JU v NU [2025] CSOH 118: Relocation, Coercive Control and the Court’s Duty to Choose the “Least Bad” Welfare Option

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of Lord Braid in JU v NU [2025] CSOH 118, a Scottish Court of Session (Outer House) judgment on international relocation in the context of child residence and contact under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995.

The case is notable for three interlinked reasons:

Both parents are accepted as loving, capable carers. An experienced psychologist recommends shared care as the ideal, and the children themselves strongly wish to spend equal time with each parent.
The father (pursuer) has already relocated to the south of England (“Wessex”) for a high-level professional football role, and seeks a specific issue order under s 11(2)(e) of the 1995 Act to move the children to Wessex, coupled with a contingent shared-care proposal if the mother (defender) also relocates.
The mother cannot, and does not wish to, relocate to Wessex. There are allegations of domestic abuse and controlling behaviour, including covert recordings and perceived financial control, which the court links to the broad statutory definition of “abuse” in s 11(7C).

At the heart of the dispute is a stark geographic reality: the parents live hundreds of miles apart and neither is willing (or, in the defender’s case, able) to move to be near the other. Yet the expert, the curator ad litem, both parents and the court all agree that the boys’ welfare would be best served by some form of shared parenting if geography allowed.

Lord Braid rejects the relocation application and holds that the children should remain in Scotland with their mother, with the father continuing to live and work in Wessex if he so chooses. The court then defers fixing the detailed residence and contact regime to a subsequent “by order” hearing.

The judgment is legally significant for its:

Explicit confirmation that in relocation disputes the court has no presumption in favour of the relocating parent and must simply choose the “least bad” welfare option when the optimal solution (shared care in one place) is impossible.
Application of the domestic abuse provisions in s 11(7A)-(7D), including recognition that coercive, controlling dynamics (such as covert recordings) can amount to “abuse” and are relevant when assessing whether a relocation order would indirectly harm the children by exacerbating that dynamic.
Use of s 6 of the 1995 Act (the parental duty to have regard to children’s views when making major decisions) to scrutinise the father’s choice to prioritise his football career in Wessex over returning to Scotland to maintain more substantial involvement in his children’s daily lives.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Parties, Children and Procedural Posture

The parties married in 2012 and separated in June 2024.
They have three sons:
- L (born 2018)
- R (born 2020), awaiting surgical treatment for hypospadias and adenoid removal
- S (born 2022)
The family moved to Scotland in 2022 for the father’s football physiotherapy job. Since separation, care has been broadly shared on a 50:50 basis, through a “shuttle” arrangement at the former matrimonial home.

2.2 Orders Sought

The pursuer seeks:

A specific issue order under s 11(2)(e) authorising him to relocate the children to Wessex. His primary vision is 50:50 shared care in Wessex if both parents live within a “suitable distance” of each other there.
Failing that, if the defender does not move to Wessex, a residence order under s 11(2)(c) giving him primary residence in Wessex, with the defender having contact.

The defender:

Opposes relocation, saying she neither wishes nor can afford to move to Wessex, and shared care there is not feasible on her resources.
Seeks a near 50:50 shared care arrangement in Scotland, asks the pursuer to return to Scotland, and if he does not, proposes that the boys live with her in Scotland with the pursuer having as much contact as he is willing and able to exercise.

A curator ad litem (Minuter) is appointed for the children. She supports shared care as the best outcome but opposes a relocation order unless adequate financial provision exists to enable the defender realistically to relocate to within 30–40 minutes of the pursuer in Wessex.

2.3 Core Findings

Lord Braid finds, in essence, that:

Both parents are loving, engaged and capable. Their parenting styles differ radically but are complementary; neither is “better” than the other.
All three boys are emotionally attached to both parents. L and R articulate strong, consistent wishes for equal time with each parent; S, being younger, is especially attached to his mother.
The ideal arrangement would be some form of shared care/parenting, but geography and parental choices make this impossible.
The defender cannot realistically afford to relocate to Wessex or to secure adequate accommodation there to enable shared care, even with the pursuer’s proposed sharing of accommodation and childcare allowances.
The pursuer has chosen to prioritise his football career in Wessex and is, on his evidence, unwilling to relocate back closer to Scotland even if relocation is refused, meaning that (absent a change of mind) he will accept a very substantial reduction in his day-to-day parenting role.

