No Excessive Evidential Burden and No “More than Normal Emotional Ties” Requirement in Dependency Assessments under Article 3(2) of the Citizens’ Directive

1. Introduction

This commentary analyses the judgment of Barr J in Alauddin & Ors v Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 613, delivered on 14 November 2025 by the High Court of Ireland. The decision is a significant addition to Irish and EU free movement jurisprudence on:

• how “dependency” is to be assessed under Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38/EC (the “Citizens’ Directive”) and the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015 (“the 2015 Regulations”);
• the permissible evidential burden that the Minister may impose on visa applicants who claim to be financially dependent on an EU citizen sponsor; and
• whether there is any additional requirement to prove “more than normal emotional ties” or a form of “social dependency” beyond material/financial support.

The case involved two Bangladeshi siblings (the second and third applicants) seeking visas as “permitted family members” of their older brother, the first applicant, a dual British/Bangladeshi national exercising free movement rights in Ireland. Following the death of their parents, the younger siblings claimed long-term financial dependence on the first applicant, including payment of school and college fees and regular remittances for everyday necessities.

The Minister twice refused their visa applications, including after a previous High Court quashing by Jackson J (Alauddin (No. 1), 2023 IEHC 621). The present judgment concerns the second set of refusals, dated 15 May 2024, and addresses whether those decisions were lawful.

The High Court’s decision is particularly important for clarifying:

• that while applicants bear the burden of proving dependency, decision-makers cannot demand an unrealistically granular “chain of evidence” linking each remittance to each small cash purchase;
• that sworn evidence concerning the absence of other income, when corroborated by bank records and family evidence, cannot simply be ignored or treated as if it had no probative value;
• that there is no freestanding requirement to prove “social” or “emotional” dependency, or “more than normal emotional ties”, as a condition of recognition under Article 3(2); and
• that minor drafting or typographical slips (e.g. mis-citing Article 3(1) instead of 3(2)) will not, by themselves, vitiate an otherwise lawful decision.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The parties and family circumstances

The first applicant, Mohammed Alauddin, is a 45-year-old dual British/Bangladeshi citizen. He lived and worked in the United Kingdom for many years and subsequently moved to Ireland in July 2020, where he has worked as a kitchen manager and now operates a delivery business. He is accepted by the Minister as an EU citizen (or in an analogous position post-Brexit) exercising free movement rights in Ireland.

The second and third applicants, Naim Uddin (26) and Nurjahan Begum (21), are his younger brother and sister. They are Bangladeshi nationals residing in Bangladesh. Their mother died in 2008 and their father in 2015, when they were 16 and 11 years old respectively. They claim that since their father’s death they have been financially dependent on the first applicant.

The core of their dependency claim is that the first applicant:

• paid their school and college fees in Bangladesh; and
• sent regular monetary remittances to cover essential living needs, including food, clothing, school materials, and computer equipment.

2.2 Prior UK proceedings

While the first applicant resided in the UK, an attempt was made to secure UK visas for the second and third applicants on the basis of financial dependency. Those applications were refused in 2016. The reasons for that refusal are not detailed in this judgment, but the history is noted as part of the background.

2.3 First Irish visa applications and Alauddin (No. 1)

After the first applicant’s move to Ireland in 2020:

• On 23 November 2020, the second and third applicants applied for Irish visas as extended family members dependent on an EU citizen under the Citizens’ Directive and the 2015 Regulations.
• On 31 January 2022, the Minister refused the applications on two grounds:
  • lack of evidence of financial or social dependency; and
  • non-acceptance that the first applicant was “habitually resident” in the State.
• An appeal was lodged on 26 March 2022 with further supporting documentation, but the appeals were refused on the same grounds.
• The applicants challenged these refusals by judicial review. In a reserved judgment delivered on 15 November 2023, Jackson J (2023 IEHC 621) quashed the appeal decision and remitted the matter to the Minister for reconsideration.

In that first judgment, of particular relevance here, Jackson J recorded an important concession: that payment of fees for full-time education, if proved, can in principle constitute financial dependency for the purposes of Article 3(2) and the 2015 Regulations (see para. 31 of Barr J’s judgment).

