Flexible Application of National Density Guidelines, “Accessible Locations” and Reasons in Split-Scheme Appeals – Commentary on AAI Baneshane Ltd v An Coimisiún Pleanála (No. II) [2025] IEHC 642

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the judgment of Humphreys J in AAI Baneshane Ltd v An Coimisiún Pleanála (No. II) [2025] IEHC 642, delivered on 21 November 2025 by the High Court of Ireland in its Planning & Environment list. The case forms part of a pair of linked judicial reviews (Phase I and Phase II) concerning a proposed build-to-rent apartment development at Canterbury Gate, Old Navan Road, Mulhuddart, Dublin 15.

The core legal significance of the decision lies in three related points:

the Court’s endorsement of a flexible, evaluative application of the 2024 Sustainable Residential Development and Compact Settlements Guidelines for Planning Authorities (“2024 Compact Settlements Guidelines”), particularly in relation to the concept of an “accessible location” and density ranges;
a reaffirmation of a practical, context-based standard for adequacy of reasons under s.34(10)(b) of the Planning and Development Act 2000 (“PDA 2000”), including where the planning authority departs from an inspector’s recommendation;
confirmation that, where a developer has artificially split a single overall scheme into two applications, An Coimisiún Pleanála (the Board) is lawfully entitled to assess density and layout by reference to the overall scheme, not only each application in isolation.

The judgment in Phase II (“AAI Baneshane II”) explicitly follows and applies the reasoning of the companion decision in AAI Baneshane Ltd v An Coimisiún Pleanála (No. I) [2025] IEHC 641 (“AAI Baneshane I”), which is to be read in tandem. All core issues raised in the Phase II challenge had already been resolved in Phase I, so this judgment is in large measure an application of those principles to the second set of proceedings.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The applicant, AAI Baneshane Ltd, sought judicial review of An Coimisiún Pleanála’s decision of 13 November 2024 refusing permission (appeal ref. ABP 315450-23) for Phase 2 of a two-phase build-to-rent apartment scheme comprising 91 units at Canterbury Gate.

The Board refused permission principally on the bases that:

the proposal, when assessed as part of the overall scheme (Phases 1 and 2), resulted in a net density of approximately 184 dwellings per hectare (dph), which was significantly in excess of the ranges “generally” considered appropriate for such a site under the 2024 Guidelines; and
the development “of itself constitutes a poor disposition of units on the overall site”, and the site was in “relative isolation from high frequency public transport”, such that it did not qualify as an “accessible location” warranting densities up to 150 dph.

The applicant advanced three “core grounds”:

Core Ground 1 – Misinterpretation / Irrationality: the Board’s conclusion that the site was “in relative isolation from high frequency public transport” and not suitable for higher density under the 2024 Guidelines was said to be irrational, unsupported by evidence, and based on a misinterpretation of the definition of “accessible location” (Table 3.8 of the Guidelines) contrary to s.34(2)(ia) PDA 2000.
Core Ground 2 – Failure to Give Reasons (Accessible Location): the Board allegedly failed to adequately explain its disagreement with the inspector’s conclusion that the site was an “accessible location”.
Core Ground 3 – Failure to Give Reasons (Layout): the Board allegedly failed to provide adequate reasons for its conclusion that there was a “poor disposition of units on the overall site”, particularly given the inspector’s detailed positive assessment of the layout.

In addition, the Board raised a preliminary argument that the applicant had failed to challenge all of the reasons for refusal – in particular, the Board’s approach to the calculation of density across both phases – and that this failure was fatal.

Humphreys J:

expressed some doubt as to whether the preliminary objection was fatal but considered it unnecessary to resolve definitively because the applicant failed on the merits in any event (para. 39);
held that each of the three core grounds failed for the same reasons as those given in AAI Baneshane I (paras. 42, 45, 48, 50);
emphasised that the Board was entitled to:
- apply the 2024 Guidelines flexibly, including their definition of “accessible location”;
- assess the density of the overall scheme at 184 dph and reject it as significantly above the guideline ranges;
- disagree with the inspector’s analysis, provided it gave intelligible reasons, which it did.

