No Constitutional Right to Fictitious Identity Documents and Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value (Not a Stand‑Alone Right)

Commentary on Doe & ors v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána & ors [2025] IESC 44

1. Introduction

This Supreme Court decision in Doe & ors v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána & ors ([2025] IESC 44) addresses two distinct but closely related constitutional themes:

The limits of any constitutional entitlement to obtain new identity documents that are factually inaccurate, and
The status of human dignity in Irish constitutional law: whether it is a constitutional value, a stand‑alone right, or both.

The plaintiffs (the “Doe” family) sought to compel the State to issue birth (and related) certificates in assumed names, different from the names correctly recorded in the official register of births maintained under the Civil Registration Act 2004. While the reasons for the assumed names are not spelled out in the Collins J judgment, he expressly acknowledges that the appellants have “perfectly understandable reasons” for wishing to conceal, rather than reveal, their original identities.

The Supreme Court (O’Donnell C.J., Charleton J., Hogan J., Collins J., Donnelly J.) unanimously dismissed the appeal. The principal judgment is by the Chief Justice; the text provided is a substantial concurring judgment of Collins J, who agrees in the result and offers a detailed exposition of:

The nature of the constitutional right to identity,
The public interest in the integrity of civil registration, and
The conceptual status of human dignity in the Irish constitutional order.

In doing so, the Court refines and clarifies strands of jurisprudence running from Caldaras and Habte (on identity and official records) through Simpson, NHV, and Quinn’s Supermarket (on dignity and equality), while also engaging with European and international law jurisprudence such as Goodwin v UK.

2. Factual and Procedural Background (Reconstructed from the Judgment)

From the passages of Collins J’s judgment, the factual skeleton can be reconstructed as follows:

The appellants are a family unit (parents and children) who now live under assumed names.
The register of births correctly records the appellants’ original names. There is no allegation that the register contains any factual error.
The appellants sought to require the State (through the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, the Minister for Justice and Equality, Ireland, and the Attorney General) to issue:
- Birth certificates for each family member reflecting their assumed names, and
- It appears also a marriage certificate in the assumed name(s) of the parents.
Their case was framed in constitutional terms, invoking:
- A right to identity (relying in part on Caldaras and Habte), and
- A right to life under Article 40.3, on the basis that not having such documents left them exposed to danger.

The High Court and Court of Appeal rejected these claims. Before the Supreme Court, the appeal focused on:

Whether the Constitution confers a right to require the State to issue new, inaccurate identity documents (i.e. in assumed rather than birth names) where the civil register is already factually correct; and
Whether, in the circumstances of this case, Article 40.3 (protection of life and person) can stretch so far as to oblige the State to issue fictitious identity documents to protect the appellants’ safety.

Collins J agrees with the Chief Justice that neither contention can succeed on the facts, and takes the opportunity to articulate the framework within which “identity” and “dignity” operate in Irish constitutional law.

3. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

3.1 Outcome

The appeal was dismissed.
The State is not constitutionally obliged to issue birth or other identity documents that record inaccurate particulars where the register itself is accurate.
The right to identity, as understood in prior case law, was held not to be engaged by a request to create fictitious records.
The evidence did not establish that the refusal to issue such documents placed the appellants’ lives in danger. Therefore, the Court did not need to decide whether Article 40.3 could ever require the issuing of fictitious identity documents.
Human dignity is confirmed as a constitutional value of central importance, informing and animating the interpretation of explicit rights, but not as a free‑standing “right to dignity” enforceable in itself.