2.4 Reconsideration and the 2024 refusals

Following remittal:

• On 29 January 2024, the applicants submitted further documentation in support of their appeal applications.
• On 15 May 2024, the Minister again refused both appeals. This time, the Minister:
  • accepted that the first applicant was an EU citizen (or equivalent) exercising free movement rights in Ireland; but
  • maintained that the second and third applicants had not demonstrated that they were financially dependent on him at the time of the reconsideration.

The decisions were detailed, running to about 13 pages each, and:

• listed all remittances from the first applicant to the siblings’ bank accounts (directly or via the “Small World” money transfer agency);
• acknowledged documentary evidence that the first applicant paid their school and college fees; and
• acknowledged receipts for various items (food, clothing, school materials, computer equipment) bought in cash by the second and third applicants.

However, the decisions concluded that financial dependency had not been proven because:

• the applicants had not provided a full narrative or documentary picture of their household finances, everyday living expenses, and any other income; and
• the evidence did not show that the remittances met “essential needs” as opposed to non-essential expenditure.

The decisions also stated that the applicants had not shown a social/emotional relationship with the sponsor going beyond “normal emotional ties between siblings” and concluded that they had not established that they were financially or socially dependent on him.

2.5 The present judicial review

On 11 November 2024, the applicants obtained leave to challenge the May 2024 refusal decisions by way of judicial review. The substantive hearing was held in July 2025.

They challenged the decisions on four principal grounds:

1. Educational support: Lack of clarity as to whether educational financial support was deemed essential or non-essential, and whether regarding it as non-essential was an error of law or fact.
2. Excessive evidential burden: Imposition of an unreasonable evidentiary burden, including a requirement for a detailed “chain of evidence” linking each remittance from the sponsor to specific expenditures by the applicants.
3. “More than normal emotional ties”: Error of law in requiring proof of a social/emotional relationship with “more than normal emotional ties” between the siblings.
4. Manifest errors: Various alleged legal and factual errors in the decision-making process.

The Minister contended that, read as a whole, the decisions:

• applied the correct legal test for dependency as derived from EU law and Irish case law; and
• were open to the Minister on the evidence, as the applicants had not discharged the burden of proving financial dependency to the requisite standard (balance of probabilities).

3. Legal Framework

3.1 The Citizens’ Directive – Article 3(2)

Directive 2004/38/EC (“the Citizens’ Directive”) governs the right of EU citizens and their family members to move and reside freely within the EU.

Article 3(2) requires Member States to:

“facilitate entry and residence” for:

• “any other family members … who, in the country from which they have come, are dependants or members of the household of the Union citizen…”
• and certain durable partners.

The host Member State must undertake an extensive examination of the personal circumstances and justify any denial of entry or residence.

This provision deals with “other family members” beyond the “core” definition in Article 2(2) (spouse, registered partner, direct descendants, dependent direct relatives in the ascending line, etc.). In Irish law, such persons are generally referred to as “permitted family members” as distinct from “qualifying family members”.

3.2 The 2015 Regulations – Regulation 5

The Citizens’ Directive is transposed into Irish law by the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015 (S.I. 548/2015).

Key provisions include:

• Regulation 5(1): applies to a person who is:
  • “a member of the family (other than a qualifying family member) of a Union citizen … and who in the country from which the person has come is a dependent of the Union citizen.”
• Regulation 5(2): such a person may apply to be treated as a “permitted family member” and must produce documentary evidence from the country of origin that he or she is a “dependent” of the EU citizen.
• Regulation 5(5): when deciding whether to recognise someone as a permitted family member, the Minister must consider, inter alia:
  • the extent and nature of the dependency (including the extent and duration of financial support, having regard to living costs in the country of origin);
  • whether the financial dependency could be met by remittances in the country of origin rather than by residence in the State; and
  • other financial resources available to the applicant.

The Minister may also consider whether the relationship is one of convenience (e.g. entered into primarily to secure residence rights) and the EU citizen’s capacity to maintain support in Ireland.

