JR87 v Department of Education: Indoctrinating Religious Education, Burdensome Opt‑Outs and Children’s Independent A2P1 Rights

1. Introduction

This Supreme Court judgment, JR87, Re Application for Judicial Review [2025] UKSC 40, is a major constitutional decision on religious education (“RE”) and collective worship in Northern Ireland schools, and more broadly on the interaction between:

• Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights (“A2P1”) – the right to education and to respect for parents’ religious and philosophical convictions; and
• Article 9 ECHR – freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

The applicants were:

• JR87, a girl educated in a controlled grant‑aided primary school in Northern Ireland between ages four and seven; and
• her father, G, both parents being broadly “humanist” and non‑religious.

They did not oppose the existence of religious education or Christian collective worship in schools. Their case was more nuanced: they challenged the legality of:

• the Christian‑centred religious education and collective worship at the school, which followed the Department of Education’s “core syllabus” for RE; and
• the statutory arrangements requiring such provision, coupled with a parental right to withdraw children from RE and collective worship.

They contended that:

1. the core syllabus as delivered was not objective, critical and pluralistic, but instead amounted to Christian indoctrination; and
2. the statutory right to withdraw was incapable of curing that incompatibility because exercising it would place an undue burden on parents and risk stigmatising the child.

The Department of Education (“the Department”) was the respondent. The school Board of Governors and the Transferor Representatives’ Council (representing the main Protestant churches) participated at various stages.

At first instance, the High Court (Colton J) found that the religious education and collective worship breached A2P1 read with Article 9. The Court of Appeal accepted that the teaching was not objective, critical and pluralistic, but held that the unqualified statutory right of withdrawal was sufficient to avoid a breach. The Supreme Court, per Lord Stephens (with whom Lord Reed, Lord Lloyd‑Jones, Lord Hamblen and Lord Burrows agreed), has now:

• restored the High Court’s substantive conclusion of a violation of A2P1 read with Article 9 for both parent and child; and
• clarified several important points of principle affecting religious education, parental opt‑out rights and children’s own rights under the ECHR.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Core findings

The Supreme Court held that:

1. Teaching in accordance with the Northern Ireland core syllabus, without sufficient additional pluralistic content, is not “objective, critical and pluralistic” and amounts to indoctrination.
   This point had already been decided by the High Court and upheld by the Court of Appeal; the Department was refused permission to cross‑appeal on it. The Supreme Court proceeds on the basis that the core syllabus, as implemented in the school, constituted Christian indoctrination, especially for very young children.
2. Indoctrination = non‑objective, non‑critical, non‑pluralistic teaching.
   The Court rejected the Court of Appeal’s attempt to distinguish “indoctrination” from teaching which is not objective, critical and pluralistic. The two are “different sides of the same coin”. If the state conveys religious information in a manner which is not objective, critical and pluralistic, that is indoctrination for A2P1 purposes – no further separate proof is required.
3. There is no additional requirement to prove that the State “pursued an aim of indoctrination”.
   Once indoctrination is found objectively, A2P1 is violated; it would be wrong to make breach contingent on proving a subjective “aim” on the part of the State. To do so would render the right “theoretical and illusory” rather than practical and effective.
4. Even an unqualified statutory right of withdrawal (an “automatic exemption”) can be insufficient if its exercise is capable of placing an undue burden on parents or stigmatising the child.
   In this case, the evidence showed that:
   • JR87 would have been the only child withdrawn out of 250–275 pupils;
   • her parents reasonably feared stigmatisation, bullying, isolation and repeated outing of her as “different” or “non‑Christian”; and
   • practical arrangements for withdrawal required negotiation with the school, with a real risk that parents would feel compelled to disclose intimate philosophical views and be exposed to conflict or be seen as “awkward”.
   In these circumstances, the opt‑out right was capable of placing an undue burden on the parents and deterring its use. It therefore did not cure the underlying incompatibility with A2P1 and Article 9.
5. Established Strasbourg principles about undue burden and “partial exemptions” apply equally to “automatic” or unqualified exemptions.
   The Court of Appeal had suggested that Strasbourg only condemned qualified exemption schemes and that domestic courts should not go further under the Ullah principle. The Supreme Court disagreed: the underlying principle is that Convention rights must be practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory. That principle applies equally to automatic opt‑outs.
6. Children themselves have rights under A2P1 read with Article 9, not just their parents.
   By reading:
   • the first sentence of A2P1 (right to education) in light of
   • the second sentence (respect for parents’ convictions) and
   • Article 9 (freedom of religion),
   the Court held that schoolchildren have a direct right to education in a form which respects their own right to believe or not to believe. Thus, both G and JR87 separately enjoyed rights which were infringed.
7. The Department breached its “duty of utmost care” in relation to religious education and collective worship.
   The Department had:
   • specified the core syllabus (drafted exclusively by the four main Christian churches);
   • required all grant‑aided schools to teach it; and
   • failed to inspect or monitor RE and collective worship in controlled schools at all.
   This combination meant that indoctrinating teaching could occur without oversight, breaching the A2P1 requirement that the State take “the utmost care” to ensure objectivity, critical thinking and pluralism.

