Permissive Amendment Standard in Judicial Review: Byrne v An Bord Pleanála

Introduction

Byrne v An Bord Pleanála & Anor [2025] IEHC 222 is a High Court ruling delivered by Mr Justice Nolan on 29 April 2025. The applicant, Mr Patrick Byrne, sought to amend his Statement of Grounds in a pending judicial review of the Board’s decision of 13 August 2024. The two respondents are An Bord Pleanála (“the Board”) and, by order, Cork County Council (“the Council”). The core issue is whether the Court should permit amendments that clarify factual dates and introduce a new ground based on “default permission” under Section 34(8)(b) of the Planning and Development Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”), without changing the fundamental thrust of the original challenge.

The applicant, acting in person, relies on Order 84 Rule 20(4) of the Rules of the Superior Courts and High Court Practice Direction HC126 to justify his motion. The Council opposes on three grounds: (1) lack of arguability; (2) inadequate explanation for delay; and (3) prejudice. The Board adopts a neutral stance.

Summary of the Judgment

Mr Justice Nolan granted the applicant leave to amend his Statement of Grounds, subject to full scrutiny at the substantive leave hearing. He held that:

The question of arguability and whether the amendments amount to a new cause of action is best left to the leave hearing before Humphreys J.;
The applicant has offered a sufficient explanation—namely his wife’s prolonged illness and subsequent death—for his inability to advance the “default permission” point earlier;
Allowing the amendments does not cause material prejudice to the respondents, as any additional affidavits would be minor and aimed at clarifying rather than overhauling the case;
Given the applicant’s litigant-in-person status, the court should apply a generous standard consistent with established jurisprudence on amendments in judicial review proceedings.

The order permits the amendments without prejudice to the respondents’ right to challenge them on any ground at the substantive leave hearing.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

McCallig v An Bord Pleanála (No. 1) [2013] IEHC 60 – confirms the narrow window for challenging council decisions once lodged and the importance of timely relief.
Yennusick v Wexford County Council [2023] IEHC 70 and Duffy v Clare County Council [2023] IEHC 430 – underscore that unarguable extensions or new grounds can be rejected when they materially enlarge the case.
Keegan v Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission [2012] 2 IR 570 – sets out the requirement to explain delay when seeking amendments in judicial review.
North West Meath Turbine Action Group v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IECA 126 – emphasizes the “interests of justice” as the touchstone for allowing amendments.
Sherwin v An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 26 – clarifies that amendments to grounds in an already timely judicial review do not require the same level of “good and sufficient reason” as out-of-time applications.
Heavey v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 480 – highlights the generous approach courts adopt towards litigants in person, allowing greater latitude in pleadings.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolds in three main strands:

Interests of Justice: Guided by North West Meath and Sherwin, the Court asked whether the amendments serve the interests of justice. It found that clarifying factual dates and asserting a “default permission” argument remains within the scope of the original challenge to the Board’s decision.
Explanation for Delay: The applicant’s personal circumstances—caring for a terminally ill spouse and coping with grief—constituted a satisfactory explanation under Keegan. The timing of the “default permission” point only became apparent when preparing the judicial review.
Prejudice to Respondents: The Council claimed that new grounds would necessitate extensive further affidavits and disrupt the proceedings. The Court, however, deemed any additional affidavit exchange minor and unlikely to prejudice fair trial.

On the question of arguability, the Court preferred to defer detailed analysis to the leave hearing, acknowledging that only at that stage can the Board’s decision and the Council’s procedural decisions be fully scrutinized.

3. Impact

This ruling affirms and refines the permissive approach to amendments in judicial review:

Courts will apply a flexible standard, especially for litigants in person, balancing finality and procedural fairness;
Explanation of delay grounded in serious personal circumstances can satisfy the threshold for amendments;
‘Interests of justice’ remains the decisive criterion, promoting substantive access to relief over technical objections;
The case provides a roadmap for future applicants seeking to clarify or refine grounds without expanding the core challenge.

Practitioners advising lay litigants can rely on Byrne for robust support when seeking amendments, subject to a genuine connection to the original grounds and minimal prejudice to respondents.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Default Permission: Under Section 34(8)(b) of the 2000 Act, if a planning authority does not issue a request for further information within eight weeks of receipt, the application is deemed granted by default.
Order 84 Rule 20(4): The procedural rule permitting amendments to a Statement of Grounds in judicial review, provided they do not introduce a substantially new cause of action.
Practice Direction HC126: A High Court guideline for the planning and environmental list, setting timelines and requirements for judicial review of planning decisions.
Litigant in Person: A party who represents themselves without a lawyer. The courts extend them greater latitude in pleadings to ensure access to justice.

Conclusion

Byrne v An Bord Pleanála & Anor [2025] IEHC 222 establishes that:

Amendments clarifying factual circumstances or introducing closely related legal grounds may be permitted in judicial review even at a late stage, if they do not alter the fundamental case.
Excusable delay, especially rooted in serious personal hardship, satisfies the explanation requirement.
Prejudice to respondents must be substantial to merit refusal; minor additional affidavit exchanges will not bar amendment.
Courts will adopt a generous, justice-focused approach, particularly for litigants in person, ensuring procedural technicalities do not thwart substantive rights.

This decision underscores the judiciary’s commitment to balancing procedural integrity with equitable access to remedies in administrative law.