3.3 The legal test for “dependency” – VK and Dar

Barr J grounds his approach primarily in two leading Court of Appeal authorities:

• VK v Minister for Justice and Equality [2021] 1 IR 724 (Baker J); and
• Dar v Minister for Justice & Equality [2023] 3 IR 224 (Costello J delivering for the Court).

In VK, after an extensive review of EU and Irish case law (including the CJEU’s decision in Reyes v Migrationsverket), Baker J summarised the dependency test (paras. 82–86), as quoted by Barr J:

Real and not temporary dependence – the applicant must show, in light of his or her financial and social conditions, a “real and not temporary dependence” on a Union citizen.

Essential material needs – financial needs must be for “basic or essential needs of a material nature without which a person could not support himself or herself”. The support must be more than merely “welcome”.

Broad interpretation – the concept of dependence is to be interpreted “broadly and in the light of the perceived benefit of family unity and the principles of freedom of movement.”

No excessively burdensome proof – while Member States may prescribe the nature of required proof, they must not impose: “an excessively burdensome obligation on an applicant … or an excessive demand for the production of documentary evidence”. The Member State must justify any refusal with clear reasons.

“Real” dependence: substance, not destitution – dependency must be “something of substance”, more than fleeting or trifling, and factually established. However, the applicant need not prove destitution or that life would be reduced to mere subsistence absent support.

Focus on need for support, not reasons – the assessment is whether the family member has a real need for financial assistance, not an inquiry into why the EU citizen provides support.

Dar clarified an increasingly controversial question: is there a separate legal requirement to prove “social dependency” or “emotional dependency”? The Court answered this in the negative. It held:

• there is no separate freestanding concept of “social dependency”;
• reference to “financial and social conditions” refers to the applicant’s overall personal circumstances (e.g. health, age, disability, family context) as they bear on material support; and
• dependency remains ultimately about material support, i.e. being “not in a position to support oneself” without the EU citizen’s assistance.

As Barr J summarised (para. 30, citing para. 41 of Dar):

“The test for dependency … is the result of a factual situation characterised by the fact that material support for that family member is provided by the Union citizen…”

The Minister must assess whether, “having regard to financial and social conditions, the family member is not in a position to support herself.”

3.4 Burden and standard of proof

Barr J notes that in the earlier Alauddin (No. 1) judgment, Jackson J recorded agreement between the parties that:

• the burden of proof lies on the applicant to establish dependency; and
• the standard of proof is the civil standard – on the balance of probabilities (more likely than not).

3.5 Judicial review standard – O’Keeffe / Keegan and Abbas

Importantly, the High Court does not determine dependency de novo. The question is not whether Barr J personally believes the applicants were dependent, but whether the Minister’s decision falls foul of the well-known judicial review standard of unreasonableness (or irrationality) from:

• O’Keeffe v An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 IR 39; and
• Keegan v Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] IR 642.

Barr J quotes Binchy J in Abbas v Minister for Justice [2021] IECA 16 at para. 101:

The court’s task is to decide not whether dependency in fact existed, but whether the Minister’s decision was “so unreasonable as to offend the principles established in O’Keeffe … and Keegan …”.

There is a recognised high threshold before courts will interfere with specialist decision-makers in Reg. 5 dependency cases.

That high bar frames the analysis: even if a court might have taken a different view on the facts, it will not quash unless the decision is irrational, unsupported by evidence, or based on legal error.

4. Summary of the High Court’s Decision

4.1 Outcome

Barr J grants orders of certiorari quashing both refusal decisions of 15 May 2024 in respect of the second and third applicants (para. 57). The applications are remitted, and the parties are invited to make submissions on the precise terms of the order and on costs.

The court finds:

• no error of law in the Minister’s treatment of educational fees per se (Ground 1 fails);
• but serious errors in:
  • the Minister’s effective disregard of sworn evidence about the absence of other income (Ground 2 succeeds);
  • the imposition of an unreasonable “chain of evidence” requirement between remittances and cash expenditure (Ground 3 succeeds); and
  • the introduction of a “more than normal emotional ties” test akin to Article 8 ECHR standards (Ground 4 succeeds, though this could in theory be severable).
• minor typographical or drafting errors (e.g. conflating Article 3(1) and 3(2), misdescribing family roles) were not of themselves decisive (Ground 5 fails).