2.2 Result

• The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of JR87 and G.
• It dismissed the Department’s cross‑appeal (which had argued the judge should have separated, and effectively rejected, the child’s claim).
• It reinstated the High Court’s declaration that:

  “The teaching of religious education under the core syllabus ... and the arrangements for collective worship in the primary school attended by [JR87] breached her and her father’s rights under [A2P1] read with article 9 of the ECHR.”

• The validity of the underlying legislation was not in issue before the Supreme Court because the parents had not appealed the High Court’s refusal to quash it.

3. Factual and Legislative Background

3.1 The family’s convictions and experience

JR87’s parents are non‑religious and broadly humanist. They:

• do not wish to raise their daughter as Christian;
• object to her being taught to assume the truth of Christianity rather than merely learning about it; and
• want her to be taught in a way which is objective, critical and pluralistic, particularly given her young age and unformed critical faculties.

They were otherwise happy with the school. They did not oppose RE or Christian worship per se; their complaint was that, as implemented, it crossed the line into indoctrination.

3.2 The school, curriculum and core syllabus

The school is a controlled grant‑aided primary school (i.e. historically Protestant, now under the Education Authority, with statutory representation of transferor churches on its Board of Governors). It teaches:

• the Foundation Stage (P1–P2, ages 4–6); and
• half of Key Stage 1 (P3, age 6–7).

Under Article 21(1) of the Education and Libraries (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 (“the 1986 Order”):

• all grant‑aided schools (except nursery schools) must provide religious education; and
• the school day must include daily collective worship.

Under Article 21(2), in a controlled (non‑integrated) school, RE must be:

• undenominational – based on the Bible, but not distinctive of any particular denomination; and
• collective worship likewise must not be distinctive of any denomination.

Under Article 21(3A) and Article 11 of the Education (Northern Ireland) Order 2006, the religious education given in every grant‑aided school must include a core syllabus specified by the Department. This core syllabus:

• was drafted by a group consisting exclusively of representatives of the four main Christian churches (Catholic, Church of Ireland, Presbyterian, Methodist); and
• for the Foundation Stage and Key Stages 1–2 (ages 4–11) is wholly Christian and explicitly faith‑promoting.

Crucial features of the core syllabus (as analysed by the courts) include:

• no reference to any other religion or non‑religious world‑view up to age 11;
• teaching children that:
  • God created the world and cares for “his” creation and “his people”;
  • prayer is a way of talking to “God” to thank, praise, say sorry and ask for help;
  • morality (e.g. forgiveness, respect for creation) is rooted in the Christian God’s character and commands.
• non‑statutory guidance produced by the churches for teachers which treats RE as part of the faith development of children, not neutral education about religions.

The High Court and Court of Appeal (and, in effect, the Supreme Court) concluded that this core syllabus is structured as Christian evangelism, not neutral or comparative education, at least for younger children.

3.3 Collective worship and external access

Collective worship at the school:

• took place principally via school assemblies;
• was explicitly Christian in content, Bible‑based and linked to the core syllabus; and
• was supplemented by visits from Christian ministers and representatives of Christian organisations (Scripture Union, Christian Fellowship Church), whose calling is to proselytise.

Further, Article 21(7) of the 1986 Order gives ministers of religion and “other suitable persons” a right of reasonable access to pupils in all grant‑aided schools “for the purpose of giving religious education” (including denominational teaching) or inspecting RE, unless parents object. In practice, the only such external persons at this school were Christian.