3.2 Key Legal Holdings

No right to inaccurate identity documents:
- The Caldaras/Habte line of authority protects a person’s right to have their authentic identity accurately recorded in official documents.
- That right cannot be inverted into a right to have the State conceal or falsify one’s identity by issuing inaccurate documents.
Right to identity is grounded in enumerated rights:
- The Court expressly locates “identity” as an inherent aspect of a cluster of explicit rights in the Constitution – including:
  - Article 40.1 (equality before the law),
  - Article 40.3.2º (protection of the person), and
  - Article 40.3.2º (right to good name).
- There is “no need to dive into the murky waters of unenumerated rights” to find a right to identity.
Human dignity: value not stand‑alone right:
- Dignity, referred to in the Preamble, is a foundational constitutional value.
- It underpins and informs the interpretation of enumerated rights, particularly equality and the protection of the person.
- But the Court finds no basis in the text or case law for a free‑standing constitutional right to dignity as such.
Right to life argument fails on evidential grounds:
- To succeed, the appellants would have needed cogent evidence that the lack of fictitious identity documents placed them in real danger or significantly increased an existing danger.
- On the evidence, that threshold was not met.
- Accordingly, the Court leaves for another day the difficult question of whether Article 40.3 could ever require the State to issue fictitious identity documents to protect life.

4. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.1 Integrity of the Civil Registration System

The starting point of the Court’s reasoning is the nature and purpose of the civil registration system. Collins J relies on two key strands:

Foy v An tArd-Chláraitheoir:
- McKechnie J described the birth register as capturing “the fact and event of birth”; it records an “historical fact” and is “intended to be a document of current identity” (§84(8)).
- That dual function (historical record and current identifier) drives the Court’s view that the register and the certificates derived from it must be accurate.
Chesnokov v An tArd Chláraitheoir:
- Irvine J (as she then was) stressed that the register of births must be of the “utmost integrity” (§21).
- Collins J endorses that approach, describing a “manifest and compelling public interest” in maintaining an accurate civil register (births, marriages, deaths).

Within this framework, the Court draws a sharp line between:

Rectifying inaccuracies (as in Caldaras and Habte) – which goes to ensuring the register remains factually correct; and
Creating deliberate inaccuracies (as sought by the Does) – which would undermine the historical accuracy and integrity of the system.

The appellants’ existing entries are accepted to be accurate. Their complaint is not that the State has misrecorded their identity, but that it is too accurate for their current needs, which include concealing their past identities. As Collins J puts it, their birth certificates “all too accurately record their true identity”.

Accordingly, the civil registration system – both as conceived domestically and as recognised in Goodwin v UK – provides strong normative reasons not to issue documents that are knowingly false.

4.2 The Right to Identity: Proper Scope

The appellants relied on Caldaras and Habte, where the courts recognised a “right to identity” in circumstances where State records were wrong. Collins J carefully distinguishes those cases.

4.2.1 Caldaras and Habte revisited

Caldaras v An tArd Chláraitheoir:
- The applicant’s name was incorrectly recorded on her daughter’s birth registration and certificate.
- The High Court required rectification so that the official record matched reality.
Habte v Minister for Justice and Equality:
- The applicant’s naturalisation certificate recorded the wrong date of birth.
- Rectification was ordered – again to ensure factual accuracy of State documentation.

In those cases, the right to identity functioned as a guarantee that the State would not misrepresent who a person is in public records. It was about:

Having one’s authentic particulars correctly recorded and recognised by the State; and
Being able to present oneself to third parties through official documents that are truthful.

In Doe, Collins J insists this line of authority cannot be inverted into a right to compel the State to falsify or conceal an identity:

“Whatever the source and scope of the right to identity recognised in Caldaras and Habte … it would be to turn that right on its head to permit its invocation in circumstances where the Appellants' essential complaint is that their birth certificates all too accurately record their true identity … A right … to have one's authentic name and civil registration details recorded and recognised by the State … simply will not do duty for the Appellants here.” (§3)

Thus, doctrinally, the Court clarifies that:

The constitutional right to identity is a right to accuracy, not a right to alter or obscure accurate identity records.
Requests for protection or secrecy of identity, even if entirely understandable, must be justified (if at all) on some other constitutional or statutory basis – not on the “right to identity” itself.

