Fair Procedures in Irish Employment Visa Appeals: Consistent Reasons, Engagement with Evidence and Limits on Post‑Hoc Justification – Commentary on Z.I. v Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 708

---

1. Introduction

This judgment of Gillane J in Z.I. v Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 708 is a significant addition to the growing body of Irish case law on employment visa refusals and administrative fair procedures. It concerns a Pakistani national, Z.I., who obtained a general employment permit to work as a meat processing operative in Ireland but was refused an employment visa at both first instance and on appeal. He sought judicial review of the Minister’s appeal decision.

The case sits squarely in the now-busy intersection between:

• the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment’s role in granting work permits, and
• the Minister for Justice’s broad executive power to control entry and residence via the visa system.

While the Court re‑affirms that the Minister enjoys a wide discretion in immigration matters and that work permits are not determinative of visa applications, it also insists on:

• consistency of reasoning between first-instance and appeal stages,
• genuine engagement with evidence submitted on appeal,
• avoiding “moving the goalposts” on applicants,
• the need for non‑generic, intelligible reasons where standard-form wording does not actually explain the decision, and
• the impermissibility of post‑hoc supplementation of reasons by affidavit.

The judgment consolidates and applies principles from O’Keeffe, Keegan, G.K., Mukovska, Balz, Rana, A.A., S, Masood, Raza and other authorities, specifically in the context of employment visa appeals.

---

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 Factual Setting

The facts were largely uncontroversial:

• Applicant: Z.I., Pakistani national.
• Employment permit: A general employment permit from the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment to work as a general operative/meat processing operative in a well‑known meat factory in County Mayo.
• Job offer: Full-time employment at €441 per week as a general operative (not a critical skills role).
• Experience: Approximately two years’ experience working in a meat shop in Pakistan; an “experience certificate”/reference was provided.
• Accommodation plan: Accommodation said to be arranged via a local auctioneer and financed by the employer; letters from the auctioneer and, on appeal, from the employer supported this.

The applicant first applied for an employment visa in November 2022. A previous visa application had been refused in May 2022 (upheld on appeal in August 2022), but both parties agreed that the earlier refusal was irrelevant to the issues in this case.

2.2 First-Instance Refusal

On 12 January 2023, a Visa Officer refused the visa. The main reasons were under two headings:

1. ID – Insufficient documentation:
   • Insufficient evidence of relevant qualifications/experience to undertake the proposed employment.
   • The meat shop experience certificate was deemed insufficient proof of employment: no payslips, no evidence of salary in bank statements, no contact details to verify the letter.
   • Accommodation plan: the auctioneer’s letter was deemed insufficient proof of accommodation; insufficient detail to show a contract was in place and it was unclear who was financing the stay.
   • A separate finances ground (which later dropped away on appeal).
2. OB – Obligations to return home: information on personal, economic and family circumstances was said to be insufficient to show that visa conditions would be observed.

2.3 The Appeal

On 6 March 2023, the applicant’s solicitor lodged an appeal, filing additional documentation and submissions:

• Experience and qualifications: A new experience letter from the meat shop dated 13 February 2023, now with contact details. The solicitor explained that the applicant had been paid in cash, said to be standard practice in Pakistan, accounting for the lack of bank or payslip evidence. They invited the Minister’s office to contact the employer to verify the letter.
• Accommodation: Re‑emphasised the auctioneer’s letter (which included contact details). A new letter from the Irish employer stated that:
  • accommodation had been arranged via the auctioneer, and
  • the employer was paying for it.
  Additionally, a letter from the applicant’s brother‑in‑law (resident and working in Ireland) confirmed financial support.
• Finances: Further information was provided and this ground effectively fell away in the appeal decision.
• Obligations to return: Evidence of strong family ties in Pakistan:
  • marriage to a wife living in Pakistan,
  • three children,
  • supporting certificates (marriage, family registration, birth certificates).
  The applicant averred by affidavit that he would comply with visa conditions and return when the permit neared expiry.

On 12 March 2024, an Appeals Officer upheld the refusal (“the impugned decision”), again citing:

• ID – Insufficient documentation (now focussed on alleged deficiencies in proof of qualifications/experience and accommodation); and
• OB – Obligations to return home, using almost identical wording to the first-instance refusal, with some additional generic phrases about public funds and risk of overstaying.