3.4 No inspection or monitoring of RE and worship

Unlike other parts of the curriculum, religious education and collective worship are not inspected by the Department’s inspectors. The Department frankly admitted it:

• does not know how RE is in fact taught in grant‑aided schools;
• does not know whether additional religious content is taught beyond the core syllabus; and
• does not evaluate whether collective worship or additional RE crosses into evangelism or proselytising.

Similarly, the school’s Board of Governors had no structured oversight of how RE and worship were delivered in practice. This absence of monitoring is highly significant in the Supreme Court’s analysis of the State’s positive obligations.

3.5 The statutory right of withdrawal and the parents’ reasons for not using it

Article 21(5) of the 1986 Order grants parents a statutory right to request that their child be wholly or partly excused from RE or collective worship, or both. There is:

• no requirement to give reasons;
• no requirement that the request be in writing; and
• an obligation on the school to comply immediately.

On its face, this is an automatic, unqualified exemption. But the reality at school level was more complex. Because:

• there were no pre‑existing alternative arrangements for excused pupils; and
• the school insisted that “prior” discussions be held to agree such arrangements, including what the child would do, where they would go, and who would supervise them,

exercising the right involved negotiation and planning between parents and school, with obvious scope for friction.

The parents did not withdraw JR87 for four main reasons:

1. Risk of stigmatisation and harm to the child:
   • she would have been the only child excluded from RE and worship in the entire school;
   • they feared bullying, isolation, or perception of punishment;
   • they feared she would repeatedly be flagged, year after year, to peers, staff and other parents as “the non‑Christian child”, particularly in a small, religiously homogeneous community.
2. Principle: she should not have to be excluded to avoid unlawful teaching:
   They objected to the idea that their daughter should be forced to opt out of part of her education simply because the State had specified an unlawful core syllabus.
3. Undue burden on parents:
   • they reasonably felt compelled to disclose their own non‑religious convictions to school staff – sensitive private information in a small community;
   • they anticipated, and to some extent experienced, potential conflict with the school about alternative provision;
   • they feared being seen as “awkward” or hostile to the majority faith.
4. Practical burden of co‑designing alternative arrangements:
   With no statutory alternative curriculum and no dedicated funding, devising a meaningful alternative educational experience during RE/worship time would require parent‑school negotiation and compromise, placing extra workload and emotional strain on the parents.

These concerns, supported by evidence and context, were accepted by the trial judge as “valid”. The Supreme Court places heavy weight on that finding.

4. Precedents and Authorities Cited

4.1 Core Strasbourg authorities on A2P1 and religious education

4.1.1 Folgerø v Norway (2007) 46 EHRR 47

Folgerø is the leading Grand Chamber authority on A2P1 and religious education. Norway replaced a purely Christian RE subject and a separate non‑religious subject with a combined course (“KRL”) in Christianity, religion and philosophy. There were:

• automatic exemptions (on request, no reasons) for activities clearly religious in character; and
• partial exemptions requiring parents to provide “reasonable grounds” explaining which activities conflicted with their convictions.

The Grand Chamber distilled key principles (paras 84(a)–(i)), which Lord Stephens reproduces and emphasises, notably:

• the State must ensure that information is conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner;
• the State is forbidden to pursue an aim of indoctrination not respecting parents’ convictions;
• parents are primarily responsible for the education of their children, but public schooling must still respect their convictions throughout the curriculum;
• the State owes a “duty of utmost care” in implementing these principles, including at the level of individual schools.

Crucially, the Court in Folgerø:

• treated teaching that was not objective, critical and pluralistic and teaching amounting to indoctrination as functionally equivalent (paras 71, 85, 102); and
• held that the partial exemption regime placed a “heavy burden” on parents, because requiring “reasonable grounds” risked compelling disclosure of intimate convictions and creating conflict with schools, thus deterring parents from seeking exemptions (para 98).

The Court concluded that Norway had failed to ensure objectivity, critical thinking and pluralism, and that the refusal to grant full exemption from the KRL subject for applicant families violated A2P1.

4.1.2 Papageorgiou v Greece (2019) 70 EHRR 36

In Papageorgiou, Greek law allowed exemption from compulsory Orthodox‑based RE courses if parents submitted a solemn declaration that their child was not Orthodox Christian. Making a false declaration was a criminal offence.