4.2.2 Source of the Right to Identity in the Constitution

Collins J then addresses a more abstract question: where does the right to identity sit in the constitutional architecture?

He rejects the need to invoke unenumerated rights:

“As to the source of the right to an identity, there is no need to dive into the murky waters of unenumerated rights to locate such a right.” (§8)

Instead, he explains that identity is an “essential aspect” of several enumerated rights:

Article 40.1 – Equality before the law:
- Participation as an equal person in the constitutional community presupposes recognition as a person.
Article 40.3.2º – Protection of the person:
- “Protection of the person” has long been interpreted to include aspects of privacy, bodily integrity and autonomy.
- Identity is intertwined with these personal rights.
Article 40.3.2º – Right to good name:
- Collins J notes this right is likely broader than mere defamation protection.
- It is “arguably concerned with the protection of a person's place and reputation in civil society, which in turn necessarily implies a right to a social identity that the State must seek to protect.” (§8)

He emphasises that “recognition as a person – recognition of one's personal and civil/social identity – is essential if persons are to participate as equals in the free and democratic social and political community envisaged by the Constitution.” (§8) Hogan J is quoted with approval: it is “impossible to function in a modern society without a name and identity.”

This is a critical doctrinal clarification: the right to identity is not a freestanding, unwritten right hovering above the text, but a necessary aspect of the Constitution’s existing rights framework.

4.3 Human Dignity: Value vs Right

4.3.1 Dignity in the Irish constitutional tradition

Collins J offers a major exposition of human dignity in Irish constitutional law:

The Preamble “articulates” the constitutional commitment to “the dignity and freedom of the individual” (§9).
He notes that the 1937 Constitution was, in this respect, ahead of post‑war international human rights instruments that later foreground dignity (e.g. UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR).
Drawing on Binchy, he observes that dignity has been the “normative driving force” of human rights developments for decades.

Building on Simpson v Governor of Mountjoy Prison and NHV v Minister for Justice and Equality, Collins J reiterates core points:

Constitutional personhood implies each individual has “intrinsic worth which is to be respected and protected by others and by the State” (§10).
The Constitution “is set” on the “essential equality of the human person” (NHV, per O’Donnell J).
Dignity is the value underpinning this “radical equality” (Quinn’s Supermarket).

4.3.2 Dignity as value, not stand‑alone right

Despite the centrality of dignity, Collins J is clear: dignity is a value rather than a free‑standing, justiciable constitutional right. This follows the approach in Simpson, where:

MacMenamin J described dignity as “a value which underlies all fundamental rights, especially that of equality before the law” (§12 summarising Simpson).
O’Donnell J emphasised that the fundamental rights provisions exist “so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured” (§13).

Collins J observes that in comparative law (Canada, certain European jurisdictions), dignity is often the guiding value in interpreting rights, without being itself a freestanding right. He refers to:

Canada – in Blencoe, dignity is an “essential value” guiding interpretation of the Charter, not a standalone guarantee.
Germany and the EU Charter – where dignity is articulated as an “inviolable” or “absolute” right, yet in practice its scope is relatively narrow and most rights‑protection work is done by more specific rights (Article 1 Basic Law, Article 1 EU Charter).

After reviewing academic debates (e.g. O’Mahony, McCrudden, Barak), Collins J concludes:

Textual basis:
- Dignity appears in the Preamble only, not in a rights‑conferring provision.
- The framers used the language of “rights” elsewhere when they intended to do so. The omission in relation to dignity seems deliberate.
Derived rights doctrine:
- Under Friends of the Irish Environment, a “derived right” must be logically necessary to render an express right effective.
- Dignity functions more as a “springboard” from which rights may be derived than as something from which a further right is itself derived (§16).
Case law usage:
- References to “dignity rights” in cases such as In re a Ward of Court and People (DPP) v AM are better understood as shorthand for the application of known rights (bodily integrity, privacy, autonomy) in a dignity‑sensitive way.
- They do not require or imply that there exists a freestanding right “to dignity”.

