Holistic, baseline-driven application of the proximity principle and reasons adequacy under Waste Plan Policy 4(c)

Holistic, baseline-driven application of the proximity principle and reasons adequacy under Waste Plan Policy 4(c)

Introduction

In Stop Portland Waste Incinerator v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government & Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 1405, the Court of Appeal addressed a single, tightly framed public law question: did the Secretary of State fail to discharge the statutory duty to give adequate reasons, specifically in relation to the “proximity principle” limb of Policy 4(c) of the Bournemouth, Christchurch, Poole and Dorset Waste Plan 2019 (“the Waste Plan”), when granting permission for a large Energy Recovery Facility (“ERF”) at Portland Port?

The appeal arose from Dorset Council’s refusal of Powerfuel Portland Limited’s (“PPL”) ERF proposal, citing among other things conflict with Policies 1 and 4 and the proximity principle. Following an 11‑day inquiry in December 2023, the Inspector recommended allowing the appeal. The Secretary of State accepted that recommendation and granted permission. A section 288 TCPA 1990 challenge by the campaign group Stop Portland Waste Incinerator (“SPWI”) failed in the High Court (Lang J), and permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was granted only on a narrow “reasons” ground focused on Policy 4(c).

The case sits at the intersection of: (i) the legal standard for adequacy of reasons, (ii) the substantive content and interaction of key waste planning principles (waste hierarchy, self‑sufficiency, and proximity), (iii) an “unusual” plan policy that expressly requires a comparative assessment between an unallocated site proposal and allocated sites, and (iv) the significance of Green Belt constraints on allocated sites versus the practical baseline of actual waste flows. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the Inspector’s and Secretary of State’s reasons.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed SPWI’s reasons challenge. It held that the Inspector and the Secretary of State gave legally adequate reasons for concluding that the proposal complied with Policy 4, including Policy 4(c)’s requirement that a scheme on an unallocated site “supports the delivery of the Spatial Strategy … and adheres to the proximity principle.” The Court emphasised:

  • The adequacy of reasons is judged pragmatically and holistically, focusing on the principal important controversial issues, and decision documents are to be read fairly and as a whole by an informed audience (paras 26–27).
  • Policy 4’s criteria overlap, and the Spatial Strategy permeates the analysis under multiple limbs (paras 68–70); decision‑makers may therefore reason holistically rather than disaggregating each limb with separate sub‑conclusions.
  • Applying the proximity principle is fact‑sensitive: it can legitimately be assessed relative to the existing real‑world baseline of waste movements (including significant exports outside the plan area) and not exclusively by theoretical comparison with allocated sites that have not come forward (paras 71–73).
  • Where allocated sites are in the Green Belt, the substantial weight to Green Belt harm, and the availability of a suitable non‑Green Belt alternative, may outweigh locational advantages claimed under the Spatial Strategy (paras 73–74).
  • The Inspector’s comparative analysis of the appeal site versus the Parley and Canford Magna allocations, and his finding that the appeal scheme would reduce waste miles relative to the status quo, provided ample reasoning that the proximity principle was adhered to (paras 72–75).

Analysis

Precedents and authorities cited

  • General reasons law: The Court endorsed the well‑established principles (set out by Lang J and summarised at para 27): reasons need only address the principal important controversial issues; they must not create substantial doubt that the decision‑maker erred in law; they should be intelligible to informed parties; and a claimant must show substantial prejudice from any deficiency.
  • Monkhill Limited v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2020] PTSR 416; [2021] PTSR 1432: Cited for the “tilted balance” under NPPF 11(d). The Inspector explained that only if Dorset’s Waste Plan policies were out of date (which he rejected) would the tilted balance apply (paras 50–51).
  • R (Tesco Stores Ltd) v Stockport MBC [2025] EWCA Civ 610: Quoted for the approach that policies should be understood and applied with “realism and common sense” (para 75).

National policy references included the NPPF paragraph 11(d) “tilted balance” and paragraph 153 (2023 NPPF) on Green Belt “very special circumstances,” which contextualised the Inspector’s analysis of the alternative Green Belt allocations.

The Court’s legal reasoning

1) The correct frame: what “reasons adequacy” required in this case

The only live issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the Inspector and Secretary of State gave legally adequate reasons on adherence to the proximity principle within Policy 4(c). SPWI expressly did not pursue misinterpretation or irrationality arguments on appeal (paras 8–9). The Court therefore asked whether the decision made clear, to an informed reader, the Inspector’s conclusions on the principal controversial issue and why he reached them, bearing in mind:

  • Decision letters/reports are addressed to parties well aware of the issues and arguments (para 27(3)).
  • Reasons need not address every material consideration, nor treat each plan limb with discrete sub‑findings, especially where criteria overlap (paras 27(1), 68–70).
  • Success requires showing genuine and substantial prejudice from any deficiency (para 27(4)).

