can itself be a serious procedural irregularity, even before any final substantive order has been made.

5. Precedents and Authorities Cited

5.1 Lanes Group Plc v Galliford Try Infrastructure Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1617

In Lanes Group, Jackson LJ discussed “predetermination” in public law and commercial contexts. At [45]–[46], he observed that predetermination arises where a judge or decision-maker:

reaches a final conclusion before they are in possession of all the relevant evidence and arguments.

He also noted that findings of actual predetermination are rare because they are hard to prove, and most cases concern apparent predetermination.

In C (Children), the Court of Appeal imports this concept into the family jurisdiction, emphasising that the same basic problem arises when a judge tells parties that no further evidence could change their mind. This is precisely what occurred here: the judge announced that there was no evidence he could hear from the Guardian or family finder that would change his opposition to adoption.

Thus, Lanes Group provides the definitional backbone for “predetermination”, which the Court of Appeal finds was actually present, not merely apparent, on the facts of this case.

5.2 Re H (A Child) (Recusal) [2023] EWCA Civ 860

Lewison LJ’s discussion in Re H (Recusal) [2023] EWCA Civ 860; [2023] 4 WLR 64 is cited for the proposition that the classic authorities on judicial bias do not always capture the full range of scenarios in which a judge may be asked to recuse themselves.

The central test, reaffirmed in C (Children) at [5], is:

whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts in the context of the proceedings as a whole, would conclude that there was a real possibility that a party would not receive a fair hearing.

Although C (Children) was not pleaded as a recusal appeal (no party asked the judge to step down), the Court of Appeal adopts the same conceptual framework. The question is whether the judge’s stance—in declaring that nothing could change his view on adoption, and then staying the proceedings—created a real possibility that the parties (especially the local authority and Guardian) would not receive a fair hearing.

The Court answers that question decisively in the affirmative.

5.3 Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim [1994] 6 Admin LR 348

Sir Thomas Bingham MR’s well-known observations on judicial interventions are quoted at [6]. He contrasted the English tradition—where judges are encouraged to communicate and engage with counsel—with traditions in which judges sit almost entirely silent.

Bingham MR said:

It certainly does not sanction the premature expression of factual conclusions or anything which may prematurely indicate a closed mind. But a judge does not act amiss if ... he indicates the need for unusually compelling evidence ... An expression of scepticism is not suggestive of bias unless the judge conveys an unwillingness to be persuaded ... whatever the evidence may be.

These remarks, though made in a fact-finding context, are expressly applied in C (Children) “equally to an evaluative decision” ([6]). They draw the crucial line:

• It is legitimate for a judge to express provisional scepticism and to signal that strong evidence will be required.
• It is illegitimate to communicate an unwillingness to be persuaded “whatever the evidence may be”.

The Court of Appeal essentially finds that Judge Oliver’s statements—especially that he could not think of any evidence that would change his mind—fell squarely into the prohibited category.

5.4 Singh v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 492

In Singh, Davis LJ emphasised the positive role that clear judicial indications can play:

such statements can positively assist the advocate or litigant in knowing where particular efforts may need to be pointed. In general terms, there need be no bar on robust expression by a judge, so long as it is not indicative of a closed mind.

The Court of Appeal in C (Children) cites this at [7] to underline that:

• “Robust expression” is not only acceptable; it may be “positively necessary” to correct misunderstandings or focus the issues.
• The key safeguard is that such expression must not signal a closed mind.

This authority supports the court’s careful distinction between, on the one hand, the judge’s initial indication on Monday—which was robust but acceptable—and, on the other, his Tuesday statements, which indicated that no evidence could alter his settled conclusion.

5.5 London Borough of Southwark v Jiminez [2003] EWCA Civ 502

Peter Gibson LJ’s warning in Jiminez, quoted at [8], provides a note of caution for judges who choose to indicate their thinking before the end of the hearing:

it is easy for this to be misunderstood, particularly if the views are expressed trenchantly. It is always good practice to leave the parties in no doubt that such expressions of view are only provisional and that the Tribunal remain[s] open to persuasion.

This authority is particularly apt on these facts. The problem here was not merely that the judge expressed his views trenchantly; it was that he did so without any clear assurance that his views were provisional and subject to change. Indeed, when invited to treat his earlier comments as provisional, he instead “doubled down”.

5.6 Synthesis of the authorities

Collectively, these cases support the following propositions, which underlie the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in C (Children):

• Judges may, and often should, indicate provisional views, to assist effective argument and efficient use of court time (Hashim, Singh).
• They must avoid indicating that their mind is already made up such that no further evidence or argument could change it (Lanes Group, Hashim).
• Where a judge’s interventions create a real risk of unfairness, the correct test is that of the fair-minded and informed observer (Re H (Recusal)).
• Expressing trenchant views without making clear their provisional nature can easily descend into apparent predetermination or unfairness (Jiminez).