2.4 Decision

The court:

Refuses the pursuer’s motion for a specific issue order permitting relocation of the children to Wessex.
Sustains the defender’s plea opposing relocation and repels the pursuer’s relevant plea.
Holds that, on balance, the “least bad” welfare option is that the boys remain in Scotland with the defender as primary carer.
Defers making detailed residence and contact orders and fixes a further by order hearing, explicitly allowing time for the pursuer to “read and digest” the opinion and potentially reconsider his stance on returning closer to Scotland.
Flags the desirability of a child-appropriate explanation of the decision, likely via a letter either from the court or from the psychologist, particularly for L, who is expected to be resentful and upset.

3. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework

3.1 Section 11 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995

The court proceeds under s 11 of the 1995 Act, which governs orders relating to parental responsibilities and rights. Two specific types of order are central:

Residence order – s 11(2)(c): regulates with whom a child is to live and when.
Specific issue order – s 11(2)(e): regulates any “specific question” arising in relation to parental responsibilities/rights, here the proposed relocation to Wessex.

When considering any s 11 order, the court must apply the three familiar principles in s 11(7):

Welfare principle – s 11(7)(a): the child’s welfare is the court’s paramount consideration.
No‑order principle – also s 11(7)(a): the court must not make an order unless doing so is better for the child than making no order.
Child’s views – s 11(7)(b): so far as practicable, the child must be given an opportunity to express views, and the court must have regard to them taking account of age and maturity.

3.2 Abuse, Domestic Abuse and Co-operation (s 11(7A)–(7D))

The judgment gives unusual prominence to the 2011 and 2020 amendments strengthening the court’s duties where abuse or risk of abuse is in play. Sections 11(7A)–(7D) require the court to consider:

Any abuse (widely defined in s 11(7C)) or risk of abuse affecting the child.
The need to protect the child from such abuse or risk.
The impact of any abuse on the ability of a person to care for the child or fulfil parental responsibilities.
Whether it is appropriate to make an order requiring co-operation between parties who hold parental responsibilities, given any background of abuse (s 11(7D)).

“Abuse” in s 11(7C) is deliberately broad and explicitly includes domestic abuse and conduct causing or likely to cause “fear, alarm or distress.” That definition can encompass controlling or coercive behaviour, even where not prosecuted criminally. Lord Braid uses this framework to characterise the pursuer’s covert recording of the defender as falling within the statutory concept of “abuse” because of its controlling and distressing nature ([46]).

Though neither party contends that the children themselves are at direct risk of physical harm, the court recognises two important, more indirect welfare links:

The potential indirect harm to the children if a relocation order effectively compels the defender to move to Wessex in a way that continues or entrenches controlling dynamics ([9], [48], [88]).
The constraint of s 11(7D): an order that requires co-operation (e.g. shared care dependent on both parents choosing housing in proximity) may be inappropriate where there is no realistic prospect of such co-operation or where there is a history of abusive control ([9], [89]).

3.3 Section 6: Parents’ Duty to Consider Children’s Views

Section 6 of the 1995 Act is often less visible in reported cases, but Lord Braid places it centre-stage ([12]). It obliges any person with parental responsibilities/rights, when taking any major decision involving those responsibilities or rights, to:

Seek, so far as practicable, the views of the child (if the child wishes to express them), taking account of age and maturity; and
Have regard to the views of any other person with PRRs.

The judge emphasises that s 6 binds the parents every bit as much as it guides the court. Applying it, he implicitly criticises the pursuer’s insistence that, if relocation is refused, he will prioritise remaining in his current Wessex job even though that choice necessarily reduces his involvement from near 50:50 care to effectively a “visitor” role ([63], [76], [91], [94], [96]).

