Hemming v Poulton [2025] EWCA Civ 1494: Context, Repetition, and Preliminary Issues in Modern Defamation Law

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hemming v Poulton & Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 1494, a significant case in English defamation law arising from online publications concerning allegations of child sexual abuse, the conduct of a journalist, and a former Member of Parliament.

Although the underlying litigation is sprawling – involving cross-claims of harassment, additional parties, and allegations of SLAPPs (strategic lawsuits against public participation) – the appeal was tightly focused. It concerned:

the meaning of two specific publications by journalist Sonia Poulton about former MP John Hemming;
whether those meanings were defamatory at common law;
whether the words were statements of fact or opinion; and
the costs order made after the preliminary issue trial.

The judgment, delivered by Warby LJ (with Falk LJ and Bean LJ agreeing), is important not because it radically changes the substantive law of defamation, but because it:

clarifies how the so-called “repetition rule” should operate in practice;
confirms that context and tone can reduce an allegation from one of guilt to one of “grounds to investigate” (Chase level 3);
treats an allegation that there are reasonable grounds to investigate someone for serious criminality as a factual, defamatory imputation;
illustrates how courts should deal with preliminary issue trials on meaning, especially where “reference” and innuendo meaning are intertwined; and
shows the Court of Appeal willing, in unusual circumstances, to step in and itself determine both reference and meaning to avoid further procedural complication.

These points are of real practical importance to media defendants, claimants in defamation, and courts managing increasingly complex online publications and SLAPP-adjacent disputes.

2. Case Background

2.1 Parties and claims

The claimant, John Hemming, is a businessman and former MP. He sued Sonia Poulton, a journalist, principally for libel arising out of two publications:

The Video – a podcast-style YouTube interview with Ms Poulton hosted by Shaun Attwood and published in November 2019, within a wider discussion of child abuse, Jeffrey Epstein, Jimmy Savile, and alleged paedophiles in Parliament. A key segment concerned allegations by Esther Baker, who has accused an unnamed MP of sexually abusing her as a child. In the Video, Ms Poulton links those allegations to Mr Hemming.
The Update – a short “POLICE UPDATE” posted on 10 September 2021 on Ms Poulton’s online “fighting fund” page, giving an account of a police interview about an alleged breach of reporting restrictions and criticising unnamed “dark characters” who supposedly pressured authorities to charge her and were desperate to stop her reporting on child abuse.

Mr Hemming’s claim alleged that:

the Video conveyed that he is a paedophile who raped Esther Baker as a child and used baseless legal threats to conceal his sexual misconduct with children; and
the Update (though not naming him) referred to him by way of innuendo and suggested that he had falsely reported her to the police and sought to cover up child abuse, including his own alleged abuse of Ms Baker.

Separate harassment and libel claims between other parties (Samuel Smith, Darren Laverty, and Ms Poulton) and allegations of SLAPP and abuse of process formed the broader context, but the Court of Appeal did not address those on this appeal.

2.2 Procedural posture

The proceedings had reached a trial of preliminary issues before a Deputy High Court Judge, Susie Alegre. Pursuant to CPR Part 53 and Practice Direction 53B, she was asked to decide, for both the Video and the Update:

the natural and ordinary, and (where applicable) innuendo meanings of the words complained of;
whether each publication was defamatory of the claimant at common law; and
whether each was a statement of fact or of opinion.

A key complication was the Update. It did not name Mr Hemming. His case depended on:

reference: whether the reasonable reader would understand the Update to be about him; and
true innuendo meaning: whether, given extrinsic facts known to readers, the words carried additional defamatory meanings concerning him.

Before the preliminary trial, a Master had struck out substantial parts of Ms Poulton’s Defence that denied the Update referred to Mr Hemming. This left the trial judge in an awkward position: to decide meaning and defamation without a formal resolution of the reference issue, yet in a context that practically required it.

After losing on the central meaning issues, Mr Hemming appealed. He contended that:

the judge had given the Video too “low” a defamatory meaning (Chase level 3 rather than level 1 or 2);
the judge had mishandled the Update by treating reference as unresolved yet assuming it “to some extent” for her analysis; and
the costs order (“costs in the case”) was wrong because he had substantially succeeded at the preliminary trial.