He encapsulates the position as follows:

“Simpson is, in my view, the clearest and most authoritative statement of the place – the central place – of human dignity in our constitutional order, as a fundamental value that should enliven and inform the interpretation and application of the personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution … but that does not involve or require the recognition of a right to dignity as a justiciable standalone constitutional right.” (§17)

Importantly, Collins J acknowledges that whether dignity might in future be understood as both value and right is a question that “may well come before the courts” (§18). But for now, the Court’s clear ratio is that dignity is a value, not a free‑standing right.

4.4 Interaction with Article 8 ECHR and Goodwin v UK

Turning to European human rights law, Collins J examines Goodwin v United Kingdom (transgender recognition).

In Goodwin, the ECtHR accepted the importance of historical accuracy in birth registers, noting that the creation of exceptions could undermine the “essential function” of the system (§86).
Nonetheless, the Court held that respect for private life under Article 8, informed by “respect for human dignity and human freedom”, may require adjustments to such registers to enable individuals “to live in dignity and worth in accordance with the sexual identity chosen by them at great personal costs” (§90–91).

Collins J accepts that some derogation from strict historicity in registration may be necessary to accommodate fundamental aspects of a person’s identity (e.g. gender identity), as reflected in Goodwin and now in domestic legislation (e.g. the Gender Recognition Act).

However, he stresses that nothing comparable arises in the Does’ case:

The appellants’ complaint concerns concealment of their true identity, not recognition of a deeply rooted aspect of their personal identity (such as gender).
The refusal to issue certificates in assumed names does not “strike at fundamental aspects of ‘their identity as individual human beings’ or … their ‘sense of themselves’” (§5).
Even if the Constitution’s protection were co‑extensive with Article 8 in this field (a point assumed, not decided), Goodwin “does not avail the Appellants”.

Thus, the judgment:
(1) acknowledges the legitimacy of carefully delimited exceptions to the historical accuracy of civil registers in extreme identity cases; but
(2) insists that the appellants’ situation falls well outside this category.

4.5 The Right to Life and Positive Obligations

In paragraph 7, Collins J recognises that the appellants’ “only plausible argument” is that the refusal to issue fictitious documents violates their right to life under Article 40.3.

He addresses this with care:

He accepts that, “had there been cogent evidence” that the appellants were placed in danger, the Court would have had to confront the question whether Article 40.3 could impose a positive obligation to issue fictitious identity documents.
This would raise a profound issue: whether the Constitution can ever require the State to depart from factual accuracy in core public registers in order to protect life.
However, he concludes that the evidence falls “a long way short” of showing that the unavailability of such documents “has put them in danger (or in greater danger than might otherwise be the case).”

Thus, the Court postpones the substantive doctrinal question and decides the issue purely on evidential grounds. This is significant. The door is not definitively shut on the idea that, in an extreme case with compelling evidence, Article 40.3 might require extraordinary identity‑protection measures. But Doe does make clear that the threshold of proof for such a claim would be very high.

5. Precedents and Authorities Cited – Their Role in the Judgment

5.1 Domestic Case Law on Identity and Registration

Caldaras v An tArd Chláraitheoir [2013] IEHC 275; [2013] 3 IR 310:
- Right to identity used to justify correction of an inaccurate birth entry.
- Influence in Doe: establishes the principle that identity requires accurate recording; Doe clarifies that this cannot justify deliberate inaccuracy.
Habte v Minister for Justice and Equality [2019] IEHC 47; [2020] IECA 22; [2021] 3 IR 627:
- Right to identity and fair procedures required correction of an incorrect naturalisation certificate.
- Influence: same as above; Doe narrows and properly characterises Habte as about accuracy, not about a right to assume a new identity.
Foy v An tArd-Chláraitheoir [2007] IEHC 470; [2012] 2 IR 1:
- On transgender recognition; McKechnie J’s characterisation of birth registration as a record of historical fact and current identity is used by Collins J to explain the nature of the registration system.
Chesnokov v An tArd Chláraitheoir [2017] IECA 19:
- Stresses the “utmost integrity” of the birth register.
- Influence: helps underpin the strong public interest against issuing fictitious documents.

