Egregious Solicitor Misconduct, the “Special Circumstances” Gateway, and Renewal of a Lapsed Summons: Commentary on Galvin v Sharif & DePuy [2025] IEHC 680

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the High Court decision of Ferriter J in Galvin v Sharif & DePuy International Ltd [2025] IEHC 680, a judgment that refines the law on renewal of lapsed summonses under Order 8 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (“RSC”), particularly where the plaintiff has been gravely misled by her own solicitor.

The case lies at the intersection of:

• strict procedural rules governing service and renewal of originating summonses,
• the principle that a plaintiff is normally “fixed with” their solicitor’s conduct, and
• exceptional circumstances where solicitor misconduct is so egregious that it may not fairly be attributed to the client.

The plaintiff, Ms Geraldine Galvin, brought proceedings arising from an allegedly defective DePuy metal-on-metal hip implant, a type of claim of which there have been hundreds before the Irish courts. Her 2015 personal injuries summons was never served and expired in January 2016. Almost eight years later, in April 2024, that summons was renewed on an ex parte application. The second defendant, DePuy, then applied to set aside that renewal.

The High Court was asked to decide:

• whether “special circumstances” existed within the meaning of Order 8, rule 1 RSC to justify renewing a very stale summons, and
• whether the ex parte renewal order should be set aside under Order 8, rule 2 RSC.

While the Court accepted that the plaintiff was personally blameless and that her first solicitor’s conduct was extraordinary, it still set aside the renewal. The judgment therefore both recognises a narrow exception for extreme solicitor misconduct and reaffirms the strictness of the “special circumstances” gateway, especially where later periods of delay remain unexplained.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 Underlying medical claim

Ms Galvin, now aged 70, underwent a hip replacement in May 2005 using a DePuy ASR XL metal-on-metal implant. The device became the subject of a global recall in 2010. Clinical review and blood testing led to revision surgery in January 2012. Both surgeries were performed by the first defendant, an orthopaedic surgeon who has since died.

In January 2012, the plaintiff engaged her first firm of solicitors. On 23 January 2015, that firm issued a personal injuries summons, naming DePuy (the second defendant) and the surgeon (the first defendant). The claim against DePuy was based on negligence and the Liability for Defective Products Act 1991.

2.2 The unserved summons and initial misconduct

The summons was never served on either defendant. Under the RSC, it lapsed after 12 months, i.e. on 23 January 2016.

DePuy’s solicitors, McCann FitzGerald, became aware of a potential claim when a PIAB application was lodged in January 2015 by the first solicitor. That application:

• was lodged without the plaintiff’s knowledge or authority,
• incorrectly named a non-existent DePuy entity, and
• prompted McCann FitzGerald, by letter of 12 February 2015, to confirm they had authority to accept service of proceedings.

The first solicitor ignored that letter and never informed the plaintiff of it. Nor did she serve the summons within the 12-month period.

More seriously, the first solicitor actively misled the plaintiff. In a letter dated 18 August 2015:

• she enclosed a generic DePuy recall letter (from June 2015) but presented it as a letter from DePuy’s solicitors “forwarded for your attention”,
• she falsely asserted that DePuy had raised a notice for particulars, and
• she requested detailed information (out-of-pocket expenses, previous injuries, etc.) supposedly to answer that (non-existent) notice, indicating that a defence would be filed thereafter.

In reality, no appearance had been entered by DePuy, no notice for particulars was served, and the summons remained unserved. The plaintiff reasonably believed her case was progressing.

2.3 Escalation: Law Society complaint and discovery of non-service

In December 2018, a newspaper article alerted the plaintiff to disciplinary issues involving her first solicitor. Alarmed, she wrote seeking an update and met the solicitor on 24 January 2019. The solicitor followed up with a long email attributing delay to:

• the volume of DePuy hip cases in the High Court, and
• systemic difficulty dealing with the “onslaught” of such claims.

She falsely assured the plaintiff that:

• the plaintiff’s case was in the High Court system, and
• settlement was expected within “6–8 months”.