3. Summary of the Judgment

3.1 The Video

The Court of Appeal:

upheld the judge’s conclusion that the Video did not allege outright guilt (Chase level 1) or reasonable grounds to suspect guilt (Chase level 2);
affirmed that the Video conveyed a Chase level 3 meaning: that there are reasonable grounds to investigate whether Mr Hemming abused Esther Baker as a child; but
criticised the way the judge had expressed that meaning, which was paraphrastic and failed clearly to identify the defamatory sting.

The Court substituted its own, more precise formulation:

The single natural and ordinary meaning of the Video is that “there are reasonable grounds to investigate whether John Hemming abused Esther Baker when she was a child”, and this is a defamatory factual imputation.

To that limited extent, the appeal on the Video succeeded (in form, not substance).

3.2 The Update

On the Update, the Court of Appeal undertook a more radical reconstruction.

It held that the Master had not conclusively determined the reference issue in Mr Hemming’s favour: the denial was struck out, but there had been no summary judgment on reference, and reference therefore remained an unresolved question of fact.
It recognised that the judge’s determination was an “unsatisfactory halfway house”, forced on her by the procedural posture. The Court, to avoid further delay and cost, decided to resolve both reference and meaning itself.
It held that, read in the context of the wider fundraising page, the Update did refer to Mr Hemming.
It then held that the Update, in its natural and ordinary meaning (in context), conveyed three defamatory imputations about him:
- (1) he tried to stop Ms Poulton exposing child abuse by members of the Establishment by:
  - (a) participating in the inappropriate and excessive pressure on the police and the Attorney General to charge her with a reporting restriction offence; and
  - (b) harassing and attacking her on other occasions;
- (2) his motivations for this behaviour were improper; and
- (3) there are reasonable grounds to investigate whether those motivations include a desire to cover up his own criminal activities.
It agreed with the trial judge that limb (3) was at Chase level 3, i.e. suggesting that there are grounds for investigation, not asserting guilt.
It categorised almost all of these meanings as fact, with only two components (use of words such as “inappropriate and excessive” and “improper”) being opinion.

On that basis, the Court allowed the appeal on the Update, set aside the judge’s earlier determination, and substituted its own findings on reference, meaning, and characterisation as fact/opinion.

3.3 Costs

The Court upheld the trial judge’s order that the costs of the preliminary trial be “costs in the case”:

preliminary issues were not dispositive of the whole action;
the judge was entitled to take into account the parties’ conduct in the proceedings overall, which raised broader questions beyond the preliminary issues; and
there is no fixed rule that the party “winning” preliminary meaning issues should receive an immediate costs order.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Precedents and Earlier Authorities

The judgment draws on, and refines, a series of important defamation authorities. The Court’s approach cannot be understood without seeing how it deploys them.

4.1.1 Preliminary issues and PD53B

Tilling v Whiteman [1980] AC 1 – Lord Scarman’s warning against “treacherous short cuts” is the classic cautionary note against ill-judged preliminary issues. Warby LJ recalls this to emphasise that, although preliminary meaning trials are valuable, they can go badly wrong when deployed inappropriately.
CPR Part 53 and Practice Direction 53B – These expressly authorise preliminary determinations of:
1. meaning;
2. whether the words are defamatory at common law; and
3. whether they are fact or opinion.
The judgment strongly endorses the utility of such determinations in media and communications claims: they are usually evidence-light and relatively cheap, and often enable early settlement or strike-out.
Hewson v Times Newspapers Ltd [2019] EWHC 650 (QB) – confirms that meaning can sometimes be determined on the papers, without an oral hearing.
Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17; [2020] AC 593 – the Supreme Court emphasised that appellate courts should be slow to interfere with trial judges’ findings on meaning, as these involve evaluative judgments about how the ordinary reader would understand words. Warby LJ cites it for the limited scope of appellate interference on meaning.
Millett v Corbyn [2021] EWCA Civ 567; [2021] EMLR 19 – extends similar deference to decisions on whether words are fact or opinion.
Dyson v Channel Four Television Corp [2023] EWCA Civ 884; [2023] 4 WLR 67 – emphasises the benefits of early rulings on meaning (prompt compromise, clarity about the “target” of a truth defence, etc.). It also warns of the dangers of preliminary trials on true innuendo meaning and reference (i.e. whether unnamed words refer to the claimant), because those may require witness evidence and complex factual disputes.
Bindel v PinkNews Media Group Ltd [2021] EWHC 1868 (QB); [2021] 1 WLR 5497 – Nicklin J cautions against preliminary trials on true innuendo and reference for similar reasons.
Blake v Fox [2025] EWCA Civ 1321 – is cited for the point that a preliminary ruling on meaning is binding at trial and shapes truth, public interest, malice, and remedies.
Harcombe v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2022] EWHC 543 (QB) – illustrates that courts may rescind a prior order for preliminary issues if, on reflection, they prove unsuitable or unmanageable.
The King’s Bench Guide is invoked to reinforce that preliminary issues are generally ordered only where they can be decided without contested witness evidence and that rulings must be clear, precise, and firmly focused on the defamatory imputations about the claimant.

