O’Pray v R: Maturity Discounts for Young Adults and s.322 Uplifts to Murder Minimum Terms Clarified

Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in O’Pray v R [2025] EWCA Crim 1379 (31 October 2025). The appellant, aged just under 22 at the time of offending, was convicted of the murder of Rico Burton and the wounding with intent of Harvey Reilly during a violent late‑night incident in Altrincham. He had earlier pleaded guilty to possession of a bladed article and possession of cocaine.

At first instance, he received a life sentence with a minimum term of 28 years for murder. A concurrent 12-year sentence was imposed for the s.18 offence, and a further 2 years concurrently for the bladed article; there was no separate penalty for the drug offence. The single ground of appeal, for which leave was granted by the full court, was that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the appellant’s youth and immaturity, rendering the sentence manifestly excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In doing so, it restated and refined the approach to:

Assessing and evidencing immaturity in young adult offenders (up to age 25);
How maturity interacts with the statutory 25‑year starting point for knife murders under Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020;
The appropriateness of adjourning sentence to obtain maturity assessments and expert reports; and
Uplifting a murder minimum term under s.322 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to reflect associated offences, here a Category 1A s.18 wounding that caused life‑threatening injury.

Summary of the Judgment

The appeal against sentence was dismissed. The 28‑year minimum term stands.
For the murder alone, the sentencing judge correctly applied the 25‑year starting point under Schedule 21 paragraph 4 (bringing a knife to the scene and using it), and—after weighing aggravation and mitigation—identified 23 years as the appropriate minimum term for the murder itself.
Applying s.322 of the Sentencing Act 2020 and the totality principle, the judge added a 5‑year uplift to the minimum term to reflect the associated s.18 offence (Category 1A: highly dangerous weapon; particularly grave, life‑threatening injury). The resulting minimum term was 28 years.
Although it will often be preferable to adjourn for a pre-sentence report (PSR), OASys assessment, and expert psychological evidence where neurodiversity and immaturity may be relevant, the absence of such further reports here did not render the sentence wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. The court held that the judge had already made a significant downward adjustment for immaturity.
Expert evidence about immaturity must be “tethered to the evidence” of the offence and the offender’s personal circumstances; generalised observations have limited value absent a maturity assessment linked to the facts.
Lack of intent to kill carried little weight as mitigation where the risk of death was “so very great,” and the absence of premeditation was of limited force because the appellant carried a knife throughout and engaged in escalating aggression.

Factual Background

Over the evening of 20–21 August 2022 in Goose Green, Altrincham, the appellant consumed cocaine and alcohol, carried a lock-knife, and behaved aggressively when refused entry to a bar. After a melee near the King Pong bar, he exposed the knife and stabbed Mr Burton in the neck, severing the carotid artery and causing fatal blood loss. Immediately afterwards, he slashed Mr Reilly, then aged 17, inflicting life‑threatening wounds to the chest and a severe arm injury requiring extensive surgery and leaving lasting functional impairment and pain.

The appellant was intoxicated and possessed three wraps of cocaine. He had prior convictions, including for possession of a bladed article (for which he had received a Detention and Training Order). Victim personal statements illustrated the devastating and enduring impact of the offences, especially on Mr Reilly and Mr Burton’s family.

Analysis

1) Legal Framework Applied by the Court

Sentencing Act 2020, Schedule 21 paragraph 4: A 25‑year starting point for the minimum term where a knife is taken to the scene and used in the murder.
Sentencing Act 2020, s.322: The minimum term must take into account the seriousness of the offence and any associated offence(s). This permits an uplift to the minimum term for murder to account for the s.18 wounding, rather than imposing a consecutive determinate sentence.
Totality principle: The overall sentence must reflect the total criminality, avoiding double counting but ensuring the associated offence is not ignored because of the life sentence.
Sentencing Council Guideline: Sentencing Children and Young People; Judicial College Youth Bench Book: Guidance on developmental maturity and its relevance to culpability in young adults.
Criminal Procedure Rules 2025, r.19.4 and R v BRM [2022] EWCA Crim 385: Expert evidence must be “tethered” to the facts of the offence, with opinions anchored in evidential material that explains the link between the offender’s presentation and the offending conduct.