4.2 Key legal holdings

Key legal principles that emerge are:

1. Educational expenses: While payment of education fees can in principle form part (or even the core) of essential support establishing dependency, the Minister is not obliged to treat them as determinative in every case. What matters is the overall picture of material support.
2. Affidavit evidence and proof of no other income: When applicants swear, corroborated by bank records and family affidavits, that they have no other income, the Minister cannot simply say there is “no evidence” of their financial circumstances without grappling with that sworn evidence. Rejecting such evidence requires a clear, reasoned explanation.
3. No excessive “chain of evidence” burden: It is unreasonable and contrary to VK to require a one-to-one evidential linkage between each remittance and each cash purchase of everyday necessities. That is an excessively onerous evidential burden within the meaning condemned in VK, para. 84.
4. No extra “emotional ties” hurdle: It is an error of law to suggest that, beyond financial/material dependency, applicants must also prove “more than normal emotional ties” or a separate “social dependency” to qualify under Article 3(2).
5. Typographical errors: Incorrect references to Article 3(1) instead of 3(2), or to “son”, “spouse”, “brothers”, etc., amounted to minor slips that would have been severable had the decisions otherwise been lawful.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

5.1.1 VK v Minister for Justice and Equality [2021] 1 IR 724

VK is now the central authority in Ireland on the meaning of “dependency” under Article 3(2). The Court of Appeal, per Baker J, distilled from CJEU case law (especially Reyes) that:

• The concept of dependency is autonomous EU law and must be interpreted uniformly.
• The test concerns material support to meet essential needs, not mere conveniences or welcome extras.
• However, dependency does not require proof of near-destitution; it is enough that the family member needs the material support to maintain themselves at an appropriate standard in their home country.
• Member States may specify documentation but must avoid excessively burdensome evidential demands and must give clear reasons for refusal.

Barr J relies heavily on para. 84 of VK, where Baker J warns against imposing “excessively burdensome” documentation obligations. This becomes crucial in rejecting the Minister’s demand for a fully traceable link from each remittance to each cash expenditure as a condition of proving dependency (paras. 47–50 of Barr J’s judgment).

5.1.2 Dar v Minister for Justice & Equality [2023] 3 IR 224

Dar settled a debate about whether applicants must show not only financial dependency but also some separate “social” or “emotional” dependency on the EU citizen.

The Court of Appeal held that:

• there is no independent test of social dependency detached from material support;
• “financial and social conditions” refer to the overall circumstances relevant to whether the applicant can support themselves materially; and
• what remains decisive is whether “material support for that family member is provided by the Union citizen” and whether the applicant is not in a position to support themselves (paras. 30–31 of Barr J, quoting para. 41 of Dar).

This becomes directly relevant when Barr J considers the Minister’s invocation of a requirement for “more than normal emotional ties” and the reference to “financial and social dependency” as though “social” were a separate legal threshold (paras. 51–54).

5.1.3 Abbas v Minister for Justice [2021] IECA 16

Abbas concerned, inter alia, the weight to be attached to statements and affidavits from applicants asserting dependency but lacking documentary corroboration. At para. 82, Binchy J remarked that such statements, whether sworn or unsworn, are “mere assertion” absent supporting documentation.

The Minister in Alauddin relied on this dictum to justify treating the applicants’ affidavits (and those of siblings and stepmother) as having little or no probative value without documentary proof of every aspect of their financial situation.

However, Barr J points out (paras. 39–40) that:

• one must be cautious not to over-read isolated dicta; and
• in Abbas itself, Binchy J stressed that:
  • sworn statements are evidence (albeit of varying weight);
  • they cannot simply be ignored; and
  • their credibility must be assessed in light of any supporting documentation.