The proceedings were therefore dismissed, with a provisional order of no order as to costs unless written submissions seeking a different costs order were filed within 7 days (para. 51).

3. Factual and Procedural Background

3.1 The Development and the “Split” Applications

The proposed development related to a site at Canterbury Gate, Old Navan Road, Mulhuddart, Dublin 15. The developer sought to construct build‑to‑rent apartments in two linked phases:

Phase 1: the subject of AAI Baneshane I [2025] IEHC 641 and refused by the Board (appeal ref. ABP 315425‑22);
Phase 2: the subject of the present proceedings (Phase II), involving 91 build‑to‑rent apartments and associated works (planning register ref. FW22A/0237; appeal ref. ABP 315450‑23).

Notably, in para. 1 Humphreys J remarks that:

“For unexplained reasons (but one infers in order to split the project to avoid strategic housing development thresholds), the developer divided the development site into two parts and made two separate planning applications…”

Both planning applications were refused by Fingal County Council, primarily on the ground that each half, taken alone, did not make sense as a stand‑alone proposal. The developer appealed both refusals to the Board. The inspector recommended that permission be granted for both phases (reports of 28 February 2024 and addenda of 21 and 23 October 2024), but the Board, in a meeting of 4 November 2024, decided to refuse permission for both.

3.2 Engagement with the New Development Plan and 2024 Guidelines

During the appeal process, a new Fingal Development Plan (2023–2029) came into effect, as did the Sustainable Residential Development and Compact Settlements Guidelines for Planning Authorities (January 2024). Recognising this change in the policy framework, the Board:

issued s.137 PDA 2000 notices on 22 May 2024 (and again on 20 August 2024 in relation to Phase 1), inviting submissions on:
- the new development plan; and
- the 2024 Guidelines, including in particular questions surrounding density and amenity (e.g. how Phase 1’s residential amenities would be provided if Phase 2 did not proceed).
issued s.131 notices inviting the planning authority to comment on the applicant’s responses (paras. 13, 18).

Fingal County Council declined to make further substantive submissions (paras. 11, 14, 16, 19).

3.3 The Board’s Decision and Reasons

In its order dated 13 November 2024, the Board refused permission for Phase 2. Its core reasoning (para. 37) can be summarised as follows:

Having regard to:
- the Fingal Development Plan 2023–2029; and
- the density provisions of the 2024 Compact Settlements Guidelines;
the proposed development “of itself constitutes a poor disposition of units on the overall site”.
This defect was “compounded” by the fact that, treating the overall scheme (Phases 1 and 2) as a unit, it would lead to a net density of 184 dph, which the Board described as:
“significantly in excess of the range which would generally be considered for such a site under the Ministerial Guidelines.”
Considering the site as a “City – Suburban/Urban Extension” location and finding that it was in “relative isolation from high frequency public transport”, the Board concluded that:
- the development would not accord with the density ranges “open for consideration” under the Guidelines; and
- it was contrary to the proper planning and sustainable development of the area.
The Board expressly recorded why it did not accept the inspector’s recommendation:
- it considered it appropriate to assess density by reference to the overall scheme (both concurrent applications);
- in City – Suburban/Urban Extension areas, densities of 40–80 dph (net) “shall generally be applied”;
- densities of up to 150 dph (net) are “open for consideration” only at “accessible” suburban/urban locations (as per Table 3.1 and Table 3.8 of the Guidelines);
- although the Board “noted” that densities up to 150 dph “shall be open for consideration” at accessible locations, it considered that the site “fails to meet this test” “given the distance to existing or planned high frequency public transport services”.

The potential significance of this reasoning is that the Board:

applied the upper range of 150 dph as a ceiling applicable only to “accessible” locations; and
took a holistic, site-wide view of density across both phases rather than considering each application in isolation.

3.4 Judicial Review Proceedings

The applicant issued proceedings on 14 January 2025. On 20 January 2025, leave for judicial review was granted for both Phase 1 and Phase 2 decisions. The two sets of proceedings were heard together on 6 November 2025 and judgment reserved. A draft judgment was circulated on 10 November 2025, and this final judgment was delivered on 21 November 2025 (paras. 28–33).

