Personal Motive Is Not a Convention Nexus; Displacing a Safe‑Country Presumption Does Not Foreclose State Protection: Commentary on N.S. & T.S. v IPAT & Minister [2025] IEHC 578

Personal Motive Is Not a Convention Nexus; Displacing a Safe‑Country Presumption Does Not Foreclose State Protection: Commentary on N.S. & T.S. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Minister [2025] IEHC 578

Introduction

In this conjoined judicial review, Justice Conleth Bradley of the High Court of Ireland dismissed the challenges of two Georgian nationals, N.S. and T.S., to decisions of the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT) affirming the International Protection Office (IPO) recommendations that neither be granted refugee status nor subsidiary protection. The Applicants are a married couple whose relationship contravened a strong Orthodox Christian taboo in Georgia because the husband’s mother was the wife’s godmother; the wife had also been promised by her parents to a police officer, “IK.” They alleged serious violence and threats from family members and from IK, including a hospitalising assault on T.S. and police inaction purportedly due to IK’s influence.

The case raised interlocking questions central to Irish international protection law under the International Protection Act 2015 (IPA 2015):

  • Whether the feared harms had a Convention nexus (i.e., were “for reasons of” a protected ground) so as to qualify for refugee status;
  • Whether Georgia’s designation as a “safe country of origin” under section 72/Order 2018 was displaced on the Applicants’ facts;
  • How and when a state protection analysis must be undertaken, and what it requires, particularly after any safe‑country presumption is displaced;
  • How section 28(6) (“serious indication” from past harm) operates within the sequential assessment; and
  • Whether IPAT’s reliance on available country information and internal accountability mechanisms (notably the Public Defender/Ombudsman and policing oversight) satisfied the “reasonable steps” standard for state protection.

The judgment clarifies the relationship between the Convention nexus and state protection analyses, the legal effect of displacing a safe‑country presumption, the threshold for “persecution” (as distinct from familial “shunning”), and the evaluation of harms driven by a persecutor’s personal motives versus protected grounds. It also situates the analysis against recent CJEU guidance on gender‑based persecution and particular social groups.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court refused both judicial review applications, upholding the IPAT’s decisions. Key holdings include:

  • Nexus: Although IPAT accepted as credible the underlying facts and the risk of assault by the would‑be spouse (a police officer), it lawfully concluded there was no Convention nexus. IK’s hostility was found to spring from a personal motive—his thwarted intention to marry N.S.—rather than from the Applicants’ religion or membership of a particular social group. As such, refugee status could not be granted.
  • Forced marriage and familial disapproval: The Applicants’ lawful civil marriage removed the possibility of a forced marriage; family “shunning” or disapproval fell short of “persecution” within section 7 IPA 2015.
  • Safe country of origin: IPAT correctly held that the Applicants had provided “serious grounds” displacing the safe‑country presumption (Georgia) by evidencing a dropped police investigation when IK’s involvement emerged. This did not, however, predetermine the outcome on protection; it simply removed the presumption and required a full, individualized state protection analysis.
  • State protection: Applying the “reasonable steps” standard under section 31 IPA 2015 and Article 7 of the Qualification Directive, IPAT lawfully concluded that effective (though not perfect) protection was generally available in Georgia, supported by an effective legal system, oversight of police misconduct, and the availability of the Public Defender’s Office. The Applicants’ failure to pursue complaints beyond the initial police encounter or to approach the Public Defender was a relevant factor.
  • Section 28(6): Past harm is a “serious indication” of future risk but is not dispositive; the tribunal still had to determine nexus and, if required, state protection. IPAT’s sequencing and analysis comported with TA v IPAT and NG v IPAT.
  • Fair procedures: No breach arose from IPAT’s observation that police interest in Borjomi could plausibly have been a missing‑person report from N.S.’s parents rather than a search orchestrated by IK. In any event, IPAT had already treated the safe‑country presumption as displaced and proceeded to a full state protection assessment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • ABO v Minister for Justice [2008] IEHC 191; XS v IPAT [2022] IEHC 100. These authorities underscore the presumption of state protection absent state collapse, and that applicants must rebut that presumption with cogent, case‑specific evidence. Here, IPAT deemed the presumption displaced on the facts (police inaction when IK was implicated) but still found effective protection available upon a fresh assessment.
  • TA v IPAT [2023] IEHC 390; NG v IPAT [2023] IEHC 535. Central to the Court’s reasoning. They require a sequential analysis: first, whether the apprehended harm reaches the threshold of persecution or serious harm; second, whether effective state protection exists. A well‑founded fear alone does not establish entitlement if effective state protection is available. Justice Bradley endorsed that IPAT sequenced and applied this analysis correctly.
  • ES v IPAT [2022] IEHC 613; ZM (MZ) v IPAT [2023] IEHC 637; BA v IPAT [2020] IEHC 589; BC v IPAT [2019] IEHC 763. These decisions articulate the content of the state protection inquiry and set out the “reasonable steps” test: the state need not guarantee perfect protection; it must operate an effective legal system for detection, prosecution and punishment of persecutory acts, and the applicant must have access to such protection. Justice Bradley specifically echoed the ES/BC approach.
  • LAA (Bolivia) v RAT [2016] IEHC 12; Idiakheua v Minister [2005] IEHC 150. Reaffirm the “reasonable protection in practical terms” standard, now reflected in section 31 and Article 7 of the Qualification Directive. The Court held IPAT stayed within these parameters, relying on country information and Georgia’s accountability mechanisms.
  • CJEU: K, L v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (C‑646/21, 2024); WS (C‑621/21, AG Opinion). These recent EU authorities confirm that, in some societies, “women” may constitute a particular social group (PSG) and emphasize the prohibition on gender‑based violence and forced marriage (Istanbul Convention; CEDAW). The Court acknowledged these principles but accepted IPAT’s finding that, on the facts, the risk was not “for reasons of” sex or other Convention grounds but due to a personal vendetta by IK.