Barr J’s key contribution is to clarify that, especially where the issue is the absence of other income, it may be inherently difficult or impossible to produce independent documentary proof. Affidavit evidence corroborated by bank records and circumstances (death of parents, ages, etc.) may be sufficient, absent clear reasoned grounds for doubting credibility.

5.1.4 SK and JK v Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 591

In SK and JK, Ferriter J endorsed the proposition (citing Abbas) that the Minister is entitled to “disregard mere assertion” where claims in affidavits are not supported by documentation.

Barr J distinguishes this by emphasising (paras. 40–44) that:

• the Minister may give to uncorroborated assertions; but
• he cannot simply pretend the evidence does not exist or act as if there were “no evidence” of financial circumstances where several affidavits and bank records are in fact before him;
• especially where what is being asserted (lack of other income) is precisely the kind of negative fact not easily documented.

5.1.5 O’Keeffe, Keegan and deference to administrative expertise

The High Court restates the long-standing position that judicial review does not involve re-trying the case. Quoting Abbas, Barr J reminds that the threshold for interfering with decisions of “specialist tribunals” or administrative decision-makers in immigration matters remains high (para. 32).

Nonetheless, where a decision:

• fails to engage rationally with key pieces of evidence;
• rests on an excessively onerous interpretation of evidential requirements; or
• is underpinned by a misapplication of the legal test for dependency;

it can be quashed as unreasonable or based on an error of law, even under the O’Keeffe/Keegan standard.

5.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

5.2.1 Educational expenses as potential essential support

The first ground alleged that the Minister failed to recognise that payment of education fees can constitute “essential” support and treated educational expenditures as non-essential by default.

Barr J rejects this argument as misconceived (paras. 33–37):

• He accepts that, as recognised by Jackson J and conceded by both parties, discharge of full-time educational fees can constitute dependency in appropriate cases (para. 31).
• However, that concession does not translate into a rule that education fees must always be treated as determinative of dependency in every factual context.
• When read as a whole, the impugned decisions clearly:
  • acknowledged the payment of education fees;
  • considered them alongside the remittances; and
  • assessed whether, in combination, they established reliance on the first applicant for essential material needs.

On that reading, the Minister’s conclusion that dependency had not been established overall implicitly means that, on the facts of this case, the education-related payments alone were not sufficient to prove total financial dependency.

Crucially, Barr J does not say that education expenses can never suffice; he simply holds that:

“there is no substance in this ground of challenge” (para. 37),

because the decision-maker had actually considered those payments and did not treat them as automatically determinative.

5.2.2 Treatment of affidavits and the difficulty of proving a negative

The second ground of challenge concerned the Minister’s finding that there was “no narrative or documentary evidence” about the second and third applicants’ general living conditions and other possible income sources. The applicants argued that this ignored affidavits from:

• the second and third applicants themselves;
• their four siblings; and
• their stepmother,

all of which consistently asserted that:

• the second and third applicants were in full-time education;
• they had no independent income; and
• the first applicant was financially supporting them, while the other relatives lacked the means to do so (paras. 42–44).

Barr J recognises a critical practical point at para. 43:

“It is very difficult to prove a negative. Ordinarily there will not be documentary evidence to establish that you do not have an alternative source of income.”

Therefore:

• Affidavit evidence is often the only feasible way to assert absence of other income.
• It can be strengthened by consistency and corroboration (multiple affidavits, bank statements, ages at parental death, etc.).

Here, that is precisely what the applicants did:

• they swore affidavits of having no income other than the first applicant’s support;
• they provided bank records consistent with that account; and
• other family members swore they could not support them and that the first applicant had assumed responsibility.

Barr J holds (para. 45) that if the Minister intended effectively to reject this entire body of sworn evidence, he was:

“incumbent … to do so in clear terms and to say why this evidence was being rejected.”

Because the decisions did not do this, and yet proceeded as if there was no such evidence or “no narrative” of finances, the decisions are unlawful on this ground. This is a strong application of the requirement of reasoned decision-making and fair consideration of evidence.

