Plummer v The King: Reinforcing the Judicial Duty to Halt Un-convincing Hearsay Cases under s.125 Criminal Justice Act 2003

Introduction

Plummer v The King ([2025] EWCA Crim 1036) is a landmark decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) that quashed the 2023 reconviction of Justin Plummer for the 1997 murder of Janice Cartwright-Gilbert. The case centred on an alleged cell-confession made to Christopher Dunne—now deceased—whose witness statement was admitted as multiple hearsay. Lord Justice Edis, giving the lead judgment, held that the trial judge’s failure to invoke the statutory safeguard in s.125 Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA 2003) rendered the conviction unsafe. The decision:

Confirms that judges must (on their own initiative) consider stopping a case where the prosecution is substantially based on untested hearsay.
Emphasises the need for tailored jury directions and heightened caution where multiple hearsay or cell-confession evidence is sole or decisive.
Highlights practical disclosure and fairness problems that arise when prosecutors change position decades after an initial trial.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court allowed Plummer’s appeal and quashed the conviction primarily because:

The judge did not conduct the mandatory safety review required by s.125 CJA 2003 once the prosecution case hinged on Dunne’s hearsay statement.
The hearsay directions given to the jury were generic and failed to equip them with the tools necessary to evaluate Dunne’s reliability.
Additional alleged confession evidence (via the deceased mother, relayed through Plummer’s brother Adam) was itself multiple hearsay, admitted without any statutory scrutiny, and compounded the unreliability.

Consequently the Court ruled the conviction unsafe and refrained from ordering a retrial.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

R v Riat [2012] EWCA Crim 1509 – outlined the statutory framework for hearsay and the relevance of the “sole or decisive” test. The trial judge relied heavily on Riat when admitting Dunne’s statement.
R v F (S) [2011] EWCA Crim 1844 – reaffirmed the classic Galbraith “no-case” test but clarified that s.125 introduces a different, defendant-focused safety test where hearsay is central.
R v BOB [2024] EWCA Crim 1494 – decided after Plummer’s trial but before the appeal; BOB requires judges to initiate a s.125 review even if counsel do not raise it. Plummer applies and strengthens BOB by quashing a conviction where the duty was missed.
Common law principles on confession and hearsay, preserved by s.118 CJA 2003.

Legal Reasoning

Admissibility under s.121 CJA 2003: Dunne’s statement was “multiple hearsay.” The judge admitted it, finding its probative value high and other safeguards sufficient.
Section 78 PACE 1984: Though argued, the judge refused to exclude the statement for unfairness, accepting prosecutors could re-evaluate reliance on Dunne after his death.
Failure to Apply s.125 CJA 2003: This provision obliges the court—after the close of the prosecution case—to halt proceedings where hearsay evidence is so unconvincing that any conviction would be unsafe. The judge omitted this step.
Jury Directions: Directions did not:
- Warn of the particular dangers of cell-confession hearsay.
- Map for jurors the discrepancies between Dunne’s various accounts.
- Explain how Dunne’s status as a paid informant and his requests for inducements undermined credibility.
Aggregate Effect: Considering the above failings and the absence of independent corroboration, the Court deemed the hearsay unconvincing and the conviction unsafe.

Impact of the Decision

Plummer will likely reshape criminal practice in three key respects:

Automatic s.125 Consideration: Judges must minute and rule on s.125 whenever hearsay is a pivotal part of the Crown’s case—regardless of submissions. Failure will risk reversal on appeal.
Enhanced Jury Directions: Courts must give bespoke guidance where hearsay (especially cell-confessions and informant evidence) is decisive. Generic warnings will be inadequate.
Disclosure & Strategic Choices: Prosecutors who abandon live witnesses at a first trial may later face hurdles if they resurrect that witness’s statement post-mortem. The historic decision can seriously hamper a defendant’s ability to challenge the evidence, tipping the balance toward exclusion or case stoppage.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Multiple Hearsay: Evidence of a statement (A) repeating another statement (B) relied on for its truth. Each link is hearsay, multiplying the risk of error.
Section 121 CJA 2003: An exception that allows multiple hearsay if its “value…is so high that the interests of justice require” admission.
Section 125 CJA 2003: After the prosecution case closes, the judge must stop the trial if the hearsay is “so unconvincing” that conviction would be unsafe.
Section 78 PACE 1984: Gives courts a broad discretion to exclude prosecution evidence if admitting it would adversely affect fairness.
Cell-Confession Evidence: Testimony from a fellow inmate claiming the accused confessed while in custody. Viewed with suspicion because inmates may fabricate for advantage.

Conclusion

Plummer v The King fortifies the protective architecture surrounding hearsay in criminal trials. It underscores that:

The statutory stop-gate in s.125 CJA 2003 is not optional; judges must apply it whenever hearsay is central.
Where confession evidence originates from deceased informants, decades-old statements, or prison cells, the court must demand stringent corroboration and give juries robust, tailored guidance.
Historical prosecution decisions can have irreversible consequences for fairness; changing course years later may make the evidence intrinsically unconvincing.

Ultimately, Plummer re-balances the scales by ensuring that convictions grounded on fragile, untested hearsay will not stand—thereby promoting both the accuracy of verdicts and the integrity of the criminal justice system.