The decision also included a generic exposition on the distinction between work permits and visas, and quoted from two earlier High Court cases (S and Akhtar) on that point.

2.4 Judicial Review Proceedings

The applicant obtained leave on 22 July 2024 to seek:

• certiorari quashing the appeal decision,
• remittal of the appeal to a different decision-maker, and
• a declaration of breach of fair procedures.

By the time of hearing, the employment permit had expired. Both sides accepted that, in practical terms, remittal would likely be otiose (a fresh visa could not be granted without a valid permit), but the Minister conceded that the negative decision would remain on the file and could impact the future. Relying on Mukovska, the Court accepted the case was not moot.

The declaratory relief was not pressed; the main contest centred on whether the appeal decision was unlawful for irrationality and breach of fair procedures.

---

3. Issues Before the High Court

The key issues were:

1. Scope of review: Whether the appeal decision, viewed as a whole, was unreasonable, irrational or in breach of fair procedures and natural/constitutional justice.
2. OB ground (“obligations to return”): Whether the Minister:
   • failed to engage with the applicant’s new evidence and submissions on family ties and intention to comply, and
   • gave only a generic, “copy-and-paste” justification amounting to a bald assertion.
3. ID ground – qualifications and experience:
   • Whether the Minister unfairly “moved the goalposts” between the first-instance decision (which treated the experience letter as insufficient proof he had worked at all) and the appeal decision (which appeared to accept he had worked, but now treated his role and training as inadequate).
   • Whether this shift denied the applicant an opportunity to address the new rationale.
   • How the grant of a general employment permit should feature in the analysis.
4. ID ground – accommodation plan:
   • Whether it was lawful and rational to treat the accommodation evidence as:
     • “insufficient proof of accommodation” because no contract was shown to be “in place”, and
     • supported by “no evidence” that the employer would pay for it, despite a specific employer letter stating precisely that.
   • Whether the Minister could rely on an unpublished alleged “standard practice” (via affidavit) to justify the refusal, when the website guidelines only spoke of “details of the accommodation”.
5. Pleading point: Whether the applicant was precluded from challenging the OB ground because it was not allegedly particularised in the statement of grounds.
6. Mootness / remedy: Given the expiry of the employment permit, whether certiorari should still be granted, and if so whether remittal was appropriate.

---

4. Summary of the Judgment

Gillane J granted an order of certiorari quashing the appeal decision of 12 March 2024, holding that:

• the OB (obligations to return) reasoning was generic, arbitrary and irrational, failing to engage with the applicant’s evidence and giving no meaningful explanation for rejection;
• on the qualifications/experience limb, the Minister had unfairly shifted from challenging whether the applicant had worked in the meat shop at all to suggesting his experience and qualifications were substantively inadequate, without giving him an opportunity to address that qualitatively different concern;
• on accommodation, the Minister irrationally asserted that there was “no evidence” the employer would pay for accommodation when such a letter plainly existed; this mischaracterisation contaminated the reasoning on that issue; and
• imposing a requirement to prove a formal contract for accommodation—beyond what was stated in the published guidance and without explaining what was actually required—was unreasonable in the circumstances.

The Court refused to remit the matter, as the permit had expired, rendering any remittal essentially pointless. However, the quashing of the decision remained important because of the continuing effect of a negative decision on the applicant’s immigration file.

On costs, the Court’s preliminary view was that the entirely successful applicant should receive his costs, subject to any contrary application by the Minister under s.169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015.

---

5. Detailed Analysis of the Judgment

5.1 Standard of Review and General Principles

The Court restated core administrative law principles:

• The Minister has a broad discretionary power in immigration and visa matters; the Court’s function is not to substitute its own view but to assess lawfulness, not merits (K v Minister for Justice; I.S.O.F. v Minister for Justice).
• The applicable standard is the classic O’Keeffe/Keegan irrationality test: is the decision one that “flies in the face of fundamental reason or common sense”?
• Visas: Immigration policy is for the Minister, and reasons can be “terse, short-form, broad and/or general” (Mukovska), but must still communicate the essential rationale of the decision.
• Presumption of consideration: Where a decision-maker states that all material was considered, the court will accept that unless there is evidence to the contrary (G.K. v Minister for Justice; LTE; M.H. (Pakistan)).
• Work permit vs visa: A work permit is not a visa, and does not prevent the Minister from requiring independent proof of qualifications/experience for visa purposes (A.A. v Minister for Justice), but it is a relevant factor which cannot simply be ignored (S v Minister for Justice, approved in A.A.).
• One-shot obligation: Applicants must put forward their full case and supporting documentation; the Minister is under no obligation to invite further submissions or to “advise on proofs” (O.O. v Minister for Justice; endorsed and elaborated in S.M. v Minister for Justice).
• Standard reasons and severability: The Court can, in principle, refuse certiorari even if one reason is flawed, where other valid reasons independently sustain the decision (S.M. applying Olakunori and Mukovska (HC)); but this requires genuinely independent and lawful grounds.