3.4 Relocation Case Law Cited

Lord Braid’s approach to relocation is explicitly anchored in established Scottish authority:

M v M 2012 SLT 428 (Lord Emslie) – cited for the proposition that relocation cases must be approached like any other s 11 dispute, without any presumption or “preconceived leaning” in favour of the relocating parent or against them ([80]).
Donaldson v Donaldson 2014 Fam LR 126 (Lady Smith) – cited to underscore that no single factor is of pre‑determined or greater weight in relocation assessment (e.g. effect of refusal on the relocating parent) ([80]).
GL v JL 2017 Fam LR 54 (Lady Wise) – authority that each relocation case is highly fact‑sensitive and that formulating fixed checklists or mandatory factors is neither helpful nor appropriate ([80]).
MCB v NMF 2018 SCLR 660 (Lady Wise) – confirms that the evidential burden lies on the parent seeking relocation to show that the proposed move would be in the child’s best interests and that it is better to allow relocation than refuse or make no order ([80]).

Taken together, these precedents underpin the judgment’s refusal to treat the pursuer’s prior decision to move to Wessex or the defender’s earlier expression of support as determinative. They are simply facts in the matrix, not trump cards.

4. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.1 Evaluative Starting Point: No Presumptions, Only Welfare

Consistent with the authorities, Lord Braid insists that a relocation application is not a separate species of case with its own presumptions. It is a standard s 11 welfare exercise:

No automatic preference for the parent who has already moved or wishes to move.
No special weighting for impact on that parent’s career or lifestyle.
All interests, including those of the non‑moving parent, are just factors in the welfare balance ([80]).

The pursuer therefore must demonstrate that, from the children’s perspective, it is better to permit relocation than to refuse it.

4.2 Reasonableness of the Father’s Move: Relevant but Not Decisive

The pursuer argued, and the court accepted, that his decision to accept employment with a Championship club in Wessex was understandable and not in itself unreasonable ([81]). The defender had explicitly told him to “take the job” and indicated at the time that she was prepared to move with the children.

However, Lord Braid treats this as no more than a background fact:

The reasonableness of the move does not create a presumption that the children must now follow.
The defender’s earlier willingness to relocate does not constrain her position 15 months on; her “change of heart” carries no special legal consequence for the welfare analysis ([81]).
The key questions remain: where will the children’s welfare now be best served, and is it better to make a relocation order than not?

Equally, the court notes that the pursuer could choose to give up his Wessex employment and move back nearer Scotland; he is a skilled physiotherapist and could find work closer to the children, even if less lucrative. But he has elected not to do so, and the court simply accepts that choice as a given factual constraint on its options ([81], [96]).

4.3 Domestic Abuse and Coercive Control

The defender alleged a pattern of controlling and emotionally abusive behaviour by the pursuer: monitoring her movements, controlling finances, interrogating the children, and covertly recording her. The pursuer denied being abusive and framed his behaviour as driven by a need for structure and a desire to avoid conflict.

Lord Braid’s findings are nuanced:

He stops short of branding the pursuer a criminally abusive partner or finding that his conduct compromises his parenting capacity in the present.
He accepts that the parties’ very different personalities and communication styles significantly contributed to their difficulties, and that both have, at times, behaved in ways that might be seen as controlling (e.g. the defender changing the children’s GP without telling the pursuer) ([49]).
However, he is clearly disturbed by the covert recordings, describing them as inherently controlling and falling within the broad statutory definition of “abuse” because they are “likely to cause psychological harm, or at the very least, distress” ([46]).
He also accepts the defender’s perception of having been controlled as genuine and relevant, and notes corroboration from her presentation to Women’s Aid ([47]–[48]).

The significance for the relocation decision lies not in any direct risk to the children but in two interconnected points:

The defender experiences the idea of being “required” to relocate to Wessex – following the pattern of past moves dictated by the pursuer’s career – as a continuation of that controlling dynamic. A relocation order could thus, from her perspective, be a legal vehicle for further coercion ([48], [88]).
The court accepts that forcing such a move would exacerbate the defender’s anxiety and distress, with a likely negative impact on her mental health and on the children’s emotional environment. Given that she “wears her emotions on the outside,” this risk is acute ([88]).