5.2.3 The “chain of evidence” requirement and excessive burden of proof

The third ground attacked the Minister’s insistence that there was “no documentary evidence” linking:

• monetary transfers from the first applicant; and
• domestic receipts for expenditures on clothing, food, school materials and computer equipment.

The decisions reasoned that, because the receipts did not expressly show that payments came from the first applicant’s remittances, they did not prove that over and above educational support the first applicant was meeting day-to-day essential living costs (paras. 25–26).

Barr J rejects this as an unreasonable and unlawful evidential requirement, stating (paras. 47–50):

• It is clear from the documentation that substantial payments were made by the first applicant to the siblings over years after their father’s death.
• In the real world, when people receive funds in a bank account, they use them for purchases as needed. Those purchases may be in cash and will not bear any notation linking them back to the specific remittance.
• Requiring a precise evidential nexus between each remittance and each small cash expenditure on “ordinary necessaries of life” is “asking too much” and creates exactly the kind of “excessively burdensome obligation” warned against by Baker J in VK (para. 49).

Hence, in holding that dependency was not proven because of the absence of such a chain of evidence, the Minister:

• applied an unlawfully high standard of proof; and
• imposed a documentation requirement inconsistent with the liberal, facilitative approach mandated by Article 3(2) and VK.

Barr J therefore concludes (para. 50):

“the respondent erred in law in applying an unreasonable burden on the applicants in having to establish that these day-to-day purchases were purchased with funds provided by the first applicant.”

5.2.4 Misuse of “financial and social dependency” and “more than normal emotional ties”

The fourth ground alleged that the Minister had conflated:

• the dependency concept under Article 3(2) of the Directive and the 2015 Regulations; and
• Article 8 ECHR/constitutional concepts used in family reunification or private/family life cases (especially the notion of “more than normal emotional ties”).

The impugned decisions stated that:

• the applicants had not provided sufficient information or documentary evidence of a social/emotional relationship with their EU citizen sponsor which was more than the “normal emotional ties” expected between siblings; and
• therefore, they had not shown they were financially or socially dependent.

Barr J finds substantive merit in this complaint (paras. 51–54):

• By suggesting that an additional threshold of heightened emotional attachment was required on top of financial dependency, the decision-maker introduced an unwarranted extra hurdle not found in Article 3(2) or the 2015 Regulations.
• Dar makes clear that dependency under Article 3(2) is about material support in light of the applicant’s financial and social conditions, not about emotional intensity or “social dependency” as a separate category.
• While it may be understandable that, because the applicants had adduced evidence of WhatsApp contact and photographs, the decision-maker felt obliged to comment on emotional ties, that material was simply not relevant to the legal test of dependency.

Although Barr J indicates that he would have been prepared to sever this part of the reasoning if the remainder of the decision had been lawful (para. 54), in light of the other substantial errors it forms one further strand supporting the grant of certiorari.

5.2.5 Typographical errors and severability

The applicants also objected to various drafting errors in the decisions, including:

• references to Article 3(1) instead of 3(2); and
• misdescriptions such as “son”, “spouse”, or “brothers” where these did not match the actual relationships.

Barr J declines to treat these as determinative errors (paras. 55–56):

• they are characterised as “somewhat minor typographical errors”;
• read as a whole, it is clear that the true basis for the refusal was the alleged failure to prove financial dependency; and
• such slips would have been severable had the decision otherwise been valid.

This reflects a practical approach: courts will not seize upon minor clerical errors to invalidate decisions where the overall reasoning is clear and lawful. The problem in this case lay in the substance, not the slips.

5.2.6 Application of the judicial review standard

Finally, it is important to situate the judgment within the O’Keeffe/Keegan framework. Barr J is careful to emphasise (para. 32) that his role is not to decide whether dependency actually existed between the siblings and the first applicant, but:

• whether the Minister acted lawfully and reasonably in concluding that dependency was not proven.

Having identified:

• a failure to reckon with key sworn evidence on the absence of other income;
• an excessive and legally impermissible evidential burden regarding the link between remittances and cash spending; and
• a misapplication of the legal test by importing a “more than normal emotional ties” requirement,

he concludes that the decisions cannot stand, even giving due deference to administrative expertise.