These background principles frame the Court’s analysis of each ground in the impugned decision.

5.2 The OB Ground: Obligations to Return to Home Country

5.2.1 Pleading point rejected

The Minister argued that the applicant had not specifically challenged the OB ground in his statement of grounds and therefore could not do so at hearing. The Court rejected this:

• The applicant’s grounding affidavit clearly complained of:
  • “copy and paste” reasoning on OB, and
  • a failure to engage with his new evidence on ties to Pakistan.
• The statement of grounds, particularly paragraph (e), captured these objections.

The Court therefore treated the OB ground as properly in issue.

5.2.2 Generic reasoning and failure to engage

The OB portion of the appeal decision stated essentially that:

• the visa was for a specific purpose and duration,
• the applicant had not satisfied the visa officer that the conditions would be observed, and
• his personal, economic and family circumstances were insufficient to show compliance,

with the appeal decision adding a generic reference to public funds/public resources and risk of overstaying.

Crucially, the decision:

• did not mention any of the specific materials and submissions on:
  • marriage and three children in Pakistan,
  • supporting civil status documentation,
  • the full-time nature of the role tied to a work permit,
  • employer-funded accommodation,
  • support from the brother‑in‑law in Ireland, and
  • the applicant’s sworn undertaking to comply and return.
• used language that could apply equally to any applicant, i.e. was wholly generic.

Although the decision prefaced its reasons with the usual formula that all documentation had been considered, the Court held that the operative OB reasoning:

• gave no indication that the specific evidence was actually weighed, and
• provided no intelligible explanation of why the Minister remained unsatisfied.

In light of Mukovska, S, Raza and Masood, the Court characterised this as falling into the category of a bald, arbitrary assertion. The applicant was “none the wiser” as to how or why his case failed under this head.

5.2.3 Application of authority

• Mukovska and S: Both emphasise that:
  • standard reasons are acceptable in principle,
  • but where the file is detailed and the applicant has marshalled substantial documentation, a stock phrase may not suffice to explain the decision, and
  • the Minister must in those cases give at least a short, intelligible indication of the real rationale.
  Gillane J held that this threshold was not met here.
• Raza and Masood: Like those cases, the OB refusal in Z.I. was expressed in broad, default terms, with no link drawn to the applicant’s actual circumstances. Those cases condemned such reliance on unparticularised fears of overstaying or burdening public funds.
• Balz and Rana (via G.K.):
  • Balz illustrates the requirement to address relevant submissions and not to treat significant material as irrelevant or dismiss it in limine without reason.
  • Rana clarifies that the mere formula “we considered all material” is sufficient unless there is evidence that particular material was treated as irrelevant or disregarded.
  While the Minister did not explicitly say the applicant’s evidence was irrelevant, the total lack of any reference to it, coupled with boilerplate language, led the Court to conclude that the decision failed to “meaningfully communicate the essential rationale” as required by Mukovska.

Accordingly, the OB reasoning was held to be arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable.

5.3 The ID Ground: Qualifications and Experience – “Moving the Goalposts”

5.3.1 How the first-instance decision was framed

At first instance, the ID component combined two bullet points under the “qualifications/experience” heading:

1. Insufficient evidence submitted to demonstrate that the applicant had the relevant qualifications or experience to undertake the proposed employment.
2. The experience certificate from the meat shop was deemed insufficient proof of previous employment because:
   • no payslips,
   • no evidence of salary in bank statements,
   • no contact details, so the letter could not be verified.

Read together, these pointed squarely to a concern that the applicant had not in fact worked at the meat shop, because his only documentary proof was an unverifiable letter with no corroborating financial records.