Legal Reasoning

The High Court’s reasoning consolidates several core principles under the IPA 2015 and EU law.

  • No Convention nexus where harm is driven by a personal motive. IPAT accepted that both Applicants faced a reasonable chance of serious harm (including inhuman or degrading treatment) from IK. However, it found the motive to be personal—IK’s anger at being unable to marry N.S.—rather than religious disapproval or hostility to a PSG. Accordingly, the “for reasons of” requirement in the refugee definition (section 2 and section 7, read with section 7(3)) was not satisfied. The High Court held this was a lawful and rational conclusion on the evidence presented.
  • Forced marriage risk mooted by a valid civil marriage; familial “shunning” is not persecution. Because Georgia recognizes only civil marriage, N.S. could no longer be forced into a marriage with IK. IPAT’s further observation—that religiously motivated familial disapproval would likely result in social ostracism rather than acts reaching the severity threshold in section 7—was accepted by the Court. The distinction between social disapproval and persecution is legally significant.
  • Section 28(6) is a serious indication, not a trump card. Prior harm or threats are a “serious indication” of future risk but do not, of themselves, establish entitlement to refugee or subsidiary protection. They trigger, but do not replace, the required analyses of nexus (for refugee status) and state protection (for refugee and subsidiary protection). The Court approved IPAT’s structured approach.
  • Displacing the safe‑country presumption does not predetermine the protection outcome. Section 33 allows the presumption to be displaced by “serious grounds”—as IPAT found here because a police investigation was discontinued upon learning of IK’s involvement. Importantly, once displaced, the decision maker must reassess state protection “without the presumption,” not assume its absence. The Court endorsed IPAT’s execution of that task.
  • State protection: the “reasonable steps” standard, not perfection. Applying section 31 IPA 2015 and Article 7 Qualification Directive, IPAT concluded that Georgia operates an effective, non‑temporary system capable of detecting, prosecuting and punishing police misconduct, with access to the Public Defender (Ombudsman). Even acknowledging gaps and political‑case anomalies, the system was found effective for the Applicants’ circumstances. The Applicants’ limited engagement with available remedies (no further complaint, no approach to the Public Defender) was relevant, though not dispositive. The High Court found this reasoning consistent with ES, BC, LAA, and Idiakheua.
  • Procedural fairness. IPAT’s alternative explanation for the police interest in Borjomi (a possible missing‑persons report by parents) did not breach fair procedures. Context matters: IPAT had already displaced the safe‑country presumption and conducted a full state protection analysis. The remark did not operate as a determinative adverse credibility finding.

Impact and Practical Implications

The judgment provides clear guidance for future international protection decision‑making in Ireland, particularly in cases involving non‑state actors and safe‑country designations.