These authorities underpin the Court’s dual message:

preliminary trials on meaning, defamation, and fact/opinion are often highly useful; but
preliminary trials on innuendo meanings and reference can be dangerous and should be used sparingly and carefully.

4.1.2 Meaning, Chase levels, and the repetition rule

Several leading cases shape the Court’s approach to the key conceptual issues in this appeal:

Shah v Standard Chartered Bank [1999] QB 241 – central on the “repetition rule”. It explains that where a statement is a bald repetition of an allegation (e.g. “C says D is a thief”), it will usually convey the same defamatory sting as the original allegation. May LJ describes the rule as rooted in the reality that such repetitions, in substance, restate the original charge.
Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772; [2003] EMLR 11 – introduces the familiar “Chase levels”:
1. Level 1: an allegation that the claimant is guilty of the wrongdoing;
2. Level 2: an allegation that there are reasonable grounds to suspect the claimant of the wrongdoing;
3. Level 3: an allegation that there are reasonable grounds to investigate whether the claimant has committed the wrongdoing.
Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 – a foundational case on the distinction between guilt and suspicion. The House of Lords rejected the argument that, as a matter of law, a statement of suspicion necessarily implies guilt. Lord Devlin’s famous “smoke and fire” analogy is revisited in this judgment: one may speak of “smoke” (suspicion) without asserting “fire” (guilt), depending on context.
Stern v Piper [1997] QB 123 – includes Simon Brown LJ’s earlier description of the repetition rule as a “rule of law which, where it applies, dictates the meaning to be given”, which is later carefully reinterpreted.
Mark v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 882; [2002] EMLR 38 – revisits Stern. Simon Brown LJ clarifies that the repetition rule “dictates” meaning only in the sense that it reflects empirical reality: people hearing a simple repetition of a defamatory accusation tend to treat it as if the speaker endorsed the accusation. He also emphasises that the “bane and antidote” principle requires consideration of the publication as a whole: if qualifying words (the “antidote”) completely neutralise the sting (the “bane”), the publication may not be defamatory overall.
Chalmers v Payne (1835) 2 C.M. & R. 156 – provides the “bane and antidote” metaphor quoted in Mark.
Sergi v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1983] 2 NSWLR 669 – Hutley JA explains that the bane-and-antidote idea is just another way of saying that the publication must be read as a whole.
Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB); [2020] 4 WLR 25 and Brown v Bower [2017] EWHC 637 (QB); [2017] 4 WLR 197 – Nicklin J formulates a widely adopted, structured approach to determining meaning and clarifies the repetition rule’s proper role. In Brown v Bower he stresses that the rule is not to be applied “mechanistically” and that context may show whether repetition amounts to endorsement.

Warby LJ approves this modern, context-sensitive understanding. The repetition rule is descriptive, not prescriptive: it describes what usually happens with “bald” repetition, but it does not override the fundamental question – what meaning the ordinary reasonable reader actually takes from the publication as a whole.