Shortly afterwards, the plaintiff terminated her retainer and moved to a second solicitor. That solicitor:

• requested the file and a fees account in February 2019,
• received only a grossly inflated, un-itemised bill exceeding €23,000, and
• was effectively stonewalled on release of the file.

A formal complaint to the Law Society was made in August 2019. Throughout late 2019 and early 2020, the plaintiff expressed to the Law Society her concern that something might be fundamentally wrong, including a fear that proceedings had never been issued.

The key turning point occurred on 5 June 2020, when:

• a separate firm acting for the first solicitor phoned the second solicitor,
• admitted that the summons had issued but was never served, and
• suggested a “deal” whereby DePuy might settle for less than full value and the first solicitor would pay the balance, while also indicating the first solicitor had not notified her professional indemnity insurers and appeared to have no assets.

This was the moment when the plaintiff (via her second solicitor) first learned that her 2015 summons had never been served. She also learned that her natural remedy – a negligence claim against her solicitor backed by indemnity cover – was itself jeopardised.

2.4 The second solicitor’s response and eventual disengagement

After June 2020, the second solicitor:

• continued to press for the full file through the Law Society process,
• obtained a copy of the original summons in August 2020,
• wrote to McCann FitzGerald in August 2020 seeking settlement and clarifying the non-service issue,
• received confirmation in September 2020 that DePuy had never been served, and
• advised both the Law Society and DePuy’s solicitors that a renewal/extension application would have to be made.

However, after taking counsel’s advice, the second solicitor reached the view that non-service rendered the proceedings fatally defective and that a renewal application would fail. In a letter of 18 May 2021 to the first solicitor, he explicitly stated:

• two senior counsel had advised that non-service would be “fatal” to the proceedings, and
• the plaintiff now wished to sue the first solicitor.

In effect, a conscious decision was taken not to attempt renewal at that stage.

The plaintiff later turned to a third solicitor (early 2022). That firm:

• struggled to obtain the file from the second solicitor, only receiving it in March 2023,
• found the file incomplete (notably lacking medical records),
• then obtained extensive medical records from the Galway Clinic and Hermitage Medical Clinic in late 2023, and
• prepared and brought an ex parte application to renew the summons in February 2024.

The High Court renewed the summons on 8 April 2024, recording as “special circumstances” that:

“the current solicitors on record for the plaintiff were endeavouring to resolve difficulties created by the former solicitors and the fact that it was discovered in June 2020 that the summons had not actually been served”.

The renewed summons was served on DePuy on 10 June 2024. DePuy then applied, on 31 July 2024, to set aside the renewal.

Separately, the plaintiff has issued protective negligence proceedings against both her first and second solicitors. Ferriter J stressed that his findings were not determinations of negligence in those prospective actions but were based solely on the evidence before him for the purpose of the renewal dispute.

3. Issues Before the High Court

The legal principles governing renewal of a lapsed summons and the power to set aside a renewal order were not in dispute. The real controversy lay in how those principles should be applied to an eight-year delay interlaced with serious solicitor misconduct and subsequent professional missteps.

The central issues were:

1. Special circumstances gateway: Did the plaintiff show “special circumstances” under Order 8, rule 1 RSC that justified renewal of the summons, bearing in mind:
   • the very long period between lapse (January 2016) and renewal (April 2024), and
   • the requirement (from case law) that special circumstances must cover the whole, or substantially the whole, of the extension period?
2. Attribution of solicitor misconduct: Could the extreme misconduct of the first solicitor be treated as outside the normal scope of the solicitor–client relationship, such that it should not be attributed to the plaintiff for the purposes of Order 8?
3. Later delay and the second/third solicitors: Even if special circumstances existed to June 2020, did they also exist for the prolonged period from June 2020 to April 2024, particularly when:
   • the second solicitor knew of non-service and chose not to apply for renewal, and
   • a further two-and-a-half-year gap elapsed before the third solicitor received the file and eventually brought the renewal application?
4. Set-aside criteria: Could DePuy show that the ex parte renewal order was “incorrect in principle” because, properly understood, no special circumstances existed or they did not extend over the relevant period, thus requiring the renewal to be set aside under Order 8, rule 2?