The Court held the procedure incompatible with A2P1 because it:

• required parents effectively to disclose their own religious or non‑religious status to the school and community; and
• placed a disproportionate burden on them, especially in small, religiously homogenous communities where the risk of stigmatisation is acute (para 87).

It emphasised that A2P1, read with Article 9, guarantees schoolchildren a right to education that respects their right to believe or not to believe (para 39) and found a breach of the rights of both parents and children.

4.1.3 Lautsi v Italy (2011) 54 EHRR 3

Lautsi concerned the display of crucifixes in Italian state school classrooms. Although the Grand Chamber ultimately found no violation, it held that:

• secularism is a philosophical conviction qualifying for protection under A2P1 and Article 9 (para 58); and
• parents retain a right to “guide [their children] on a path in line with [their] own philosophical convictions” at home and in private religious settings (para 75).

The case is relied on in JR87 to affirm that non‑religious humanist positions can amount to protected “philosophical convictions”.

4.1.4 Perovy v Russia [2021] ELR 298

In Perovy, the Grand Chamber clarified that:

• children are independent holders of the right to freedom of religion under Article 9;
• the first sentence of A2P1, read in light of the second sentence and Article 9, guarantees schoolchildren a right to education which respects their own right to believe or not (paras 49–50); and
• although the child in that case framed his complaint under Article 9 alone, it would have been open to him to rely on A2P1’s first sentence directly.

This case underpins the Supreme Court’s conclusion that JR87 herself (not only her parents) had a right under A2P1 read with Article 9 which was infringed.

4.2 Domestic authorities

4.2.1 R (Fox) v Secretary of State for Education [2015] EWHC 3404 (Admin)

Fox concerned the omission of non‑religious world‑views from GCSE Religious Studies specifications in England. Warby J emphasised that:

• the State’s obligation is to respect pluralism in publicly funded education; and
• the very fact that families have to rely on withdrawal rights can itself indicate a lack of pluralism in the curriculum.

Colton J in the High Court adopted this reasoning, and the Supreme Court approves that approach: the need to withdraw may, in itself, reflect a structural defect in the educational scheme.

4.2.2 R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] 2 AC 323 and R (AB) v Secretary of State for Justice [2022] AC 487

Under the Ullah principle, domestic courts should not generally “go beyond” the clear meaning of Strasbourg case‑law in developing new principles of Convention law. Lord Reed in AB re‑emphasised this restraint.

The Court of Appeal had invoked Ullah to argue that, since Strasbourg had never condemned an automatic, unqualified exemption as insufficient, domestic courts could not treat such a scheme as incompatible. The Supreme Court firmly rejects that reading, explaining that:

• no new principle is being developed;
• the Court is merely applying the established Strasbourg principle that rights must be practical and effective, and that exemptions must not be capable of placing an undue burden on parents; and
• there is no logical reason why that principle would apply only to partial exemptions and not to automatic ones.

5. Key Legal Reasoning and Principles

5.1 Indoctrination and the “objective, critical and pluralistic” standard

A central point of law in this judgment is the relationship between:

• the obligation to convey religious knowledge in an objective, critical and pluralistic way (A2P1, as interpreted in Folgerø); and
• the prohibition on the State pursuing an aim of indoctrination.

The Court of Appeal had treated these as distinct thresholds, suggesting that a breach of A2P1 arises only when the State is shown to have a forbidden aim of indoctrination, beyond mere failure to be objective, critical and pluralistic.

The Supreme Court disagrees, holding that Strasbourg jurisprudence (especially Folgerø) treats the two propositions as conceptually unified:

• If RE is not objective, critical and pluralistic, it is indoctrination.
  There is no separate category of “non‑objective but non‑indoctrinating” teaching.
• No additional proof of subjective State intent is required.
  Making breach contingent on proving that public authorities aimed at indoctrination would undermine effective protection. The focus is objective: what is happening in practice.

Lord Stephens describes indoctrination in this context as equivalent to Christian evangelism or proselytising in schools – i.e. teaching that seeks to win pupils over to a particular faith as truth, not teaching about religions in neutral terms. While he is careful to say “indoctrination” is not being used here as a moral criticism of religious practices outside school, in the A2P1 framework it marks the point at which State‑mandated teaching becomes unacceptable.