6. Clarifying Complex Legal Concepts

6.1 “Permitted family member” and Article 3(2)

Under EU free movement law, there are broadly two categories of family members:

1. “Qualifying family members” (Article 2(2)):
   • spouses or registered partners;
   • direct descendants under 21 or dependent (children, grandchildren);
   • dependent direct relatives in the ascending line (parents, grandparents).
2. “Other family members” (Article 3(2)):
   • extended family such as adult siblings, aunts/uncles, cousins, etc., if they are dependants or members of the EU citizen’s household in the country from which they come.

Irish law refers to those in category (2) as “permitted family members”. They do not enjoy the automatic rights of qualifying family members, but Member States must facilitate their entry and residence and conduct an “extensive examination” of personal circumstances.

6.2 What does “dependent” mean in this context?

In this context, “dependent” does not have its ordinary lay meaning. It is a technical EU law concept, interpreted by the CJEU and Irish courts as:

• a factual situation where the EU citizen provides material support to meet the family member’s essential needs in the country of origin;
• the applicant cannot, in practice, support themselves adequately without that assistance.

Key points:

• Dependency is assessed in the country of origin (or where the applicant currently resides), not in the host state.
• It is about real, concrete, non-trivial support; but does not require proof of absolute poverty or destitution.
• The applicant does not need to be wholly dependent on the EU citizen — partial but essential support can suffice.

6.3 “Financial and social conditions” vs “social dependency”

The phrase “financial and social conditions” appears in EU case law and in VK. It means that when assessing whether the applicant can support themselves materially, the decision-maker must consider:

• their income, assets, living costs (financial conditions); and
• their age, health, family situation, education, employment prospects, etc. (social conditions).

However, as explained in Dar and applied in Alauddin, this does not mean there is a separate hurdle of “social dependency” (e.g. emotional attachment, psychological reliance, etc.). The focus remains on whether:

• the applicant is in a position to support themselves materially without the EU citizen; and
• the EU citizen is in fact providing material support.

6.4 Burden and standard of proof – what must an applicant show?

The applicants must show, on the balance of probabilities:

• that the EU citizen has been providing material support over a period of time; and
• that they need that support to meet their essential needs in the country of origin.

Evidence might include:

• bank statements showing regular remittances;
• money transfer receipts;
• evidence of school, college, medical or housing costs paid by the sponsor;
• affidavits explaining the lack of other income and the family circumstances; and
• reasonable documentation of living expenses.

However, as VK and Alauddin stress:

• Member States cannot demand an “excessively burdensome” documentary trail; and
• they must make a realistic, holistic assessment of the evidence actually available.

6.5 Judicial review, irrationality and certiorari

Judicial review does not allow the court to decide the merits of immigration applications. Instead, the court asks:

• Did the decision-maker apply the correct legal test?
• Did they consider relevant evidence and ignore irrelevant considerations?
• Was the decision rationally open on the evidence, or was it so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached it?

Where a decision is legally or procedurally defective, the court may issue an order of certiorari, quashing the decision and remitting it for reconsideration in accordance with law.

7. Impact and Future Significance

7.1 For visa decision-makers

The judgment sends several clear messages to the Minister and officials assessing dependency-based visa applications under Regulation 5:

1. Holistic engagement with evidence: Decision-makers must:
   • engage meaningfully with all relevant evidence, including sworn statements; and
   • explain clearly if and why they reject particular evidence, especially where it is the only practical way to prove a fact (such as the absence of other income).
2. Reasonable documentation demands: Authorities should avoid:
   • requiring an unrealistically detailed accounting of every small expenditure; or
   • demanding a one-to-one link between each remittance and each cash purchase for everyday items.
   Their role is to assess whether, overall, the financial flows and circumstances demonstrate real dependency, not to conduct a forensic audit.
3. Correct understanding of “dependency”: Officials must:
   • apply the VK and Dar tests faithfully;
   • avoid importing Article 8 ECHR-style notions such as “more than normal emotional ties” into Article 3(2) assessments; and
   • focus on material support in light of financial and social conditions, rather than emotional intensity.
4. Drafting care, but no panic over minor slips: While small typographical errors will not automatically invalidate decisions, accurate identification of the legal basis and precise description of family relationships remains good practice and reduces litigation risk.

