Lloyd & Doran [2025] EWCA Crim 1565: Sentencing Attempted Domestic Burglary and Related Driving Offences – The Duty to Reflect Attempts and the Totality Principle
Case: R v Lloyd & Anor [2025] EWCA Crim 1565
Court: Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), England and Wales
Judgment date: 11 November 2025
Judge giving judgment: Murray J
1. Introduction
This appeal concerns the proper approach to sentencing repeat domestic burglars for a mixture of completed and attempted burglaries, combined with dangerous driving and aggravated vehicle taking, and the consequent calculation of driving disqualification periods.
The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v Lloyd & Doran [2025] EWCA Crim 1565 revisited sentences imposed on:
- Daniel Lloyd – sentenced to an aggregate term of 11 years’ imprisonment and a lengthy driving disqualification for:
- one dwelling burglary (count 1),
- two attempted dwelling burglaries (counts 5 and 6), and
- dangerous driving (count 7).
- Layton Doran – sentenced to 6 years 5 months’ imprisonment and a driving ban for:
- one attempted dwelling burglary (count 6), and
- aggravated vehicle taking (count 8).
Both appellants were experienced burglars with substantial relevant antecedents and were on licence at the time of the new offending. The case is important for three main reasons:
- It underlines that attempted domestic burglary must attract some reduction in sentence compared to a completed burglary, even in high culpability and high harm cases.
- It re‑emphasises the totality principle: even if individual sentences and their concurrent/consecutive ordering are justifiable, the overall term must not be disproportionate.
- It illustrates how the Court must recalibrate driving disqualification orders under sections 35A and 35B of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (“RTOA 1988”) when the custodial term is altered on appeal.
2. Factual and Procedural Background
2.1 The offending
The judgment deals with two short but serious episodes of offending.
(a) 28 August 2023 – burglary and attempted burglary (counts 1 and 5)
- Count 1 – completed dwelling burglary (Carberry) (paras 10–11):
- In the early hours (between about 1 and 2 am), Lloyd entered the home of Mr and Mrs Carberry while they and their young son slept.
- The back door lock barrel had been removed; the chain removed; an internal dining room door left ajar.
- Keys to the family’s Volkswagen Golf estate (worth about £36,000) were taken from a box in the hallway and the vehicle was stolen.
- Count 5 – attempted dwelling burglary (Kempley) (para 12):
- On the same night, at around 2.25 am, Mrs Kempley was woken by her dog barking.
- She discovered her patio door lock burned and hanging off; neighbours’ Ring doorbell footage showed a Volkswagen Golf estate passing and two persons (including Lloyd) walking up the side of her house.
- The Volkswagen was the car stolen from the Carberrys earlier that night.
(b) 26 September 2023 – attempted burglary and vehicle offences (counts 6–8)
- Count 6 – attempted dwelling burglary (Easto) (paras 13–15):
- About a month later, just before 11 pm, Ms Kelly Easto saw two masked men in her garden via CCTV (Lloyd and Lawrence); one had a rucksack, the other a cross‑body bag.
- They tried to gain access to the back door, then left around 11 pm. A child was present in the house.
- Doran was linked by DNA and further CCTV; the Crown’s case was that he acted as a lookout, fleeing nearby with Lawrence. Clothing and a balaclava with his DNA were found.
- Counts 7 and 8 – dangerous driving and aggravated vehicle taking (paras 16–18):
- About 10 minutes after the attempt on Ms Easto’s property, police located the stolen Golf, displaying cloned plates, with Lloyd driving and Doran and Lawrence as passengers.
- Lloyd drove through a closed exit on a roundabout, scattering barriers and cones, and ignored emergency lights.
- A stinger deflated both nearside tyres; Lloyd mounted the pavement and collided with a police car, then continued at speed before eventually stopping. All three men fled.
- The vehicle and area contained balaclavas with all three men’s DNA and extensive “burglary kit”: gloves, a signal jammer, drill, blow torch, screwdriver, bolt cutters, overshoes, number plates, and butane canisters.
