Extreme Consequences of Pregnancy in Historic Rape as Category 1 Harm: Commentary on R v VDT [2025] EWCA Crim 1567

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v VDT [2025] EWCA Crim 1567, a reference by His Majesty’s Solicitor General under the unduly lenient sentence scheme.

The case concerns a 65-year-old offender convicted of nine sexual offences committed over several decades against three family members, anonymised as C1, C2 and C3. The most serious offence was the historic rape of C1, then aged 16, which resulted in pregnancy, the stillbirth of the child, permanent loss of fertility, and lifelong psychological trauma. Years later, the offender committed multiple sexual offences against two of his great-nieces, C2 and C3, when they were children.

At first instance, the Crown Court imposed an extended sentence of 16 years (12 years’ custody plus a 4‑year extended licence) on the rape count, making all other sentences concurrent. The Solicitor General referred the sentence to the Court of Appeal as unduly lenient.

The Court of Appeal:

• Re‑classified the rape of C1 from harm category 2B to category 1B under the Historical Sexual Offences Guideline, on the basis that the pregnancy and psychological harm were of an “extreme” nature and impact.
• Held that the passage of time, in this case 22 years, aggravated seriousness by revealing the full, extreme impact of the offence.
• Found that the overall sentence failed to reflect the totality of offending against three victims.
• Quashed the sentence on the rape count and substituted an extended sentence of 20½ years (16½ years’ custody and 4 years’ extended licence).

The decision is significant for three main reasons:

1. It confirms that pregnancy caused by rape, where its nature and consequences are extreme (stillbirth, infertility, enduring trauma), can elevate harm to category 1 in historic sexual offences, notwithstanding that “pregnancy” is ordinarily listed as a category 2 factor.
2. It emphasises that the passage of time can aggravate, not merely mitigate, the seriousness of historic sexual offences where it brings into sharper focus the long-term harm.
3. It illustrates the robust application of the unduly lenient sentence jurisdiction and the totality principle in multi‑victim sexual offending.

Throughout its judgment, the Court preserved the automatic anonymity of the complainants under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992, and this commentary follows that approach.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 Offending against C1

C1 lived with her grandparents, who were the offender’s parents. The offender was a regular visitor. When the family gathered for Sunday lunches, C1 would often be in her bedroom. The offender would pretend he was going to use the toilet, go upstairs, sit on her bed, and put his hands inside her pyjama top to touch her breasts. These incidents formed:

• Count 1: a single indecent assault (touching her breasts once).
• Count 2: multiple further indecent assaults of the same nature.

The offender used threats to silence C1, telling her no one would believe her, and that disclosure would “split the family up” and cause everyone to hate her. This was classic grooming and manipulation.

Later, when C1 was 16 and her grandfather was undergoing cancer treatment, the offender came to the house knowing she would be alone. Under the influence of drugs, he vaginally raped her in the living room, despite her verbal resistance (“no”, “stop”). He ejaculated inside her without contraception. This was:

• Count 3: rape contrary to section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956.

As a result of the rape:

• C1 became pregnant.
• The baby died in the womb at about 8 months’ gestation; she had to deliver a stillborn child.
• Samples taken at post-mortem later produced DNA evidence providing “moderately strong” support that the offender was the father.
• Due to medical complications, C1 became unable to have further children.
• She experienced decades of depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, isolation, and severe ongoing psychological harm.

In a particularly distressing episode, the offender was allowed to carry the coffin at the baby’s funeral, which C1 felt compelled to accept because she had not disclosed the rape.

2.2 Offending against C2

Some eight years later (2011–2013), the offender committed offences against C2, his great‑niece, then aged 9–10:

• Count 4: inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity by exposing his penis and saying “now show me yours”.
• Count 5: exposure, involving multiple occasions of exposing his penis to C2.
• Count 6: further incitement to sexual activity, telling C2 to touch his penis (she refused).

These were accompanied by grooming behaviour, such as giving her money and making sexualised comments.

