Obligation to Provide Reasons for “Unfounded” Findings in Child Protection Investigations

Introduction

This judgment arises from G.H. v Tusla Child and Family Agency & Ors [2025] IEHC 263, a High Court judicial review challenge to Tusla’s decision to deem the applicant’s historical‐abuse allegations “unfounded.” The applicant, now a qualified social‐care worker, had complained in 2015 about emotional and physical abuse suffered in foster care in childhood. Tusla initially found “serious concerns” in a May 2017 report, shared with both the applicant and her foster carer. After a flawed first investigation, Tusla reopened its inquiry and, without informing the applicant, concluded on 19 December 2022 that the allegations were unfounded. Notification did not reach the applicant until 10 July 2023 and contained no reasons. The applicant sought declarations that Tusla’s procedures were unlawful and ultra vires, and challenged the absence of reasons and the constitutional validity of Section 3 of the Child Care Act 1991. The High Court considered locus standi and time limits before addressing whether Tusla owed a duty to give reasons for its final decision.

Summary of the Judgment

Mr. Justice Micheál O’Higgins held that:

The applicant overcame preliminary objections on delay and locus standi. Applying a modern, liberal approach (Mohun v Ireland; D.M. v Child and Family Agency), she had a “real and meaningful” interest in the outcome of Tusla’s decision‐making process.
Tusla’s obligation under public law to act fairly and transparently, and the requirements of the rule of law (Mallak v Minister for Justice; Connelly v An Bord Pleanála), gave rise to a duty to provide reasons for decisions affecting personal interests, including to complainants.
Certain factors strengthened the duty to give reasons here: (a) Tusla’s earlier 2017 finding had endorsed the applicant’s account; (b) significant delays and change of approach without explanation; (c) uninformative affidavits that precluded effective review; and (d) policy documents (2014 Procedure, CASP 2022) did not lawfully oust the duty to give reasons.
The court directed Tusla to furnish the applicant with reasons for its impugned decision and reserved further directions on redactions and consequential relief. Constitutional challenges against the State respondents were unnecessary once relief against Tusla was granted.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Meadows v Minister for Justice (2010) 1 IR 200: A right of review is pointless without access to sufficient information to assess lawfulness.
Mulholland v Minister for Agriculture [2010] IEHC 443: Decisions affecting rights and obligations must be lawfully made and explainable.
Rawson v Minister for Defence [2012] IESC 26: Where the decision‐making process is challenged, reasons are needed to show direction of mind.
Mallak v Minister for Justice [2012] 3 IR 297: Even discretionary grants or refusals require fair, rational decision‐making with reasons, so that judicial review is effective.
Connelly v An Bord Pleanála [2021] 2 IR 752: Affected persons are entitled to know, in general terms, why decisions are made and what issues were determinative.
Y.Y. v Minister for Justice [2018] 1 ILRM 109: When a Minister diverges from a specialized tribunal’s fact‐finding, a reasoned explanation is required.
D.M. (A Minor) v Child and Family Agency [2022] IEHC 716: A complainant in a child‐protection process has locus standi and a public interest in ensuring statutory processes are lawfully discharged.
Mohan v Ireland [2021] 1 IR 293: Standing requires a “real and meaningful” interest, not solely a legal or constitutional right.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in stages:

Locus Standi & Delay: Applying Mohan and D.M., the applicant’s personal engagement, the seriousness of her allegations and her role in the process sufficed for standing. The three-month time limit was met once leave was formally opened on 9 October 2023, and any extension for the undisclosed December 2022 decision was justified in the interests of justice.
Duty to Give Reasons: Mallak established that public‐law decision-makers must give reasons to ensure fairness and permit effective judicial review. Connelly clarified that reasons need only be sufficient to explain the decision in general terms and enable appeal or review.
Enhanced Duty Here: The decision-making context had “unusual features”: a prior 2017 substantiation; abrupt reversal in 2022/2023 without explanation; prolonged delays; policy documents silent on complainant reasons; and bare affidavits offering no insight. These factors cumulatively triggered a strong obligation to provide reasons.
Policy vs Public‐Law Duty: Tusla’s internal policies (2014 Procedure, CASP 2022) could not oust or narrow its public-law duty to act fairly. Absence of express policy provisions was not an express prohibition but rather a policy choice that must yield to constitutional and administrative‐law norms.

Impact

This decision will shape future child-protection investigations and judicial reviews by:

Requiring Tusla and similar bodies to revise procedures to ensure complainants receive reasons for “unfounded” findings, enhancing procedural fairness and transparency.
Guiding lower courts to apply Mallak and Connelly in contexts beyond naturalisation and planning appeals, extending the duty to give reasons wherever personal interests are affected.
Encouraging legislative clarification of procedural rights within the Child Care Act 1991 or accompanying regulations to codify the right to reasons.
Strengthening trust in child-welfare agencies by ensuring accountability and enabling meaningful review of decisions with enduring consequences for complainants and respondents alike.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Locus Standi: The legal capacity to bring a case. Modern courts look beyond technical rules to whether the applicant’s interests are genuinely affected.
Ultra Vires: Acts or decisions beyond the powers conferred by statute.
CASP (Child Abuse Substantiation Procedure): Tusla’s 2022 framework for assessing whether historical or current abuse disclosures are founded or unfounded.
Fair Procedures (Natural Justice): A set of principles—right to be heard, unbiased decision‐maker, and reasons—ensuring decisions affecting rights are made justly.
Nemo iudex in causa sua (“No one should be judge in their own cause”): The principle against bias, requiring impartial decision-makers.
Judicial Review: A court’s power to assess the lawfulness of public-law decisions.

Conclusion

The High Court in G.H. v Tusla establishes a clear precedent: child-welfare agencies must provide adequate reasons to complainants for “unfounded” findings when their personal interests are affected. This obligation stems from the rule of law, constitutional guarantees of fair procedures and the need for effective judicial review. Tusla’s internal policies must be aligned with these public-law duties. Going forward, complainants in child-protection and other statutory investigations can expect transparency and reasoned decision-making as a minimum procedural entitlement.