C (Children) applies these principles to a dramatic set of facts in the child protection context, thereby anchoring the concept of predetermination firmly within the family law jurisprudence.

6. The Court of Appeal’s Legal Reasoning

6.1 The procedural nature of the appeal

The court emphasised at [33] that this was a procedural appeal, not an appeal on the substantive merits of adoption versus other outcomes for A and R:

We emphasise that this is a procedural appeal. It is not about the merits of the decisions that will be made about R and A's futures, and we express no view whatever about that.

Their function was to decide whether the process in the lower court had miscarried because of a serious procedural irregularity, not to substitute their own welfare judgment.

6.2 Why the judge’s conduct was predetermination, not a robust indication

At [36], the Court rejects the argument that the judge’s statements on the second day were merely robust:

We reject the argument that the judge's statements on the second day of the hearing amounted to no more than a robust indication. He repeatedly said that he could not sleep at night if he made an adoption order and that it would be a waste of time to hear further evidence. He said and repeated that he had “made the decision”.

This language left no room for a provisional characterisation. The judge’s own words that he had “made the decision” crystallised the problem. Crucially:

• He explicitly said he could not see any evidence that might change his mind;
• He dismissed further evidence from the Guardian and family finder as pointless (“waste of time”);
• He linked his stance to his own conscience and ability to “sleep at night”, personalising the decision in a way that emphasised its finality to him.

The Court held that this was:

an unmistakeable predetermination by a judge who had closed his mind to the case being advanced by two of the parties in relation to a matter of profound and lifelong importance to A.

6.3 Parties are not required to argue for a judge’s open mind

The father’s position was that the local authority and Guardian should have continued with the evidence and attempted to persuade the judge to change his mind. The Court of Appeal strongly rejected this:

We also reject the submission that the advocates should have tried to persuade the judge to keep an open mind until he had heard all the evidence. Parties are entitled to expect that of a court, and should not have to argue for it. ([37])

This is an important clarification of principle. It underlines that:

• The duty to maintain an open mind is inherent in the judicial role; it is not something that parties have to “secure” through submissions.
• When the judge is already signalling that they have “made the decision”, further advocacy is not merely wasted effort; it cannot cure the underlying unfairness.

In other words, the onus is not on the parties to rescue fairness once a judge has overtly closed their mind.

6.4 The impossibility of a fair trial once the judge declared his hand

The Court notes at [38]:

The only way the hearing could have continued would have been if the local authority and the Guardian had fallen in with his view. That is clear from the one question that he asked of the Guardian: "Has she changed her mind?" A fair trial was now impossible.

This encapsulates the core unfairness:

• The judge’s question to the Guardian implicitly made her continued participation conditional on changing her professional opinion to align with his;
• The local authority and Guardian were put in an “impossible position”: continue in a charade before a judge whose mind was closed, or seek appellate intervention.

By choosing to seek permission to appeal, the local authority and Guardian acted consistently with their duty to A; but the judge’s reaction (granting permission and staying the case) further entrenched the procedural difficulty.

6.5 The “unconscionable” stay and the problem of delay

The Court is particularly critical of the staying of proceedings:

If ever a set of care proceedings should not have been indefinitely stayed, this was it. These children's lives had been on hold for years, and delays on this extravagant scale can become decisions by default as time forecloses on the range of available options. ([40])

Key points:

• The judge appeared “equanimous” about the stay; the Court did not share that equanimity.
• The Guardian’s description of the judge’s course as “unconscionable” is endorsed.
• There is an explicit recognition that in child protection litigation, delay can itself effectively decide outcomes, as fewer options remain realistically available over time.

The Court emphasises that, given the extreme delay already suffered by A, an indefinite stay—especially without any clear timetable for the appeal or the resumed hearing—was wholly inappropriate.

6.6 The role and centrality of the Children’s Guardian

At [42], the Court makes an important observation about Children’s Guardians:

Children's Guardians are a cornerstone of our public law system.

The judge’s reluctance (indeed, refusal in practical effect) to hear the Guardian’s evidence is described as “unaccountable” and “obviously procedurally unfair”. The Court notes:

• The judge had never heard from the Guardian in person throughout two years of proceedings.
• The decision was not straightforward; adoption versus alternative permanence involves complex, multi-faceted welfare considerations.
• Even if the judge ultimately intended to dismiss the placement order application, hearing from the Guardian would have deepened his understanding of A’s welfare and the sibling and family dynamics.

This segment reinforces the structural role of Guardians in English public law children proceedings, and makes clear that deciding fundamental welfare issues without their evidence will often be a serious procedural defect.