2.3 Offending against C3

Between 2018 and 2022, the offender sexually targeted another great‑niece, C3, then aged 11–12:

• Count 7: sexual communication with a child (e.g. graphic commentary on sex, including “That’s what male cum looks like” and comments about her body).
• Count 8: causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity — a specific incident where he asked to put his penis on her.
• Count 9: multiple further occasions of asking to put his penis on her.

Some of this offending occurred while he was driving her to or from school or when she stayed at his house, reflecting a misuse of family trust and parental reliance on him as a caregiver.

2.4 Disclosure, investigation and trial

The offences came to light in January 2021 when C3 and then C2 disclosed their abuse to their mother, who contacted the police. C1 then reported what had happened to her the next day. All three gave visually‑recorded (ABE) interviews.

The offender was arrested and initially denied everything, suggesting he was the victim of a fabricated, revenge‑motivated family plot. After forensic testing of the preserved tissue from C1’s stillborn baby linked him to paternity with “moderately strong” support, he gave an initial Defence Statement admitting some sexual activity with C1 (which he asserted was consensual and non‑penetrative). He later abandoned this account, served an amended Defence Statement denying any sexual activity at all, and claimed he must have been too intoxicated to remember if intercourse had occurred.

Following an 8‑day trial in March 2025, the jury convicted him on all nine counts. A pre‑sentence report assessed him as high risk of further serious harm, noting his complete denial of wrongdoing and lack of engagement.

3. Sentencing at First Instance

3.1 Structure of the sentence

On 3 July 2025, the Crown Court at Leeds (HHJ Pema) imposed an extended sentence under section 279 of the Sentencing Act 2020:

• Extended sentence of 16 years on Count 3 (rape):
  • Custodial term: 12 years.
  • Extended licence period: 4 years.
• Concurrent sentences on all other counts:
  • Counts 1–2 (indecent assaults on C1): 1 year each, concurrent.
  • Counts 4 and 6 (inciting C2): 18 months each, concurrent.
  • Count 5 (exposure to C2): 6 months concurrent.
  • Count 7 (sexual communication with C3): 6 months concurrent.
  • Counts 8–9 (inciting C3): 18 months each, concurrent.

The judge treated Count 3 as the lead offence and intended it to reflect the totality of the offending against all three victims. Ancillary orders were made, including a victim surcharge, but the Court of Appeal later held that the surcharge was inappropriate for counts 1–3 because those offences pre‑dated 1 October 2012.

3.2 The judge’s application of the guidelines

The judge correctly noted that in sentencing historic sexual offences, the Sentencing Council’s guidelines are to be followed unless they are “wholly inappropriate”, and that they are not to be applied as inflexible “tramlines”.

In outline:

• Counts 1–2 (indecent assaults on C1):
  • Categorised as harm category 2B under the Historical Sexual Offences Guideline.
  • Starting point of 1 year, range up to 2 years (maximum 10 years under the 1956 Act).
  • Aggravated by the familial relationship, the repeated nature of the abuse, and their function as precursors to the rape.
• Count 3 (rape of C1):
  • The judge accepted there was planning and “beyond any measure” severe psychological harm.
  • He recognised pregnancy as a harm factor placing the case in category 2.
  • However, he declined to treat the harm as “extreme” and therefore left the case in harm category 2B, not 1B.
  • Culpability was assessed as B: there was planning, but not “significant” planning, and he did not find “abuse of trust” within the specific terms of the guideline.
  • On that basis, the guideline indicated a starting point of 8 years and a range of 7–9 years for the rape alone.
• Counts 4–6 (C2):
  • Treated as a “course of conduct”, falling overall within category 3B (starting point 2 years; range 1–4 years).
  • Downward adjustment for the fact that the incited sexual contact did not occur.
  • Balanced against the significant harm suffered by C2 and the maximum of 2 years for the exposure count.
• Counts 7–9 (C3):
  • Count 7 (sexual communication) placed in category 2B, with a starting point of 6 months and range up to 12 months.
  • Counts 8–9 (incitement) were placed in category 3B (starting point 2 years; range 1–4 years).
  • The judge viewed this offending as grooming and recognised some breach of trust given the school runs and caring role.