5.2 Domestic Case Law on Dignity, Equality and Personal Rights

Simpson v Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2019] IESC 81; [2020] 3 IR 113:
- Key authority on human dignity as a constitutional value, tied closely to “constitutional personhood”.
- Influence: Collins J uses Simpson as the central anchor for the proposition that dignity is not a freestanding right but a value that informs rights.
NHV v Minister for Justice and Equality [2017] IESC 35; [2018] 1 IR 246:
- Re‑emphasised the “essential equality of the human person” and “radical equality” as core constitutional commitments.
- Influence: supports the linkage between dignity, equality (Article 40.1) and personhood.
Quinn’s Supermarket v Attorney General [1972] IR 1:
- Walsh J characterised Article 40.1 as guaranteeing equality “as human persons”, connected to their inherent dignity.
- Influence: early affirmation of dignity as foundational value, corrected in NHV after a period during which 40.1 was given a very narrow effect.
In re a Ward of Court (No 2) [1996] 2 IR 79:
- Landmark case on treatment of incapacitated persons and withdrawal of medical treatment.
- Influence: often cited for “dignity” in the context of bodily integrity and autonomy; in Doe, Collins J treats references to dignity here as referring to the way existing rights (bodily integrity, privacy, autonomy) are applied.
People (DPP) v AM [2025] IESC 16:
- Recent judgment of Collins J on the rights of complainants in criminal trials.
- Influence: again, he recharacterises “dignity rights” there as manifestations of privacy and bodily integrity.
Friends of the Irish Environment v Government of Ireland [2020] IESC 49; [2021] 3 IR 1:
- Clarified the doctrine of unenumerated/derived rights and cautioned against expansive judicial creation of new rights.
- Influence: Collins J uses this reasoning to argue that dignity cannot readily be treated as a derived right.
Fox v Minister for Justice and Equality [2021] IESC 61; [2022] 3 IR 221:
- Clarke C.J. had discussed dignity as foundational, used as a springboard for rights.
- Influence: Collins J aligns with this view, rejecting dignity as a derived right in its own name.

5.3 European and International Sources

Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18:
- ECtHR recognised that Article 8 requires States to legally recognise the gender identity of transgender persons, even if this modifies historical records.
- Influence: used by Collins J to show that exceptions to the historicity of registers are sometimes required, but only in cases where core identity and dignity are at stake.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ICCPR, ICESCR:
- Referenced to situate dignity within the international human rights tradition.
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 1 – Human dignity)
Germany’s Basic Law (Article 1(1) – Human dignity as inviolable):
- Cited mainly through secondary literature (Barak, Poscher) to illustrate how dignity can be both a foundational value and an explicit right, but that such an approach is not lightly to be inferred in Ireland given different constitutional text.
Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission) [2000] 2 SCR 307:
- Canadian authority: dignity as an essential interpretive value, but not a freestanding right.

6. Key Legal Concepts Explained (In Plain Language)

6.1 “Right to Identity”

In Irish constitutional law (as clarified by Doe), “right to identity” means, at minimum:

You have a right to:
- Know who you are in legal terms (your name, parentage, birth details, etc.), and
- Have the State record and recognise truthful, accurate information about you.
The State should not:
- Misidentify you in official registers, or
- Prevent you from establishing your true identity to others via official documents.

It does not entail:

A right to force the State to:
- Rewrite accurate historical records, or
- Issue documents that knowingly give false identity information.