2.2 Previous convictions and licence status
Lloyd (para 21):
- 20 previous convictions for 27 offences, including non‑domestic burglary and many dishonesty and driving offences.
- Significantly, a 2018 conspiracy to commit domestic burglary (with Doran as co‑defendant), for which he received 6 years 8 months’ custody.
- He was released (following recall) on 19 July 2023; the new offending began very shortly thereafter while he was on licence.
Doran (para 22):
- 10 previous convictions for 21 offences, including domestic burglary and the same 2018 conspiracy to commit domestic burglary.
- In the conspiracy, because of his youth, he received a two‑year detention and training order, but subsequently committed another domestic burglary (32 months’ imprisonment).
- He too was on licence at the time of the current offences. The sentencing judge noted he would have been a “third strike” burglar had count 6 been completed rather than attempted.
The sentencing judge described all three men as “experienced, determined, professional burglars”, a view significantly influenced by their history and the burglary paraphernalia found in the car (para 25).
2.3 Pleas and first instance sentences
- Lloyd (paras 1, 5–6):
- Pleaded guilty at a plea and trial preparation hearing (8 March 2024), four days before the original trial date:
- Count 1: burglary of a dwelling – 5 years’ imprisonment.
- Count 5: attempted burglary of a dwelling – 5 years’ imprisonment (concurrent with count 1).
- Count 6: attempted burglary of a dwelling – 5 years’ imprisonment (consecutive).
- Count 7: dangerous driving – 12 months’ imprisonment (consecutive).
- Total: 11 years’ imprisonment.
- Driving disqualification: 7 years 6 months (2‑year disqualification + 5½‑year “extension period”) plus extended test requirement (para 6).
- Pleaded guilty at a plea and trial preparation hearing (8 March 2024), four days before the original trial date:
- Doran (paras 2, 7–8):
- Pleaded guilty on 29 August 2024, before jury sworn:
- Count 6: attempted burglary of a dwelling – 5 years 4 months’ imprisonment.
- Count 8: aggravated vehicle taking – 13 months’ imprisonment (consecutive).
- Total: 6 years 5 months’ imprisonment, minus 203 days for time spent on a qualifying curfew (para 33, 36).
- Driving disqualification: 4 years 8½ months (18‑month disqualification + 3 years 2½ months extension) (para 8).
- Pleaded guilty on 29 August 2024, before jury sworn:
Both appellants obtained leave to appeal sentence (para 9).
3. Issues Before the Court of Appeal
The appeals focused not on guilt but on the length and structure of the sentences. The key issues were:
- Attempts vs completed offences: Did the judge err by refusing to reduce sentence for counts 5 and 6 on the basis that they were attempts, not completed burglaries?
- Totality: Was the global sentence on each appellant too long, even if individual sentences and the decision to make some counts consecutive were not wrong in principle?
- Concurrency and consecutivity:
- For Lloyd – should the dangerous driving sentence (count 7) have been consecutive?
- For Doran – should the aggravated vehicle taking (count 8) have been consecutive to the burglary attempt when both arose out of the same incident?
- Driving disqualification orders: What recalibration of driving bans was required under sections 35A and 35B of the RTOA 1988 once the custodial terms were reduced?
The appellants accepted that the judge’s categorisation of the offences per se under the Sentencing Council guidelines (domestic burglary; dangerous driving) was properly open to him, and that the principle of imposing some consecutive sentences was not mistaken (paras 37–38). Their challenge was to:
- the refusal to discount for attempts, and
- the resulting overall lengths, alleged to be manifestly excessive in light of totality.
4. Summary of the Judgment
The Court of Appeal agreed that the offences were “unpleasant” and that the appellants’ records and licence status greatly aggravated seriousness (para 40). Nonetheless, it held that the total sentences were too long.
4.1 Core holdings
- Attempts must be reflected:
- The sentencing judge ought to have taken account of the fact that counts 5 and 6 (for Lloyd) and count 6 (for Doran) were attempted burglaries, not completed ones (paras 41–42).