Applying the totality principle, the judge stated that if he had sentenced separately for each complainant, the individual sentences would have been higher, but he had reduced them to reach a global custodial term of 12 years on Count 3, intended to reflect all the offending.

4. The Appeal: Issues and Outcome

4.1 Solicitor General’s reference

The Solicitor General applied for leave to refer the sentence as unduly lenient. Leave was granted.

The Solicitor General accepted:

• The propriety of concurrent sentences in a dangerousness case where an extended sentence is imposed.
• No criticism of the individual concurrent sentences of 18 months for the offending against C2 and C3.

However, the reference focused on two main propositions:

1. The rape of C1 should have been categorised as category 1B, not 2B, because of the extreme nature and impact of:
   • Pregnancy and stillbirth;
   • Permanent loss of fertility;
   • Long‑term severe psychological harm.
2. The global sentence of 12 years’ custody on Count 3 failed to reflect the totality of offending and the many aggravating features.

4.2 Offender’s submissions

On behalf of the offender, it was argued:

• The sentencing exercise was complex, and the judge, having presided over the trial, was best placed to assess the facts.
• The categorisation of the rape as 2B was within the scope of a reasonable sentencing judgment.
• While the additional offending against C2 and C3 could theoretically justify a larger uplift than 2 years, the overall sentence was “albeit only just” within the reasonable range.

4.3 Decision of the Court of Appeal

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and agreed with the Solicitor General. In summary, the Court held:

• The combined nature and impact of C1’s pregnancy, the stillbirth, her infertility and the prolonged severe psychological harm were so extreme that the case belonged in harm category 1B (para 31).
• The Historical Sexual Offences Guideline expressly recognises that the passage of time can aggravate or mitigate seriousness; here, 22 years had served to clarify the extreme impact of the rape, thus aggravating its seriousness.
• On Count 3 alone (taking into account the indecent assaults in Counts 1–2 and the aggravating features), the sentence should have been no less than 13½ years’ custody (para 34).
• To reflect the additional offending against C2 and C3, applying totality, the custodial term should have been increased to at least 16½ years (para 35).
• The original custodial term of 12 years was therefore not merely lenient but unduly lenient, as it fell below the minimum level properly open to the sentencing judge.

Accordingly, the Court:

• Quashed the sentence on Count 3.
• Substituted an extended sentence of 20½ years, comprising:
  • 16½ years’ custody, and
  • 4 years’ extended licence.
• Left all other orders intact but quashed the victim surcharge order, as it could not lawfully apply to offending predating 1 October 2012.

5. Legal Analysis

5.1 Precedents and Guideline Framework

The extract provided does not reproduce specific case authorities, but the Court’s analysis is anchored in well‑established principles and the Sentencing Council’s Historical Sexual Offences guideline. Key strands of existing law underpinning the decision include:

• Attorney General / Solicitor General references for unduly lenient sentences, under which:
  • The Court of Appeal will not intervene simply because it would have passed a higher sentence.
  • Intervention is justified only where the sentence falls outside the range of sentences which a reasonably competent judge could impose, given the facts and the relevant guideline structure.
  • The Court must identify a concrete error in principle or a substantial misjudgment of seriousness.
• Sentencing guidelines for historic sexual offences:
  • These classify seriousness according to culpability (A, B, C) and harm (categories 1–3).
  • “Pregnancy” and “severe psychological harm” are normally listed as factors placing an offence in harm category 2.
  • The guideline also allows movement to category 1 where the nature or impact of those factors is “extreme”.
  • The guideline expressly addresses the effect of time, recognising that, in historic cases, long‑term harm can either aggravate or mitigate seriousness.
• The totality principle:
  • Where an offender is sentenced for multiple offences, the overall sentence must be just and proportionate to the totality of the offending.
  • Even where sentences are made concurrent (as is common with extended sentences for dangerous offenders), the lead sentence must adequately reflect the combined seriousness of all offences.
• Dangerousness and extended sentences:
  • Under the Sentencing Code (now the Sentencing Act 2020), courts may impose extended sentences for certain specified sexual offences where the offender poses a significant risk of serious harm to the public.
  • An extended sentence consists of a custodial term reflecting punishment and deterrence, plus an extended licence designed to protect the public after release.