The reliefs sought included:

certiorari of the Board’s decision;
remittal to the Board for reconsideration in accordance with law;
a range of declarations, including one that the protective costs regime under s.50B PDA 2000, the Environment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011 and O.99 RSC, read with Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention, applied to the proceedings (para. 35(iv)); and
costs-related orders.

4. Legal Issues Before the Court

4.1 Preliminary Objection: Failure to Challenge All Reasons

The Board argued (para. 38) that the applicant had failed to challenge all of the reasons underpinning the refusal, in particular:

the Board’s approach to density across both decisions and both phases; and
the explicit conclusion that a density of 184 dph was “significantly in excess of the range which would generally be considered” for such a site under the 2024 Guidelines.

On the Board’s reading, “the range which would generally be considered” referred to the upper bound of 150 dph (which is “open for consideration” at accessible locations), not to the 40–80 dph range “generally applied” in City–Suburban/Urban Extension areas. It contended that, even on the applicant’s own case, the concurrent density exceeded 150 dph, and the applicant had not directly challenged the legality of refusing permission on that basis. Therefore, the challenge was, in the Board’s submission, defective and should fail in limine.

The applicant, by contrast, argued that:

the Board’s own decision was “crystal clear”;
once the Board determined that the site was not “accessible”, it considered itself confined to applying the lower range of 40–80 dph;
the references to density “significantly in excess of the range which would generally be considered” clearly pointed to that 40–80 range, not 150 dph; and
if the applicant succeeded in undermining the Board’s conclusion that the site was not an accessible location, the entire density rationale, including its reliance on the lower band, would fall.

Humphreys J stated that he was “not completely persuaded” that the Board’s objection was fatal (para. 39), but that, even assuming the objection could be overcome, the applicant faced “the next, and fatal, set of obstacles” on the merits.

4.2 Core Ground 1 – Misinterpretation of the 2024 Guidelines and Irrationality

Core Ground 1 alleged that the Board’s conclusion that the site was “in relative isolation from high frequency public transport” (and thus not suitable for the higher density ranges) was:

irrational, as there was allegedly no evidence to support such a finding; and
legally erroneous, in that the Board failed to properly apply and/or misinterpreted the definition of “accessible location” in Table 3.8 of the 2024 Guidelines, contrary to s.34(2)(ia) PDA 2000.

The applicant emphasised that the inspector had determined the site to be within 500 m of a high frequency public transport service – thus falling squarely within the guideline definition of an accessible location – and had explained that up to 150 dph was therefore open for consideration. It argued that:

the Board’s finding of “relative isolation” was inconsistent with that objective measurement;
the Guidelines did not permit the Board to “displace” the 500 m criterion in Table 3.8, which had been adopted “to allow for consistent application”; and
the Board had not explained any principled reason for departing from the inspector’s analysis on this key guideline concept.

The Board countered that this ground overlooked the overall density of 184 dph, which exceeded even the upper “open for consideration” threshold of 150 dph in Table 3.1, meaning that the case could not succeed even on the applicant’s premise. It also stressed that Table 3.8 expressly states:

“The characteristics detailed in Table 3.8 are not exhaustive and a local assessment will be required.”

Thus, the definition of “accessible location” is not a mechanistic checklist; it requires an evaluative local judgment. The Board contended it had performed precisely that assessment and lawfully concluded that, despite proximity in pure distance terms, the site was in “relative isolation” from high frequency public transport when viewed in its broader context.

4.3 Core Ground 2 – Adequacy of Reasons Regarding “Accessible Location”

Core Ground 2 alleged that the Board failed, contrary to s.34(10)(b) PDA 2000 and constitutional justice, to give adequate reasons for its rejection of the inspector’s view that the site was an “accessible location” under the Guidelines.

The Board’s answer was that it had explicitly explained its position: it considered the site to be “in relative isolation from high frequency public transport” and thus not to meet the “accessible location” test. That was a clear and specific statement of its reason for departure from the inspector’s recommendation, and the applicant could not credibly claim to be in any doubt as to why permission had been refused.