5.3.2 The appeal: addressing the stated concerns

On appeal, the applicant did exactly what the refusal seemed to require:

• He produced a new experience letter, with contact details and confirmation that he had been employed as a meat cutter for over two years.
• His solicitor explained the cash payment practice, and expressly invited the Minister to contact the employer to verify the letter.

The appeal decision:

• acknowledged that the applicant had submitted an experience letter stating he worked at the meat shop for the relevant period as a meat cutter,
• did not repeat or maintain the “cannot be verified” criticism, and
• did not dispute that he worked there, implicitly accepting the employment as a fact.

However, the Appeals Officer then faulted the applicant for not submitting “new documentary evidence” such as:

• a further letter detailing his role in the company, or
• training/course certificates in the area.

Thus, the focus had shifted from “you have not proven you worked there at all” to “you have not proven that what you did there gives you adequate qualifications/experience”. This was never articulated at first instance as the core problem.

5.3.3 Unfair shift of rationale

The Court accepted the applicant’s characterisation: the two bullet points at first instance were conflated and had been read (reasonably) as a single issue – disbelief or non‑acceptance of the employment history. On appeal:

• The applicant successfully addressed the original concerns (verifiability and lack of contact details).
• The Appeals Officer effectively changed the target and faulted him for not providing detail that had not been clearly signalled as the central deficiency.

Gillane J held that:

• it is not unlawful in principle for the Minister’s focus to evolve between first instance and appeal as new information emerges;
• however, constitutional fairness requires that the applicant be given an opportunity to address the real, substantive concern that will ground refusal;
• here, the shift from questioning the existence of the employment to questioning the adequacy of skills and training was sufficiently material that springing it at appeal stage, without prior indication, amounted to the sort of unfairness criticised by Barr J in N.I. v Minister for Justice.

The Court emphasised that one of the purposes of giving reasons is to allow an applicant to make an informed assessment of the prospects of appeal and to engage meaningfully at the appeal stage. If the basis of refusal is altered at that stage, the applicant has been deprived of that opportunity.

5.3.4 Relevance of the general employment permit

The Court reiterated that:

• a work permit does not preclude the Minister from questioning skills/experience for visa purposes (A.A.), and
• the permit is not prima facie proof of qualifications (S), but cannot be wholly ignored.

In Z.I.:

• the permit was for a general, low‑skill role as a meat factory operative;
• the Irish employer had offered full-time work and expressed readiness for the applicant to start;
• the job was not in the critical skills category; it did not appear to require formal qualifications; and
• the employer’s satisfaction with the applicant’s skills was a significant factual indicator.

Gillane J found that:

• while the Minister correctly acknowledged the existence of the work permit and correctly recited the legal distinction between permits and visas,
• the way the permit, the nature of the job, and the employer’s acceptance of the applicant’s ability to do the job were handled in the decision reinforced the unfairness of the late shift in emphasis;
• these were matters that, had they been signalled earlier, the applicant could have specifically addressed (e.g. by elaborating his tasks, providing employer attestations about his competence, etc.).

5.4 The ID Ground: Accommodation Plan and “No Evidence”

5.4.1 The published guidance and the Minister’s decision

The Minister’s website for employment visas stated that an applicant must provide:

• details of the new job,
• salary, and
• details of the accommodation, if the employer is providing accommodation.

At first instance, the Minister refused on the basis that the accommodation letter from the auctioneer was insufficient proof:

• insufficient detail to show a contract was in place; and
• unclear who was financing the stay.

On appeal, the applicant supplied a letter from the Irish employer explicitly stating that:

• they had arranged suitable accommodation via the auctioneer,
• it was “in place”, and
• the company was paying for it.

Yet the appeal decision maintained the refusal, on the basis that:

• the auctioneer’s letter remained insufficient proof of accommodation as there was no evidence of a contract being in place; and
• “no evidence” had been submitted to support the statement that the employer was paying for the accommodation.

5.4.2 Mischaracterisation of evidence

The Court found it “difficult to see” how the Minister could state there was “no evidence” that the employer would pay for accommodation when a specific letter from the employer said exactly that. The situation was:

• Evidence existed (the employer’s letter).
• The Minister was entitled to disbelieve or give little weight to this evidence.
• But to describe the position as one of “no evidence” was simply .