5.2 The role and limits of parental withdrawal rights

A critical and novel part of the judgment concerns whether an unqualified right to withdraw a child from RE and collective worship is sufficient, by itself, to “save” an otherwise indoctrinating curriculum.

The Supreme Court’s answer is clear: no. Withdrawal rights must themselves be:

• practical and effective; and
• not capable of placing an undue burden on parents nor stigmatising children.

Drawing upon Folgerø and Papageorgiou, the Court holds that the same Strasbourg principles apply whether the exemption is:

• a partial exemption requiring reasons (as in Folgerø); or
• an automatic exemption with no formal reason‑giving requirement (as in Northern Ireland).

The question is always whether, in practice, the scheme:

• risks forcing parents to reveal intimate religious or philosophical convictions to school authorities or the wider community;
• creates a “potential breeding ground for conflict” between parents and school; and/or
• carries a real risk of stigmatisation or isolation of the child, especially in small or religiously homogeneous communities.

The Court expressly rejects the Court of Appeal’s requirement that parental fears must be “objectively made out” in the sense that they “would have been realised in practice”. Instead, it suffices that reasonable apprehensions exist which make the right burdensome and deterrent. That reflects the Strasbourg focus on risk and capability of undue burden, not proof of actual harm in a particular family’s experience.

On the facts, the Supreme Court emphasises:

• the judge’s finding that the parents’ concerns about stigmatisation and conflict were “valid” was well‑supported and effectively unassailable on appeal;
• the small‑school context, the child being the only one withdrawn and the previous short‑lived withdrawals, increased the likelihood of stigma and pressure; and
• discussions “prior” to withdrawal, in the absence of any standard alternative provision or central guidance, inevitably invited disclosure of personal convictions and created potential for conflict.

Accordingly, the statutory right of withdrawal did not avoid a breach of A2P1 and Article 9. It itself suffered from the very defects condemned in Folgerø and Papageorgiou – undue burden, deterrent effect, and risk of stigma.

5.3 The Ullah principle and “no Strasbourg case on automatic exemptions”

The Department and the Court of Appeal argued that:

• Strasbourg had only condemned partial or qualified exemption schemes; and
• no case had held that an automatic or unqualified opt‑out was insufficient; so
• under Ullah, UK courts should not go further by scrutinising such schemes.

The Supreme Court carefully rejects this line of argument. It reasons that:

• Folgerø involved both automatic and partial exemptions; the Court’s reasoning on undue burden was principle‑based, not technical to one type.
• The underlying principle – that rights must be practical and effective, and that exemptions must not impose undue burden or stigma – is well‑established Strasbourg law.
• The fact that no previous Strasbourg case had encountered or condemned a particular configuration of domestic law does not mean domestic courts are barred from applying the general principles to that configuration.

Thus, the Supreme Court is applying Strasbourg principles, not creating a new doctrine. The Ullah restraint is not violated.

5.4 Children’s independent rights under A2P1 and Article 9

The Department’s cross‑appeal contended that the second sentence of A2P1 (respect for “parents’ convictions”) confers rights only on parents, such that the child’s own A2P1 claim should fail.

The Supreme Court rejects that submission, relying on Lautsi, Papageorgiou and Perovy, and holding that:

• children are rights‑holders under Article 9 ECHR (freedom of religion);
• the first sentence of A2P1 (“No person shall be denied the right to education”) must be read together with the second sentence and Article 9;
• so understood, A2P1 guarantees schoolchildren the right to education in a form which respects their right to believe or not to believe;
• that right is separate from, though guided by, parental rights: parents may seek to exercise their responsibilities to secure appropriate education, but the child’s own interests and rights are not reducible to the parent’s alone.

On that basis, the High Court was correct to find a violation of A2P1 read with Article 9 in relation to both G (as parent) and JR87 (as child). The Supreme Court endorses an approach where the outcome for the child’s claim will generally be guided by the analysis of the parental claim, but remains conceptually distinct.

