Ordinary Residence Determination in Cornwall Council v. Secretary of State for Health [2015] UKSC 46
Introduction
Cornwall Council, R (on the application of) v. Secretary of State for Health and Somerset County Council is a landmark case adjudicated by the United Kingdom Supreme Court on July 8, 2015. The central issue addressed in this case was the determination of the "ordinary residence" of PH, a person with severe physical and learning disabilities who lacked the capacity to decide his place of residence. The case primarily revolved around which local authority should bear the responsibility and associated costs for PH's care under the National Assistance Act 1948.
The parties involved included:
- Applicant: Cornwall Council
- Respondents: Secretary of State for Health and Somerset County Council
- Supporting Authorities: South Gloucestershire Council and Wiltshire Council
This case has significant implications for the allocation of local authority responsibilities concerning individuals who cannot make decisions for themselves, particularly in determining their ordinary residence for the provision of care and support.
Summary of the Judgment
The Supreme Court's judgment focused on critically assessing the lower courts' decisions regarding PH's ordinary residence. Initially, the Secretary of State determined Cornwall as the responsible authority based on the "Vale tests," a set of criteria derived from previous cases. This decision was upheld by the High Court but overturned by the Court of Appeal, which placed responsibility on South Gloucestershire Council.
However, upon reaching the Supreme Court, the justices scrutinized the application of the ordinary residence test and the interpretation of relevant statutory provisions. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the Secretary of State had erred in applying the "Vale tests" as rigid legal rules rather than guidelines. The Court emphasized that the ordinary residence should be determined based on the individual's actual living situation and connections, rather than substituting the role of decision-makers or considering the placement authority's perspective.
Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, overturning the Court of Appeal's decision. The responsibility for PH's care was reaffirmed as lying with Wiltshire Council, given PH's long-term placement with foster parents from Wiltshire and the lack of enduring ties with South Gloucestershire.
Analysis
Precedents Cited
Several pivotal cases and statutory provisions influenced the Supreme Court's decision:
- R v Barnet LBC, Ex p Shah [1983] AC 309: Provided the foundational definition of "ordinary residence," emphasizing accommodation adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes.
- R v Waltham Forest, Ex p Vale (unreported, 1985): Introduced the "Vale tests 1 and 2," which sought to determine ordinary residence based on decision-making authority and the individual's integration into the social environment.
- A v A (Children: Habitual Residence) [2013] UKSC 60: Clarified the approach to determining a child's habitual residence under European regulations, emphasizing social and family integration.
- R (Hertfordshire County Council) v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2011] EWCA Civ 77;
- In re P (GE) (An infant) [1965] Ch 568: Addressed the concept of a child's "base" in determining ordinary residence.
Legal Reasoning
The Supreme Court delved into the statutory interpretation of the National Assistance Act 1948, particularly sections 24(1) and (5), which hinge on the concept of "ordinary residence." The Court critiqued the rigid application of the "Vale tests," arguing that they should serve as guidelines rather than strict legal criteria. Emphasizing the individual's actual living circumstances and social connections, the Court underscored that the decision-maker should prioritize the person's integration into the social and family environment over procedural formalities.
Additionally, the Court addressed the interplay between the Children Act 1989 and the National Assistance Act 1948, highlighting that the ordinary residence determination should remain consistent with the individual's direct living situation, irrespective of prior placements under different statutory frameworks.
Impact
This judgment has profound implications for local authorities responsible for adult social care:
- Clarification of Ordinary Residence: Reinforces that ordinary residence should reflect the individual's actual living environment and social ties, not merely administrative placements or the jurisdiction of decision-makers.
- Guidance on Statutory Interpretation: Highlights the necessity of a flexible approach to statutory terms, allowing for context-specific interpretations that prioritize the individual's welfare.
- Financial Responsibility: Ensures that local authorities cannot evade financial obligations by transferring the individual to another jurisdiction without substantiated ties.
- Policy Consistency: Promotes uniformity in the determination of ordinary residence across different statutory contexts, reducing administrative complexity and potential jurisdictional conflicts.
Future cases involving the ordinary residence of incapacitated individuals will likely reference this judgment to ensure a person-centered approach in determining responsibility.
Complex Concepts Simplified
Ordinary Residence
Ordinary residence refers to the place where an individual regularly lives and considers their permanent home. It involves a combination of physical presence and social ties, representing where the person's life is centered.
The "Vale Tests"
The "Vale tests," derived from the case R v Waltham Forest, Ex p Vale, are criteria used to determine an individual's ordinary residence. These tests assess whether the individual's residence is based on decision-making authority and the extent of their integration into the social environment.
Section 24 of the National Assistance Act 1948
This section outlines the criteria for determining which local authority is responsible for providing care and support to individuals in need. It emphasizes the importance of the person's ordinary residence in establishing administrative and financial responsibility.
Section 105(6) of the Children Act 1989
Originally, this provision allows the ordinary residence of a minor in care to be disregarded when determining their ordinary residence status under the 1948 Act. It ensures that the placement of a child for care purposes does not inadvertently transfer responsibility for their long-term care.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Cornwall Council v. Secretary of State for Health underscores the paramount importance of accurately determining an individual's ordinary residence based on their actual living circumstances and social connections. By rejecting the rigid application of the "Vale tests" and emphasizing a flexible, person-centered approach, the Court ensures that the welfare of vulnerable individuals like PH remains at the forefront of legal determinations.
This judgment not only clarifies the interpretation of statutory provisions concerning ordinary residence but also aligns legal responsibilities with practical, welfare-oriented outcomes. It serves as a critical reference point for future cases, promoting fairness and consistency in the allocation of local authority responsibilities across the United Kingdom.
Comments