Against this backdrop, R v VDT does not invent new doctrine but clarifies and sharpens the application of these principles, especially around the treatment of pregnancy and long‑term harm in the harm categorisation of rape.

5.2 Re‑categorising harm: from Category 2B to Category 1B

The central legal move in the judgment is the re‑classification of Count 3 (rape of C1) as harm category 1B rather than 2B.

The Crown Court judge accepted that:

• The case involved pregnancy.
• C1 had suffered “beyond any measure” severe psychological harm.

However, he treated these as putting the offence in category 2B, with pregnancy and psychological harm regarded as within the guideline’s “standard” conception of category 2 seriousness, and then treated the particularly grave consequences (stillbirth, infertility, prolonged trauma) merely as aggravating factors, without elevating the case to category 1.

The Court of Appeal rejected that approach. It drew a careful distinction between:

• Cases where pregnancy and psychological harm fall within the usual bounds contemplated by category 2; and
• Cases where the nature or impact of those factors is so grave as to be “extreme” in the sense used by the guideline.

For C1, the Court emphasised:

• She became pregnant as a direct result of the rape.
• The child died in utero at around 8 months; she went through the physical and emotional trauma of delivering a stillborn baby.
• She suffered medical complications that rendered her unable to have further children, permanently depriving her of the chance of biological motherhood.
• Her psychological harm — depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, flashbacks, chronic panic attacks, inability to form normal intimate relationships — persisted over decades.

The Court concluded that:

“The combined nature and impact of C1's pregnancy, the loss of her child and the severe psychological harm suffered by C1 over many years since she was raped by the offender was so extreme that the offence should have been elevated to category 1B.”

It went further, holding that:

• The complications arising from the pregnancy and their consequences were, in themselves, of an “extreme nature”.
• Alternatively, the impact of the pregnancy and harm was “extreme”.

Thus, the case exemplifies how factors expressly listed in the guideline as typically generating category 2 harm — pregnancy and severe psychological harm — may, in exceptional and particularly tragic circumstances, justify harm categorisation at level 1.

The Court therefore set a correct guideline starting point of 12 years’ custody for Count 3, with a category range of 10 to 15 years, on a harm category 1B, culpability B basis.

5.3 The role of the passage of time in historic sexual offences

A distinctive feature of the case is the Court’s explicit engagement with how time affects the assessment of harm in historic offences.

The Historical Sexual Offences Guideline notes that the passage of time can:

• Mitigate seriousness, for instance where an offender has led a blameless life for many years and there is evidence that the conduct will not be repeated; or
• Aggravate seriousness, especially where long‑term harm becomes apparent or where offences have only come to light because of the victim’s delayed disclosure, itself often an index of the harm and power imbalance.

The Court of Appeal applied this directly, stating:

“In this case the harm caused by the offending has become apparent since the 22-year period since the offence was committed and was ‘extreme’ within the meaning of the guideline. This is a case… where the passage of time has served to clarify the profound and extreme impact of the offence.”

In other words, the intervening decades did not dilute the seriousness of the rape. Instead, they allowed the full scale of its consequences — permanent infertility, a lifetime of psychological trauma, impact on education and life trajectory — to come into view. Time here was an aggravating factor, not a mitigating one.

This nuance is important in practice: defence submissions in historic cases sometimes stress an offender’s age, lack of recent offending, or apparent rehabilitation. VDT illustrates that where the long‑term harm is profound, time can justify a greater sentence, not a lesser one.