4. Summary of the Judgment

Ferriter J’s decision can be summarised as follows:

1. Special circumstances existed up to June 2020.
   The Court held that, from the lapse of the summons in January 2016 until the discovery in June 2020 that the summons had never been served, a combination of highly unusual factors amounted to “special circumstances”:
   • the first solicitor’s sustained and active deception of the plaintiff about the supposed progress of the case,
   • the plaintiff’s own proactive and diligent efforts to follow up her claim,
   • the obstruction in handing over the file and the need to invoke Law Society processes, and
   • the fact that DePuy had been on notice of a potential claim since early 2015 and was dealing with many similar hip cases.
   In these circumstances, the conduct of the first solicitor was “so far outside the reasonable scope of the solicitor client relationship” that it would be unjust to fix the plaintiff with it for the purpose of Order 8. The plaintiff was treated as blameless up to June 2020.
2. No sufficient special circumstances thereafter.
   From June 2020 onwards, the Court held that the position was different:
   • Once the fact of non-service was discovered, it “behoved” the second solicitor to bring a renewal application within a reasonable time.
   • Some leeway (a “couple of months”) would have been understandable given the ongoing Law Society process and lack of a full file, but no application was brought until more than three years later.
   • The second solicitor had sufficient information by late 2020 to justify a renewal application, particularly given the clear evidence of misconduct by the first solicitor and DePuy’s knowledge of the underlying claim.
   • Instead, he obtained counsel’s advice, decided that renewal was hopeless, and consciously chose not to apply, focusing instead on settlement and a claim against the first solicitor.
   Ferriter J found that this conscious decision not to apply – and the subsequent two-and-a-half-year period before the file reached the third solicitor – meant that “special circumstances cannot be made out” for that later period.
3. Special circumstances must cover “the whole or substantially the whole” period.
   Applying AIB v Boyd, the Court emphasised that:

   “As the plaintiff cannot get through the gateway requirement of establishing special circumstances for the whole or substantially the whole of the relevant period, she unfortunately does not get to the interests of justice assessment.”

   Thus, even though special circumstances existed for a long initial period, the unexplained (or unjustifiably explained) gaps from June 2020 onwards were fatal.
4. Renewal order set aside; plaintiff’s action effectively lost.
   With “considerable reluctance”, given that the plaintiff “remained blameless throughout”, the Court concluded that it was compelled to set aside the renewal order of 8 April 2024. The practical result is that the plaintiff’s substantive claim against DePuy is now time-barred. Her remaining recourse lies in the separate negligence actions issued against her first and second solicitors.

5. Precedents and Authorities Cited

5.1 Order 8 RSC: The statutory framework

Order 8, rule 1 RSC allows renewal of a summons after its 12-month validity period has expired only where the Court is satisfied that there are “special circumstances which justify an extension”. Those circumstances must also be recorded in the renewal order.

Order 8, rule 2 empowers the Court to set aside a renewal. Applications to set aside are heard de novo (afresh), not as appeals against the ex parte order. As explained in Downes v TLC Nursing Home [2020] IEHC 465:

• the defendant must show that the renewal decision was “incorrect in principle”, or
• that, had the ex parte judge known additional facts now before the Court, the renewal would not have been granted.

In Galvin, the second limb did not arise: no materially new facts were produced on the set-aside motion. The issue was whether the ex parte judge erred in principle in finding special circumstances.

5.2 Murphy v HSE [2021] IECA 3 – defining “special circumstances”

Murphy v HSE is the leading Court of Appeal authority on Order 8 as amended (which raised the standard from “good reason” to “special circumstances”). Haughton J held that:

• “special” suggests a fact or circumstance “beyond the ordinary or the usual”, though not necessarily “extraordinary” in a colloquial sense,
• such circumstances must be assessed case by case; no inflexible rule can be laid down, and
• the Court must consider whether renewal is in the interests of justice, weighing prejudice/hardship to both sides.