6.2 Human Dignity: Value vs Right

A constitutional value is a core principle that guides how we interpret and apply rights (e.g. dignity, democracy, the common good). A right is a specific entitlement that an individual can invoke directly in court (e.g. right to vote, right to bodily integrity).

Dignity as value:
- Courts interpret rights like equality, privacy, bodily integrity in a way that respects human dignity.
- For example, the right not to be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment is interpreted in a dignity‑enhancing way.
Not a stand‑alone right (as per Doe):
- You cannot simply say “my right to dignity is breached” without tying that claim to some specific, recognised right (such as privacy, bodily integrity, equality, fair trial, etc.).

6.3 Enumerated vs Unenumerated (or “Derived”) Rights

Enumerated rights:
- Rights expressly set out in the Constitution, e.g.:
  - Article 40.1 – equality,
  - Article 40.3 – protection of person,
  - Article 40.3.2º – good name,
  - Article 40.3.3º (now repealed), etc.
Unenumerated/derived rights:
- Rights inferred by the courts as implicit in the Constitution’s structure and values (e.g. early recognition of a right to marital privacy).
- Friends of the Irish Environment restricts this approach, requiring a tight connection between any derived right and explicit text.

In Doe, Collins J emphasises that:

The right to identity can be located within enumerated rights (equality, person, good name), so there is no need to treat it as unenumerated.
Dignity is a value that helps interpret those enumerated rights, but is not itself a new derived right.

6.4 Positive Obligations under the Right to Life

A negative obligation is a duty for the State not** to do something (e.g. not to arbitrarily kill). A positive obligation is a duty to act (e.g. to protect a person at risk).

Article 40.3 protects life and the person. In some circumstances, it may impose positive duties on the State (e.g. to investigate threats, to provide basic safety). In Doe, the question (left open) is whether this could go so far as to require the State to:

Issue fictitious identity documents as a protective measure.

The Supreme Court does not decide this difficult question, because on the facts the appellants failed to show a sufficiently concrete threat to life arising from the State’s refusal.

7. Impact and Future Significance

7.1 Clarifying the Scope of the Right to Identity

Doe provides a crisp doctrinal clarification:

The right to identity:

Protects factual accuracy in official records about who you are; but

Does not entitle you to State‑sponsored concealment or re‑invention of that history.

This will have concrete implications for:

Future challenges seeking to alter accurate birth, marriage or death records for reasons unrelated to an error or to core aspects of identity (e.g. safety, social preference, reputational concerns).

How courts deal with identity issues in contexts like:

Witness protection schemes,

Victims of domestic violence seeking anonymity,

Persons changing names for personal reasons.

The judgment signals that while such individuals’ interests may be compelling, the Constitution does not, of itself, mandate the issuing of inaccurate civil status documents. If such measures are to be available, they will typically have to rest on legislation (e.g. statutory frameworks for protected identities) rather than on a right to identity.

7.2 Re‑anchoring Identity in Enumerated Rights

By explicitly grounding identity in Articles 40.1 and 40.3, the Court:

Continues the post‑Friends of the Irish Environment trend of curtailing unenumerated rights discourse and insisting that new rights claims be firmly tied to the text;

Makes future identity‑based claims more likely to be framed as:

Equality claims (discriminatory treatment of certain identities);

Good name claims (misrepresentation of one’s social identity);

Protection of person claims (privacy, bodily integrity, autonomy of how one presents oneself).

7.3 Consolidating the Status of Human Dignity

Doe is an important waypoint in the development of Irish dignity jurisprudence. It:

Confirms dignity’s central place as a constitutional value;

Rejects (for now) the existence of a free‑standing right to dignity;

Aligns Irish law with jurisdictions (such as Canada) where dignity is the lodestar for rights interpretation but not directly enforceable in its own name.

For litigants and counsel, this means:

Dignity arguments will remain powerful as context for interpreting and applying specific rights;

But a bare plea of “violation of dignity” will not be sufficient; it must be connected to an identifiable, established right.