These abuse-related concerns are treated as welfare factors under s 11(7A)–(7D), particularly in considering:

Whether relocation would indirectly harm the children by harming their mother’s mental state; and
Whether an order predicated on future co-operative shared care in Wessex is “appropriate” at all, given the history and the defender’s reasonable unwillingness to move ([89]).

4.4 Parenting Styles and the Value of Complementarity

The psychologist, Dr Lucie MacKinlay, paints a detailed picture of two sharply contrasting but ultimately complementary parenting styles:

Defender (mother) – free-flowing, instinctive, emotionally expressive, highly attuned to the children’s feelings, but less structured and sometimes chaotic, particularly around routines and punctuality ([51]).
Pursuer (father) – highly structured, organised, punctual; provides consistency and clear routines but is less emotionally expressive and tends to avoid confrontation ([52]).

Crucially, Dr MacKinlay does not endorse one style as superior. Each has strengths and weaknesses; together they give the boys a “rounded upbringing” ([54]). The children are capable of understanding that “this is mum’s way, that is dad’s way.”

This finding directly undermines any attempt by either parent to cast themselves as the “better” or “primary” parent in a normative sense. It also means that any relocation outcome that significantly reduces one parent’s involvement deprives the children of one half of a beneficial parenting dyad. This theme runs through the entire welfare analysis.

4.5 The Children’s Views

L and R are described as bright, articulate and emotionally aware. Their views were taken twice, in January and August 2025. The core messages are strikingly consistent:

Both L and R want their parents to live together again; recognising that this is impossible, they want to spend exactly equal time with each parent.
L articulates a near-obsessive focus on fairness, wanting time “calculated to the millisecond” so that it is evenly split ([66]).
R (aged 5) initially says, if forced to choose because of distance, he would prefer to spend more time with his father, but immediately qualifies this with a desire to see his mother the same number of nights – confirming that his real preference is also symmetry ([67]).
The children’s attachment is more to people than place; they are not especially wedded to Scotland or Wessex, though L would prefer not to lose his current friendships ([69], [97]).

The court gives these views serious weight but is candid that they cannot be honoured in full: geography and parental choices make exact 50:50 time-sharing unattainable. Lord Braid acknowledges that both older boys will be disappointed and that L is likely to be “angered” by the outcome ([99]).

4.6 Comparing Life in Wessex and in Scotland

4.6.1 Wessex Scenario

The court examines Wessex under two sub-scenarios:

Idealised: both parents relocate to Wessex and live close enough for shared care.
Realistic: only the pursuer lives in Wessex; the defender cannot afford to relocate.

(1) Idealised Shared Care in Wessex

On paper, Wessex has attractions:

The pursuer’s working hours (roughly 9am–3pm) would allow school runs and hands-on parenting on most days ([55], [60]).
There are acceptable local schools and affordable rentals (in principle) in the area.
His parents in York can support childcare similarly whether the children are in Scotland or Wessex ([24], [83]).
If the defender could also relocate and secure adequate accommodation, the children could have the shared-care pattern that everyone accepts is ideal.

Dr MacKinlay, assessing scenarios in the abstract, regarded Wessex as the “best solution” if it genuinely permitted 50:50 shared care ([75]).

However, the court concludes that this attractive scenario is illusory:

The defender’s evidence that she cannot afford comparable accommodation in Wessex is accepted as credible and reliable ([62], [84]).
Her current income, dependence on housing benefit, and lack of capital make it unrealistic to assume she could rent a three‑bedroom house and shoulder Wessex living costs, even with uncertain contributions from the pursuer.
Her prospects of building a Pilates and copywriting business in Wessex are speculative compared to the clearer trajectory in Scotland ([62], [84]).
Any relocation would sever her existing support network without immediately replacing it.

Alongside the financial unviability, the court emphasises the likely psychological impact on the defender of being compelled (in reality) to move to accommodate the pursuer’s career – a move she associates with continued control ([88]).

