Mandatory Dog Destruction Absent Owner Evidence: Parsonage R v EWCA Crim 456

Introduction

This commentary examines the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Parsonage, R v [2025] EWCA Crim 456, involving a challenge to a dog destruction order under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1981 (as amended). The appellant, Mr Parsonage, pleaded guilty to an aggravated offence when his dog, Rocco, severely bit a member of the public. He was sentenced to a community order, five‐year disqualification from dog ownership and—mandatorily—destruction of Rocco. The key issue on appeal was whether the judge should have considered a contingent destruction order in place of immediate destruction, and whether fresh evidence could alter that outcome.

Parties:

Applicant/Appellant: Mr Parsonage, owner of Rocco.
Respondent: Crown Prosecution Service.
Judges: The Court of Appeal Criminal Division (Phillips LJ, Atkinson LJ, King J).

Summary of the Judgment

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding:

Under section 4(1)(a) of the Dangerous Dogs Act, destruction of a dog is mandatory following conviction for an aggravated offence unless evidence shows the dog poses no danger to public safety.
Mr Parsonage offered no evidence at sentencing to displace the mandatory order or to justify a contingent destruction order under section 4A(4).
The judge was not obliged to explore hypothetical alternatives when the owner provided no basis for them.
Fresh evidence from the applicant’s sister and Dog Legislation Officers was inadmissible or insufficient to alter the outcome: it either should have been tendered earlier or failed to demonstrate reduced risk.
The Court made several observations about poorly drafted legislation (section 4A(1)) and warned that owners cannot reserve contingent‐order arguments for appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

R v Flack [2008] EWCA Crim 204: Established that before ordering immediate destruction the sentencing court should consider a “contingent” (suspended) order under section 4A(4), specifying conditions (muzzling, lead, exclusions, neutering).
R (Killeen) v Birmingham Crown Court [2018] EWHC 174 (Admin): Summarised burden on owner to adduce evidence to displace the mandatory destruction order, including expert or lay evidence on dog’s character and behaviour.
R v Davies [2010] EWCA Crim 1923: Confirmed the burden of proof rests on the owner to show a contingent order will mitigate risk to acceptable levels.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in stages:

Statutory Framework – Sections 3, 4 and 4A
- Section 3(1): Owner guilty of aggravated offence if dog dangerously out of control and causes injury.
- Section 4(1)(a): Mandatory destruction post‐conviction for aggravated offence unless owner proves dog is not a danger to public safety (s 1A).
- Section 4A(4): Enables a court to make a contingent destruction order with specified control measures but only if invoked by the owner and supported by evidence.
Failure to Adduce Evidence at Sentencing

The judge explicitly invited submissions on a contingent order in September 2023, yet the applicant produced no expert reports, no lay testimonials, and no transfer of ownership. On the sentencing day, Mr Parsonage represented himself but still offered no alternative or evidence. Under Flack and Killeen, without evidence the judge was not required to explore a suspended order.
Rejection of Fresh Evidence on Appeal

Applying section 23(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, the Court held:
- The sister’s statements and Dog Legislation Officer’s report were credible but should have been produced pre‐sentencing.
- Evidence of five months’ peaceful behaviour under sister’s care did not outweigh three prior bites over four years and did not show the owner would relinquish contact or abide clear conditions.
- An email from another Officer was inadmissible (no statement of truth, unsupported assertions) and added nothing new.
Legislative Observations

The Court criticized section 4A(1) as badly drafted, potentially misleading by referencing aggravated offences among prohibited breeds provisions. It urged amendment to remove the meaningless cross‐reference.

Impact

This decision will shape future Dangerous Dogs Act cases by:

Emphasizing that the burden to displace mandatory destruction lies with the owner and must be discharged at the initial sentencing hearing.
Discouraging “back-door” contingent‐order arguments raised for the first time on appeal without prior evidence.
Encouraging prompt preparation of expert or lay evidence when seeking alternatives to destruction.
Highlighting the courts’ willingness to call out defective legislation and inviting reform.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Aggrevated Offence: Under s 3(1) of the Act, when a dangerously uncontrolled dog injures someone, the owner commits an aggravated offence.
Immediate vs Contingent Destruction:
- Immediate: Mandatory destruction once aggravated offence proven, unless owner shows dog poses no public danger.
- Contingent: A “suspended” destruction order (s 4A(4)) that comes into force if owner breaches specified control conditions (lead, muzzle, neuter, exclusions).
Newton Hearing: A short trial within sentencing to resolve disputed facts relevant to sentencing (e.g., which dog bit the complainant).
Fresh Evidence in Criminal Appeal: New evidence must be credible, likely to affect outcome, admissible originally, and explained why it was not tendered earlier.

Conclusion

Parsonage establishes a clear rule: where destruction of a dangerous dog is mandatory, an owner who wishes to avoid immediate destruction must adduce evidence and propose clear control measures at the original sentencing hearing. Absent such evidence, neither the judge nor an appellate court is obliged to invent hypothetical alternatives. This judgment reinforces the statutory scheme’s object—public safety—by placing the onus squarely on owners. It also exposes a legislative anomaly in section 4A(1) and signals the courts’ readiness to call for statutory reform. Practitioners must now ensure timely, robust evidence is assembled when seeking suspension of a destruction order.