6.7 Remitting to a different judge

Finally, the Court orders that the case be remitted to a different judge at the Central Family Court for “early determination”, beginning with an urgent case management hearing ([44]).

While acknowledging the parents’ understandable frustration (particularly the mother’s, given the judge’s indications seemed to fend off adoption), the Court concludes that the only proportionate remedy for the unfairness is a fresh hearing by a new tribunal. The original judge’s actions had irretrievably compromised his ability to continue fairly.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

7.1 Predetermination vs provisional indication

A central theme of the case is the difference between:

• Provisional indications: A judge saying “At the moment, I am inclined to think X, but I will listen to further evidence and submissions and may be persuaded otherwise.”
• Predetermination: A judge effectively saying “Whatever further evidence or submissions I hear, I will decide X; nothing can change my mind.”

Only the former is acceptable. The latter violates the basic right to a fair hearing because it renders the remainder of the process a formality.

In C (Children), expressions such as “I cannot in all conscience make an adoption order”, “I do not see any evidence I could hear that will change my view”, and the admission that he had “made the decision” were clear markers of predetermination.

7.2 Serious procedural irregularity

Under CPR 52.21(3)(b), an appeal can be allowed where the lower court’s decision was unjust because of a “serious procedural or other irregularity”. This can include:

• Refusal to hear relevant evidence;
• Bias or apparent bias;
• Failure to allow submissions on key points; or
• Predetermination of issues before the hearing is complete.

In this case, the serious irregularity consisted of:

• The judge closing his mind on adoption without hearing all the evidence;
• The de facto exclusion of the Guardian’s oral evidence;
• The description of further evidence as a “waste of time”; and
• The subsequent staying of proceedings that left A’s future undecided for longer.

7.3 Children’s Guardian and “global holistic” analysis

A Children’s Guardian (usually a Cafcass officer) is an independent professional appointed to represent the child’s interests in public law proceedings. The Guardian:

• Investigates the child’s circumstances;
• Liaises with all professionals and family members;
• Evaluates expert and social work evidence; and
• Makes recommendations to the court on what arrangement is in the child’s best interests.

In care and adoption cases, the court must conduct a “global holistic” welfare analysis of all realistic options—often referred to in case law since Re B-S (2013). The Guardian’s evidence is central to that exercise because it synthesises the competing factors and perspectives in a child-focused way.

By shutting down the Guardian’s opportunity to give evidence in person, the judge not only denied the court the best chance of an informed decision; he also undermined the fairness of the process.

7.4 Care orders, placement orders, and adoption

Broadly:

• A care order (under the Children Act 1989) places a child in the care of the local authority, which then has parental responsibility.
• A placement order (under the Adoption and Children Act 2002) authorises a local authority to place a child for adoption with prospective adopters, usually as a stepping stone to an eventual adoption order.
• An adoption order permanently severs the legal relationship between the child and the birth parents and creates a new legal family.

Because adoption is such a “draconian” step (to borrow the language of earlier case law), the court is required to treat it as a last resort, only if nothing else will do, and only after a rigorous comparison with less interventionist options such as rehabilitation to parents or long-term foster care.

In C (Children), the judge’s early removal of adoption from the table meant that this structured comparative exercise had not yet been properly performed.

7.5 Stay of proceedings in children cases

A stay of proceedings means that the case is effectively put on hold; no further steps can be taken until the stay is lifted. While stays can be appropriate in some civil contexts (e.g., pending related litigation), in public law children cases a stay:

• Delays final decisions about the child’s future;
• Prolongs uncertainty and instability; and
• Can narrow the realistic options as the child grows older.

Accordingly, an indefinite stay in long-running care proceedings—especially without any expedited appeal timetable—is, as the Court said, effectively a decision by default and, in this case, “unconscionable”.

7.6 Recusal and apparent bias

The concept of recusal concerns whether a judge should step aside because of:

• Actual bias; or
• Apparent bias (where a fair-minded and informed observer would think there is a real possibility of bias or unfairness).

Although no formal application for recusal was made in this case, the same principles inform the Court’s analysis: a judge whose mind is closed to half the parties’ case cannot fairly try the matter. The appropriate remedy here was not recusal alone, but appellate intervention and remittal to a new judge.

8. Impact and Wider Significance

8.1 For judges: boundaries of judicial indication

The decision is a clear warning to trial judges—particularly in the family jurisdiction—about the limits of permissible case management interventions and indications:

• Judges can and should signal provisional concerns and invite parties to address them.
• However, they must:
  • make it explicit that such views are provisional;
  • avoid language that suggests a final, conscience-based resolve (“I cannot do X”); and
  • reinforce that they remain open to persuasion by further evidence and submissions.

C (Children) will likely be cited as authority that, where a judge says they cannot see any evidence that might change their conclusion, they have crossed the line into predetermination, potentially vitiating the entire hearing.