Gillane J held that such a misdescription of the evidential record was irrational. Once that irrationality infected the core of the accommodation reasoning, the Court was unwilling to try to “sever” it from the rest and uphold the ground on the remaining “contract in place” criticism alone.

5.4.3 The “contract in place” requirement and unpublished standards

The Minister argued (primarily through the affidavit of Ms Brennan, a Higher Executive Officer) that:

• it was “standard practice” for longer-term visas to require proof of a contract for accommodation, and
• the absence of any such contract justified the refusal.

However:

• The impugned decision did not explain what was meant by “contract in place” or what documentary evidence would suffice.
• The published guidance merely referred to providing “details” of accommodation where the employer is providing it; there was no sign that a formal lease or similar legal contract was required as a threshold condition.
• The employer’s letter, prima facie, evidenced an agreement: the employer would arrange and pay for accommodation via the auctioneer.
• There was no suggestion in the decision itself that this letter was disbelieved or inherently unreliable.

Referring to City of Waterford VEC v Department of Education, the Court held that:

• post‑decision affidavits can be used to explain context or general practices,
• but cannot supplement, amend or correct the actual reasons given in the written decision.

In other words, Ms Brennan’s evidence that it was “standard practice” to look for contracts could not be used to retrospectively bolster or supply missing reasoning in the written decision.

The Court concluded that:

• it remained unclear what standard of proof the Minister required on accommodation;
• the Minister appeared to reject, without rational explanation, a facially plausible employer arrangement that in practice does amount to a contractual or quasi‑contractual commitment; and
• insisting on an unrevealed, higher threshold than that suggested by the published guidance, without articulating it clearly, was unreasonable and irrational in the circumstances.

5.5 Cumulative Effect and Severability

The Minister argued that the three main bases for refusal:

1. insufficient experience/qualifications,
2. insufficient accommodation evidence, and
3. insufficient proof of willingness to return,

were independent, such that even if one was flawed, the decision could stand on the others (relying on the line of authority culminating in S.M.).

The Court, however, found significant legal frailties in each of the core grounds:

• OB: arbitrary, unexplained and therefore irrational.
• Experience/qualifications: unfair movement of the goalposts at appeal stage.
• Accommodation: mischaracterisation of evidence as “no evidence”, and unreasonable insistence on an undefined contractual proof.

Given that each ground was tainted in its own way, there was no solid, independent basis upon which the decision could safely stand. Certiorari was therefore warranted without invoking any doctrine of severability to salvage the decision.

5.6 Mootness, Practical Effect and Remedy

Although the applicant’s employment permit had expired, the Court accepted—following Mukovska—that:

• a negative visa decision remains on an applicant’s immigration file and may affect future applications;
• therefore, the lawfulness of that decision is not moot simply because immediate practical relief (a visa) is no longer obtainable.

The Court therefore:

• granted certiorari quashing the impugned decision;
• declined to order remittal, as any fresh visa decision would be doomed in the absence of a current employment permit; and
• indicated that costs should follow the event in favour of the applicant, subject to any application to displace that presumption under s.169 LSRA 2015.

---

6. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The judgment stands on the shoulders of a dense body of case law. Some of the key precedents and how they were used are as follows.

6.1 Standard of Reasonableness and Deference

• O’Keeffe v An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 IR 39; The State (Keegan) v Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] IR 642:
  • Establish the extremely deferential standard of review: a decision must be so fundamentally at odds with reason and common sense as to be irrational.
  • Reaffirmed as the applicable standard for reviewing discretionary immigration decisions.
• K v Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 582; I.S.O.F. v Minister for Justice [2010] IEHC 386:
  • Authority for the proposition that courts assess the lawfulness of the process, not the merit of the outcome.

6.2 Consideration of Material and the G.K. Principle

• G.K. v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 418:
  • Hardiman J held that where a decision-maker says they have considered all material, a challenger must provide some evidence to the contrary to show that specific material was ignored.
  • This presumption underpins the Court’s approach, but is balanced against later authorities where failure to engage with key submissions undermines that presumption.
• LTE v Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 504; M.H. (Pakistan) v IPAT [2020] IEHC 364:
  • Reaffirm G.K.; cited in support of the presumption that material has been considered if the decision states as much.