5.4 Aggravating features and uplift on Count 3

Having fixed the proper harm category as 1B, the Court catalogued numerous aggravating factors surrounding Count 3:

• The rape occurred in C1’s own home, undermining the sense of safety usually associated with that environment.
• The offender planned the offence by waiting until her grandfather was at hospital, knowing she would be alone.
• There was a significant age disparity (he was then in his early 40s; she was 16).
• C1 was vulnerable: her primary carer was seriously ill with cancer.
• The offender had engaged in prior grooming behaviour through the indecent assaults in Counts 1–2, “testing the water” to see if she would complain.
• He took deliberate steps to prevent disclosure, warning her of catastrophic consequences for the grandparents if she told anyone.
• He was under the influence of drugs at the time of the rape, compounding his culpability.
• He later falsely suggested that C1 had instigated sexual activity, effectively blaming the victim.

The Court also emphasised that, provided double counting was avoided, the impact of Counts 1 and 2 had to be reflected in the sentence for Count 3. Those indecent assaults formed part of a continuum of abuse and grooming culminating in the rape.

Considering these factors, the Court concluded that even without factoring in the offences against C2 and C3, the sentence on Count 3 should not have been less than 13½ years’ imprisonment.

5.5 Totality and the additional offending against C2 and C3

The Court then turned to the crucial question of totality. Although the absolute gravity of the rape of C1 far exceeded the later offences, the criminality against C2 and C3 was nevertheless serious and had to be given real weight.

The judge had imposed concurrent sentences of 18 months for significant courses of sexualised grooming, exposure and incitement of two child relatives. He acknowledged that if sentencing for each victim’s offending separately, he would have imposed higher sentences and then reduced them on totality grounds to reach the 12‑year custodial term.

The Court accepted the concurrency but found the resulting uplift of only 2 years (from what the judge described as a 10‑year starting point for the rape) wholly inadequate. As the Court noted:

• The judge himself accepted he would have imposed “higher” standalone sentences for C2 and C3.
• Defence counsel realistically conceded that the combined effect of the C2/C3 offending could justify more than a 2‑year increase.

The Court therefore:

• Took a notional sentence for Count 3 alone of at least 13½ years.
• Applied a further uplift to reflect the offending against C2 and C3, settling on a minimum proper custodial term of 16½ years for the totality of the criminality.

This approach illustrates a disciplined application of the totality principle:

• Ask what each group of offences would attract as standalone sentences.
• Consider how much real additional punishment must be imposed to ensure those offences are not effectively ignored, while still keeping the overall sentence proportionate and not crushing.

The lesson is that where multiple victims have suffered distinct sexual victimisation, especially over different time periods, an uplift of only a token number of years on the lead count will generally be inadequate.

5.6 Unduly lenient sentence: the threshold for intervention

The Court’s language in paragraphs 34–35 is important for understanding the unduly lenient threshold. It did not simply say a higher sentence would have been justified; it said:

“We consider that the least custodial sentence that could properly have been imposed… was a sentence of 16½ years.”

That formulation is central in unduly lenient reference cases. The Court must identify:

• A lower boundary of properly open sentencing options, given the guideline framework and the facts.
• That the sentence actually imposed fell below that boundary.

Here, almost 4½ years separated the sentence imposed (12 years’ custody) and the lower bound deemed appropriate (16½ years). The Court therefore felt no hesitation in describing the sentence as “not merely lenient but… unduly lenient”.

The case thus reaffirms that:

• Where there is a clear miscategorisation of harm under a guideline, particularly in serious sexual offences, this can readily translate into an unduly lenient sentence.
• Failure to make a proper totality adjustment for further serious offences, particularly against additional child victims, will also justify intervention.

5.7 Dangerousness and extended sentences

The Court did not disturb the finding of dangerousness or the length of the extended licence period of 4 years. The pre‑sentence report had assessed the offender as presenting a high risk of further serious harm, and he continued to deny all wrongdoing. The pattern of offending — against multiple young relatives over many years — strongly supported the need for an extended sentence.

However, the case underscores an important distinction:

• The custodial term of an extended sentence must still adequately reflect punishment and deterrence for the past offending.
• The extended licence period is focused on public protection after release.

An inappropriately low custodial term cannot be justified on the basis that the offender will be on an extended licence; the two components serve different purposes. VDT reinforces that principle by raising the custodial element while leaving the licence period unchanged.