- While category A1 classification (high culpability, category 1 harm) was not faulted, some reduction for the lesser seriousness of attempts was required.
- Totality required reduction of the overall terms:
- For Lloyd, a total of 11 years was excessive; 9 years’ imprisonment was “sufficient to meet the justice of the case” (para 41).
- For Doran, 6 years 5 months was too high; 5 years was proportionate (para 42).
- Restructuring concurrency and consecutivity:
- The Court accepted concurrent sentences for offences an hour apart (counts 1 and 5) and consecutive sentencing for the later attempted burglary (count 6) (para 41).
- However, to respect totality, it:
- For Lloyd – made the dangerous driving sentence (count 7) concurrent with the attempted burglary (count 6) instead of consecutive (para 43).
- For Doran – directed that aggravated vehicle taking (count 8) run concurrently with the attempted burglary (count 6) (para 44), in light of their common factual background.
- Driving disqualifications recalculated:
- Both original disqualifications were quashed (para 45).
- New orders were made under RTOA 1988 ss 35A and 35B, taking account of the reduced custodial terms (para 46).
4.2 The revised sentences
Lloyd (para 43):
- Count 1 (completed burglary): 5 years’ imprisonment (unchanged).
- Counts 5 and 6 (attempted burglaries): 4 years’ imprisonment on each.
- Count 5 concurrent with count 1.
- Count 6 consecutive to count 1.
- Count 7 (dangerous driving): 12 months’ imprisonment, now concurrent with count 6.
- Total: 9 years’ imprisonment.
- Disqualification: 6 years 6 months, comprising:
- 2‑year discretionary ban;
- 6‑month extension under s 35A; and
- 4‑year uplift under s 35B;
Doran (para 44):
- Count 6 (attempted burglary): 5 years’ imprisonment, less 203 days for qualifying curfew time.
- Count 8 (aggravated vehicle taking): 12 months’ imprisonment, concurrent with count 6.
- Total: 5 years’ imprisonment (less 203 days) (para 44).
- Disqualification: 3 years and 263 days, comprising:
- 18‑month discretionary ban;
- 6‑month extension under s 35A; and
- 1 year and 263 days uplift under s 35B (para 46(b)).
5. Detailed Legal Analysis
5.1 Domestic burglary and the treatment of attempts
5.1.1 Guideline categorisation at first instance
The sentencing judge applied the Sentencing Council’s Domestic Burglary guideline:
- He categorised counts 1, 5 and 6 as category A1 (para 26):
- High culpability, including “significant planning and organisation” and offending by a group.
- Category 1 harm, including:
- Victims at home during the offence; and
- For count 1: theft of a high‑value car;
- For count 6: substantial psychological impact on the victim and family.
- The guideline starting point for category A1 is 3 years’ custody, with a range of 2–6 years (para 27). Given the heavy aggravation (repeat burglaries, on licence, at night, group offending, presence of a child on count 6), the judge assessed the appropriate sentence after trial at 6 years for each of counts 1, 5 and 6 (para 34).
The appellants accepted that these categorisations were available to the judge (paras 37–38).
5.1.2 The judge’s refusal to discount for attempts
Critically, the sentencing judge made no distinction between attempted and completed burglary at the level of the guideline sentence:
- He accepted that counts 5 and 6 were attempts, but rejected the prosecution’s own submission that there should be a discount for this (para 28).
- His reasoning was that count 6, in particular, was the “principal offence” for all three defendants, that they were disturbed rather than voluntarily desisting, and that they “realised it was getting too difficult and [they were] going to be detected” (para 28).
Thus, he treated attempts as if they were completed burglaries in terms of seriousness, save for the factual detail that they were interrupted.
5.1.3 The Court of Appeal’s correction
The Court of Appeal accepted that culpability and harm were high, but held that:
- In Lloyd’s case, “in relation to the sentences for counts 5 and 6 … [the judge] should have taken some account of the fact that each offence was an attempt” (para 41).