7.4 The Unanswered Question: Fictitious Documents to Protect Life?

One of the most intriguing aspects of the judgment is what it does not decide. Collins J expressly contemplates that in a case with strong evidence of danger, the Court might have to ask:

“whether the undoubted duties of the State under Article 40.3 of the Constitution could extend to the obligation asserted here — an obligation to issue fictitious identity documents.” (§7)

Although this question is left open, the reference is significant:

It acknowledges that constitutional rights, including the right to life, can sometimes justify extraordinary measures.

It is implicitly attentive to contexts like:

Witness protection,

Threats from organised crime or terrorism,

Extreme domestic violence scenarios.

If a future case presents compelling evidence that the absence of protective identity documents places someone in grave danger, the courts may have to balance:

The integrity of public records, and

The State’s positive obligations to protect life.

Doe therefore sets a high evidential bar but does not foreclose a more radical constitutional remedy in an extreme case.

7.5 Legislative and Policy Implications

Beyond the courtroom, Doe has broader policy resonance:

It implicitly invites the Oireachtas to consider:

Whether and how to provide structured mechanisms (with robust safeguards) for the creation of protected or alternative identities in cases of genuine risk.

It reinforces that any such system must:

Minimise harm to the integrity of the civil registration system;

Be carefully tailored to necessity and proportionality;

Be grounded in clear legislative authority, not in constitutional compulsion to falsify official records.

8. Conclusion: The Significance of Doe in the Constitutional Landscape

Doe & ors v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána & ors is a significant decision at the intersection of identity, dignity and the integrity of official records.

The key takeaways can be summarised as follows:

No constitutional right to fictitious identity documents:

The Constitution does not grant individuals a right to compel the State to issue documents that knowingly misstate their birth names or other core particulars where the register itself is accurate.

The right to identity protects accuracy, not State‑facilitated concealment or re‑invention.

Right to identity rooted in enumerated rights:

Identity is an “essential aspect” of explicit rights: equality (40.1), protection of the person, and good name (40.3.2º).

This clarifies and stabilises the doctrinal basis for identity‑related claims in Irish law.

Human dignity reaffirmed as foundational value, not stand‑alone right:

Dignity is central to the Constitution’s normative structure and crucial to interpreting all personal rights.

But there is “no basis” in the text or authorities for treating it as a self‑standing, justiciable right at this stage.

This aligns Irish doctrine with the direction signposted in Simpson and with comparative approaches such as Canada’s.

Article 8 ECHR and Goodwin distinguished:

While the Court recognises that respect for dignity may require limited derogations from the historicity of birth records (e.g. transgender recognition),

The appellants’ desire to conceal their identity does not implicate the same core aspects of personal identity or “sense of self”.

Positive obligations under the right to life left open:

The Court does not rule out the possibility that, in an extreme case backed by cogent evidence, Article 40.3 might support exceptional protective measures affecting identity documentation.

However, on the facts of Doe the evidence was insufficient; thus, no such obligation arises.

In essence, Doe is not only about a specific family’s request for documentation under assumed names. It is a careful reaffirmation of first principles: that the State’s recognition of who we are must be anchored in truth; that our legal system’s respect for human dignity is real and central, but mediated through concrete rights; and that the integrity of civil registers is itself a vital public good, not lightly to be compromised, even in the face of understandable individual hardship.

Future litigation on identity, anonymity and protective documentation will now have to proceed against the backdrop of this judgment. Any effort to press the Constitution into service as a mechanism for formal identity reconstruction will have to engage with the twin pillars erected here: the truth‑seeking function of civil registration, and the value‑driven but non‑freestanding role of human dignity in Irish constitutional adjudication.

No Constitutional Right to Fictitious Identity Documents & Human Dignity as Value: Commentary on Doe & ors v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2025] IESC 44