Introduction

This decision addresses sentencing for online instigation of violent disorder and criminal damage under section 46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (SCA 2007) in the aftermath of the Southport stabbings of 29 July 2024. The applicant, a 39-year-old taxi driver with no previous convictions, pleaded guilty to one count of intentionally encouraging or assisting the commission of offences (s.46, count 2) and one count of possessing a bladed article (s.139 Criminal Justice Act 1988, count 3). He was sentenced in the Crown Court at Liverpool to seven years and six months’ imprisonment on count 2 and a concurrent six months on count 3.

On a renewed application referred by the Registrar, he challenged the total sentence as manifestly excessive, contending (i) that the pre-discount sentence was set too close to the statutory maximum, and (ii) that he received insufficient credit for his guilty plea. The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds and refused leave.

The judgment is significant for crystallising how courts assess the seriousness of online encouragement that contributes to widespread public disorder: the absence of a direct causal link to a specific act of damage is not mitigating; to the contrary, where the offending facilitates multiple incidents across multiple locations, a sentence approaching the statutory maximum may be warranted. It also reinforces orthodox principles on guilty plea credit in circumstances where the offender delays pleas and continues to contest material facts.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Court affirmed a sentence of seven years and six months’ imprisonment for s.46 SCA 2007 offending, with a concurrent six months for the knife offence, holding that the overall sentence was not excessive.
• Key factual findings included the applicant’s prominent role as administrator of a Telegram channel “Southport Wake Up,” rapid mobilisation posts urging non-peaceful protests at mosques, racially hostile messaging (including “Death to traitors”), and cross-posting to extremist channels, all in the immediate wake of highly publicised killings.
• Impact statements evidenced extensive public harm: over 90 police officers injured, daily redeployment of 75–125 officers, serious strain on resources, and community harm in Sefton.
• For sentencing, the judge analogised to Sentencing Council guidelines for violent disorder and criminal damage, found highest culpability and harm factors engaged, and identified statutory aggravation for racial hostility and offending against emergency workers.
• The absence of a direct link to a particular criminal act did not reduce seriousness; rather, the wide-scale, multi-location encouragement aggravated the case beyond a single-specified offence of criminal damage or violent disorder.
• The maximum sentence on count 2 was 10 years, reflecting the maximum for criminal damage. A pre-discount sentence of nine years was appropriate given the breadth and gravity of the offending; a one-sixth reduction for a late guilty plea was within the judge’s discretion.
• Application for leave to appeal refused: no arguable excess in total sentence, nor error in approach or credit.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The sentencing judge, and the Court of Appeal, anchored their reasoning in two key authorities:

1. R v Blackshaw and Others [2011] EWCA Crim 2312:
   This seminal authority from the 2011 riots affirms that in cases of serious public disorder, immediate and severe sentences serve both punishment and deterrence. The present Court explicitly applied Blackshaw’s deterrence rationale to the Southport-related unrest: the systemic nature of the disorder, the assault on public order, and the strain on policing resources justify robust sentencing. Blackshaw thus functions as a touchstone whenever public order collapses in multiple locales and messaging accelerates or sustains that collapse.
2. R v Cush and Others [2024] EWCA Crim 1382:
   The Lady Chief Justice’s contextual statement on the late July–August 2024 disturbances framed the immediate social landscape: violence, misinformation, and far-right sentiment translated into attacks on mosques and properties, significant damage, and injuries to police. Quoting Cush allowed the judge to situate McIntyre within an ongoing national phenomenon and to highlight the catalytic role of misinformation. Cush thus underpinned the assessment of harm, scale, and the imperative for deterrent sentencing in the wake of the Southport tragedy.

In addition, the Court referred to:

• Sentencing Council General Guideline (offence seriousness, aggravation/mitigation, totality);
• Reduction in sentence for a guilty plea guideline (sliding scale credit tied to plea timing and conduct);
• Analogous guidelines for violent disorder and criminal damage (used to structure culpability and harm in the absence of an offence-specific guideline for s.46).