- Similarly, for Doran, “the judge ought to have taken some account of the fact that count 6 was an attempt, rather than the completed offence” (para 42).
The Court did not prescribe a rigid numerical formula or percentage reduction for attempts. However, its approach establishes a clear principle:
Where the Sentencing Council guideline addresses completed domestic burglary, a sentencing court must ordinarily reduce sentence in recognition of the lesser seriousness of attempted burglary, even in high culpability / high harm cases, unless truly exceptional circumstances justify parity.
That principle is reflected in the adjusted individual terms:
- For Lloyd, the effective sentence on each attempted burglary (after plea and totality) was reduced from 5 years to 4 years (para 43).
- For Doran, the sentence on count 6 fell from 5 years 4 months to 5 years (para 36 vs 44), and, crucially, his aggravated vehicle taking, previously consecutive, became concurrent (para 44). Both steps collectively gave effect to the recognition that the burglary was an attempt and to totality.
Two points are worth emphasising:
- The Court did not disturb the judge’s assessment that, but for the “attempt” issue and totality, the case lay at the top of the category A1 range, particularly in view of the appellants’ professional offending and licence status.
- The Court’s insistence on “some account” being taken of attempts shows that, even if an attempt is very near completion, it will almost always be wrong to treat it as fully equivalent to the completed offence for guideline purposes.
5.2 The totality principle and restructuring of the sentences
5.2.1 The totality principle
The “totality principle” requires courts, when sentencing for multiple offences, to ask whether the aggregate sentence is just and proportionate to the overall criminality. Even if individual sentences and their consecutive/concurrent ordering are justifiable, the combined term may still be excessive.
The Court of Appeal’s language is telling:
- For Lloyd: “As unpleasant as these offences were … we agree that, in each case, the total sentence imposed was too long” (para 40); “having regard to totality … a total sentence of nine years’ custody is sufficient to meet the justice of the case” (para 41).
- For Doran: “the total sentence he passed was too long … having regard to totality, we consider that a total sentence of five years’ custody is sufficient” (para 42).
The Court therefore accepted the general structure (concurrent sentences for offences close in time; some consecutive terms for separate episodes), but found that the overall lengths overshot what was required.
5.2.2 Lloyd: making dangerous driving concurrent
For Lloyd, the sentencing judge rightly:
- treated counts 1 and 5 as concurrent, having occurred within about an hour of each other (para 34, 41); and
- treated count 6 (a separate attempted burglary a month later) as consecutive to counts 1 and 5 (para 34, 41).
The judge also treated the dangerous driving (count 7) as a distinct offence warranting a consecutive term (para 34), reflecting:
- a police pursuit,
- deliberate evasion,
- collision with a police vehicle, and
- damage caused (para 29).
The Court of Appeal accepted that the dangerous driving properly fell within category A1 of the relevant guideline, with a starting point of 18 months (range 12–24 months) and that a sentence of 12 months’ custody after plea was open to the judge (paras 29, 41). The error lay not in the individual sentence but in the aggregate structure.
To correct this, the Court:
- maintained separate culpability by keeping the 12‑month term for count 7, but
- ordered that it run concurrently with count 6 (para 43), rather than consecutively.
This did not minimise the seriousness of the dangerous driving; rather, it recognised that, in the context of an already lengthy sentence for serious burglaries and attempts, a further consecutive term produced an unjustified increase in overall length.
5.2.3 Doran: concurrency for offences arising from the same episode
For Doran, the offences on count 6 (attempted burglary) and count 8 (aggravated vehicle taking) arose from the same factual background (para 38): the same night, the same stolen vehicle, and part of a single criminal episode.
The sentencing judge nonetheless made them consecutive, producing 6 years 5 months (before deduction for curfew). The Court of Appeal took a more integrated view of the incident and totality:
- It held that the total sentence was “too long” (para 42).