2) Overlap within Policy 4 and the Spatial Strategy

A central plank of the Court’s reasoning is that Policy 4’s limbs overlap, and the Spatial Strategy permeates them all (paras 68–70). Criterion (c) refers expressly to the Spatial Strategy, the waste hierarchy, and the proximity principle; yet those elements are also engaged under criteria (a)–(b) when comparing the suitability and availability of allocated sites versus a non‑allocated alternative. As the Court put it, the Spatial Strategy is the foundation for allocations in Policy 3 and is “reflected in criteria (a) and (b)” (para 68).

The legal consequence is important: decision‑makers may give reasons that address these interlinked strands together, rather than artificially compartmentalising. The adequacy question is not whether there is a separate, self‑standing paragraph labelled “proximity principle,” but whether the reasoning shows that the proximity issue was in fact grappled with and resolved. The Court found that it was.

3) The proper comparator for proximity: allocated sites versus the real‑world baseline

SPWI’s core complaint was that the Inspector only compared the appeal site to allocated sites—a comparison they said was relevant to Policy 4(a), but not to Policy 4(c)—and failed to reason why the proximity principle (within 4(c)) was satisfied. The Court rejected that reading and made two key clarifications:

  • The Waste Plan itself (Policy 4 and para 6.11) contemplates that allocated sites may not come forward and allows acceptable, non‑allocated sites to deliver the Spatial Strategy (paras 71–72). Accordingly, a comparative exercise between the proposal and the allocations was not only legitimate but required by the (unusual) policy design (IR 12.11–12.13; para 53).
  • Critically, the proximity principle in this case could not sensibly be applied solely by comparing the appeal site to (hypothetical) development on allocations that had failed to materialise over time and were subject to acute constraints (notably, Green Belt). The Inspector was entitled to consider the existing baseline—that Dorset’s residual waste was actually being transported long distances to landfill and ERFs in other counties and overseas—and to find that the appeal scheme would reduce waste miles relative to that baseline (paras 72, 61, 62, and IR 12.95). That is a direct application of the proximity principle to real conditions on the ground.

This is the judgment’s most practically significant clarification: adherence to the proximity principle can be reasoned by reference to real‑world waste flows (waste miles today) and not exclusively by reference to a plan‑led counterfactual in which constrained allocations are presumed to come forward.

4) Green Belt constraints and their bearing on the Spatial Strategy and proximity

The Inspector recognised that Canford Magna might perform better in terms of the Spatial Strategy’s locational preference for south‑east Dorset. But the site sits in the Green Belt. The Inspector found that an ERF there would cause a “very high” level of Green Belt harm and other harms (IR 12.105), and stressed that “very special circumstances” (VSC) are unlikely if provision can be made outside the Green Belt—as the appeal scheme demonstrated (IR 12.107). The Court endorsed this logic (para 73), which aligns with NPPF Green Belt policy: substantial weight is given to Green Belt harm; if a non‑Green Belt alternative can meet the need acceptably, that severely undermines the VSC case for Green Belt development.

The result is a balanced judgment: the Inspector did acknowledge Canford’s locational advantages under the Spatial Strategy (hence proximity), but explained, in reasons the Court found “unimpeachable,” why those advantages did not prevail over the Green Belt harms and constraints (para 73; IR 12.108).

5) Why the reasons were “adequate”

Read fairly and as a whole, the Inspector’s report and the Decision Letter:

  • Squarely identified the “waste issue,” including need and plan compliance (IR 12.2–12.14);
  • Reaffirmed the Waste Plan as up to date, rejecting Dorset’s attempt to recalibrate “need” downwards (IR 12.5–12.9; DL 16);
  • Executed the comparative exercise between the appeal site and Parley/Canford (IR 12.100–12.109; DL 17), noting Parley’s limited capacity and Green Belt status and Canford’s Green Belt and other constraints;
  • Explicitly recognised that the appeal scheme would reduce waste miles relative to the current position in which Dorset’s residual waste is sent out of county (IR 12.95; paras 61–62);
  • Drew the overall conclusion that the proposal “would have very clear advantages over the allocated sites … and as such, it complies with Policy 4 … [and] accords with Policy 1” (IR 12.109; DL 17).

The Court rejected the notion that the Inspector treated the “need/capacity gap” as dispositive of Policy 4 compliance. The Inspector reasoned on all relevant limbs (including the proximity element), and the Green Belt analysis showed that he undertook a balanced, policy‑integrated judgment (paras 78–80). There was no substantial prejudice to the appellant; the reasons enabled opponents to understand both why they lost and how the decision would inform future cases (para 75).

Impact and implications

1) Proximity principle in practice: baseline‑first realism

This judgment confirms that, where the plan expressly anticipates flexibility on unallocated sites, adherence to the proximity principle may legitimately be assessed against the actual baseline of waste flows rather than only a theoretical alternative of allocated sites that have stalled or are severely constrained. In effect:

  • Applicants on unallocated sites can demonstrate proximity compliance by showing net reductions in waste miles relative to current export patterns, alongside alignment with the waste hierarchy and greater self‑sufficiency.
  • Objectors and authorities cannot insist that proximity be assessed only by reference to the geography of allocations if those allocations are not realistically deliverable within the plan period or are subject to constraints (such as Green Belt) that materially affect their planning balance.