8.2 For advocates and parties

The case offers practical guidance to those appearing before judges:

• If a judge gives a robust indication, advocates should clarify whether it is provisional and seek confirmation that the judge remains open to persuasion.
• If the judge says, in substance, “nothing will change my mind”, there is now very strong appellate authority that:
  • the parties are not obliged to proceed to call evidence in a futile exercise; and
  • they are entitled to treat the situation as giving rise to a serious procedural irregularity.
• In urgent child cases, advocates should resist indefinite stays that are not accompanied by clear and expeditious appellate timetables.

Importantly, the burden is not on advocates to argue for judicial impartiality. As the Court says, parties should not have to “persuade the judge to keep an open mind”; that is the judge’s responsibility by default.

8.3 For care proceedings and public law children practice

The decision underscores several structural points about public law children work:

• Delay is itself a welfare harm. Courts must be acutely conscious that “delays on this extravagant scale can become decisions by default” ([40]).
• Children’s Guardians are institutionally central. Deciding contested welfare issues without hearing them in person will often be procedurally unfair.
• Evidence-based decision-making cannot be short-circuited, even with the best intentions of avoiding wasted time. The attempt here to “save time” by pre-empting the outcome produced much greater delay overall.

8.4 Beyond family law: cross-jurisdictional relevance

Although rooted in care and adoption proceedings, the judgment’s analysis of predetermination, fairness, and judicial indications is of wider application:

• Any jurisdiction in which judges hear and weigh evidence—civil, employment, tribunal, public law—can draw on this articulation of the boundary between robust expression and impermissible predetermination.
• The case links together commercial authority (Lanes Group), immigration authority (Singh), and procedural fairness/bias authority (Re H, Jiminez, Hashim) in a coherent way.

Accordingly, C (Children) is likely to be cited wherever a judge is alleged to have “closed their mind” in mid-hearing and to have curtailed evidence or submissions on that basis.

9. Practical Guidance Derived from the Case

9.1 For judges

• When expressing a preliminary view:
  • Use language like “tentatively”, “provisionally”, or “at this stage, subject to hearing the rest of the evidence…”;
  • Explicitly say that you remain open to persuasion.
• Avoid:
  • Statements that no further evidence could change your mind;
  • Describing further evidence as a “waste of time” when key witnesses have not yet been heard;
  • Personalising the issue in terms of conscience or sleep, which emphasises finality rather than judicial openness.
• In children’s cases in particular:
  • Recognise the Guardian’s central role and, absent very unusual reasons, hear them give evidence if there is any live dispute about their recommendations.
  • Be extremely reluctant to stay proceedings indefinitely; ensure any stay is coupled with urgent appellate or listing directions.

9.2 For advocates

• If a judge’s indication seems to cross the line into predetermination:
  • Politely seek clarification: “My Lord/Lady, may I confirm that your observations are provisional and that you remain open to persuasion by the remaining evidence?”
  • If the judge confirms they are provisional, use that to shape your evidence and submissions.
  • If the judge reaffirms that nothing could change their mind, consider:
    • Raising the issue of fairness explicitly;
    • Seeking an adjournment to consider your position;
    • Applying for permission to appeal, referring to C (Children).
• In urgent children cases:
  • Press for expedition of any appeal;
  • Resist open-ended stays that risk compounding delay.

10. Conclusion

C (Children: Premature Determination) [2025] EWCA Civ 1481 is a powerful reassertion of fundamental principles of fair trial in the specific, high-stakes context of care and adoption proceedings. It confirms that:

• Judicial indications, though useful and even desirable, have clear limits: once a judge communicates that no evidence could alter their view on a key issue, they have likely committed predetermination.
• Such predetermination is a serious procedural irregularity capable of vitiating the trial under CPR 52.21(3)(b).
• Parties are entitled to an open-minded tribunal without having to argue for it; they are not obliged to proceed with a hearing that has effectively become a formality.
• In children’s cases, delay must be seen as a substantive harm; indefinite stays in long-running proceedings are, absent compelling justification, “unconscionable”.
• Children’s Guardians occupy a central role in the public law system, and excluding their evidence from contested welfare determinations will rarely be compatible with procedural fairness.

The judgment also carries a more general message: judicial attempts to short-circuit due process in the name of efficiency can easily backfire, causing greater delay, added cost, and—most seriously—unfairness to the parties. As the Court observed, “all these difficulties could have been avoided if the judge had performed his duties in the normal way, by listening to the evidence and submissions and giving a suitable judgment” ([43]).

In that sense, C (Children) is both a cautionary tale and a clarifying precedent. It will doubtless become a key reference point in future disputes about judicial indications, predetermination, and procedural fairness across the English civil and family jurisdictions.