- To achieve a just outcome, it reduced the burglary sentence modestly (5 years vs 5 years 4 months) and, crucially, made the 12‑month aggravated vehicle taking sentence concurrent with count 6 (para 44).
This reflects a common-sense application of totality: where offences are closely bound together in time and circumstance, it will often be more proportionate to recognise the second offence through an uplift within the range for the first, or concurrency, rather than stacking sentences consecutively.
5.3 Guilty plea credit and curfew credit
The Court did not find fault with the sentencing judge’s approach to credit for guilty pleas:
- Lloyd pleaded guilty “just two or three days before the trial” (para 35). The judge gave “slightly more” than 10% credit (para 35), consistent with the Sentencing Council’s plea guideline for very late pleas where some utilitarian benefit remains.
- Doran pleaded on the day his trial was due to start, but before the jury was sworn; the judge also gave “more than 10 per cent” credit (para 36).
There was also proper consideration of curfew credit:
- Doran had spent time on a qualifying electronic curfew, entitling him to a reduction of 203 days (paras 33, 36, 44).
- For Lloyd, days in remand custody would be automatically deducted administratively (para 33).
The appeal, therefore, did not hinge on the plea discounts or curfew credit; the Court accepted those as appropriate and focused instead on attempt vs completion and totality.
5.4 Dangerous driving and aggravated vehicle taking
5.4.1 Dangerous driving (Lloyd – count 7)
The sentencing judge placed Lloyd’s dangerous driving in category A1 of the Sentencing Council’s guideline:
- There was a police chase.
- Lloyd deliberately evaded officers.
- He drove through barriers and cones on a closed exit.
- He mounted the pavement and collided with a police car.
The guideline starting point of 18 months’ custody, with a range of 12–24 months, was correctly identified (para 29). The judge set 18 months after trial and 12 months after plea (para 34), within range and justified by mitigation and the short duration (“a matter of minutes”: para 18).
The Court of Appeal endorsed this categorisation and sentence as such (paras 37, 41); its intervention related only to the question whether the 12‑month term had to be consecutive in order properly to reflect the harm and culpability of the dangerous driving. It concluded that, for totality reasons, concurrency with count 6 was more appropriate (para 43).
5.4.2 Aggravated vehicle taking (Doran – count 8)
There is no dedicated Sentencing Council guideline for aggravated vehicle taking (para 30). The maximum sentence is 2 years’ custody. The judge selected:
- 15 months after trial, reduced to 13 months after plea, and made consecutive to the burglary (para 36).
On appeal, the Court:
- Did not quarrel with the individual seriousness assessment (15 months after trial was within the statutory maximum and recognisable as moderate for such circumstances).
- Reduced the post‑plea sentence slightly to 12 months (para 44), and, more importantly, ordered it to run concurrently with the 5‑year sentence for the attempted burglary, again by reference to totality and the “same factual background” (paras 38, 44).
5.5 Driving disqualification under RTOA 1988 ss 35A and 35B
5.5.1 The statutory framework (in outline)
Sections 35A and 35B of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 require courts to adjust driving disqualifications in certain circumstances, including where:
- a custodial sentence is imposed alongside disqualification, and
- the offender is a repeat offender for specified driving offences.
In broad terms:
- s 35A provides for an extension period so that the effective period of disqualification accommodates any time spent in custody, ensuring that the disqualification properly bites once the offender is at liberty.
- s 35B provides for an uplift in disqualification length for repeat offenders (where there is, for example, a second or further conviction for specified serious driving offences within a defined time frame).
The key point for this appeal is procedural: when the Court of Appeal changes the length of the custodial term, it must also ensure that the associated disqualification orders are adjusted in line with the statute, not simply left as they stood.
5.5.2 Recalculation for Lloyd and Doran
The Court therefore quashed the original driving bans and substituted fresh orders (para 45–46).
Lloyd (para 46(a)):
- Total disqualification: 6 years 6 months, broken down as:
- 2 years – the court’s discretionary disqualification period;
- 6 months – extension period under s 35A (reflecting the custodial term and ensuring the ban has effect after release);
- 4 years – uplift under s 35B, reflecting repeat offending.