4.4 Core Ground 3 – Adequacy of Reasons Regarding “Poor Disposition of Units”

Core Ground 3 focused on the phrase “poor disposition of units on the overall site”. The applicant argued that:

a bare reference to “relevant provisions” of the Fingal Development Plan and unspecified density provisions of the Guidelines did not explain why the Board considered the layout to be poor; and
this was particularly problematic given that the inspector had provided detailed reasoning explaining why, in terms of daylight, overlooking, internal circulation, flood risk, and open space/planting, the layout of both phases together was acceptable.

The applicant further contended that the Board’s Statement of Opposition simply confirmed the deficiency in reasons, as it failed to identify any specific provisions of the plan or guidelines that supported the Board’s conclusion. In submissions the Board then contended that:

the inspector had considered the layout of the overall scheme (Phase 1 + Phase 2) as a single integrated development; whereas
the Board had considered the layout of each individual application “of itself” on the overall site, given that the developer had chosen to proceed by way of two separate applications.

According to the Board, this meant that it was not simply “disagreeing” with the inspector on the same question; it was addressing an additional and different question that the inspector had not directly confronted – namely, whether each phase, viewed on its own, was acceptably laid out relative to the full site.

The applicant objected that this was an artificial ex post facto justification, not properly pleaded, and that in any event the Board had still failed to provide a reasoned analysis of why it considered the layout poor.

5. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

In Phase II, Humphreys J expressly declines to re‑state in detail the reasoning already given in AAI Baneshane I. Instead, he indicates that:

Core Ground 1 “corresponds to ground 1 in the Phase I case and fails for similar reasons” (para. 42);
Core Ground 2 “corresponds to ground 2 in the Phase I case and fails for similar reasons” (para. 45);
Core Ground 3 “corresponds to ground 3 in the Phase I case and fails for similar reasons” (para. 48).

Nevertheless, the Phase II judgment – together with the parties’ pleadings and positions summarised in it – allows us to identify the key elements of the Court’s reasoning.

5.1 Treatment of the Preliminary Objection

The Court does not uphold the Board’s preliminary objection as a standalone dispositive point, but the analysis is important. The judge notes (para. 39) that he is “not completely persuaded” that the applicant’s failure to challenge certain density-related aspects of the decision is fatal, but he also emphasises that even if the applicant surmounted this threshold issue, it would still face “the next, and fatal, set of obstacles.”

This contributes to a broader line of authority in Irish judicial review that:

where a decision is supported by multiple distinct reasons, a challenger will usually need to show a legal flaw in each such reason that is sufficient to vitiate the decision as a whole; and
failure to challenge one or more substantial, independent reasons can be highly problematic, although in some cases the Court may prefer to address the merits rather than decide purely on procedural or pleading grounds.

In practical terms, the judgment serves as a caution to litigants: in planning judicial review, the entire reasoning chain in the impugned decision must be carefully assessed and, where necessary, challenged. Attempting to focus only on one aspect (e.g. misinterpretation of “accessible location”) while leaving other key rationales (e.g. overall density being too high even on the generous assumption that the site is accessible) unchallenged is risky.

5.2 Application of the 2024 Guidelines and the Concept of “Accessible Location” (Core Ground 1)

While the detailed reasoning is contained in Phase I, Phase II confirms the following key points:

The Guidelines are evaluative, not purely mechanical.
The Board and the Court treated the 2024 Compact Settlements Guidelines as requiring a case‑by‑case, context‑sensitive assessment, especially for the category of “accessible location”. This is supported by the explicit language quoted in the judgment:
“The characteristics detailed in Table 3.8 are not exhaustive and a local assessment will be required.”
Thus, the presence of a 500 m distance guideline to high frequency public transport is not a rigid legal entitlement to classification as “accessible”. It is a starting point that must be applied with professional judgment, having regard to local conditions and other characteristics.
The Board may disagree with the inspector’s application of the Guidelines.
The inspector concluded that the site was within 500 m of high frequency public transport and hence “accessible”; the Board concluded that the site was nonetheless in “relative isolation from high frequency public transport” and thus not accessible for the purpose of the higher density range. The Court accepts that:
- such a divergence is permissible; and
- the Board, as the decision‑making body, is entitled to form its own evaluative judgment, provided it acts within the terms of the Guidelines and the statute, and its conclusion is not irrational.
Interplay between the two density bands in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 of the Guidelines provides:
- for “suburban and urban extension locations in Dublin and Cork”, densities of 40–80 dph (net) “shall generally be applied”; and
- for “accessible suburban/urban extension locations”, densities of up to 150 dph (net) “shall be open for consideration”.
The Board’s decision explicitly recognises this structure. It applies the 40–80 dph band as the normal range for a City–Suburban/Urban Extension site and acknowledges that up to 150 dph is “open for consideration” in the special case of accessible locations. It then finds that:
- the site is not “accessible”; and
- even on the most generous reading, the concurrent density of 184 dph is well beyond the ranges contemplated for the site.
No misinterpretation or irrationality shown.
The Court, following Phase I, finds that the applicant’s attempt to characterise the Board’s conclusion as a misinterpretation of Table 3.8 or as irrational fails. The Board:
- acknowledged the structure of the Guidelines;
- conducted a local assessment that it was entitled to conduct; and
- reached a conclusion on accessibility and density that fell within the range of rational planning judgment.
Core Ground 1 therefore fails (para. 42).

5.3 Adequacy of Reasons on “Accessible Location” (Core Ground 2)

Core Ground 2 challenged the sufficiency of the reasons given for the Board’s departure from the inspector on the accessibility question. The legal touchstone is s.34(10)(b) PDA 2000, which requires that:

“A decision under this section shall state the main reasons and considerations on which the decision is based.”

Together with constitutional fairness, this provision underpins the well‑established requirement that an affected party be able to understand why a decision has been made and how it has been reached.

The Court accepts the Board’s argument that:

the Board explicitly stated that it considered the site to be in “relative isolation from high frequency public transport”;
it explicitly linked that conclusion to the test of “accessible location” under the 2024 Guidelines; and
it explicitly recorded that this was its reason for not accepting the inspector’s view and for not applying the more generous density range.

In other words, the Board’s reasons were short but intelligible and specific. The applicant clearly understood them; indeed, its pleadings and submissions in the judicial review analyse and dispute precisely those reasons. That very fact significantly undermines any claim of inadequate reasoning.

Humphreys J therefore holds, consistently with Phase I, that the Board discharged its duty to give reasons on this issue and that Core Ground 2 fails (para. 45).

5.4 Adequacy of Reasons on Layout and “Poor Disposition of Units” (Core Ground 3)

The third ground focuses on what the applicant saw as an unreasoned or unexplained rejection of the inspector’s positive assessment of layout. The Board’s decision states that the development “of itself constitutes a poor disposition of units on the overall site”.

The Court’s reasoning, derived from Phase I and applied in Phase II, can be summarised as follows:

The Board’s meaning was clear in context.
The applicant’s own Statement of Grounds and submissions – which the judgment quotes – show that the applicant fully understood the meaning of the Board’s criticism. The applicant recognised that:
- the Board was treating each phase as a stand‑alone development;
- it considered the layout of each phase “of itself” to be poor, when seen in the context of the entire site; and
- this approach differed from that of the inspector, who had looked at layout largely from the perspective of the combined, integrated two‑phase scheme.
This understanding by the applicant is inconsistent with the claim that the Board had not given adequate reasons.
The Board was entitled to focus on each application “of itself”.
The developer had chosen to divide what the Court plainly sees as a single overall project into two applications. The Board was entitled – and arguably obliged – to assess each application as it stood, notwithstanding awareness of the broader scheme. That approach is reflected in the phrase “of itself” and in the reference to the “overall site”.
No requirement for granular design critique where the gist is clear.
Irish case law does not require that planning decisions contain exhaustive design analysis, nor do they need to rebut an inspector’s report point by point. What is required is that the decision:
- identifies the main reasons and considerations; and
- enables the parties, and a reviewing court, to understand broadly why the decision has been made.
In context, the Board’s reasoning – that the layout of the development, viewed phase‑by‑phase, was not an appropriate or satisfactory use of the overall site – satisfies that threshold.
The difference between the Board and the inspector was a difference of focus.
The inspector assessed layout by reference to the entire combined scheme, taking into account shared open space, internal circulation etc. The Board’s criticism was aimed at the adequacy of each phase considered independently. That is a distinct evaluative perspective, and there is nothing unlawful in the Board adopting it or in it reaching a different conclusion from the inspector on that basis.