4.1.3 Identification (“reference”) and innuendo

Simon v Lyder [2019] UKPC 38; [2020] AC 650 – from the Privy Council, used to support the idea of a “nexus” between publications. Where disparate statements on a webpage or series of articles are thematically linked, the reasonable reader may infer that unnamed persons in one statement are the same as named persons in others.

This concept of a “nexus” is crucial to the Court’s conclusion that the Update referred to Mr Hemming, despite not naming him.

4.1.4 Costs

Vardy v Rooney [2020] EWHC 3831 (QB) – Warby LJ’s own earlier decision, where he took the approach that successful preliminary issue parties might be awarded their costs immediately. He acknowledges that this is not universal practice and that costs in the case orders are common – especially where preliminary issues are intertwined with a broader pattern of litigation conduct.

4.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.2.1 The Video: Repetition, context, and Chase level 3

The key question on the Video was: did repeating Esther Baker’s allegation about an unnamed MP, linked to Mr Hemming, and recounting that he had “outed himself” amount to:

a straightforward allegation that he was a paedophile (Chase level 1);
an allegation that there were reasonable grounds to suspect him (Chase level 2); or
an allegation that there were reasonable grounds to investigate whether he abused Ms Baker (Chase level 3)?

Mr Hemming argued for level 1 or, at least, level 2, relying on the repetition rule and Mark v Associated: once the allegation is repeated, the “bane” is imported unless neutralised by a powerful “antidote”.

Warby LJ rejected a rigid, rule-based approach. Relying heavily on Brown v Bower and Lewis, he emphasised:

the primary task is always to determine the single meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader/viewer by the publication as a whole;
you do not:
1. isolate one sentence,
2. mechanically apply the repetition rule to dictate a meaning, and then
3. hunt for an “antidote” elsewhere.
Rather, you read and assess the entire publication, including tone and context.
repetition can convey endorsement (especially if bald), but it can also be presented in a way that clearly distances the publisher from the truth of the allegation.

The trial judge had watched the full Video and found that, compared with Poulton’s treatment of Savile, Epstein, and another politician, the segment on Hemming and Baker was:

much more measured and qualified in tone;
hedged with language such as “alleging” and “I’m not making any accusations about John Hemming”;
explicitly acknowledging uncertainty (“I don’t know the truth of the story”).

Against that backdrop, the judge concluded that the Video’s meaning was at Chase level 3 – serious but short of suggesting guilt or reasonable grounds to suspect guilt. The Court of Appeal held that:

this was a result open to the judge, particularly as she alone had seen and heard the Video; and
there was no error of law or principle in treating the contextual qualifications and tone as moderating the meaning from level 1 or 2 to level 3.

What did concern the Court was the formulation of the meaning in the order below. The judge had expressed the meaning as:

(i) Esther Baker made public allegations of child abuse by an MP and John Hemming revealed that those allegations were about him. Esther Baker must feel that those allegations have not been thoroughly investigated.

(ii) John Hemming is very proactive in protecting his reputation, including through the use of legal threats.

Warby LJ pointed out that:

this is a paraphrase, not a precise statement of the defamatory imputation;
it buries the real sting (that there are grounds to investigate whether he abused Ms Baker) within an implicit suggestion about what Ms Baker “must feel”; and
it mixes in non-defamatory material (e.g. being proactive in defending one’s reputation) that distracts from the key issue.

The Court therefore reformulated the meaning in a sharper, more targeted way:

The Video’s single natural and ordinary meaning is that there are reasonable grounds to investigate whether John Hemming abused Esther Baker when she was a child.

Critically, the Court held that:

this is a factual allegation, not an opinion; and
it is defamatory at common law.

That classification (fact vs opinion) matters for the availability of the honest opinion defence and will influence how any future public interest defence is framed.

4.2.2 The Update: Reference, meaning, and Chase level 3

(a) The reference problem

The Update posed a structurally different challenge. It did not name Mr Hemming. His case was that:

it referred to him by implication (reference by innuendo); and
readers who knew contextual facts about his disputes with Poulton would infer that he was one of the “dark characters” pressuring the authorities to have her charged.