- Additionally, Lloyd is disqualified until he passes an extended driving test.
Doran (para 46(b)):
- Total disqualification: 3 years and 263 days, composed of:
- 18 months – discretionary disqualification;
- 6 months – extension period under s 35A;
- 1 year and 263 days – uplift under s 35B.
This underlines an important practical point: ancillary orders such as driving disqualifications are not immune from adjustment on appeal. When custodial terms change, courts must revisit the disqualification calculation to ensure compliance with statutory rules.
5.6 Precedents and the place of this decision
The judgment, as provided, does not cite previous case law expressly. Instead, it operates within and applies:
- the Sentencing Council guidelines on domestic burglary and dangerous driving,
- the Totality Guideline, and
- the statutory scheme under the RTOA 1988 (ss 35A and 35B).
Nonetheless, it contributes to the jurisprudence in several ways:
- By confirming that sentencing courts must differentiate between attempts and completed offences when using offence‑specific guidelines framed around completion.
- By demonstrating a robust application of the totality principle, including:
- accepting that an individually justifiable consecutive sentence (e.g. for dangerous driving) can still be made concurrent to avoid an excessive overall term; and
- recognising that offences arising from the same incident (attempted burglary and aggravated vehicle taking) should often be concurrent.
- By clarifying the need to adjust driving disqualification orders whenever the custodial element is varied on appeal, carefully distinguishing discretionary, extension and uplift components.
6. Clarification of Key Legal Concepts
The judgment uses several technical terms. The following brief explanations may assist readers:
- Domestic burglary:
- Burglary of a home or dwelling, particularly serious because of invasion of personal space and risk to occupants.
- Attempted burglary:
- Where the defendant, with intent to commit burglary, takes more than merely preparatory steps, but the burglary is not completed (e.g. lock is burned or forced, but entry is not achieved or property not stolen).
- Legally treated as an offence in its own right, but generally less serious than the completed offence.
- Category A1 (Domestic Burglary Guideline):
- High culpability (e.g. significant planning, professional operation, group offending, targeting, or exploitation).
- Category 1 harm (e.g. victims present in the dwelling, significant emotional/psychological impact, or high‑value property stolen).
- Starting point: 3 years’ custody; range: 2–6 years.
- Dangerous driving:
- Driving that falls far below the standard expected of a competent and careful driver and in which it would be obvious to such a driver that it was dangerous.
- Examples here include driving through barriers and a closed road, mounting the pavement, and colliding with a police car during a pursuit.
- Aggravated vehicle taking:
- Taking a vehicle without consent (often “TWOC”) with additional aggravating circumstances, such as dangerous driving, causing damage, or causing injury while the vehicle is taken.
- Carries a higher maximum penalty than simple taking without consent.
- Concurrent vs consecutive sentences:
- Concurrent: sentences run at the same time; the offender serves only the longest term.
- Consecutive: sentences run back‑to‑back; the terms are added together.
- Courts decide based on whether offences are part of the same incident or separate episodes and to what extent each adds to overall criminality.
- Totality principle:
- A general requirement that the overall sentence must be just and proportionate to the totality of offending behaviour.
- May lead courts to:
- reduce individual terms, and/or
- order concurrency instead of consecutivity.
- Credit for guilty plea:
- Reduction in sentence to recognise the utilitarian benefits of an early plea (saving court time, sparing victims and witnesses a trial).
- The later the plea, the smaller the discount. Pleas on the eve of trial or on the day typically attract around 10% credit.
- Qualifying curfew:
- A period when an offender is subject to an electronically monitored curfew before sentence.
- Under legislation and guidance, a qualifying curfew may entitle the offender to credit (time deducted from the custodial term), typically at a specified ratio.
- On licence:
- Serving the remainder of a custodial sentence in the community, subject to conditions.
- Committing further offences while on licence is an aggravating factor and can trigger recall to prison.