(2) Realistic Wessex: Father as Primary Carer

Given the financial reality, Wessex in practice would mean the pursuer as primary carer and the defender as a contact parent, likely living at a distance or in precarious arrangements she herself cannot yet envisage ([62], [85]–[88]).

Here the court identifies several serious disadvantages:

The children would suffer a “drastic and unconscionable” reduction in time with their mother. This is particularly acute for S, who remains in early childhood and has a strong, secure attachment to the defender ([35], [85]–[86]).
The boys would lose the routine daily benefits of the defender’s emotionally attuned parenting style, which the expert sees as essential to their balanced development ([54], [86]).
The defender’s mental health and functioning as a parent would likely deteriorate, given her sense of being compelled into a move she does not want and may not cope with, producing knock-on harms for the children ([88]).
The pursuer’s plan remains high-level and lacking detail – there is no concrete school placement or identified property, and he would in practice need more childcare support and cover from his parents than acknowledged ([83], [87]).
R’s pending NHS surgeries would likely be delayed by a move, given the need to re-enter a different waiting list ([87]).
Critically, the mobility of the pursuer’s career means Wessex cannot be assumed to be a long-term base. His history of moves to follow football posts, and the volatile nature of the industry, create a real risk of further relocations, leading to further disruption and future litigation ([74], [93]).

The pursuer’s argument that he should become primary carer in Wessex is also undermined by his own positions:

He accepts, as does the expert and the defender, that the best scenario is shared care and that the defender is a good parent whose involvement is vital.
He is willing, if relocation is refused, to leave the children with the defender 13 nights out of 14 during term-time, which sits uneasily with any claim that she is less able to care or that he must be primary carer for welfare reasons ([85]).

Overall, Lord Braid concludes that, on a welfare analysis, the Wessex options – once stripped of unrealistic assumptions about the defender’s ability to move – create too much risk and too much loss of an important parental relationship to be in the children’s best interests.

4.6.2 Scotland Scenario

If relocation is refused and the pursuer remains in Wessex, the boys will live primarily with the defender in Scotland. That scenario has its own difficulties, but the court finds it to be the “least bad” solution.

On the positive side:

The boys can stay at their current school and nursery, with continuity of education and friendships ([17]–[19], [90]).
The defender will move into Women’s Aid accommodation nearby, stable and affordable for up to two years, with a garden and proximity to school and community networks ([64], [90]).
Existing support structures (Women’s Aid, local community, school staff familiar with the boys) will remain in place ([17], [64], [90]).
R’s surgeries can proceed within the Scottish NHS queue, avoiding additional delay ([90]).
The defender has a credible plan to grow her self-employed work incrementally as the children enter school, and the cost of living is more manageable for her in Scotland ([62], [64]).

However, there are serious drawbacks:

The boys’ time with their father will reduce dramatically if he persists in living in Wessex – likely to one night per fortnight in term-time, plus extended holiday contact ([63], [91]).
They will lose the day-to-day benefits of his structured style and the emotional security of close, regular contact with him. As the expert puts it, he risks becoming a “visitor” rather than an engaged co-parent ([76], [94]).
The children will understandably feel angry, sad and confused at this reduction, and there is a risk that their relationship with the pursuer will deteriorate over time ([76], [91], [94]).

Lord Braid is plainly troubled by these consequences, but concludes that, set against the alternatives, they represent the lesser of two evils ([94]–[96]).

4.7 The “Least Bad” Solution and Stability as Tie‑Breaker

After a meticulous comparison, the court summarises its position candidly:

Neither outcome – Wessex or Scotland – is “ideal” ([94]).
Both involve a significant reduction in time with one parent, contrary to what everyone recognises would be best.
The court is forced to choose the “least bad solution” ([95]–[96]).