Before the preliminary trial:

Hemming applied both:
- for preliminary issues on meaning and reference; and
- to strike out parts of the Defence denying reference, arguing they contradicted an earlier witness statement of Poulton’s and were therefore abusive.
Deputy Master Sabic struck out Poulton’s denial that the Update referred to Hemming, but did not grant summary judgment on the issue of reference.
The Master also chose not to list reference as a preliminary issue, only meaning (plus defamation and fact/opinion).

The Court of Appeal held that this created the central difficulty:

on a proper analysis, the question “does the Update refer to Hemming?” remained unresolved in the pleadings;
yet the trial judge was asked to determine meaning as if reference were fixed;
the judge understandably concluded she should “assume reference in some capacity” while acknowledging it remained unclear “how far” he was implicated.

Warby LJ criticises the way the reference issue was handled at the Master’s stage:

Reference is objective: the test is whether the hypothetical reasonable reader would understand the words to refer to the claimant. The publisher’s subjective intentions or beliefs (e.g. Poulton’s statement to the police that she thought the pressure came from Hemming and others) are irrelevant to that question.
As a result, the supposed contradiction between Poulton’s witness statement and her Defence did not justify treating reference as “decided” in Hemming’s favour.
The Master was entitled to strike out material wrongly focusing on Poulton’s intentions, but not to remove entirely her entitlement to put the claimant to proof on reference in the absence of summary judgment.

Given this, Warby LJ concludes that the judge was left with three theoretical options:

decide meaning without finding a Hemming-specific meaning (effectively sidestepping reference);
decide reference as well as meaning; or
decline to decide any preliminary issue on the Update at all (rescind the order).

The judge chose option (1) but did so imperfectly, assuming some degree of reference without formally deciding it. On appeal, to avoid delay and wasted costs, the Court decided to adopt option (2) itself.

(b) Reference: did the Update identify Hemming?

Using Simon v Lyder as authority for the “nexus” concept, Warby LJ examines the fundraising page as a whole. The page:

explained that Poulton was a journalist exposing Establishment child abuse;
stated that she had “enemies” who were “desperate” to harm and silence her;
referred to “Paedophiles in Parliament” (PiP), and to Hemming by name as a former MP featuring in it;
told readers that Hemming was suing her for defamation over her child-abuse reporting;
stated she was countersuing him for harassment;
claimed his conduct was unreasonable and designed to silence her; and
said that “some people look for any reason to report me to authorities”, citing an example of Hemming sending her an email in October 2020 claiming she was under police investigation.

Against that background, the reasonable reader of the page would see the Update as part of a continuing narrative about the same dispute. The Court held:

There was a link or “nexus” between the Update and the other statements on the fundraising page sufficient to identify Hemming as a subject of the Update’s criticisms.

Thus, the case on reference was made out: the Update did, objectively, refer to him.

(c) Meaning: what did the Update say about Hemming?

Having resolved reference, the Court revisited meaning. It accepted and built upon the judge’s findings about extrinsic facts and likely reader knowledge (the Esther Baker allegation, PiP, the libel and harassment suits, Poulton’s public comments about Hemming seeking to “destroy” her and her work).

However, the Court largely treated the defamatory imputations as arising from the natural and ordinary meaning of the Update, read in the context of the fundraising page as a whole, rather than from a distinct “true innuendo meaning” requiring extrinsic facts. It concluded that the Update meant, in relation to Hemming:

He has tried to stop Poulton exposing child abuse by members of the Establishment by:
- (a) participating in the application of inappropriate and excessive pressure on the police and Attorney General to charge her for breaching reporting restrictions; and
- (b) harassing and attacking her on other occasions.
His motivations for this behaviour were improper.
There are reasonable grounds to investigate whether those motivations include a desire to cover up his own criminal activities.

The Court held that:

these are defamatory meanings at common law;
limb (3) clearly falls within Chase level 3 – there are grounds for investigation, not an assertion of guilt; and
this is consistent with the tones and caveats found elsewhere on the page concerning allegations against Hemming.

