Humphreys v R: Clarifying the Evidential Threshold for Harm Category 1 in Dangerous-Driving Sentencing

1. Introduction

Humphreys, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 997) presented the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) with an opportunity to refine the application of the Sentencing Council guideline for Causing Serious Injury by Dangerous Driving (effective 1 July 2023). The appellant, aged 20, challenged a 30-month custodial sentence on the grounds that the trial judge:

Incorrectly placed the offence in culpability category A rather than B; and
Misclassified harm as category 1 rather than 2.

Beyond the immediate appeal, the judgment is significant for the way it:

Spells out the quantum and quality of evidence necessary before a court can conclude that an injury has a “substantial and long-term effect on the victim’s ability to work” (Harm Cat 1 c)); and
Re-emphasises that the capacity to undertake some work does not automatically defeat a category 1 classification—yet cogent, preferably expert, evidence is required.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Mr Justice Cavanagh, giving the single judgment of the court, dismissed the appeal. While the appellate court accepted that the harm element should be reduced from A1 to A2 (i.e., category 2 harm), it held that the revised starting point (three years) still comfortably justified the 40-month sentence before plea discount. Consequently, the 30-month term (post-25 % reduction) remained neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

Although the judgment is largely guideline-driven and does not cite an extensive list of earlier authorities, it draws implicitly upon two strands of existing case-law:

Guideline Interpretation Cases: Authorities such as R. v. Fraser ([2020] EWCA Crim 1141) cautioning against a rigid or “statutory” reading of sentencing guidelines. Cavanagh J expressly echoed these admonitions (“the sentencing guidelines should not be read as if they are a statute”).
Aggravating Factors in Dangerous-Driving Offences: Earlier holdings (e.g., R. v. Richardson [2019] EWCA Crim 983) that flight from the scene and post-incident deception exacerbate culpability.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Culpability Assessment

The court confirmed the trial judge’s view that three distinct A-level factors overlapped: (i) alcohol-impairment at twice the legal limit; (ii) a highly dangerous manoeuvre (crossing both lanes onto a main road without stopping); and (iii) speed inappropriate to night-time conditions.
Collectively, these facts pushed the offence firmly into culpability category A notwithstanding the appellant’s youth and previous good character.

3.2.2 Harm Assessment

“There was no medical evidence … to the effect that Miss Prothero’s injuries had a substantial and long-term effect on her ability to work.”

Under Harm Cat 1 c) of the guideline, an injury must cause a “permanent, irreversible condition … with a substantial and long-term effect on the victim’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities, or on their ability to work.” Cavanagh J parsed this test into two limbs: (a) day-to-day activities; (b) employment capacity. The court found:

No evidence of significant restriction in daily living by the sentencing date.
An evidential gap with respect to long-term work limitation—victim impact statements were sincere but lacked corroboration from healthcare professionals.

Therefore, while the initial sentencing judge was entitled to treat the injuries as “serious” and impose an uplift, the category 1 threshold was not met. The court ultimately re-slotted the case into category A2, yet upheld the quantum because:

The starting point for A2 is three years (range two–four).
Severe, though not catastrophic, injuries plus aggravating features (flight, lies, second victim) justified a move up the spectrum to 40 months.
Mitigating factors (age, remorse, good character) balanced rather than outweighed aggravation.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

Humphreys is poised to influence dangerous-driving sentencing (and potentially other guideline offences with similar harm matrices) in three principal ways:

Evidential Rigour for Harm Category 1
Victim assertions—even eloquently expressed in impact statements—are insufficient where the court seeks to rely on the “ability to work” limb. Objective evidence (medical reports or, in employment-related cases, vocational assessments) will now be expected.
Partial Work Capacity ≠ Automatic Category 2
The judgment cautions against a binary approach. A victim may hold some employment yet still be within category 1 if “many jobs or professions are closed off.” However, that conclusion must rest on evidence, not speculation.
Sentence Stability Despite Re-categorisation
By upholding the 40/30-month sentence within the A2 band, the Court has signalled that range navigation (moving up within the bracket) is a flexible tool allowing judges to reflect aggravating features without making formal upward departures.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Culpability” vs “Harm” – In guideline parlance, culpability measures the offender’s blameworthiness (state of mind, manner of driving), whereas harm gauges the consequences (injuries sustained).
Category A/B & 1/2 – Think of a grid: letters (A, B, C) run horizontally for culpability; numbers (1, 2, 3) run vertically for harm. “A1” is the worst combination, “C3” the least.
Manifestly Excessive – An appellate test asking whether the sentence is so unreasonable that no reasonable judge could have imposed it, rather than a mere disagreement on degree.
Youthful Defendants – Under s.96 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, offenders aged 18–20 should receive detention in a Young Offender Institution (YOI). Labelling a YOI sentence as imprisonment is a technical mistake but rarely affects term length.
Plea Discount – Early guilty pleas trigger reductions: up to 33 % at first appearance, sliding to 25 % at the PTPH (as here).

5. Conclusion

Humphreys v R adds an important nuance to the interpretation of the dangerous-driving guideline: the court must anchor a “substantial and long-term effect on ability to work” finding in cogent evidence, typically medical. The decision also illustrates the elasticity within guideline ranges, affirming that serious aggravating factors can justify sentences at or near the top of a lower harm bracket without straying beyond the prescribed range. Practitioners should now:

Adduce detailed, objective medical and vocational evidence when seeking (or resisting) a harm category 1 classification;
Anticipate that partial recovery or alternative employment will not, of itself, preclude category 1, but will require clear proof of broad employment restriction; and
Recognise that appellate success on categorisation may not translate into sentence reduction if the ultimate term is still properly located within the revised range.

In short, Humphreys reinforces evidential discipline in sentencing while preserving judicial discretion to calibrate punishment within guideline parameters. The judgment will likely be cited whenever courts grapple with the evidential sufficiency for harm category 1 in road-traffic and other serious-injury contexts.