Several factors tip the balance towards Scotland as the least-damaging long-term option:

Stability and continuity – remaining in Scotland minimises disruption to schooling, friendships and support networks and avoids exposing the boys to yet another move now and a high risk of further moves later ([90], [93], [96]).
Attachment and age of S – S’s age and deep attachment to his mother mean it is marginally less harmful for the boys to be parted primarily from the pursuer than from the defender at this stage ([35], [86], [96]).
Risk in Wessex plan – financial and practical uncertainties, and the likelihood of future geographical moves due to the father’s career, make relocation a riskier path for the children ([84], [87], [93], [96]).
Impact on the defender’s mental health – forcing her into a move she experiences as continuation of past control is likely to be “catastrophic” for her and, by extension, damaging for the children ([88], [96]).
Relative adaptability of the adults – it is “more reasonable” to expect the pursuer to adjust his career expectations (even though he currently refuses to) than to expect the defender to shoulder the psychological and financial burden of moving to Wessex ([96]).

Welfare, in other words, is not served by giving effect to the father’s relocation decision at all costs. It is better preserved by prioritising continuity, safeguarding the mother’s mental functioning as the day-to-day carer, and leaving open the possibility (if the pursuer chooses) of his future return to a location closer to Scotland.

4.8 The Role of Section 6: Parents’ Own Duties

Lord Braid’s use of s 6 is subtle but important. By reminding both parents that they, too, must have regard to their children’s views when making major decisions, he:

Underscores that a parent cannot justify a career-driven relocation purely by their own interests; they must engage honestly with the impact on the children’s strongly expressed wish for meaningful, regular time with both parents.
Implicitly invites the pursuer to reconsider his stance after reading the opinion, suggesting that persisting in a career choice that reduces him to a fortnightly “visitor” may sit uneasily with his s 6 obligations ([96], [98]).

The court therefore goes beyond adjudicating a static dispute and uses the statutory framework to challenge each parent to exercise ongoing parental responsibility in a child-centred manner even after judgment.

4.9 No Final Contact Order Yet: Preserving Space for Parental Reassessment

Interestingly, despite detailed submissions from all parties on contact schedules, the court declines to fix residence and contact orders immediately. Instead, it:

Determines the relocation question now (because it is clearly better to resolve than leave undecided) ([98]).
Adjourns the residence/contact aspects to a by order hearing, expressly recognising that the pursuer’s stance on remaining in Wessex may evolve once he has reflected on the reasons for refusing relocation ([98]).

This approach is consistent with the court’s refusal to be driven by a parent’s current, perhaps entrenched, litigation position where that position is not aligned with children’s welfare. The judge leaves space for the pursuer to move towards a more child-centred position without forcing an immediate decision that would simply entrench sub-optimal arrangements.

5. Precedents and Their Influence

5.1 M v M 2012 SLT 428 (Lord Emslie)

Although the detailed facts of M v M are not rehearsed, Lord Braid relies on it for two key propositions:

Relocation cases are not a distinct category but part of ordinary s 11 welfare jurisdiction.
The court must approach them “without any preconceived leaning” towards the parent seeking to relocate ([80]).

That citation is crucial in resisting any argument that the pursuer’s status as the primary earner, or his career opportunities in Wessex, should be given special presumptive weight. Instead, the case confirms that the welfare of the children – not the fairness to the relocating parent – is the single controlling criterion.

5.2 Donaldson v Donaldson 2014 Fam LR 126 (Lady Smith)

Lady Smith’s guidance in Donaldson is invoked for the principle that there is no predefined hierarchy of factors in relocation decisions, such as:

The effect of refusal on the relocating parent.
The desire to respect the parent’s choice of where to live.
Economic advantages of the proposed move.

Lord Braid reflects this by explicitly refusing to give any one factor – especially the impact on the pursuer’s career or his feelings of disappointment at the defender’s change of stance – determinative weight ([80]–[81]). They are considered but do not trump the child-focused analysis.

5.3 GL v JL 2017 Fam LR 54 (Lady Wise)

GL v JL is cited for the proposition that each relocation case is fact-specific and that attempts to formulate rigid checklists are unhelpful ([80]). This supports Lord Braid’s refusal to apply any generic “tests” (such as the English “reasonable relocating parent” test) and instead to undertake a very detailed comparative welfare assessment of Scotland vs Wessex tailored to these three particular children, these two particular parents and this father’s particular career.