Legal Reasoning

1) Nature of the s.46 Offending and the “No Direct Link” Principle

The central doctrinal move is at [33]: the Court accepts that “no direct link was shown between the applicant’s online postings and any specific act of damage,” but holds that this does not assist the applicant. The reason is twofold:

• Section 46 SCA 2007 criminalises the intentional encouragement or assistance of offences. The offence is complete without proving that a specific offence occurred because of the encouragement (or even that any offence was committed). Causation to a particular incident is therefore not an element.
• Where the encouragement deliberately targets multiple offences, across multiple locations, over a sustained period—and successfully contributes to widespread unrest—the gravity eclipses that of a single-instance, directly-linked encouragement. The Court emphasises the scale, replication, and escalation of disorder, and the applicant’s active and prominent role in that process.

This is the judgment’s key contribution: in sentencing under s.46 for online incitement amid civil unrest, a lack of direct causation to a particular offence is not mitigation; where circumstances show multi-location, repeated, and racially hostile encouragement, that absence may be neutral or even aggravating relative to a single-incident case.

2) Analogy to Violent Disorder and Criminal Damage Guidelines

Because there is no dedicated Sentencing Council guideline for s.46, the judge drew on analogous guidelines for violent disorder and criminal damage to structure culpability and harm. The Court of Appeal endorsed this approach ([22]–[23], [33]) and accepted that all highest level factors were present:

• High culpability: leadership role (channel administrator), persistence, deliberate and provocative messaging (including warnings to police and “fire” emojis indicating anticipated violence), and cross-posting to extremist sites.
• Greatest harm: widespread public disorder, police injuries (90+ officers), resource diversion, property damage, and community trauma.

Beyond those analogies, the Court placed considerable weight on statutory aggravation:

• Racial hostility (recognized as an aggravating factor), explicitly found on the facts;
• Offending against emergency workers acting in the exercise of their functions (aggravating the seriousness where police were targeted/imperilled).

3) Statutory Maximum and Band Placement

The Court confirmed that the maximum sentence for the s.46 count was 10 years, reflecting the maximum for the underlying offence of criminal damage relied on for sentencing (violent disorder having a lower maximum). In evaluating overall seriousness, the trial judge set a pre-discount figure of nine years on count 2, placing the case “at the top of the range.” The Court upheld that assessment ([35], [38]), observing that “yet more serious offending” would generally involve other offences with a higher statutory maximum.

4) Concurrent Knife Offence and Totality

The knife in the car (count 3) was sentenced concurrently, but the Court emphasised that it increased the overall criminality and “had to be reflected in the sentence imposed on the lead offence (count 2)” ([37]). This is a straightforward application of the Totality principle: even where concurrent sentences are appropriate, the lead sentence may be adjusted to ensure the total reflects the entire criminality.

5) Guilty Plea Credit

On the Reduction in sentence for a guilty plea guideline, the Court endorsed a one-sixth reduction. The factors were:

• The applicant could have pleaded earlier to counts 2 and 3 irrespective of the unresolved count 1, which was later ordered to lie on the file. He chose not to ([39]).
• He continued to contest material aspects (e.g., denying he was the channel administrator; denying a racist motive) up to and including the sentencing hearing, abandoning positions late in the day ([17], [39]).
• Given the sliding scale, the judge was “clearly entitled” to give one-sixth rather than one-fifth or higher.

The Court also observed that the usual range discussed in practice—25% for a plea at the PTPH and 10% on the day of trial—framed the discretion here ([39]). The appellant’s tactical timing and late concessions were antithetical to maximum credit.

Impact and Prospective Significance

A. Sentencing of Online Encouragement in Civil Unrest

McIntyre will be read alongside Blackshaw and Cush as part of a coherent sentencing framework for disorder driven or amplified by online activity:

• No need for a specific causation link to one offence to justify a high sentence under s.46; multi-incident encouragement can attract near-maximum penalties.
• Scaling factors include leadership/administration of channels, geographic reach, temporal persistence, and cross-platform dissemination.
• Harm intensifiers will encompass injuries to police, community resource depletion, and reputational and cohesion harms captured via victim impact statements from public authorities.
• Racial hostility and targeting of emergency workers will be treated as serious aggravation.

B. Guideline-Analogy Method for s.46

In the absence of an offence-specific guideline for s.46 SCA 2007, McIntyre validates a structured analogy to violent disorder and criminal damage guidelines. Practitioners should expect:

• Highest culpability/harm brackets to be engaged where online conduct initiates or accelerates multiple disorder events;
• Statutory maximum set by the most serious relevant underlying offence (here, criminal damage at 10 years).

