Introduction

Attorney General Reference No. 3 of 1999 ([2001] 1 Cr App R 34) is a pivotal judgment delivered by the United Kingdom House of Lords on December 14, 2000. The case addressed a fundamental legal question regarding the interpretation of section 64(3B) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), specifically concerning the admissibility of DNA evidence when a prior DNA sample was improperly retained and used post-acquittal.

The case involved a defendant who was initially arrested and charged with burglary. After his acquittal for burglary, a DNA sample taken during that investigation was retained and later matched to DNA evidence in a more serious rape case. The defendant argued that the use of this DNA evidence violated statutory provisions, questioning its admissibility in court.

Summary of the Judgment

The House of Lords examined whether the retention and subsequent use of a DNA sample, which should have been destroyed following the defendant's acquittal for burglary, rendered the DNA evidence inadmissible under section 64(3B) of PACE 1984.

The Lords concluded that while section 64(3B)(a) clearly prohibits the use of such a sample in evidence against the individual, section 64(3B)(b) does not categorically prohibit using information derived from the sample for the purpose of investigating other offenses. Instead, any exclusion of evidence resulting from a prohibited investigation falls under the discretionary powers granted by section 78 of PACE. Consequently, the Court of Appeal's interpretation, which treated section 64(3B)(b) as mandatory and thus inadmissible without discretion, was deemed incorrect.

The House of Lords upheld the argument that information derived from a prohibited investigation could be admissibly used, provided the judge exercises discretion under section 78 to assess the fairness of admitting such evidence.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively referenced several key precedents:

• London and Clydeside Estates Ltd. v. Aberdeen District Council [1980]: Highlighted the complexities of statutory interpretation beyond mere binary classifications.
• R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Jeyaneanthan [1999]: Reinforced the importance of focusing on the consequences of legislative breaches rather than fitting provisions into defined categories.
• Kuruma v. The Queen [1955] AC 197: Established that relevant evidence is admissible regardless of how it was obtained, barring confessions.
• R. v. Khan (Sultan) [1997] AC 558: Supported the notion that unlawfully obtained evidence should not automatically be inadmissible.
• Reg. v. Weir (unreported, 26 May 2000): A case where a conviction was quashed due to the misuse of DNA evidence, which influenced the Court of Appeal's initial stance.

Legal Reasoning

The House of Lords undertook a meticulous statutory interpretation of section 64(3B) of PACE 1984. The key points in their reasoning included:

• Distinction Between Subsections: Section 64(3B)(a) explicitly prohibits using the sample in evidence against the individual, making it a mandatory prohibition. In contrast, section 64(3B)(b) prohibits using the information for investigations but does not explicitly state that such information is inadmissible in court.
• Role of Section 78: The Lords emphasized that any exclusion of evidence derived from a prohibited investigation must be determined by the judge's discretion under section 78 of PACE, which considers the fairness and integrity of the proceedings.
• Statutory Language: The absence of explicit language in section 64(3B)(b) about admissibility necessitates reliance on section 78, rather than treating the prohibition as an absolute bar.
• Public Interest Considerations: The judgment balanced individual privacy rights with the public interest in effective law enforcement, recognizing the societal need to prosecute serious crimes.

Impact

This judgment significantly impacts the handling of DNA evidence in the UK by:

• Clarifying Admissibility: It delineates the boundaries of statutory prohibitions and judicial discretion, ensuring that DNA evidence can still be utilized in serious cases even if procedural missteps occur, provided fairness is maintained.
• Guiding Future Cases: Courts now have a clearer framework for interpreting section 64(3B), preventing automatic exclusion of evidence derived from improperly retained samples.
• Balancing Rights and Justice: It reinforces the principle that while individual rights must be protected, they should not impede the pursuit of justice in cases of significant public concern.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 64(3B) of PACE 1984

This section deals with the requirements for destroying DNA samples when an individual is cleared of an offense. It has two parts:

• (a) Prohibits the use of the DNA sample itself as evidence against the person.
• (b) Prohibits using information derived from the DNA sample to investigate any offense.

The key issue was whether part (b) also implicitly forbids using derived information as evidence in court, which the House of Lords clarified does not automatically apply.

Section 78 of PACE

This section grants judges the discretion to exclude evidence if its admission would adversely affect the fairness of the trial. It serves as a safeguard to ensure justice is both served and perceived to be served.

Mandatory vs. Directory Provisions

A mandatory provision requires strict compliance without exception, while a directory provision serves as a guideline that courts can choose to follow based on the circumstances. The Court of Appeal incorrectly treated section 64(3B)(b) as mandatory, whereas the House of Lords clarified that it should be interpreted in conjunction with section 78, granting judicial discretion.

Conclusion

The House of Lords' judgment in Attorney General Reference No. 3 of 1999 marks a significant clarification in the interpretation of PACE 1984 regarding DNA evidence. By distinguishing between the mandatory prohibition of using DNA samples as evidence against an individual and the discretionary exclusion of information derived from such samples in investigations, the judgment ensures a balanced approach. This balance protects individual rights while upholding the public interest in prosecuting serious crimes effectively.

The ruling underscores the necessity of judicial discretion in maintaining fairness, preventing rigid statutory interpretations from undermining the criminal justice system's integrity. As a precedent, it provides a clear directive for future cases involving DNA evidence, ensuring that procedural missteps do not automatically preclude valuable evidence from contributing to the pursuit of justice.