(d) Fact vs opinion

The Court then determined whether these meanings were statements of fact or opinion:

the factual core – that Hemming:
- participated in pressure on authorities;
- harassed and attacked Poulton; and
- is someone whose motivations provide reasonable grounds for investigating whether he is trying to cover up his own crimes –
is all fact.
only two descriptors – “inappropriate and excessive” and “improper” – are evaluative judgements and therefore opinion. They are value-laden characterisations of conduct otherwise presented as factual.

Significantly, the Court reiterates that an assertion that there are “reasonable grounds to investigate” is not mere opinion: it is a factual assertion about the state of evidence and suspicion, and thus has to be defended (if at all) by proof of underlying facts.

4.3 Preliminary Issues and Case Management Lessons

The case illustrates both the strengths and risks of preliminary issue practice in modern defamation litigation.

4.3.1 Benefits

The Court reaffirms the benefits trumpeted in Dyson and the King’s Bench Guide:

early meaning rulings can:
- decisively end weak cases (if no defamatory meaning is found);
- exclude certain defences (e.g. honest opinion) by classifying statements as fact;
- shape and narrow truth and public interest defences; and
- encourage settlement by clarifying the battlefield.
legal principles on meaning and fact/opinion are now well-developed, and evidence is usually confined to the words themselves, making such trials suitable for short, contained hearings.

4.3.2 Risks and judicial cautions

But the case also shows what happens when preliminary issues are set in motion without fully appreciating the complexity of reference and innuendo meaning:

the Master’s decision to strike out the Defence’s denial of reference, without granting summary judgment on reference, gave a false impression that reference was fixed;
the judge was then asked to decide meaning, with an assumption of reference, while formally told reference was not in issue; and
this produced an “unsatisfactory halfway house” where reference was neither properly decided nor wholly ignored.

Warby LJ’s guidance is implicit but clear:

if reference and innuendo meaning are closely intertwined, it is often better either:
- to hear them together as part of a single preliminary trial; or
- not to attempt a preliminary trial at all.
courts should be wary of striking out a denial of reference without:
- granting summary judgment in favour of the claimant; and
- recognising that the claimant still bears the burden of proof on reference.
if preliminary issues prove unmanageable or ill-suited, the court can rescind them (as in Harcombe).

The Court’s willingness to step in and resolve both reference and meaning itself at appellate level – an unusual step – underscores a commitment to the overriding objective: dealing with cases justly, proportionately, and without unnecessary cost or delay.

4.4 Costs and Litigation Strategy

On costs, the Court confirms:

costs decisions are discretionary and appellate intervention is rare;
there is no inflexible rule that a party who “wins” on preliminary meanings automatically recovers its costs for that stage; and
judges may legitimately consider:
- the extent to which preliminary issues are dispositive or self-contained; and
- wider conduct of the parties across the litigation when deciding whether to award costs immediately or make them “costs in the case”.

This acknowledges that in complex, multi-front defamation wars – particularly where SLAPP allegations and harassment cross-claims are in play – preliminary victories on meaning may not meaningfully reflect the parties’ overall “success” or the just allocation of costs at that stage.

5. Impact on Future Cases and the Law

5.1 Substantive defamation law

From a doctrinal standpoint, Hemming v Poulton consolidates, rather than revolutionises, existing law, but with some notable clarifications:

The repetition rule is contextual, not mechanical.
The Court debunks any idea that repeating an allegation automatically equates to endorsing it as true or even as reasonably suspected. This limits attempts by claimants to use the repetition rule to “force” a level 1 or 2 meaning wherever a serious allegation is repeated. Context, tone, and explicit caveats may downgrade an imputation to Chase level 3.
“Reasonable grounds to investigate” is a factual, defamatory imputation.
The Court strongly affirms that:
- a Chase level 3 allegation is still defamatory (especially if the supposed wrongdoing is grave, e.g. child sexual abuse); and
- it is a statement of fact, not opinion – the publisher is asserting an objective state of affairs (that such grounds exist).
Journalists cannot safely characterise such allegations as mere commentary.
Contextual “nexus” can establish reference to an unnamed claimant.
Where a fundraising page or series of online posts repeatedly names and attacks a specific individual, subsequent posts on the same page using generic descriptors (“dark characters”, “people desperate to stop me”) can easily be read as referring to that person. Publishers cannot assume that omitting a name will avoid liability if the context points squarely at them.
Fact vs opinion: limited scope for recharacterising allegations as opinion.
The Court shows a willingness to treat much of the Update’s content as factual. Only obviously evaluative words (“inappropriate”, “improper”) were classed as opinion. This is consistent with a trend towards strict demarcation of opinion-based defences, reinforcing that a robust set of underlying facts must be clearly indicated if a defendant wishes to rely on honest opinion.