6.3 Work Permits vs Visas

• A.A. v Minister for Justice [2024] IECA 57:
  • Court of Appeal authority that the function of the DETE under the Employment Permits Acts is separate from the Minister for Justice’s visa function.
  • Confirms the Minister is free to consider whether a visa applicant has the requisite qualifications and experience, even if a work permit has been granted.
• S v Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 578:
  • Held that a work permit is not prima facie proof of qualifications but cannot be ignored entirely.
  • This nuanced middle-ground approach was expressly approved by the Court of Appeal in A.A. and followed by Gillane J.

6.4 One-Shot Obligation and Clarification

• O.O. v Minister for Justice [2015] IESC 26:
  • Charleton J emphasised that an applicant must make their full case and cannot expect the decision-maker to invite further submissions or correspondence.
  • Relied on in S.M., and adopted by Gillane J to underline that the Minister need not “coach” applicants on what to file.
• M.A. v Minister for Justice [2024] IECA 26:
  • The Court of Appeal reversed a High Court judgment that suggested an obligation on decision-makers to seek clarification where material is unclear.
  • S.M. interpreted this as, at least inferentially, rejecting any general obligation to solicit clarification; Z.I. adopts that stance.

6.5 Severability and Multiple Reasons

• S.M. v Minister for Justice [2024] IECA 145:
  • Binchy J endorsed the principle (drawing on Olakunori and Mukovska (HC)) that where one reason for a decision is flawed, the court can still uphold the decision if other reasons independently support it.
  • Z.I. accepts this principle but finds that here each main reason was flawed.

6.6 “Moving the Goalposts” and Unfair New Grounds

• N.I. v Minister for Justice [2023] IEHC 339:
  • Barr J condemned the practice of holding an applicant against arguments never put to them, in the context of family reunification and an unexpected focus on adoption issues.
  • Gillane J uses N.I. to frame the unfairness of introducing a new rationale at appeal stage (from disbelieving employment to critiquing the quality of experience) without giving the applicant an opportunity to answer it.

6.7 Reasons, “Administrative Throat-Clearing” and Engagement with Submissions

• Balz v An Bord Pleanála [2023] 3 IR 751:
  • O’Donnell J criticised “administrative throat-clearing” and self-protective formulae that claim everything relevant was considered without showing engagement with key submissions.
  • Balz insisted that relevant submissions must be addressed and, if rejected, the rejection should be reasoned.
  • While Balz involved planning and wind energy guidelines, its reasoning on reasons and engagement is transposed here.
• Rana v Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46:
  • O’Malley J clarified that Balz does not weaken the G.K. presumption; rather, Balz is an example of a case where the inspector explicitly treated certain material as irrelevant, thereby undermining any presumption.
  • Z.I. uses this to balance the presumption of consideration with the need for evident engagement in the reasons.
• T.A.R. v Minister for Justice [2014] IEHC 385; Connolly v An Bord Pleanála [2018] ILRM 483; NECI v Labour Court [2021] IESC 36; cited in S:
  • These cases emphasise the duty to give reasons that, while not necessarily elaborate, are sufficiently clear and cogent to:
    • allow the recipient to understand why they lost, and
    • permit a court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.

6.8 Masood and Raza: Close Analogues

• Masood v Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 485:
  • Another employment visa case involving an employer letter from Pakistan.
  • The Minister claimed the contact details (phone number, Gmail, etc.) were “insufficient to verify” the letter but had not actually attempted any verification.
  • Phelan J found that this was irrational: “to verify” entails actually checking; there was no evidence that any such steps had been taken.
  • She also criticised bland, generic OB-style reasons and lack of specific engagement with the applicant’s circumstances.
  • Z.I. draws on this to reinforce the point that unparticularised assertions of unverifiability or risk are unlawful where direct verification could reasonably be attempted and where the OB reasoning is generic.
• Raza v Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 475 (under appeal)

In Raza, a Pakistani chef de partie with an employment permit was refused a visa on similar ID and OB grounds. Barr J held that:

• the grant of the employment permit was a relevant document that had been ignored (notwithstanding the generic claim that all material was considered);
• no apparent weight had been given to the fact that:
  • the Irish employer was satisfied with the applicant’s skills,
  • accommodation had been arranged and paid for by the employer, and
  • the role was relatively low-skilled.
• mere speculative fears of future breach of visa conditions, without a credible factual basis, could not justify refusal.