2) Precedents and Guidance Cited

The Court synthesised a body of guidance affirming that maturity in young adults is a material sentencing consideration and that structured, fact‑specific evidence is indispensable:

R v Kamarra‑Jarra [2024] EWCA Crim 198: Confirms that factors relevant to sentencing children and young people remain pertinent for young adults up to age 25 because brain development and psychosocial maturation continue beyond legal adulthood.
R v Popoola [2021] EWCA Crim 842: Requires sentencing courts to consider the offender’s level of maturity at the time of offending and the extent to which youth and immaturity reduce culpability.
R v ZA [2023] EWCA Crim 596 (May J): Explains how adverse childhood experiences, educational difficulties, and mental health problems can depress maturity and thereby affect culpability.
R v BRM [2022] EWCA Crim 385 (William Davis LJ) and CrimPR r.19.4 (2025): Expert opinion must be tied to the evidential record and the facts of the offence; generalities are of limited assistance unless applied to the case specifics.
Youth Bench Book (Judicial College), ch. 15 2E: Recognises that emotional/developmental age and maturity, not just chronological age, can materially affect culpability, and that these factors can continue to influence culpability beyond the 18th birthday.

These authorities collectively reinforce that immaturity can justify a culpability discount in young adult offenders, but the discount is fact‑sensitive, depends on the quality of evidence linking immaturity to the offending, and must be balanced against aggravating features and the statutory framework.

3) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court proceeded in the following steps:

Starting point (Schedule 21, para 4): Because the appellant brought a knife to the scene and used it in the murder, the 25‑year starting point was correctly applied. This was not in dispute.
Aggravation and mitigation for the murder count:
- Aggravation: Previous knife offence; intoxication (drink and drugs); carrying the knife throughout the evening; an escalating pattern of aggression; the manner of the attack; absence of provocation; and the contemporaneous s.18 wounding causing life‑threatening injury (though formally accounted for via s.322 uplift).
- Mitigation: Youth/immaturity; absence of premeditation; lack of a proven intent to kill (only to cause grievous bodily harm), albeit the Court emphasised this offered very limited mitigation because the risk of death from such a stabbing was “so very great.”
Downward adjustment for immaturity: The judge reduced the murder minimum term from the 25‑year starting point to 23 years to reflect age and immaturity. The Court of Appeal held that, in this factual context, a two‑year reduction constituted a significant discount.
s.322 uplift for the associated s.18 offence and totality: The judge assessed the s.18 as Category 1A (highly dangerous weapon; particularly grave/life‑threatening injury), with an “ordinary” determinate starting point of 12 years and a range of 8–16. Rather than imposing a consecutive sentence—which would distort the structure where a life minimum term is set—the judge uplifted the murder minimum term by 5 years to ensure the total sentence reflected the overall criminality (murder plus s.18). The Court affirmed this as an appropriate application of s.322 and the totality principle.
Adjournment and evidence of immaturity: While the Court noted that it will often be preferable to adjourn for a PSR/OASys and psychological assessment where neurodiversity is in play, it concluded that the absence of those reports did not vitiate the sentence. The later pre‑appeal PSR (including an OASys maturity score of 15, indicating low maturity) supported that immaturity was present, but the sentencing judge had already made a material downward adjustment to reflect immaturity. Moreover, the defence expert’s pre‑trial report (mild‑to‑moderate PTSD; possible ADHD) did not, without a fresh assessment “tethered” to the offence facts, justify a greater reduction.

4) What This Decision Clarifies

Maturity discount in serious knife murders: Even where the offender is a young adult with demonstrably low maturity, the discount may be modest where the risk of death was very high and aggravating features are numerous. A two‑year reduction below the 25‑year starting point was held adequate in this case.
Lack of intent to kill: In knife murders where the nature of the attack creates an obvious and substantial risk of death, “no intent to kill” offers little mitigation.
Premeditation versus “a stabbing waiting to happen”: Absence of planning carries limited weight if the offender armed themselves and engaged in escalating aggression. Carrying a knife throughout a night of confrontation can diminish the force of arguments about spontaneity.
s.322 uplift for associated offences: Where a category 1A s.18 accompanies murder, a substantial uplift (here, five years) to the minimum term may be appropriate to reflect total criminality.
Adjournments for maturity assessments: It is often preferable to adjourn for a PSR/OASys and expert maturity report where neurodiversity or adverse childhood experiences are credibly in play. However, refusal to adjourn will not necessarily be an error if the judge makes a clear, reasoned adjustment for immaturity on the evidence available and the overall sentence is not manifestly excessive.
Quality of expert evidence: Psychological opinions must be case‑specific and tied to the facts of the offence. General descriptions of possible immaturity or neurodiversity, without a maturity assessment linked to the offending behaviour, will have limited weight.