For these reasons, Core Ground 3 fails (para. 48).

5.5 Relationship Between the Reasons

The Court acknowledges that there was “some debate” about the relationship between the two key reasons – excessive density and poor disposition of units – but holds that while the reasons are “clearly related to some extent”, that ultimately does not matter because both reasons “survive” scrutiny (para. 49).

This re‑emphasises that:

even if one reason were questionable, the existence of another lawful and sufficient reason can sustain the decision; and
the applicant in such cases must be careful to address every substantial reason underpinning the refusal.

5.6 Draft Judgment Practice and Confidentiality

Although tangential to the planning merits, the judgment contains an important procedural discussion (paras. 30–33) about:

the practice of circulating a draft judgment to the parties for limited comment; and
the confidentiality of such drafts and the narrow scope of permissible submissions on them.

Humphreys J:

sets out detailed “rules of engagement” for draft judgments, including:
- comments are confined to typographical, factual, or clear legal errors, redaction requests, and similar matters;
- they must not be used to re‑argue the case on the merits; and
- the court remains entirely free to issue judgment in whatever form it considers appropriate.
emphasises that draft judgments are not public domain materials and cannot be published or transmitted beyond those with a legitimate role in the litigation, relying on:
- O’Sullivan v HSE [2023] IESC 11;
- O’Sullivan v Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] IESC 75, [2017] 3 IR 751;
- Attorney General v Crosland (No. 2) [2021] UKSC 58, [2022] 1 WLR 367.
issues an immediately effective direction that anyone with notice of the draft must not transmit it except privately for legitimate litigation purposes and subject to the same restriction (para. 33).

This portion of the judgment provides a valuable clarification of Irish High Court practice concerning draft judgments and may have wider significance beyond planning and environmental cases.

5.7 Order and Costs

At para. 51 the Court:

dismisses the proceedings; and
indicates that, unless a party applies by written legal submission within 7 days seeking a different order, the proceedings will be perfected on the basis of no order as to costs (including reserved costs).

The judgment also notes (para. 51(iii)) that any unsuccessful application to vary the provisional costs order may trigger an adverse costs award. However, where the applicant is costs‑protected under s.50B PDA 2000 and related provisions, such an award would not be “prohibitively expensive”. This acknowledges the interaction between:

the ordinary costs rules under O.99 RSC and s.169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015; and
the special protective costs regime required by EU law and the Aarhus Convention for environmental litigation.

6. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The judgment expressly cites three authorities in the context of draft judgment practice:

O’Sullivan v HSE [2023] IESC 11 (Supreme Court).
O’Donnell C.J. is quoted (para. 39 of that judgment) warning against the assumption that fairness always requires procedures approximating a full criminal trial and criticising “an entitlement to elaborate procedures at every point.” Humphreys J uses this passage to emphasise that the draft judgment procedure is a limited concession, not a new phase of litigation.
O’Sullivan v Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] IESC 75, [2017] 3 IR 751, [2018] 1 ILRM 245.
O’Donnell J is quoted (p. 780) on the “serious error” of assuming that only procedures resembling a criminal trial are fair. This further underpins the Court’s position that the draft judgment procedure need not – and should not – be elaborate or adversarial.
Attorney General v Crosland (No. 2) [2021] UKSC 58, [2022] 1 WLR 367.
Cited in support of the proposition that restricting the publication of draft judgments is in the interests of the administration of justice. The English Supreme Court’s analysis is used to justify the strong confidentiality direction issued by Humphreys J in para. 33.

Although not cited by name in the extract, the judgment is situated within a wider body of Irish administrative and planning law jurisprudence on:

the duty to give reasons;
the standard of rationality and “Wednesbury” unreasonableness in judicial review; and
the legal status and application of ministerial planning guidelines under s.28 PDA 2000 (and, here, as reflected in s.34(2)(ia)).