Crucially, Haughton J addressed solicitor error:

“As far as legal advisors are concerned inadvertence or inattention, for example in effecting service of the summons will rarely constitute special circumstances… If inadvertence of this nature would not reach the threshold of ‘good reason’ it is even more unlikely to amount to ‘special circumstance’.”

He reinforced an earlier warning from Peart J in Moynihan v Dairygold Co-op [2006] IEHC 318 pointing out the importance of timely service and warning that inadvertence would not justify renewal.

5.3 Nolan v St Mary’s Diocesan School [2022] IECA 10 and Power v CJSC Indigo Tajikistan [2024] IECA 47

Noonan J in Nolan v St Mary’s Diocesan School clarified that:

• “special circumstances” and “justification for renewal” fall to be considered together under the broader question of whether renewal is in the interests of justice, but
• “special circumstances” is a preliminary “gateway” requirement that must be met before any prejudice balancing arises.

Allen J in Power v CJSC Indigo Tajikistan expressly approved this “gateway” formulation. Ferriter J relies on that structure in Galvin: unless special circumstances are established, the Court does not reach the interests of justice assessment at all.

5.4 Nolan v Trustees of Bridge United AFC [2021] IEHC 335 – solicitor inadvertence

Barr J in Nolan v Trustees of Bridge United AFC explained why mere solicitor inadvertence will not suffice:

“The reasons why mere inadvertence on the part of a solicitor will not suffice as a special circumstance are quite clear. Firstly, it is because mere inadvertence cannot be seen as being special, or out of the ordinary… Secondly, if mere inadvertence was allowed as a special circumstance to justify renewal of a summons, that would effectively render the time limit provided for in the rules redundant.”

This rationale underpins the general rule that the plaintiff is identified with the solicitor’s conduct. Allowing solicitor negligence to be routinely invoked as “special circumstances” would eviscerate the discipline imposed by Order 8.

5.5 AIB v Boyd [2023] IECA 318 – coverage of the extension period

Butler J in AIB v Boyd, endorsed by Ferriter J, held that:

• special circumstances must cover the whole or substantially the whole of the extension period sought,
• different special circumstances may operate in different sub-periods, but they must overlap to some extent, and
• the longer the delay, the more difficult it is to meet the threshold.

This principle is central in Galvin: although the Court accepted special circumstances for the period up to June 2020, there was a large later period (over 2.5 years) that could not be so justified.

5.6 Hadnett v Joyce [2025] IEHC 599 – exceptions for justified solicitor error

In his own earlier judgment in Hadnett v Joyce, Ferriter J had already recognised that there is no absolute bar on solicitor error constituting part of “special circumstances”. He accepted that where a solicitor’s inadvertence is explained by compelling external factors (e.g. serious illness or other unforeseen events), that may constitute special circumstances.

In Galvin, he extends that reasoning to a more radical scenario: deliberate, egregious misconduct and deception by a solicitor that goes beyond normal professional error and effectively places the solicitor outside the ordinary solicitor–client dynamic for Order 8 purposes.

5.7 Kirwan v Connors [2025] IESC 21 – context on delay (want of prosecution)

While Kirwan v Connors concerned dismissal for want of prosecution, the Supreme Court there indicated that a presumption of dismissal arises where there has been five years of inactivity. Ferriter J cites this as context for the “extreme magnitude” of delay in Galvin, even though the legal tests differ.

The reference underscores that civil procedure strongly disfavors long periods of inactivity, whether under Order 8 or in broader case management.

6. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

6.1 The “special circumstances” gateway and rationale

Ferriter J begins by reiterating the modern approach:

• The Court must first determine whether there are “special circumstances” within Order 8, rule 1.
• Only if that gateway is passed does the Court consider the interests of justice and prejudice on both sides.