5) Impact and Practical Implications

This judgment has several practical consequences:

For sentencing judges:
- Reaffirmation that immaturity remains relevant for young adults up to 25, but the discount is fact‑sensitive and can be modest in high‑aggravation knife murders.
- Strong encouragement to obtain PSR/OASys and expert reports where there are credible indicators of neurodiversity or adverse experiences affecting maturity—particularly when the adjournment would be short and proportionate.
- Clear endorsement of using s.322 to uplift the minimum term for associated offences, rather than attempting concurrent/consecutive determinate terms alongside a life minimum term.
For defence practitioners:
- Seek early funding and arrange maturity assessments as soon as possible; ensure expert evidence is explicitly tied to offence facts (linking symptoms/conditions to the behaviour on the day).
- Use OASys maturity scores (here, >10 denotes low maturity) as part of a broader evidential picture, but remember the Court will weigh them against aggravation and the nature of the homicide.
- Be realistic about “no intent to kill” arguments in knife‑to‑neck or otherwise obviously lethal attacks—mitigation is often limited.
For prosecutors:
- Highlight the high risk of death inherent in the mode of attack to curtail the force of “no intent to kill” mitigation.
- When there is an associated s.18 with life‑threatening injury, press for a substantial s.322 uplift to reflect totality.
For probation and experts:
- Reports should not only diagnose conditions (e.g., PTSD/ADHD) but also analyse how, if at all, those conditions and the offender’s developmental stage influenced the specific offending conduct.
- Ensure any maturity measure (such as OASys) is explained and contextualised, including links to impulse control and decision‑making in the offence circumstances.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Minimum term for murder (life sentence): The period a murderer must serve in custody before becoming eligible to apply for parole. It is set by reference to statutory starting points and adjusted for aggravating and mitigating factors.
Schedule 21 starting point (25 years): If the offender brings a knife to the scene and uses it to commit murder, the statutory starting point for the minimum term is 25 years before adjustments.
Associated offences and s.322 uplift: Where other offences (e.g., s.18 wounding) are part of the same criminal episode, the judge can uplift the minimum term to reflect their seriousness, instead of imposing separate consecutive terms that would not affect the minimum term.
Totality principle: The overall sentence must reflect all offending so it is neither too lenient nor disproportionately severe when viewed as a whole.
OASys maturity score: A probation assessment tool; here, a score over 10 indicates low maturity relative to chronological age. It informs, but does not dictate, the discount for immaturity.
“Tethered to the evidence” (expert evidence): Expert opinions must be grounded in the case facts and explain how any condition (e.g., PTSD/ADHD) affected the actual offending behaviour, not just describe general traits.
Manifestly excessive: The appellate test for interfering with a sentence that is not wrong in principle. A sentence is manifestly excessive if it falls outside the range of sentences reasonably open to the judge.

Conclusion

O’Pray v R clarifies the sentencing landscape for young adult offenders convicted of knife‑enabled murder with associated serious violence. The Court underlines three core propositions. First, immaturity remains a live and important consideration up to age 25, but in cases involving an obviously lethal attack and multiple aggravating features, the discount may be modest. Second, expert and probation evidence about immaturity is most persuasive when it is timely, case‑specific, and explicitly linked to the facts of the offence. Third, where an associated s.18 offence causes life‑threatening injury, a substantial uplift to the murder minimum term under s.322 is proper to ensure the sentence reflects total criminality.

Even though the Court indicated that adjournments to obtain maturity assessments will often be preferable—especially where a short delay would secure vital information—it held that, in this case, the judge’s two‑year downward adjustment for immaturity (to 23 years for the murder alone), followed by a 5‑year s.322 uplift for the Category 1A wounding, produced an overall minimum term that was not manifestly excessive. The decision provides practical direction on balancing youth and immaturity against the gravity and risk inherent in knife homicide, and on the principled use of s.322 to calibrate minimum terms where associated offences significantly increase overall seriousness.