- Driving disqualification components (RTOA 1988 ss 35A, 35B):
- Discretionary period: the basic period of disqualification chosen by the judge for the specific offence(s).
- Extension period (s 35A): additional time added because a custodial sentence is also imposed; aims to prevent overlap so that the driving ban is effective post‑release.
- Uplift (s 35B): additional time added for repeat offenders of serious driving offences.
- Extended driving test requirement: the offender must pass a more demanding test before being allowed to drive again, commonly imposed for dangerous driving.
7. Practical and Doctrinal Impact
7.1 Sentencing attempted domestic burglary
This judgment sends a clear message to sentencers:
- Even in serious repeat domestic burglary cases, where:
- offences are carefully planned,
- professional tools are used,
- victims are present in their homes at night, and
- there is significant psychological impact,
- It will usually be wrong to treat an attempted burglary as if it were a completed burglary at the very top of the range, without any reduction, when applying the domestic burglary guideline.
- Practically, advocates can rely on this decision to argue that some downward adjustment is required from the notional sentence for a completed burglary in comparable circumstances, with the precise level of reduction informed by how close the attempt was to success.
7.2 Applying totality with multiple property and driving offences
The decision illustrates the nuanced application of totality where burglary and serious driving conduct intersect:
- Where multiple offences form part of one continuous episode (e.g. attempted burglary and vehicle taking or dangerous driving in immediate temporal and causal proximity), concurrent sentences will often be the appropriate default to avoid double counting.
- Where offences arise from separate episodes (here, the first set of burglaries and the later attempted burglary), consecutive sentences are generally justified, but:
- the combined term must still be examined to ensure it does not exceed what is necessary to reflect overall criminality.
- Consecutive terms for driving offences that are serious but short in duration may be re‑evaluated on totality grounds when the offender already faces a lengthy term for associated offences.
7.3 Professional burglars and the limits of sentence escalation
The Court underscores that even where defendants are described, rightly, as “experienced, determined, professional burglars” (para 25) with dismal records and licence breaches, there is a point at which additional consecutive terms cease to be justified and become disproportionate.
This serves as a reminder that:
- Serious antecedents and breach of licence aggravate sentence but do not justify abandoning proportionality altogether.
- The totality principle functions as an important constraint even in cases of entrenched, professional criminality.
7.4 Ancillary orders must follow the custody
By recalculating the disqualification periods, the Court signals that:
- Ancillary orders, especially statutory ones such as driving bans, cannot be left untouched when the primary sentence changes.
- Sentencers (both at first instance and on appeal) must ensure that:
- the headline ban,
- the extension period, and
- any uplift for repeat offending
8. Conclusion
R v Lloyd & Doran [2025] EWCA Crim 1565 is a significant sentencing decision in three main respects.
- It confirms that attempted domestic burglaries must generally attract lower sentences than completed domestic burglaries, even when classed as category A1 under the Sentencing Council’s guideline. Judges must consciously “take some account” of the fact of attempt when fixing sentence.
-
It offers a practical demonstration of the totality principle in mixed burglary and driving cases, showing how:
- concurrent sentencing is appropriate for closely related offences arising out of the same incident, and
- even individually justifiable consecutive terms may be made concurrent if they inflate the overall sentence beyond what is needed to reflect overall criminality.
- It underlines that driving disqualification orders must be recalibrated whenever the custodial sentence is changed, with proper attention to the discretionary element, the extension period under s 35A and any uplift under s 35B of the RTOA 1988.
For practitioners, the case is a useful authority to cite where:
- an attempted offence has been sentenced as if it were the completed offence;
- the interplay between domestic burglary and related vehicle offences risks producing an excessive global sentence; or
- a court has failed to revisit driving disqualifications following variation of custodial terms.
More broadly, Lloyd & Doran reaffirms that, even for professional repeat burglars offending on licence, sentencing remains anchored in proportionality, with the seriousness of an attempt, the structure of concurrency and consecutivity, and statutory ancillary orders all subject to principled judicial scrutiny.
Comments