Lloyd & Anor, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from sentence. The First Appellant changed his plea to guilty shortly before trial to counts of burglary of a dwelling (count 1), two counts of attempted burglary of a dwelling (counts 5 and 6) and dangerous driving (count 7). The Second Appellant pleaded guilty to an attempted burglary (count 6) and aggravated vehicle taking (count 8) before the jury was sworn. A co-defendant pleaded guilty in the Magistrates' Court to offences corresponding to count 6 and count 8 and was committed to the Crown Court for sentence. On 13 January 2025 the sentencing judge (Judge Hurst) sentenced the two appellants and the co-defendant. Both appellants were granted leave to appeal their sentences by a single judge and appealed to the court presided over by Judge Murray. Each appellant was represented on appeal by the counsel who had represented him at sentence (Attorney Pidcock for the First Appellant and Attorney Singh for the Second Appellant).

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge erred in failing to apply an appropriate discount for the fact that counts 5 and 6 were attempts rather than completed offences.
2. Whether the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient regard to the principle of totality when determining the overall length of the sentences imposed on each appellant.
3. Whether the individual sentence components and ancillary orders (including driving disqualifications and extended test requirements) should be varied to achieve a just and proportionate total sentence.

Arguments of the Parties

First Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Attorney Pidcock)

• Conceded that the sentencing judge was entitled to categorise the principal offences as high culpability and category A1 harm and that the dangerous driving fell within category A1.
• Contended that the sentencing judge should have applied a discount to the sentences for counts 5 and 6 because they were attempts rather than completed offences.
• Contended that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient regard to totality when determining the aggregate sentence.
• Accepted that consecutive sentencing in principle was not incorrect but argued the aggregate sentence was excessive.

Second Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Attorney Singh)

• Accepted that, if completed, the offence on count 6 could properly be treated as category A1, but submitted that the six-year starting point for count 6 after trial was too high given the specific aggravating and mitigating features.
• Argued that the judge should have discounted the sentence for count 6 to reflect that it was an attempt.
• Contended that the sentencing judge failed to give adequate regard to totality, producing a total sentence excessive for the totality of the offending, particularly as counts 6 and 8 arose out of the same factual background.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court reviewed the sentencing judge's factual findings and legal categorisations and proceeded in a stepwise manner:

1. The court accepted the sentencing judge's categorisation of the principal burglary (count 1) and the dangerous driving offence as falling within category A1 of the relevant Sentencing Council guidelines, noting the judge's reasoning about planning, victims being at home, police pursuit and damage to property.
2. The court noted the sentencing judge's identification of aggravating factors: substantial relevant previous convictions, offences committed at night, offending while on licence, group offending, and additional aggravation for count 6 because a child was present and due to the impact recorded in the victim personal statement.
3. The appellate court accepted that the sentencing judge was entitled to reject a prosecution submission that attempts should attract lesser sentences in the particular circumstances; however, the appellate court concluded the judge should nevertheless have taken some account of the fact that counts 5 and 6 were attempts and therefore allowed some reduction on that basis.
4. The court considered the judge's approach to credit for guilty pleas (a modest reduction of slightly more than 10% for the First Appellant and more than 10% for the Second Appellant) and accepted that credit for guilty pleas was appropriately given, but it found that the aggregate sentences still failed the test of totality.
5. Applying the totality principle, the appellate court determined that the overall sentences imposed were excessive for the total offending, having regard both to the individual offence seriousness and to the cumulative punishment. The court therefore reduced the total sentences to levels it considered sufficient and proportionate to meet the justice of the case.
6. The court also addressed ancillary orders. Having altered the custodial sentences, it found it necessary to vary the driving disqualification orders and to make fresh determinations under sections 35A and 35B of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 in respect of each appellant, setting out the adjusted periods and, in the First Appellant's case, maintaining disqualification until passing an extended driving test.

Holding and Implications

The appeals against sentence succeed in part.

Immediate holdings and effects:

• First Appellant: The court quashed the sentences originally imposed on counts 5 and 6 and substituted sentences of four years' imprisonment on each of those counts. The sentence on count 5 is to run concurrently with the unaffected sentence on count 1; the sentence on count 6 is to run consecutively to count 1. The sentence on count 7 (dangerous driving) is ordered to run concurrently with the sentence on count 6. The aggregate custody term for the First Appellant is reduced to nine years' imprisonment. The original driving disqualification order was quashed and replaced with a driving disqualification of six years and six months, comprising a discretionary disqualification of two years, an extension period under section 35A of six months, and an uplift under section 35B of four years; disqualification remains until the First Appellant passes an extended driving test.
• Second Appellant: The court quashed the sentences originally imposed on counts 6 and 8 and substituted in their place a sentence of five years' imprisonment on count 6 (less 203 days to reflect time on qualifying curfew) and 12 months' imprisonment on count 8. Those sentences will run concurrently, producing an aggregate custodial term of five years' imprisonment less 203 days. The original driving disqualification order was quashed and replaced with a disqualification period of three years and 263 days, comprising an 18-month discretionary disqualification, an extension of six months under section 35A, and an uplift under section 35B of one year and 263 days.

Broader implications: The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal principle; it applies established sentencing concepts (categorisation under guidelines, mitigation for attempts, credit for guilty pleas, and the totality principle) to the facts. The decision adjusts individual sentences and ancillary orders to achieve proportionality and proper application of totality in the specific cases before the court.