5.4 MCB v NMF 2018 SCLR 660 (Lady Wise)

Finally, MCB v NMF is relied on for the proposition that the evidential burden is on the parent seeking relocation to demonstrate that the move is in the child’s best interests and better than the alternatives ([80]).

This burden shapes the outcome: the pursuer’s Wessex proposal is found wanting in terms of:

Concrete detail (schools, specific housing, precise financial arrangements).
Realistic feasibility of the defender’s co-relocation.
Long-term stability given the volatility of professional football.

The defender does not have to prove that Scotland is “ideal,” only that the pursuer has not shown that Wessex is better for the children overall.

6. Impact and Significance

6.1 Consolidating Relocation Principles: No Presumptions, No Shortcuts

JU v NU reinforces and develops existing Scottish relocation jurisprudence in several ways:

It firmly rejects any notion that the court should defer to a relocating parent’s career choices or that children must follow a parent who has already moved.
It emphasises the evidential rigour expected of relocation plans: bare assertions about jobs, housing and schooling will not suffice.
It confirms that earlier expressions of willingness to move (by the non-moving parent) are not binding and do not create estoppel-like effects in welfare decisions.
It illustrates that the court may quite explicitly describe its task as choosing the “least bad” solution when no ideal arrangement is feasible, while still carefully applying the welfare and no-order principles.

6.2 Domestic Abuse and Coercive Control in Relocation Context

The judgment is also important in integrating the expanded statutory concept of “abuse” into relocation analysis even where:

There is no allegation that the children themselves are at risk of future physical harm; and
The contested behaviour (e.g. covert recording, perceived financial control) straddles the boundary between “poor conflict management” and “coercive control.”

By expressly treating covert recordings as “abuse” in the s 11(7C) sense and by considering whether a relocation order would exacerbate a controlling dynamic experienced by the defender, Lord Braid:

Signals that courts must look behind the bare fact of proposed relocation to its emotional and power‑dynamic context.
Underscores that children’s welfare can be compromised indirectly through the deterioration of a primary carer’s mental health in a coercive environment.
Illustrates the use of s 11(7D): shared-care orders dependent on co-operation may be inappropriate where a history of control makes such co-operation unrealistic.

6.3 Practical Lessons for Advisers in Relocation Cases

For practitioners, the case carries several practical messages:

Relocating first is risky. A parent who moves without prior court authorisation cannot assume the children will follow. The “fait accompli” is not a trump card.
Concrete planning is essential. Courts will expect specific evidence about proposed housing, schooling, childcare, finances and support networks in the new location, not generalised optimism.
Financial feasibility of the other parent’s move is crucial if shared care in the new location is central to the proposal. It is not enough to assume that they “could” or “should” move.
Carefully consider s 6 duties. Lawyers should advise parents that their own decisions – about relocation, career, or residence – must take serious account of the child’s views, especially a child’s wish to maintain frequent, meaningful contact with both parents.
Be alert to coercive control evidence. Behaviour such as monitoring, controlling finances, unilateral decision-making and covert surveillance may be treated as “abuse” even without criminal charges; it will weigh heavily against an order that entrenches that dynamic.

6.4 The Status of Shared Care in Scottish Law

While Scots law does not recognise a presumption in favour of shared care, this case highlights:

The court’s willingness to recognise the psychological and developmental benefits of children having significant and meaningful time with both parents where both are capable carers.
The danger, however, of equating “shared parenting” exclusively with a rigid 50:50 time split. Dr MacKinlay emphasises that shared parenting also means shared decision-making and co-operative co‑parenting ([76]) – something notably lacking here.

JU v NU shows that where true shared care in one location is unachievable, the court’s aim shifts to minimising the losses associated with that fact, for example by increasing holiday contact and encouraging better communication and indirect contact, while still accepting that the child’s welfare may be best served by one parent being the main day-to-day carer.

6.5 Child Participation and Explanations of Decisions

Finally, the postscript is significant. Lord Braid considers how best to explain the outcome to L (and, indirectly, his brothers), suggesting:

He may write a letter himself, with expert guidance; or
The task may be delegated to the psychologist.