He accepts the general rule, drawn from Murphy v HSE, Nolan (Bridge United) and earlier case law, that:

• inadvertence or error by a solicitor will “rarely” amount to special circumstances,
• a plaintiff is ordinarily identified with their solicitor’s actions (or inactions), and
• the policy of the rule is to ensure litigation is diligently prosecuted, rather than allowing plaintiffs to rely on solicitor negligence to circumvent time limits.

The corollary is that the usual remedy for solicitor failure is a professional negligence action rather than relaxation of procedural rules.

However, the judge also emphasises that there is “no hard and fast rule” excluding solicitor-related factors entirely. Exceptional cases may exist where solicitor conduct is so aberrant that it warrants different treatment.

6.2 Finding special circumstances to June 2020

Ferriter J carefully analyses the period from:

• the lapse of the summons (January 2016) to
• the moment when the plaintiff discovered non-service (June 2020).

He identifies a constellation of “unusual and extraordinary” features (paras 46–47):

• Deliberate, multi-year deception by the first solicitor:
  • falsely representing that a notice for particulars had been served,
  • seeking information to reply to that fictitious notice,
  • blaming delays on systemic issues and the volume of DePuy litigation, and
  • repeatedly promising imminent settlement when no progress had been made.
• Proactive conduct by the plaintiff:
  • she contacted her solicitor regularly,
  • she reacted promptly upon reading of disciplinary proceedings, and
  • she moved to a new solicitor and actively drove a Law Society complaint when her file was not released.
• Obstruction of file transfer:
  • the first solicitor refused to release the file without a grossly inflated and unjustified fee,
  • no meaningful papers were released until mid-2020, despite Law Society involvement.
• Late discovery of non-service and lack of indemnity cover:
  • only in June 2020 did the plaintiff learn the summons was unserved,
  • only then did she discover the first solicitor had failed to notify indemnity insurers and apparently had no assets, compromising her fallback remedy.
• DePuy’s prior notice and experience:
  • DePuy knew of a potential claim since 2015 (via the PIAB application), and
  • it had extensive experience managing a large volume of similar DePuy hip claims.

Importantly, the plaintiff was not merely passive or indifferent. She did everything a reasonable client might do; it was her solicitor who repeatedly lied to her and obstructed her attempts to switch representation.

On this basis, Ferriter J concludes (para 47) that:

“Given the plaintiff's proactive involvement… and given that the conduct of her first solicitor was so far outside the reasonable scope of the solicitor client relationship… I do not think that this is a case where it would be appropriate to fix the actions of the first solicitor with the plaintiff for the purposes of the application of the renewal rule.”

This is a significant doctrinal development: it recognises that where a solicitor’s behaviour crosses from error into systematic deception and obstruction, justice may require treating that conduct as not attributable to the client for Order 8 purposes.

6.3 Failure of special circumstances after June 2020

The core of the judgment lies in the Court’s firm stance on the later period of delay. Having accepted that special circumstances existed to June 2020, Ferriter J rigorously examines what happened thereafter.

6.3.1 Obligation of the second solicitor to act promptly

The Court holds that, once the second solicitor learned of the non-service:

• it “behoved” him to bring a renewal application within a reasonable period,
• he understood the urgency (as evidenced by his correspondence), and
• the Court would have allowed some reasonable latitude (perhaps a couple of months) given the difficulties with the file and the Law Society process.

But no renewal application was brought until long after:

• November 2020 – when he explicitly recognised that an extension application was required, and
• January 2021 – when he again referred to making an application to the High Court.

Instead, he obtained advice from senior counsel, apparently on the basis that:

• the non-service was fatal, and
• a renewal application should not be made.

This led to a conscious strategic choice not to seek renewal, communicated in his letter of 18 May 2021. Ferriter J treats this decision as fundamentally inconsistent with any later attempt to invoke special circumstances.

6.3.2 Effect of the decision not to apply

Ferriter J notes that the evidence does not include counsel’s written advice, nor is it fully clear what the plaintiff was told. However, he reasons (para 56) that:

• if counsel was fully instructed and nevertheless advised against an application, and
• if an informed decision was then taken not to apply,

then that decision is “fatal to any renewal application brought over two and a half years later”.