Z.I. shows strong parallels with Raza and continues the trend of scrutinising visa refusals where:

• employer-arranged accommodation is present,
• a low or intermediate skill role has been approved by DETE, and
• the Minister relies largely on generic or speculative concerns without engaging with the concrete evidence.

6.9 Post‑Hoc Justification and Affidavits

• City of Waterford VEC v Department of Education [2011] IEHC 278:
  • Establishes that affidavits cannot be used to retrospectively amend, supplement or cure defective reasons in an administrative decision.
  • Applied to reject reliance on Ms Brennan’s affidavit to justify the “contract in place” requirement.

6.10 Mukovska: Reasons and Stock Phrases

• Mukovska v Minister for Justice [2021] IECA 340:
  • Hunt J encouraged the use of concise standard reasons provided that, in context, they still communicate the essential rationale of the decision.
  • Warned that in a “small number of cases” – especially where substantial documentation has been submitted – stock reasons may be inadequate without modest amplification.
  • Also held that judicial review is not moot where a refused visa decision still has real-world implications for the applicant’s record.
  • Z.I. both applies this reasoning on standard reasons (OB ground) and follows the mootness logic in deciding to hear the case despite the permit’s expiry.

---

7. Impact and Significance

7.1 For Visa Decision-Making Practice

The key messages for the Minister and visa officials are:

• Standard-form reasons are not a shield if they do not actually explain the decision.
  • Generic OB wording may suffice in simple cases with limited documentation.
  • But where an applicant has put forward detailed, specific evidence and arguments, repeating boilerplate phrases without engaging with that evidence will be unlawful.
• Do not “move the goalposts” on appeal.
  • If a first-instance decision criticises a particular aspect (e.g. absence of verifiable proof of employment), and the applicant addresses exactly that in an appeal, it is unfair to then refuse on a qualitatively different concern (e.g. sufficiency of training) without forewarning or opportunity to respond.
• Do not misdescribe the record.
  • Asserting “no evidence” on a point where relevant documents were in fact submitted is irrational, even if the decision-maker disbelieves them.
• Published guidance matters.
  • While guidelines are not rigid checklists conferring rights, decision-makers must not impose unpublished threshold requirements (such as a formal written accommodation contract) without articulating them and giving applicants a fair chance to meet them.
• Work permits are not determinative but cannot be treated as irrelevant.
  • Particularly where the job is low-skilled and the Irish employer vouches for the applicant, the fact of DETE having granted a general employment permit is part of the factual matrix the Minister must consciously take into account.
• Affidavits cannot retrofit reasons.
  • Officials must ensure that the written decision itself contains any essential rationale and does not rely on “standard practice” explanations that are only later supplied to the court.

7.2 For Applicants and Practitioners

For applicants and their advisers:

• Put forward the fullest possible evidence at the earliest opportunity. The Minister is under no duty to request missing documents or clarification.
• On appeal, target precisely the reasons given at first instance. Z.I. succeeded in part because the applicant squarely answered the original criticisms (employment verification and sponsorship of accommodation) yet the Minister failed to acknowledge that.
• Preserve the record. Thoughtful appeal submissions and supporting affidavits create the necessary evidential basis for a judicial review if reasons remain generic or unfairly shifted.
• Highlight work permits carefully.
  • Permits are not trump cards, but are still important contextual factors, especially for lower‑skill roles.

7.3 In the Broader Administrative Law Context

Beyond immigration, Z.I. reinforces several general propositions:

• Decision-makers may use standard forms, but must ensure that those forms are applied flexibly enough to reflect the specifics of each case.
• Reasons need not be elaborate, but must:
  • be intelligible,
  • engage, at least briefly, with key submissions, and
  • avoid obvious misstatements of the evidence.
• Where an administrative process includes an appeal, fairness requires that the appeal not be used as a platform for surprising applicants with new grounds not previously put to them, unless they are afforded a chance to respond.
• Post‑decision affidavits are not a cure for inadequate reasons; this underpins the rule of law by ensuring that individuals and reviewing courts can assess decisions on the reasons actually given at the time.

---

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

8.1 Judicial Review vs Appeal

A judicial review is not a rehearing of the case. The court asks:

• Did the decision-maker act within their powers?
• Was the procedure fair?
• Was the decision so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have made it?

An appeal (in the ordinary sense) often allows a decision to be reconsidered on the facts and merits. The visa appeal within the Department was an internal merits appeal. The High Court proceeding was a judicial review of the lawfulness of the appeal decision.