This reflects a growing Scottish practice, underscored by international children’s rights norms, that children who have contributed views should receive age-appropriate feedback on how and why decisions affecting them were made. It bolsters the ethos of child participation beyond mere form-filling or interviews into meaningful engagement with outcomes.

7. Complex Concepts Explained (in Plain Language)

7.1 “Pursuer” and “Defender”

In the Court of Session, the person bringing the action is the pursuer (here, the father). The person defending is the defender (the mother).

7.2 Residence Order vs Specific Issue Order

Residence order – decides where a child will live and with whom.
Specific issue order – decides a particular question about a child’s upbringing (e.g. which school, which country, whether they can relocate).

In this case, the relocation question is dealt with via a specific issue order. If relocation were granted or refused, that might then require a residence order to regulate where the child lives day-to-day.

7.3 Welfare Principle

The court must always treat the child’s welfare as the top and overriding priority. The interests or fairness of the adults come second. Even if a decision is very hard on one parent, the court must choose the outcome that is best for the children overall.

7.4 No-Order Principle

The court should not make an order just because people disagree. It must be satisfied that making an order actually improves things for the child compared with making no order at all.

7.5 Curator ad Litem / Minuter

A curator ad litem is an independent person (usually a lawyer or experienced professional) appointed by the court to represent the child’s interests. In this case the curator participates formally in the case through a “minute,” and is styled “Minuter.”

7.6 Domestic Abuse and Coercive Control

“Domestic abuse” in Scots civil child law is not limited to physical violence. It includes:

Threats, intimidation and humiliation.
Control of money or social contacts.
Monitoring movements and communications.
Covertly recording or spying on a partner.

The court treated the father’s covert recordings of the mother as a form of controlling behaviour that fits the broad statutory definition of “abuse,” especially because they were secret and caused her psychological distress when discovered.

7.7 “Least Bad” Solution

Sometimes there is no perfect answer. Here, the ideal – both parents living near each other and sharing care – is impossible. The court therefore openly acknowledges that it must choose the “least bad” option: the one that does the least harm and preserves as much as possible of what is good for the children.

7.8 “Put the Case Out by Order”

This means the court will call the case again, usually for a case management or procedural hearing, to see what further orders are needed. Here it allows time for:

The parents to absorb the relocation decision.
The pursuer to reconsider his stance on living in Wessex.
The court to set detailed residence and contact arrangements with better information about the parents’ updated positions.

8. Conclusion

JU v NU is a carefully reasoned and fact-rich decision that adds depth to Scottish relocation jurisprudence. Lord Braid’s analysis demonstrates:

An unwavering commitment to the welfare principle, resisting any temptation to treat a parent’s pre-emptive relocation or career opportunities as decisive.
Meaningful integration of the widened statutory concept of domestic abuse, including coercive and controlling behaviour, into the relocation context, not as a label to punish a parent, but as a real factor in assessing the emotional climate in which children would live.
A sophisticated use of expert psychological evidence to recognise the complementary value of two very different parenting styles and the particular vulnerabilities of each child, especially the youngest.
Serious respect for the children’s voices, even while acknowledging that their wish for perfectly equal time with each parent is practically unachievable.
A willingness to describe and accept the reality that sometimes the court can offer only a “least bad” solution, and that refusing relocation may itself leave the children with significant and regrettable losses, particularly in relation to one parent.
An important reminder that s 6 obligations bind parents as much as judges: major parental choices about where to live and work must be weighed against the children’s strongly expressed wishes and needs.

Looking forward, the case is likely to be cited for its treatment of:

Shared care as the ideal where both parents are capable, but not at any price.
The need for realistic, detailed and financially grounded relocation proposals.
The interaction between relocation and controlling behaviour under s 11(7A)–(7D), especially where a move would perpetuate or deepen an abusive dynamic.

Ultimately, JU v NU stands as an example of the court refusing to allow an adult’s career trajectory to dictate children’s futures where the cost to their stability, attachments and emotional environment would be too high. It challenges parents and advisers alike to put children’s welfare – and their clearly articulated wishes – at the centre of any decision about relocation, even when that demands difficult compromises in adult lives.