5.8 Ancillary point: victim surcharge for historic offences

The Court briefly noted that the victim surcharge ordered at first instance was inappropriate for counts 1–3, because those offences pre‑dated 1 October 2012, the date from which the surcharge regime applied to such offending. The Court accordingly quashed the surcharge order.

This is a practical reminder that, even where sentencing guidelines and overall sentence lengths are directed by current law, ancillary financial orders must respect the temporal limits of the enabling legislation.

6. Complex Concepts Explained in Plain Terms

6.1 What is a “historic” sexual offence?

A “historic” sexual offence is one committed many years before it is prosecuted, often decades earlier. The law requires:

• That the maximum sentence imposed cannot exceed the maximum that applied at the time of the offence.
• That current sentencing guidelines are used as a starting point, adjusted if needed to avoid unfairness, particularly where social attitudes and legislation have changed.

In VDT, the indecent assaults and rape of C1 were committed under the Sexual Offences Act 1956, long before the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The judge and the Court appropriately applied the Historical Sexual Offences Guideline, which is designed precisely for such cases.

6.2 Harm categories and culpability categories

Sentencing guidelines divide offences into:

• Culpability (A, B, C): how blameworthy the offender is, considering planning, use of force, abuse of trust, and so on.
• Harm (1, 2, 3): the level of harm caused or intended, taking into account physical injury, psychological impact, pregnancy, and long‑term consequences.

Category 1 is the most serious harm, category 3 the least. The combination, e.g. “1B” or “2B”, links to a recommended starting point and range of sentences.

In this case:

• The rape of C1 was ultimately assessed as category 1B: very serious harm (because of extreme consequences) with mid‑range culpability.
• The guideline starting point for 1B was 12 years’ custody, with a range of 10–15 years.

6.3 “Severe” versus “extreme” psychological harm

The guideline conceptually distinguishes between:

• Severe psychological harm — serious, long‑lasting mental or emotional injury, enough to raise harm to category 2.
• Extreme harm or impact — where the nature or consequences are so exceptional (e.g. catastrophic life changes, lifelong disability, enduring chronic mental illness) that harm should be treated as category 1.

In C1’s case, the Court agreed her harm was “beyond any measure” severe, but found that the cumulative effect of forced pregnancy, stillbirth, permanent infertility and decades of intense psychological damage took the case beyond even the “ordinary” notion of severe harm into the realm of “extreme” harm justifying category 1.

6.4 The totality principle

The totality principle is a requirement that the overall sentence for multiple offences must not be:

• So long as to be unjust or “crushing”, or
• So short that it fails to reflect the combined seriousness of all the offences.

Judges achieve totality by deciding whether sentences should run:

• Concurrently (at the same time), or
• Consecutively (one after the other),

and by adjusting the lengths of individual sentences.

In VDT, all sentences ran concurrently, but the Court held that the lead sentence on Count 3 had to be significantly higher to ensure that the abuse of C2 and C3 was properly reflected in the global term.

6.5 Unduly lenient sentence references

In serious cases, the Attorney General or Solicitor General can ask the Court of Appeal to review a Crown Court sentence on the basis that it is “unduly lenient”. The Court then asks:

• Not “would we have sentenced differently?” but “does this sentence fall outside the range of sentences a competent judge could reasonably impose?”

Only if the sentence is below that reasonable range will the Court increase it. In VDT, the Court concluded that the minimum proper custodial term was 16½ years; the 12‑year term was below that range, and so intervention was justified.

6.6 Extended sentences and dangerousness

An extended sentence is imposed where:

• The offence is of a specified type (including serious sexual offences), and
• The offender poses a significant risk of causing serious harm in future.

It has two main parts:

• A custodial term — the time actually spent in prison (subject to release rules).
• An extended licence period — extra time under supervision in the community after release. If the offender breaches licence conditions, they can be recalled to prison.

In VDT, the extended licence was 4 years. The Court increased the custodial element but did not alter the extended licence period.