Even if the advice was wrong or unduly pessimistic, the fact remains that the plaintiff (through her solicitor) made a conscious, informed choice not to pursue the renewal route at that time. That sits uneasily with any contention that the later failure to apply was due to circumstances beyond her control.

Even on a more generous view (i.e. supposing less-than-perfect instructions to counsel), the inescapable fact is that:

• a period of well over 2.5 years elapsed after October/November 2020,
• during which no renewal application was brought, and
• no satisfactory special circumstances were shown for that entire period.

The judge is clear that:

“In short, a renewal application should have been brought within a reasonable period after June 2020. Instead, a decision was taken not to bring such an application. Either way special circumstances cannot be made out.”

6.3.3 The role of the third solicitor

The third solicitor’s conduct is viewed more sympathetically:

• She diligently sought and eventually obtained the incomplete file in March 2023.
• She then obtained extensive medical records in late 2023, relevant both to advising on the merits and to proving that DePuy was or should have been on notice.
• She prepared and brought the renewal application by February 2024.

Ferriter J acknowledges that her period of involvement (from March 2023 to February 2024) might itself arguably be covered by special circumstances, given the work required. However, he expressly declines to decide that point because it cannot cure the more basic problem:

“the fundamental difficulty remains that there was a period of well over two and a half years from the discovery of the fact of non-service of the summons to that belated file handover by the second solicitor… during which, at least in substantial part, no special circumstances can be made out.”

That 2.5-year gap lies at the heart of the refusal to uphold the renewal.

6.4 Application of the “whole period” requirement

Applying AIB v Boyd, Ferriter J reiterates that:

• special circumstances can be composite, differing from one sub-period to another, but
• they must collectively cover the whole, or at least substantially the whole, of the extension period sought.

In Galvin:

• special circumstances clearly existed for January 2016 – June 2020,
• they may have existed for March 2023 – February 2024, but
• there was a yawning gap from mid-2020 to early 2023, particularly after late 2020, for which no adequate explanation was offered.

As a result, the plaintiff could not pass the Order 8 “gateway” and the Court did not proceed to balance prejudice or consider the interests of justice more broadly.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

7.1 What is a “summons” and why does service matter?

In Irish civil procedure, a summons (in personal injury cases, typically a “personal injuries summons”) is the document that initiates proceedings. It must be:

• issued by the court office (i.e. stamped and given a record number), and
• served on the defendant within a strict 12-month period.

If not served in time, the summons “lapses” and becomes ineffective. It may only be revived by a court order renewing it under Order 8.

7.2 The “special circumstances” test

Order 8, rule 1 does not define “special circumstances”, but case law has given it content:

• They must be out of the ordinary (though not necessarily truly exceptional in everyday language).
• They must be causally connected to the failure to serve or renew within time.
• They must extend over the whole, or substantially the whole, of the period sought to be excused.

Normal oversight, office error, or workload will virtually never be enough. Illness, external disasters, or – as in this case – extreme solicitor misconduct may, in rare cases, qualify.

7.3 Why is solicitor conduct usually attributed to the client?

In civil procedure, the acts of a solicitor, engaged to represent a client, are normally treated as the acts of the client. This reflects:

• the agency relationship between solicitor and client, and
• the need to ensure defendants and courts can rely on procedural rules without second-guessing internal problems in a plaintiff’s legal team.

If clients could routinely avoid time limits by saying “my solicitor made a mistake”, limitation periods and procedural deadlines would lose much of their force.

In Galvin, the Court recognises a narrow exception where a solicitor’s conduct is so grossly improper and deceitful that fairness requires not fixing it on a diligent, misled client. But that exception is tightly limited in scope and duration.

7.4 “Statute-barred” and the effect of setting aside renewal

A claim is statute-barred when the limitation period under the relevant statute has expired and no valid proceedings were commenced within that time. For personal injury actions, this is generally two years from the date of knowledge of the injury (subject to specific statutory rules).