5.5 Positive obligations: inspection, monitoring and guidance

Drawing on Folgerø (principle (i)), the Court stresses that the State must take the “utmost care” to ensure that religious education is delivered in conformity with A2P1:

• This includes monitoring and inspection of RE and collective worship, or at least ensuring some mechanism to verify compliance.
• It also suggests a duty to provide practical guidance to schools on:
  • how to arrange alternative provision for withdrawn pupils; and
  • how to structure procedures in a way that avoids undue burden and stigma for parents and children.

Although the Court stops short of definitively ruling that the Department’s failure to inspect RE is itself a separate breach of A2P1 (it notes that this is “not necessary” to decide), its reasoning makes clear that ongoing inaction in this area is constitutionally suspect and may well ground future challenges.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 “Objective, critical and pluralistic” religious education

In Convention terms, public education on religion must:

• Objective: present information about religious and non‑religious world‑views without assuming the truth of any one of them;
• Critical: develop pupils’ ability to think, question and evaluate claims, rather than simply accept them; and
• Pluralistic: expose pupils to more than one perspective – e.g. differing religions and non‑religious philosophies – so they appreciate diversity and can form their own views.

This does not forbid RE which devotes more time to Christianity, especially where historically dominant (the Court explicitly accepts that Christianity may legitimately be the main focus in Northern Ireland). But even where Christianity predominates, teaching must not:

• treat Christian doctrine as self‑evident truth that pupils are expected to accept;
• exclude all mention of other religions or non‑religious views for long phases of schooling; or
• discourage questioning or critical engagement.

6.2 Indoctrination vs evangelism vs neutral education

“Indoctrination” in this judgment is expressly not used with its usual pejorative tone. The Court treats it as a near‑synonym for Christian evangelism or proselytising: an attempt to win people over to Christian belief and practice as the sole path to salvation.

Outside the school context, evangelism is entirely legitimate religious activity. The Convention does not prevent churches or parents from engaging in it in homes, churches or voluntary settings.

However, when the State requires children to attend school and controls the curriculum:

• it may teach about religions and philosophies; but
• it may not use its compulsory powers to evangelise pupils in favour of a particular creed.

Where teaching is faith‑promoting (e.g. “God created the world”, “God loves you and forgives you”, “prayer is talking to God”) and not balanced by exposure to different perspectives or encouragement of questioning, it crosses the line into indoctrination for A2P1 purposes.

6.3 Margin of appreciation

The “margin of appreciation” is the leeway Strasbourg gives States in how they design their education systems. States are not required to adopt identical models of RE:

• Some may have predominantly Christian RE;
• Others may have multi‑faith or secular ethics courses; and
• Some may integrate religious and secular content across subjects.

But every system must respect the core obligations:

• no indoctrination by the state;
• information must be objective, critical and pluralistic; and
• withdrawal rights (if used as a safeguard) must be practical and effective, not stigmatic or onerous.

The Supreme Court is careful to emphasise that the case is not a challenge to the concept of religious education, to the Department’s general margin of appreciation, or to Christianity being the main religion studied in Northern Ireland. Rather, it is a challenge to:

• the particular content of the core syllabus;
• its exclusive Christian focus for children aged 4–11; and
• the absence of effective safeguards against indoctrination.

6.4 The Ullah principle

Domestically, courts are expected to apply Strasbourg case‑law but not usually to leap ahead of it. This is sometimes summarised as: “No more, but certainly no less.”

However, applying Strasbourg principles to new factual configurations is not “leaping ahead” – it is the ordinary judicial task. The Supreme Court here clarifies that:

• if Strasbourg has laid down a general principle (e.g. exemptions must not impose undue burden), domestic courts may and should apply it to automatic opt‑out regimes, even if no previous case has done so;
• Ullah does not require domestic courts to pretend that only the exact fact patterns litigated in Strasbourg are covered by Convention protections.