C. Guilty Plea Strategy

The Court’s approach sends a clear signal: defendants cannot justify delayed pleas to certain counts simply because a more serious count remains disputed. Earlier pleas to the counts that can be admitted will preserve credit. Continued factual contest and late concessions are a material brake on discount.

D. Evidential Themes for Future Prosecutions

• Digital trail and identity: use of pseudonyms, admin privileges, content style (including emojis and imagery) and refusals to disclose device access (e.g., PINs) may be synthesised to demonstrate intentional encouragement and awareness of likely violence.
• Victim/community impact statements from police chiefs and local authorities can persuasively demonstrate scale of harm, organisational strain, and community trauma.
• Concurrent weapons possession may significantly aggravate overall criminality even if sentenced concurrently.

E. Broader Policy Context

McIntyre consolidates the Court of Appeal’s readiness, in the post-2011 riots and 2024 civil disorder context, to deploy deterrent sentencing where online misinformation and extremist mobilisation threaten public order, community safety, and police welfare. It reinforces a robust line that speech acts crossing into intentional criminal encouragement attract heavy penalties, especially when racially charged and directed against places of worship and emergency workers.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Section 46 SCA 2007 (Intentionally encouraging or assisting the commission of offences): The offence is committed where a person intentionally does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of one or more offences, intending that the offence(s) be committed. It is not necessary to prove that any specific offence was in fact committed, nor to prove a direct causal link between the encouragement and a particular incident.
• “No direct link” point: In McIntyre, the defence argued there was no direct link between the posts and any specific act of damage. The Court held this does not reduce seriousness where the encouragement was aimed at multiple offences and contributed to widespread disorder; indeed, such breadth can make the case more serious than a single, directly linked incident.
• Aggravating factors: Racial hostility and offending against emergency workers increase seriousness. Courts look at motive and the practical effect on emergency services and public safety.
• Analogous guidelines: Where no offence-specific guideline exists, courts use analogies from related guidelines (here, violent disorder and criminal damage) to assess culpability and harm, then adjust within the statutory maximum of the relevant underlying offence.
• Totality and concurrency: Even if sentences run concurrently (at the same time), the judge must ensure the lead sentence reflects the total criminality. Additional offences (like possession of a knife) can justify a higher lead sentence notwithstanding concurrency.
• Guilty plea discount: Credit is awarded on a sliding scale; earlier pleas generally attract more credit. Delayed pleas and continued disputes of material facts reduce credit. In McIntyre, one-sixth was upheld due to late pleas and last-minute abandonment of contested points.
• “Lying on the file”: A count may be ordered to lie on the file on the usual terms—typically not to be proceeded with without leave of the court. This does not impede pleas to other counts and does not secure extra credit for delaying such pleas.

Conclusion

McIntyre [2025] EWCA Crim 1191 sets a clear and consequential marker for sentencing online encouragement of public disorder under s.46 SCA 2007. It clarifies that the absence of a direct causal link to a particular act of criminal damage or violent disorder is not a mitigating factor where the offender intentionally fosters multi-incident unrest across locations. Courts may properly employ analogous guidelines (violent disorder and criminal damage), find highest culpability and harm, and impose near-maximum sentences—especially where the conduct is racially hostile and endangers emergency workers.

The decision also reiterates disciplined application of the guilty plea guideline: defendants should enter timely pleas to counts that can properly be admitted, regardless of unresolved counts. Late pleas coupled with continued contesting of material facts will limit credit.

Read together with Blackshaw and Cush, McIntyre confirms robust appellate support for severe, deterrent sentencing in cases of digitally enabled civil disorder. For prosecutors, it offers a roadmap for presenting scale and harm (including organisational impact evidence). For defendants, it underscores the significant sentencing risks posed by leadership roles in online mobilisation and by aggravating features such as racial hostility and concurrent weapons possession.

Key Takeaways

• In s.46 online incitement cases, lack of a direct causation link to a specific offence does not reduce seriousness; breadth and replication of disorder increase it.
• Use analogous guidelines (violent disorder/criminal damage) to structure culpability/harm in s.46 sentencing, mindful of the statutory maximum tied to the underlying offence.
• Racial hostility and offending against emergency workers are potent aggravating factors.
• Concurrent weapons offences can and should be reflected in the lead sentence under totality.
• Guilty plea credit will be curtailed where pleas are late and key facts are contested until the last minute.
• Severe, deterrent sentences are justified for orchestrated online mobilisation that fuels widespread public disorder.