This case appears to be among the earlier High Court decisions dealing specifically with the 2024 Compact Settlements Guidelines and their concepts of “accessible location” and related density ranges, thus giving it particular precedential importance in planning practice.

7. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

7.1 Judicial Review vs. Appeal

The applicant’s challenge proceeds under ss.50–50B PDA 2000 by way of judicial review, not merits appeal. Judicial review asks whether the decision was:

lawful (within statutory powers);
rational (not unreasonable in the legal sense); and
procedurally fair (including proper consideration of relevant materials and provision of adequate reasons).

The Court does not substitute its own judgment on planning merits (e.g., what density is appropriate). It asks only whether the Board’s decision meets the legal thresholds of rationality and fairness.

7.2 “Ultra Vires”

“Ultra vires” means “beyond the powers”. An administrative body acts ultra vires if it:

does something the statute does not authorise; or
misapplies a legal requirement (for example, misinterpreting binding guidelines in a way not permitted by law).

In this case, the applicant argued that the Board acted ultra vires by:

misinterpreting the 2024 Guidelines (Core Ground 1); and
failing to comply with the statutory obligation to give reasons (Core Grounds 2 and 3).

The Court rejected both contentions.

7.3 The 2024 Compact Settlements Guidelines: Density and “Accessible Locations”

Under the PDA 2000, planning authorities and An Coimisiún Pleanála must have regard to national planning guidelines. The 2024 Compact Settlements Guidelines introduce:

typical density ranges for different types of locations (Table 3.1); and
criteria for “accessible locations” (Table 3.8), which can justify higher densities.

At a simplified level:

in “City – Suburban/Urban Extension” areas in Dublin and Cork, densities of 40–80 dph (net) “shall generally be applied”;
densities of up to 150 dph (net) are “open for consideration” where the site is an “accessible location”, often involving proximity (e.g. within 500 m) to high frequency public transport, but subject to a local assessment;
Table 3.8 makes clear that its listed characteristics are not exhaustive and require a “local assessment”.

The key lesson from this judgment is that those guidelines are not automatically determinative merely because a site meets one numerical criterion such as distance. Decision‑makers must consider the whole context and can conclude that a site is not “accessible” in planning terms even if it is within 500 m of a bus or train stop, where other aspects of isolation or urban structure are present.

7.4 The Duty to Give Reasons under s.34(10)(b) PDA 2000

Section 34(10)(b) requires that planning decisions “state the main reasons and considerations” on which the decision is based. The case law interprets this duty pragmatically:

reasons do not need to be elaborate or to address every conceivable matter;
they must be sufficient to convey to the affected party why the decision was made and to enable a reviewing court to understand and assess its legality;
brevity is not itself a defect if the context makes the reasons clear.

Here, short phrases such as:

“in relative isolation from high frequency public transport”; and
“poor disposition of units on the overall site”

were held adequate, particularly because the applicant’s own pleadings demonstrated that it understood precisely what the Board meant.

7.5 Protective Costs and the Aarhus Convention

The applicant sought a declaration that the protective cost provisions of:

s.50B PDA 2000;
the Environment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011; and
O.99 RSC and s.169 Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, interpreted in light of Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention,

applied to these proceedings (para. 35(iv)).

While the judgment does not analyse this in detail, the costs order (no order as to costs unless otherwise sought, and the warning that any adverse costs order against a costs‑protected applicant will not be prohibitively expensive) implicitly recognises the special regime that applies in environmental / planning judicial reviews under EU and international law, aiming to ensure that such litigation is not prohibitively costly for applicants.

8. Impact and Future Significance

8.1 Application of the 2024 Guidelines in Practice

This decision is among the first to consider the 2024 Compact Settlements Guidelines, especially their density framework and the concept of “accessible locations”. Its key implications include:

Flexibility and discretion: Planning authorities and the Board have substantial latitude in evaluating whether a site is “accessible” and what density is appropriate within the guideline ranges. Developers cannot treat the 500 m distance criterion as a guarantee of entitlement to 150 dph.
Holistic, context-based assessment: Decision‑makers can and should look at the broader urban context, including how well a site is functionally integrated with public transport and services, not just its raw distance to a stop.
Guidelines as guide, not strict rule: The Court reinforces the principle that Ministerial guidelines are influential and must be carefully considered, but they do not operate as rigid rules conferring absolute legal rights at specific densities.

