Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court anchored its approach in Keohane v Hynes [2014] IESC 66. Keohane articulates two controlling ideas that directly shaped the outcome:

• Sparing use: The power to strike out pleadings is a jurisdiction to be “sparingly exercised.”
• No summary fact-finding: A strike‑out motion “is not a means for inviting the court to resolve issues on a summary basis.”

Applying Keohane, the Court refused to engage in weighing contested narratives, emphasising that where factual disputes exist or where expert or oral evidence may be required, the strike‑out route is inappropriate. This framework decisively undercut the plaintiff’s attempt to rely on his own subjective account and documentary extracts to eliminate the defence before trial.

Legal Reasoning

1) The plaintiff’s burden of proof remains intact (LSRA observations do not alter it)

The plaintiff argued that LSRA references to his issues being before the High Court established the merit of his complaints and thereby shifted or lessened his evidential burden. The Court rejected this argument outright: in civil proceedings, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving negligence, breach of duty, breach of fiduciary duty, and loss. Regulatory commentary cannot displace, diminish, or reverse that burden. Any LSRA material is, at most, something that could be marshalled as part of the plaintiff’s case at trial; it does not affect the interlocutory analysis.

2) Taking the defendant’s case “at its highest” on strike‑out

A central principle reaffirmed is that the impugned pleading—in this case, the defence—must be assessed at its highest in the strike‑out inquiry. The plaintiff’s approach inverted that logic, urging the Court to accept his version of disputed facts and his reading of documents. The Court refused: documents “do not prove themselves,” and their meaning and context may require proof at trial, including cross-examination. To strike out now would be to impermissibly resolve factual disputes summarily, contrary to Keohane.

3) Advice to bring claims is not an admission of their validity or value

The plaintiff asserted that because the defendant advised him to bring certain statutory employment claims and acted for him in the WRC, the defendant must admit those claims’ validity. The Court clarified that litigation advice and representation do not amount to admissions that the original claims were valid or valuable for the purpose of subsequent negligence proceedings. At trial, the plaintiff must still establish the content and standard of care applicable to the advice, breach, causation, and loss. The defendant is entitled to put the plaintiff to proof on all elements.

4) Damages: caution against treating statutory maxima as automatic or cumulative

The plaintiff’s damages claim cumulatively aggregated statutory maxima across multiple alleged causes (including protected disclosures penalties and dismissal, discrimination, equality/bullying/defamation) and also claimed a separate seven-figure sum tied to a PIAB application. The Court noted that, even assuming arguendo some validity in the underlying claims, it does not follow that maximum awards under every head would be either attainable or recoverable—still less that they can be summarily treated as the measure of loss for negligence purposes. The defendant is entitled to deny quantum and causation, and those denials cannot be struck out simply because they contradict the plaintiff’s estimates or alleged precedents.

5) Alleged failures to advise on litigation options (e.g., interim relief)

The plaintiff said the solicitors failed to advise on certain options, including interim relief available in the Circuit Court under protected disclosures legislation. The Court accepted that such advisory issues may need to be “teased out” at trial and might engage expert evidence as to standard of care. But the mere assertion of such failures does not render the defendant’s denials unstateable or abusive. These are trial issues, not grounds to summarily excise a defence.

6) No automatic entitlement to an employment reference

On the plaintiff’s complaint that the settlement should have included a reference, the Court made two linked points:

• There is no automatic legal entitlement to a reference; and if a reference is provided, it may carry obligations to third parties (e.g., to be accurate and not misleading).
• Here, the plaintiff read and signed the settlement terms, which did not include a reference, and he accepted that he never instructed his solicitors to obtain one. The defendant is entitled to deny negligence on this point, and the absence of a reference is not so obviously a breach of duty as to justify striking out the defence.

Overall, the Court held that the plaintiff’s belief in his case—however strongly held—does not eliminate the need for proof or preclude the defendant from contesting the allegations through discovery, cross-examination, and, if necessary, expert evidence.

7) Costs and case management

The application failed. Applying section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, the Court’s indicative view is that the defendant is entitled to the costs of the application. The Court will consider whether to stay execution of those costs pending the outcome of the proceedings and has listed the matter for final orders and to schedule hearings of other interlocutory applications (particulars and discovery, if necessary).

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

a) Strike‑out practice: reaffirmation and clarification

Monarca provides a clear restatement of strike‑out discipline: courts will not resolve contested factual narratives or evidential controversies at the pleadings stage. For practitioners, it underscores the limited utility of strike‑out motions where the defence traverses material facts, intends to adduce evidence, or raises questions of professional standard requiring expert testimony.

b) Professional negligence claims against solicitors in employment/WRC contexts

The judgment sends a strong message that:

• A client’s later negligence suit does not transform prior litigation advice into admissions about the strength or value of the underlying claims.
• Complex negligence issues (e.g., advice on interim relief or strategic options) will typically require expert evidence and cannot be decided summarily.
• Quantum claims based on stacking or cumulating statutory maxima will be closely scrutinised; defendants may legitimately deny causation and challenge valuation.

c) LSRA and court proceedings: separate roles

The Court’s firm stance that LSRA observations do not affect the civil burden of proof provides useful guidance for litigants who seek to rely on regulatory correspondence or processes as substantive proof. Regulatory processes and civil litigation remain distinct.

d) Settlement terms and references

The Court’s reminder that there is no automatic entitlement to an employment reference—and that clients bear responsibility for instructions on settlement terms—will likely influence how both solicitors and clients document negotiations and decisions. For practitioners, it underscores the value of obtaining and recording clear instructions about whether a reference is to be sought and on what terms.

e) Costs consequences

The indicative award of costs against the unsuccessful applicant under section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 may deter speculative or misconceived strike‑out motions. The prospect of a stay pending the action’s resolution recognises proportionality and access-to-justice concerns while preserving the ordinary rule on costs.