  • Clarifying the “personal vendetta” line: When a persecutor’s motive is personal (jealousy, vendetta, possessiveness) rather than a protected ground, the nexus requirement for refugee status is not met—even if the threatened harm would otherwise amount to persecution. Applicants must adduce evidence that the harm is “for reasons of” a Convention ground (religion, race, nationality, political opinion, or PSG).
  • Gender‑based claims post‑K, L: The Court leaves intact the important EU law development that “women” may, in certain societies, constitute a PSG. However, claimants must still link their feared harm to that PSG status (or another protected ground). Evidence that the persecutor targets the applicant “because she is a woman” or because of gendered norms (e.g., forced marriage as a social practice) will be crucial; a purely personal motive will not suffice. Decision makers must continue to assess this carefully on the facts presented.
  • Safe‑country designations are rebuttable, not outcome‑determinative: Serious case‑specific reasons can displace the presumption; a single instance of police inaction may suffice for that limited purpose. But even after displacement, decision makers must conduct a full state protection analysis without presumption. Applicants should be ready to demonstrate either systemic ineffectiveness or inaccessibility of protection in their specific circumstances.
  • State protection is about “reasonable steps” and access: Country materials showing oversight mechanisms and functioning accountability may carry significant weight. Applicants should, where safe and feasible, document attempts to access alternative police channels, internal affairs, prosecutorial oversight, or the Public Defender/Ombudsman—or explain credibly why such steps were objectively unsafe or futile in their case.
  • Forced marriage and family “shunning”: A valid civil marriage may neutralize a forced‑marriage risk. Evidence that familial or community disapproval rises to a severe violation of basic rights (threats, violence, police complicity) will be necessary to cross the persecution threshold; mere ostracism typically will not.
  • Structured reasoning validated: The Court approves IPAT’s structured approach: facts and credibility, harm assessment, nexus (for refugee claims), safe‑country presumption, and then state protection (for refugee and subsidiary protection as appropriate). Tribunals should continue to articulate this sequence clearly.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Refugee vs subsidiary protection: Refugee status requires a well‑founded fear of “persecution” for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group). Subsidiary protection applies where a person faces a real risk of “serious harm” (death penalty, torture/inhuman treatment, or serious threat from indiscriminate violence in conflict) even if they do not qualify as a refugee. Both are denied if effective state protection is available.
  • Convention nexus: The feared harm must be “for reasons of” a protected ground. A persecutor’s personal motives—jealousy, revenge, or property disputes—do not satisfy nexus unless the facts show the personal motive is inseparable from, or a proxy for, a protected ground.
  • Section 28(6) “serious indication”: Past harm or threats are strong indications of risk but do not automatically establish entitlement. Decision makers still assess nexus (for refugee status) and whether effective state protection exists.
  • Safe country of origin: A designated country is presumed safe unless the applicant shows serious grounds that it is not safe for them, in their circumstances. Displacing the presumption triggers a fresh state protection analysis; it does not guarantee protection is unavailable.
  • State protection standard: The state must take “reasonable steps” to prevent persecution or serious harm, including operating an effective legal system to detect, prosecute and punish relevant crimes, and the applicant must have access to that protection. The law does not require perfect protection.
  • Actors of persecution and protection: Persecution can be by the state, state‑like entities, or non‑state actors; but where it is not the state, the applicant must show the state cannot or will not protect them effectively.

Conclusion

N.S. & T.S. v IPAT & Minister marks a careful reaffirmation—and practical refinement—of Ireland’s international protection jurisprudence. The High Court:

  • Confirms that a persecutor’s personal motive does not establish a Convention nexus, even where the threatened harm would reach the persecution threshold;
  • Accepts that while a safe‑country presumption may be displaced by case‑specific evidence, the decision maker must still conduct a rigorous state protection analysis without presumption;
  • Reasserts that state protection turns on “reasonable steps” and accessibility, not perfection or guaranteed success;
  • Holds that a valid civil marriage may moot a forced‑marriage risk and that familial “shunning,” without more, generally does not amount to persecution;
  • Integrates recent EU guidance on gender‑based persecution while emphasizing the necessity of a fact‑specific nexus showing.

For applicants and practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of marshaling evidence that the persecutor’s motive is linked to a Convention ground, and of documenting either the unavailability or the futility/danger of reasonably accessible state protection mechanisms in the country of origin. For decision makers, it validates a structured, sequential methodology and clarifies that displacing a safe‑country presumption does not short‑circuit the state protection inquiry.

Ultimately, the judgment tightens the doctrinal seams between nexus, persecution/serious harm thresholds, safe‑country presumptions, and the state protection test, and it will likely serve as a touchstone for future cases involving non‑state actors, family‑ or community‑driven harms, and claims emanating from countries designated as safe.

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