8.2 Split Schemes and Overall Density

The judgment is particularly significant for developers who seek to sub‑divide large schemes into multiple planning applications, sometimes motivated by a desire to avoid thresholds for strategic housing development or large-scale residential developments.

Key messages are:

Planning authorities and the Board are entitled to consider the totality of the scheme when assessing matters such as density and layout, even if the developer has chosen to split applications.
Attempts to shape outcomes by procedural structuring (e.g., splitting applications) may not succeed if the underlying planning merits do not support the overall density or design.
In judicial review, courts are unlikely to be sympathetic to challenges premised on maintaining a legal “fiction” that split applications are wholly independent where, in substance, they form one overall project (see para. 1).

8.3 Reasons: Short but Clear

For both planning authorities and litigants, the decision reinforces a pragmatic standard for the duty to give reasons:

Authorities need not produce lengthy, inspector-style reports, but must articulate the key reasons clearly enough that the parties can understand them.
Where a challenger’s own pleadings show that they do understand the meaning and effect of those reasons, claims of “inadequacy” are likely to face difficulty.
Conversely, those drafting planning decisions should avoid formulaic or boilerplate language that provides no real insight into the specific reasoning applied.

8.4 Litigation Strategy in Planning Judicial Review

The treatment of the preliminary objection underscores that applicants must:

identify and, where necessary, challenge every substantial reason supporting a refusal; and
avoid over‑focusing on one element (e.g. misinterpretation of a guideline) while leaving other decisive elements (e.g. concurrent overall density) under‑analysed or unchallenged.

This judgment thereby contributes to the line of authority emphasising that success in planning judicial review often hinges on careful forensic analysis of the entire decision and its reasoning, not just an isolated passage.

8.5 Procedural Practice – Draft Judgments

Finally, the judgment’s detailed treatment of draft judgment practice will likely influence wider litigation practice:

It clarifies the limited purpose of circulating drafts and the narrow scope of permissible comments.
It firmly asserts the confidentiality of drafts, backed by a direct judicial direction and reference to UK Supreme Court authority.
It emphasises that the draft stage is not a second hearing or an opportunity for further adversarial argument.

These points may be invoked in other cases where parties seek to extend or exploit the draft judgment process.

9. Conclusion

AAI Baneshane Ltd v An Coimisiún Pleanála (No. II) [2025] IEHC 642, in tandem with AAI Baneshane I, provides an early and important judicial exposition of how the 2024 Compact Settlements Guidelines should be applied in practice and how the statutory duty to give reasons operates in planning decisions where the Board departs from an inspector’s recommendation.

The key takeaways are:

The concept of an “accessible location” and the associated upper density band of 150 dph are subject to contextual local assessment. A simple 500 m distance measurement does not automatically entitle a site to be treated as accessible.
Planning authorities and the Board are entitled to consider overall density and layout across split phases of what is in substance a single scheme, and to form their own evaluative judgment distinct from the inspector’s.
The statutory obligation to give reasons under s.34(10)(b) PDA 2000 is met where the planning decision identifies its main reasons in a way that is understandable and that, in practice, is clearly understood by the parties. Short, focused reasons can suffice.
In planning judicial review, challengers must pay careful attention to all operative reasons given for a refusal, as failing to contest a decisive rationale can be fatal or at least materially weaken the case.
The judgment also offers important guidance on the management and confidentiality of draft judgments, reinforcing that such drafts are not public and that the opportunity to comment is strictly limited.

Overall, the decision strengthens the hand of planning authorities in making nuanced, context‑sensitive judgments under the 2024 Guidelines, and it signals to developers and litigants alike that neither guideline thresholds nor inspector recommendations guarantee permission or success on judicial review where the statutory decision‑maker has lawfully exercised its evaluative discretion and provided clear, if concise, reasons.