2) The “unusual” comparative exercise validated

Policy 4 requires a qualitative comparative assessment between the proposal and allocated sites. The Court endorses this design and confirms that the comparative exercise is not a narrow site‑location test: it legitimately encompasses viability/deliverability, Green Belt policy, and whether benefits (e.g., self‑sufficiency, reduction in waste miles, heat/power networks) can be achieved at lower policy cost outside the Green Belt.

3) Green Belt significance in residual waste planning

The judgment sharpens the Green Belt’s gatekeeping effect for strategic residual waste schemes. Where a non‑Green Belt site can meet the Waste Plan’s needs acceptably, it will be difficult to demonstrate VSC for a Green Belt ERF even if the latter is geographically closer to sources of arisings. Plan‑makers and promoters should therefore expect Green Belt constraints to carry determinative weight in the comparative exercise under policies like Policy 4.

4) Reasons challenges: practical guidance for decision‑makers

The Court reiterates the core reasons law and gives concrete guidance for planning decision‑makers:

  • Do identify and address the principal controversial issues;
  • Do reason holistically where policy criteria overlap, rather than artificially disaggregating every limb;
  • Do explain the comparative logic if the development plan requires it (as here);
  • Do anchor proximity reasoning in the real-world baseline where relevant and justified by the plan’s flexibility;
  • Do capture decisive constraints (e.g., Green Belt) that affect the overall balance and the deliverability of alternatives.

Properly done, such reasons will enable opponents to understand both the outcome and its implications for future cases—meeting the twin aims identified at para 27(2).

Complex concepts simplified

  • Proximity principle: Waste should be recovered or disposed of as close as practicable to where it is produced, using the nearest appropriate facilities, to protect the environment and public health and minimise transport (“waste miles”).
  • Waste hierarchy: A ranked approach prioritising prevention, then reuse, recycling, recovery (e.g., ERF), with landfill last.
  • Self‑sufficiency: The plan area should, as far as practicable, provide enough capacity to manage its own waste arisings rather than exporting them.
  • Policy 4 (unallocated sites): Permits waste facilities on unallocated land where criteria (a)–(d) are met, including a comparative advantage over allocations and support for the Spatial Strategy (including proximity and waste hierarchy).
  • Spatial Strategy: The plan’s overarching spatial logic for where and how capacity should be provided, balancing hierarchy, self‑sufficiency, proximity, environmental constraints, and flexibility.
  • Green Belt/VSC: Built waste facilities are ordinarily “inappropriate development” in the Green Belt. Permission requires “very special circumstances” that clearly outweigh Green Belt harm and any other harm. The availability of a suitable non‑Green Belt alternative strongly undermines VSC.
  • Reasons adequacy: A legal standard requiring that decision‑makers explain their conclusions on the main controversial issues sufficiently to avoid substantial doubt about legal error and to inform parties how the underlying approach will apply in future; reasons are read as a whole, for an informed audience.
  • Baseline: The actually occurring conditions (here, existing waste exports and miles). The Court confirms it can be the proper comparator for proximity where allocations are not delivering.

Conclusion

Stop Portland Waste Incinerator clarifies two points of real importance for waste planning and reasons challenges:

  • First, when a waste plan, like Dorset’s, expressly enables unallocated sites and requires a comparative exercise, decision‑makers may—and often should—apply the proximity principle with reference to the existing baseline of waste flows, not just a theoretical allocation‑led scenario, especially where allocations face entrenched delivery constraints (notably Green Belt). A reduction in waste miles relative to the current position is cogent evidence of adherence to proximity.
  • Second, reasons adequacy is satisfied by a holistic explanation addressing the principal controversial issues. There is no duty to compartmentalise overlapping policy criteria into separate mini‑judgments. Where, as here, the Inspector explained the comparative advantages over allocated sites, the decisive effect of Green Belt policy on those allocations, and the improvement over the status quo in waste miles and self‑sufficiency, the reasons were “ample.”

For future cases, the decision endorses a realism‑and‑common‑sense approach to the Spatial Strategy and proximity: if allocated sites are not delivering, well‑reasoned proposals on non‑allocated sites that improve the baseline in hierarchy, self‑sufficiency and proximity terms can lawfully be found compliant—provided the reasoning is explicit about the comparative exercise and the planning balance, including any Green Belt constraints. The appeal was therefore rightly dismissed.

Case details

  • Citation: [2025] EWCA Civ 1405 (Court of Appeal, Civil Division)
  • Judgment date: 6 November 2025
  • Parties: Stop Portland Waste Incinerator (Appellant) v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government; Powerfuel Portland Limited; Dorset Council (Respondents)
  • Outcome: Appeal dismissed
  • Key policies: Waste Plan Policies 1, 3, 4 (especially 4(c)), 21; NPPF 11(d), 153 (2023)
  • Statutes and rules: s.288 TCPA 1990; s.70(2) TCPA 1990; s.38(6) PCPA 2004; Town and Country Planning (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2000

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

Comments