5.2 Procedural and strategic impact

For litigants and practitioners, several strategic messages emerge:

Pleading and managing preliminary issues:
- Be cautious about splitting “meaning” from “reference” and “innunedo meaning” where they are fact-sensitive and intertwined.
- If you seek to strike out a denial of reference, consider whether you must also pursue (and justify) summary judgment on reference, not just excision of the Defence pleading.
- When drafting orders after preliminary trials, the meanings recorded should be precise, focused imputations, not narrative paraphrases.
Online campaigns and fundraising pages:
- Defendants should recognise that a series of posts or updates will commonly be read as a coherent thread. If specific individuals are named in some posts, generic attacks in later posts may naturally be taken to include them.
- This is especially sensitive where the page solicits funds by portraying the defendant as a persecuted truth-teller facing vexatious litigation and official harassment.
Use of disclaimers and caveats:
- While merely adding the word “alleged” does not immunise a publication, consistent and genuine qualifications, together with tone and context, can significantly affect the Chase level of the meaning.
- Defendants who want to avoid endorsing allegations must do more than mechanically label them as “allegations”; they must shape the context so it is clear they are reporting, not adopting, them.
SLAPP and public interest contexts:
- Although the Court expressly declined to engage with SLAPP and abuse-of-process issues on this appeal, the judgment indirectly shows that:
  - defamation procedure already includes tools (serious harm, preliminary issues, strike out, public interest defence, abuse of process) that can be deployed in such disputes; and
  - courts remain attentive to litigation conduct and proportionality, as seen in the costs reasoning and references to parties’ behaviour “far beyond” the preliminary issues.

5.3 Impact on journalists and online publishers

For journalists and independent commentators – particularly those publishing investigative or campaigning material about child abuse or Establishment misconduct – the case is a timely reminder that:

repeating allegations, even as part of “telling the story”, may be defamatory at least at Chase level 3;
a statement that there are reasonable grounds to investigate criminal behaviour is serious and ordinarily factual;
fundraising pages, blog updates, and Twitter-style commentaries are not low-liability zones: they are treated as part of the same publication ecosystem and will be read together; and
in naming or clearly identifying particular individuals in the course of such campaigns, it is very easy to cross the line into actionable defamation if motive or criminality is ascribed without solid footing.

Bean LJ’s concurring remark, that a defendant publishing a fundraising webpage is “treading on eggshells”, captures the practical risk. The law remains complex, and libel litigation remains potentially ruinous in costs. While this is not a problem the Court can fundamentally solve, Hemming v Poulton underscores the fine-grained scrutiny that such pages will attract.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 The “Chase levels”

When courts interpret a defamatory allegation, especially about crime, they often classify its seriousness using the Chase framework:

Level 1 – The words assert that the claimant is guilty of the wrongdoing.
Level 2 – The words assert that there are reasonable grounds to suspect the claimant of the wrongdoing.
Level 3 – The words assert that there are reasonable grounds to investigate whether the claimant has committed the wrongdoing.

All are capable of being defamatory, but level 1 is most serious. This case shows that level 3 allegations are still highly grave where the underlying allegation is child sexual abuse or serious criminality.

6.2 The repetition rule

The “repetition rule” says that if you repeat a defamatory allegation, you are treated as making that allegation yourself. Saying “X says that Y is a paedophile” is usually no safer than saying “Y is a paedophile”.

However, this rule is not absolute. Courts now treat it as a tool:

It reflects what usually happens with simple, bald repetitions.
But context matters: if you qualify, challenge, or distance yourself clearly from the allegation, you may avoid being taken to endorse it fully.

Hemming v Poulton is a good example: the Court held that, in context, the Video only conveyed there were grounds to investigate, not that Hemming was guilty or reasonably suspected.