7. Impact and Future Implications

7.1 Immediate consequences for Northern Ireland

While the Supreme Court did not quash legislation, the practical effects for Northern Ireland’s education system are profound:

1. Core syllabus reform is now unavoidable.
   The Department has effectively been told that the current core syllabus:
   • as drafted by the four main churches; and
   • as applied to young children without substantial additional pluralistic material,
   is incompatible with A2P1 read with Article 9. The Transferor Representatives’ Council itself now accepts that the syllabus must be reviewed to include compulsory study of other faiths from the earliest stages.
2. School‑level practice must change.
   Controlled, Catholic maintained and integrated schools that currently:
   • deliver the core syllabus without significant additional comparative, pluralistic material; or
   • run collective worship and RE heavily focused on faith‑promotion, especially for very young children,
   are at risk of being in breach of their pupils’ and parents’ Convention rights.
3. Opt‑out procedures must be redesigned.
   Schools and the Department need to ensure that:
   • alternative provision for excused pupils is pre‑planned and standardised as far as possible;
   • parents are not required, even de facto, to disclose their personal beliefs as a pre‑condition for withdrawal;
   • withdrawal does not result in obvious stigma or isolation for the child; and
   • parents receive clear information about what their child will do instead, without contentious negotiations.
4. Inspection and guidance on RE and worship must be considered.
   The Department can no longer credibly maintain a position of complete ignorance about RE practice. It will almost certainly have to:
   • introduce some form of monitoring or inspection for RE and collective worship; and
   • issue guidance to Boards of Governors and principals on compliant models of RE and on handling withdrawal requests.

7.2 Wider UK implications

Although the judgment addresses Northern Ireland legislation, its general principles have potential spill‑over across the UK, particularly concerning:

• Collective worship in England and Wales, where daily acts of “wholly or broadly Christian” worship are also mandated by statute. This judgment reinforces that:
  • even where a Christian focus is permitted, the manner and context of worship and RE must not amount to state‑mandated indoctrination;
  • schools should be cautious in the use of external Christian organisations with a strong proselytising ethos in compulsory sessions;
  • withdrawal procedures must be designed to avoid undue burden and stigma.
• Multi‑faith and ethics curricula elsewhere in the UK:
  The judgment underlines that even well‑intentioned, values‑driven curricula must respect:
  • the need for pluralism (including, where appropriate, non‑religious humanist views); and
  • the risk that making dissenters use opt‑outs can itself be evidence of insufficient pluralism.

7.3 Strengthening children’s rights discourse in education

By affirming that children themselves are A2P1 rights‑holders whose own freedom “to believe or not to believe” must be respected, the Supreme Court:

• aligns domestic law with the trajectory of Strasbourg jurisprudence (Perovy, Papageorgiou);
• reinforces the growing emphasis – also reflected in UN instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child – on children as autonomous rights‑bearers, not merely objects of parental rights; and
• encourages future litigants and policymakers to consider the child’s perspective explicitly in education cases, beyond parental claims.

8. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

This judgment answers several fundamental questions about religious education and collective worship in a democratic society governed by the ECHR:

1. Non‑objective, non‑critical, non‑pluralistic religious education is indoctrination.
   For A2P1 purposes, these are not distinct categories. Any mandatory teaching that promotes a single faith as absolute truth, without exposure to other views or encouragement of critical thinking, breaches the State’s duty of neutrality and respect for parents’ and children’s convictions.
2. Withdrawal rights alone do not legitimise indoctrination.
   Even an unqualified, automatic right of withdrawal is insufficient if its practical operation is capable of:
   • placing a heavy burden on parents;
   • forcing disclosure of sensitive religious or philosophical beliefs;
   • creating conflict with school authorities; or
   • exposing the child to stigma or isolation.
   Rights must be practical and effective, not merely theoretical.
3. Children have their own Convention rights in education.
   A2P1, read with Article 9, guarantees each child education that respects their right to believe or not to believe. These rights sit alongside, and are informed by, but not subsumed into, parental rights.
4. The State has positive obligations to supervise and guide religious education.
   It is not enough to set a syllabus and then disclaim responsibility for how it is delivered. There must be mechanisms – inspection, guidance, oversight – to ensure objectivity, critical engagement and pluralism at the level of individual schools and classrooms.
5. Pluralism, not secularism, is the core requirement.
   This case does not mandate secular schools or the removal of Christian worship. It requires that religious education, even when Christian‑centred, respects pluralism and does not cross the line into state‑sponsored evangelism. Parents and churches remain free to evangelise in homes and churches; what is constrained is the State’s use of the compulsory school system to do so.

JR87’s case thus stands as a landmark in UK human rights law. It clarifies the boundaries of acceptable religious education; insists that opt‑out schemes must be genuinely accessible and non‑stigmatising; and reinforces the status of children as rights‑holders whose own beliefs, doubts or non‑belief must be respected by the State’s schools.