Ensuring Precision in Domestic Abuse Fact-Finding and Schedule B Recording

Introduction

Z (A Child), Re [2025] EWCA Civ 594 is a landmark Court of Appeal decision addressing both the scope of appellate review of fact-finding in family proceedings and the formal requirements for recording domestic abuse findings under PD 12J. The appeal arose from fact-finding hearings conducted by Theis J in a return-to-home application under the Hague Convention, in which a father sought the return of his eight-year-old son, J, who was wrongfully removed from Egypt by the mother. Central issues included five categories of alleged abuse—coercion and control, sexual abuse, physical abuse, emotional abuse and financial abuse—of which only categories (3) physical and (4) emotional abuse were largely upheld against the father. The father challenged the adequacy of reasons and the evaluation of evidence supporting those findings, and the Court of Appeal was invited to consider both the merits of the appeal and an obvious drafting error in the Schedule of Findings appended to the order.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal, with Moylan LJ giving the lead judgment, dismissed the father’s appeal. It reaffirmed the stringent standards for appellate interference with primary fact-finding, citing In re B (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] 1 WLR 1911, Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 2600 and Volpi v Volpi [2022] 4 WLR 48. The panel held that Theis J had conducted a comprehensive review of the evidence, weighing inconsistencies in both parents’ accounts, and had articulated rational conclusions. A separate issue arose when an entirely unsubstantiated finding—that the father had dragged the mother by the hair, slapped her and hit her—appeared in Schedule B despite not featuring in the judgment. The Court directed deletion of that paragraph as a drafting error, while confirming that no broader remedial intervention was justified. The father’s appeal was dismissed, but the court underscored the urgency of resolving the welfare hearing without undue delay.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] 1 WLR 1911 – appellate restraint in overturning primary findings except in cases of no evidential basis, misunderstanding or irrationality.
• Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 2600 – confirmation that factual findings will stand unless plainly wrong, based on demonstrable error or failure to consider relevant evidence.
• Volpi v Volpi [2022] 4 WLR 48 – detailed principles governing the “plainly wrong” test, emphasizing reasonableness rather than appellate preference.
• Re B (A Child) (Placement Order; Adequacy of Reasons) [2022] 4 WLR 42 – guidance on “good judgment” structure but distinguished as not displacing the standard of review for fact findings.
• Practice Direction 12J FPR 2010 – requirement to record domestic abuse findings in a Schedule appended to the order, ensuring transparency in fact-finding.

Legal Reasoning

The Court of Appeal’s reasoning unfolded in two strands. First, it examined whether Theis J’s findings of physical and emotional abuse were “plainly wrong” or irrational. Applying the established authorities, the court confirmed that the trial judge had listened to both parents (through interpreters), scrutinized multiple written accounts, expert evidence on Egyptian law and immigration matters, and the Cafcass report. She had expressly noted inconsistencies in both parties’ evidence, accepted some allegations while rejecting others, and provided reasoned explanations for each category. The appellate court recognized that a trial judge is entitled to draw inferences from the overall pattern of conduct—here the father’s temper, repeated arguments, the mother’s departure from the family home, and the child’s exposure to that conflict—and that minor inconsistencies do not preclude a finding on the balance of probabilities.

Second, the Court addressed the anomalous inclusion of an allegation in Schedule B that had no basis in evidence or the judgment. Distinguishing between errors in judicial reasoning and clerical or drafting mistakes, the court held that removing a spurious paragraph from the Schedule was necessary to comply with PD 12J’s mandate that recorded findings must accurately reflect the court’s conclusions. It reiterated that an appellate court has the power to correct such material errors in orders and should do so when identified, without reopening the merits of the fact-finding exercise.

Impact

This decision clarifies two important principles for family proceedings:

1. Appellate Review of Fact-Finding: Reaffirms the narrow window for overturning primary findings of abuse. Future appellants must demonstrate that no reasonable judge could have reached the contested conclusions or that there was a demonstrable failure to consider material evidence.
2. Precision in Recording Domestic Abuse Findings: Highlights the trial court’s duty to ensure the Schedule to the order accurately mirrors the judge’s reasoning. Any discrepancy—whether by omission or inclusion of unsupported allegations—can and should be rectified on appeal to maintain the integrity of the fact-finding process and protect procedural fairness.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Balance of Probabilities: In family fact-finding, the judge must decide which version of events is more likely true than not, rather than beyond reasonable doubt.
• Plainly Wrong Test: An appellate court will only interfere with factual findings if it is satisfied that no reasonable judge could have arrived at them.
• Schedule B (PD 12J): A formal annex to family orders where findings of domestic abuse must be itemized clearly and accurately.
• Clerical vs. Judicial Error: Clerical or drafting errors in orders (e.g., stray paragraphs not grounded in evidence) can be corrected without revisiting the merits of the underlying judgment.

Conclusion

Z (A Child), Re [2025] EWCA Civ 594 underscores the high threshold for upsetting fact-finding conclusions in domestic abuse allegations and the parallel duty of family courts to record those findings with precision. By distinguishing between substantive errors in reasoning and mere drafting mistakes, the Court of Appeal preserved the integrity of Theis J’s careful assessment while ensuring that the formal order accurately reflected her conclusions. Practitioners should note the importance of meticulous order-drafting—particularly in domestic abuse schedules—and the limited but available remedy when the Schedule departs from the judge’s reasoned findings.