6.3 Bane and antidote

The “bane” is the defamatory sting; the “antidote” is qualifying material that neutralises or mitigates it. Courts read the publication as a whole:

If the antidote fully cancels the bane, there may be no defamatory meaning overall.
Often, though, the antidote only moderates the sting – for example, lowering a level 1 or 2 imputation to level 3.

In this case, Poulton’s disclaimers and tone functioned as a partial antidote, moderating (but not removing) the defamatory implications of repeating Baker’s allegations.

6.4 Natural and ordinary meaning vs true innuendo

Two main types of defamatory meaning exist:

Natural and ordinary meaning: what the average reader would understand from the words alone in their context (e.g. a whole webpage).
True innuendo meaning: additional meanings only apparent to readers who know specific extrinsic facts (e.g. that “Mr A” previously sued over a particular allegation).

Hemming v Poulton shows that where context (within the same webpage) is available to all readers, the defamatory import may properly be treated as “natural and ordinary”, even if the claimant also pleads extrinsic facts.

6.5 Reference

“Reference” is about whether the statement is about the claimant. If they are not named, the claimant must show that reasonable readers who know the surrounding context would understand that the statement refers to them.

Reference is judged:

objectively (not by what the publisher intended);
from the standpoint of the ordinary reasonable reader; and
in context (including other linked publications).

In this case, even though the Update did not name Hemming, his prior prominence on the fundraising page and his role in the described disputes created a sufficient “nexus” to identify him.

6.6 Fact vs opinion

Courts distinguish:

Statements of fact – assertions that something happened or exists (e.g. “X pressured the CPS”, “there are grounds to investigate Y”).
Statements of opinion – value judgements or comment (e.g. “X’s conduct was shameful”).

This matters because only opinions can be defended under the honest opinion defence, which requires:

that the statement is opinion;
that it indicates the basis of the opinion; and

that an honest person could have held the opinion on the basis of true facts.

Here, the Court labelled “inappropriate and excessive” and “improper” as opinion, but treated the core allegations (participation in pressure, harassment, grounds to investigate a cover-up of one’s own crimes) as fact.

6.7 SLAPP

A “SLAPP” (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) is a lawsuit (often defamation) brought not primarily to seek redress but to intimidate, silence, or burden critics (journalists, activists, whistle-blowers) with heavy legal costs and protracted proceedings.

In this case:

Poulton argued that Hemming’s claims were a SLAPP and an abuse of process.
Those issues were not before the Court of Appeal on this appeal, and the Court therefore did not rule on them.

Nonetheless, the broader background – including extensive litigation and cross-claims – forms part of the context in which the Court dealt with preliminary issues and costs.

7. Conclusion

Hemming v Poulton is a detailed, practitioner-focused judgment that refines how English courts should approach:

the interpretation of repeated allegations and the “repetition rule”;
the calibration of defamatory meaning using the Chase levels;
the complex interplay of reference, innuendo, and context in online publications;
the fact/opinion distinction in imputations of investigative suspicion; and
the use and management of preliminary issue trials under PD53B.

Its central contributions include:

reasserting that meaning is a question of how the publication as a whole affects the reasonable reader, not the mechanical application of sub-rules;
clarifying that an allegation of “reasonable grounds to investigate” serious wrongdoing is both defamatory and factual;
endorsing a contextual, “nexus”-based approach to reference when unnamed statements appear on a page that elsewhere names the claimant; and
demonstrating that the Court of Appeal will, in appropriate cases, step in to regularise defective preliminary issue determinations in the interests of procedural fairness and economy.

At the same time, the judgment highlights the acute exposure of individuals publishing investigative or campaigning content online – especially in areas like child abuse and Establishment misconduct – to finely calibrated but potentially devastating defamation litigation. Bean LJ’s observation about defendants “treading on eggshells” in fundraising pages is likely to resonate widely in media and civil society circles.

In the broader landscape of defamation and media law, Hemming v Poulton will serve as a key authority on the modern, context-driven application of the repetition rule, the classification of Chase level 3 allegations, and the strategic deployment of preliminary issues in complex, multi-party cases.