7.2 For applicants and their advisers

For practitioners and applicants, the decision emphasises:

• Value of coherent, corroborated affidavits: Applicants should:
  • provide detailed sworn statements from themselves and relevant family members;
  • ensure internal consistency and consistency with bank records and other documentation; and
  • address explicitly the absence of other income or support.
• Importance of financial documentation: Wherever possible, applicants should compile:
  • bank statements over a substantial period;
  • money transfer records; and
  • evidence of major, recurring expenses (education, rent, health).
  While Alauddin relaxes the demand for a granular chain of evidence, it does not remove the need for serious, organised documentation.
• Framing of arguments: Legal submissions should:
  • ground dependency arguments explicitly in VK and Dar;
  • challenge any suggestion that emotional ties are a separate legal threshold; and
  • highlight where excessive evidential demands are being imposed, contrary to VK and now Alauddin.

7.3 Systemic implications for Irish EU free movement law

At a systemic level, the judgment:

• consolidates the VK/Dar line of authority at High Court level, providing clear guidance on:
  • the nature of “dependency”; and
  • the limits on evidential burdens in Reg. 5 decisions.
• signals that courts will not shy away from quashing decisions, even under the high O’Keeffe/Keegan threshold, where:
  • key evidence (such as affidavits on absence of income) is effectively ignored; or
  • the evidential standard strays into the “excessively burdensome” territory forbidden by EU law.
• clarifies that reliance on emotional or social ties language drawn from Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence is inappropriate in the context of Article 3(2) dependency assessments.

As such, Alauddin is likely to be frequently cited in future judicial reviews challenging refusals of dependency-based EU residence or visa applications, particularly where applicants complain of unrealistic evidential expectations.

8. Conclusion – Key Takeaways

Alauddin & Ors v Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 613 is an important judgment that refines and reinforces the principles governing dependency assessments under Article 3(2) of the Citizens’ Directive and Regulation 5 of the 2015 Regulations.

The most significant points are:

1. Dependency remains a question of material support: The decision reaffirms that dependency is about real, concrete financial support for essential needs, assessed in light of the applicant’s financial and social conditions. There is no free-standing concept of “social dependency” detached from material support.
2. No “emotional ties” hurdle: It is an error of law to require “more than normal emotional ties” as an additional hurdle. Such language belongs, if at all, to Article 8 ECHR family life analyses, not to Article 3(2) EU free movement dependency determinations.
3. Educational expenses can support dependency, but are fact-sensitive: Payment of full-time educational fees can, in principle, constitute essential support sufficient to establish dependency, but whether it does so in a particular case remains a matter of fact for the decision-maker, properly applying the law.
4. Reasonable evidential burden, not forensic accounting: The Minister may require serious documentation, but cannot demand an impossible “chain of evidence” linking every remittance to every cash purchase. That is incompatible with the requirement not to impose an “excessively burdensome” obligation on applicants.
5. Sworn evidence on negative facts cannot be brushed aside: Where applicants consistently swear (supported by other family members and bank records) that they have no other income, the Minister must either accept that evidence or explain clearly and rationally why it is rejected. Simply asserting the absence of evidence, when such affidavits exist, is unlawful.
6. High deference, but real scrutiny: Even under the O’Keeffe/Keegan standard, the High Court will quash immigration decisions that:
   • misapply the legal test;
   • ignore key evidence; or
   • impose evidential burdens inconsistent with EU law.

In sum, Alauddin sharpens the legal boundaries around dependency-based EU family applications in Ireland: it protects the State’s legitimate interest in preventing abuse and requiring coherent proof, while equally insisting that applicants must not be set up to fail by unrealistic evidential standards or misdirected legal tests. It will likely serve as an important reference point in both administrative practice and litigation in the area of EU free movement and extended family reunification.