8.2 Certiorari

Certiorari is a court order that quashes or sets aside an administrative decision. It does not generally tell the decision-maker what outcome to reach; it simply clears the unlawful decision from the record.

8.3 “Irrationality” or “Unreasonableness”

In this context, a decision is “irrational” if it:

• is based on a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the evidence,
• ignores clearly relevant considerations, or
• uses reasons so weak or arbitrary that they “fly in the face of fundamental reason or common sense”.

The threshold is high: the court does not overturn a decision just because it would have decided differently.

8.4 Fair Procedures / Natural Justice

Fair procedures (or natural justice) generally require that:

• a person knows the case they must meet, and
• has a meaningful chance to respond before an adverse decision is made.

That is why “moving the goalposts” – changing the core rationale without giving a chance to address it – is problematic.

8.5 Legitimate Expectation from Guidelines

When a public body publishes guidance, applicants can often reasonably expect that:

• the decision-maker will follow that guidance, or
• if a departure is necessary, it will be clearly explained.

In Z.I., the Court did not go so far as to find a freestanding public-law “legitimate expectation” in the technical sense, but the mismatch between the website’s modest requirement (“details of accommodation”) and the undefined “contract in place” standard contributed to the assessment that the decision was unreasonable.

8.6 Work Permit vs Visa

A work permit:

• is issued by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment,
• relates to the Irish labour market and an employer’s inability to find suitable candidates domestically, and
• does not confer any right of entry or residence.

A visa:

• is issued by the Minister for Justice (or under her authority),
• authorises entry for a particular purpose and duration, and
• can be refused even where a work permit has been granted.

However, as Z.I. confirms, the existence of a permit remains a relevant fact which cannot simply be sidelined or ignored.

8.7 “OB” Ground (Obligations to Return)

In the Minister’s standard templates, “OB” (obligations) reasons relate to fears that:

• the applicant might overstay, or
• breach visa conditions, or
• end up reliant on public funds.

The Minister is entitled to consider such risks, but must have some concrete, case-specific basis for concluding they exist and must explain that basis, at least briefly, where the applicant has put forward substantial evidence to the contrary.

8.8 Mootness

A case is “moot” if the issue no longer has any real effect on the parties. In immigration cases, even if immediate practical relief (e.g. the particular visa) is no longer available, a negative decision can still affect future applications. Mukovska and Z.I. confirm that courts will often still hear such cases where the decision has ongoing implications.

8.9 Severability of Reasons

Sometimes an administrative decision offers several independent reasons. If one is unlawful but the others clearly justify the outcome on their own, a court may leave the decision in place. This is the doctrine of “severability”. In Z.I., each key reason was found to be flawed, so there was nothing to sever and save.

---

9. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

Z.I. v Minister for Justice is an important clarification of how far the Minister’s broad discretion in visa matters must yield to the requirements of fair procedures and rational decision-making.

In particular, the case establishes and reinforces that:

• Where an applicant has directly addressed specific first-instance reasons (for example, by providing new documentation to demonstrate employment or accommodation), an Appeals Officer must:
  • acknowledge and engage with that evidence, and
  • not simply shift to a new criticism under the same heading without giving the applicant a fair opportunity to respond.
• Standard-form OB wording about risks of overstaying or burdening public funds is insufficient where detailed contrary evidence has been furnished; the decision must communicate, albeit briefly, why the Minister remains unsatisfied.
• Mischaracterising the record—such as claiming there was “no evidence” where clear documentary evidence was filed—is irrational and will vitiate the decision.
• Unpublished, heightened requirements (like insisting on a formal accommodation contract) cannot be imposed without clear articulation and justification, particularly where published guidance suggests a lower evidential threshold.
• Work permits do not dictate visa outcomes but are relevant context, especially in low-skill roles where an Irish employer has vouched for an applicant’s capability and arranged accommodation.
• Post‑decision affidavits cannot repair inadequate reasons; the lawfulness of a decision must be judged on the reasons actually given to the applicant.

Together with Masood and Raza, this judgment signals a clear trend: Irish courts will respect the Minister’s wide immigration discretion but will also insist that visa refusals, particularly in employment cases backed by work permits and employer support, are grounded in consistent, honest and intelligible reasoning that fairly engages with the evidence presented.