6.7 Anonymity of sexual offence complainants

The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 gives lifelong anonymity to complainants in sexual cases:

• No publication during their lifetime may include details likely to identify them as victims of the offences.
• This protection can be waived or lifted only in specific circumstances; the Court expressly stated that it did not do so here.

Hence the use of anonymised labels “C1”, “C2” and “C3” in the judgment and in this commentary.

7. Impact and Significance

7.1 Elevation of pregnancy‑related rape to category 1 harm

The most notable precedent set by VDT is the clear statement that in historic rape cases:

• Pregnancy, stillbirth and infertility, when combined with long‑term severe psychological harm, can render the harm “extreme”.
• Such cases can and should be categorised under harm category 1, despite pregnancy ordinarily being treated as a category 2 factor.

Prosecutors and judges can draw on this decision to:

• Argue for category 1 harm where pregnancy from rape leads to catastrophic, enduring consequences.
• Ensure that long‑term medical and psychological evidence is marshalled at sentencing to demonstrate the full impact.

7.2 Treatment of long‑term harm in historic cases

VDT illustrates that the mere fact that offences occurred long ago does not lessen their seriousness. In some cases, as here, time reveals the full extent of damage. Future courts are likely to follow this reasoning when:

• Victims have decades of mental health difficulties clearly linked to the abuse.
• Life choices — education, employment, relationships, parenthood — have been enduringly distorted by what happened.

Defence submissions emphasising an offender’s subsequent law‑abiding life must be weighed carefully against the harm that has only become visible over many years.

7.3 Multi‑victim sexual offending and totality

The case is a warning against under‑valuing offending against additional victims when constructing a global sentence. It shows that:

• Even if those additional offences do not involve penetrative acts, they may still be profoundly harmful and deserve a substantial incremental penalty.
• A small, nominal uplift on a lead sentence will often be insufficient where there are multiple child victims across different time periods.

Sentencers must therefore construct and cross‑check their overall sentence with an eye to ensuring that each victim’s suffering is reflected in the final term.

7.4 Practical sentencing guidance

For practitioners, VDT has several practical implications:

• For the prosecution:
  • Ensure that evidence of long‑term physical and psychological consequences (e.g. infertility, chronic mental illness) is fully documented and presented at sentencing.
  • Argue explicitly where appropriate that such consequences raise harm to category 1.
  • In multi‑victim cases, press for a meaningful uplift to the lead offence, or for some sentences to run consecutively, to reflect the totality of harm.
• For the defence:
  • Recognise that, in exceptional cases like this, pregnancy from rape and its aftermath may properly be treated as “extreme”; attempts to characterise such consequences as standard category 2 features are unlikely to succeed.
  • Focus on elements genuinely capable of mitigating, such as age, health, or evidence of reduced risk — though where dangerousness is found, mitigation may have limited effect on overall structure.
• For judges:
  • Use the guideline’s flexibility to move between harm categories when the nature or impact of listed factors is clearly beyond the ordinary.
  • Articulate explicitly how the totality principle is being applied, especially where there are multiple victims and concurrent sentences.

8. Conclusion

R v VDT [2025] EWCA Crim 1567 is a powerful application of sentencing principles in the context of historic sexual offending within a family. The Court of Appeal:

• Reaffirmed that sentencing guidelines are not rigid “tramlines” and that courts must exercise judgment where the facts are at the extreme end of seriousness.
• Clarified that pregnancy resulting from rape, when coupled with stillbirth, infertility, and decades of psychological damage, can justify harm categorisation at the highest level, category 1.
• Demonstrated that the passage of time can aggravate seriousness by revealing the long‑term impact of abuse, particularly in historic sexual cases.
• Reinforced the proper use of the unduly lenient sentence jurisdiction and the totality principle in multi‑victim sexual offending.

The result — an extended sentence of 20½ years with 16½ years’ custody — underscores the gravity with which the appellate courts now approach historic intra‑familial sexual exploitation that has permanently altered the course of a victim’s life. The judgment will serve as a significant reference point in future cases involving pregnancy from rape, catastrophic consequences for victims, and complex patterns of offending across multiple family members over many years.