In this case, the original summons (issued in 2015) would have stopped the limitation clock – but only if properly served or renewed. When the renewal order was set aside, there was no longer any valid, in-time proceedings on foot. Given the lapse of many years, any new proceedings would now be out of time, so the plaintiff’s substantive product liability claim against DePuy is effectively lost.

7.5 PIAB (Personal Injuries Assessment Board)

PIAB (now the Injuries Resolution Board) is the statutory body that assesses certain personal injury claims before they go to court. Many types of claims must go through PIAB first, but some categories – including certain medical product liability cases – are exempt.

Here, the first solicitor wrongly submitted a PIAB application:

• without the plaintiff’s consent or knowledge,
• naming a non-existent DePuy entity, and
• in circumstances where PIAB certification was not required at all.

However, the fact of that PIAB application did put DePuy’s legal team on notice of a possible claim.

7.6 Law Society complaint and professional indemnity

The Law Society regulates solicitors. Complaints can be made about failures to communicate, mishandling of files, overcharging, and other misconduct. Solicitors must have professional indemnity insurance to cover negligence claims arising from their practice.

In Galvin:

• the complaint to the Law Society was necessary to obtain the plaintiff’s file,
• the first solicitor had failed to notify her indemnity insurers of the claim, and
• she appeared to have no assets, complicating any negligence action against her.

These facts deepened the plaintiff’s predicament and contributed to the special circumstances up to June 2020.

8. Impact and Implications

8.1 For plaintiffs and their advisers

This judgment sends two key messages to plaintiffs and their legal teams:

1. Egregious misconduct can sometimes protect a blameless client – but only for a time.
   The Court is willing, in rare cases, to treat egregious solicitor misconduct as outside the ambit of conduct attributable to the client. Where a plaintiff:
   • has been actively and systematically misled, and
   • has nevertheless been diligent in following up their case,
   the Court may find special circumstances that excuse long delays up until the point when the true position is discovered.
2. Once the problem is discovered, urgent action is required.
   From the moment the plaintiff (or new solicitor) learns that proceedings have not been properly served, the clock starts running on a different basis. The Court expects:
   • prompt consideration of a renewal application,
   • swift gathering of essential information, and
   • no prolonged inaction or reliance on pessimistic advice to justify delay.
   A conscious decision not to apply for renewal, based on legal advice, will be very hard to reconcile with an assertion of “special circumstances” years later.

Practically, plaintiffs who discover serious mistakes in earlier representation should:

• seek fresh, independent legal advice immediately,
• press their new advisers to consider urgent protective steps (such as renewal applications and protective writs against former solicitors), and
• insist on clear records of advice given about the options and their risks.

8.2 For solicitors (first, second and later advisers)

The case highlights risks not only for the original negligent solicitor, but also for subsequent solicitors who inherit a problematic file.

• First solicitor: This case illustrates textbook grounds for serious disciplinary and negligence consequences: failure to serve, misrepresentation, obstruction of file transfer, and failure to notify insurers.
• Second solicitor: The judgment implicitly underscores that a second solicitor who:
  • discovers a summons has not been served, and
  • decides not to seek renewal (especially after equivocal or undocumented counsel’s advice),
  may themselves face exposure if that decision later proves to have extinguished the plaintiff’s cause of action. The fact that the plaintiff has now issued protective proceedings against both first and second solicitors underlines this.
• Third and subsequent solicitors: While the Court was sympathetic to the third solicitor’s diligence, the case is a reminder that late engagement does not cure earlier gaps in special circumstances. Nonetheless, later solicitors should move as quickly as possible to:
  • obtain the full file,
  • gather key evidence (e.g. medical records), and
  • bring any renewal or protective applications at the earliest reasonable opportunity.

8.3 For defendants

Defendants, particularly institutional defendants facing numerous similar claims (like DePuy), may draw several conclusions:

• Notice of a potential claim” is not fatal to challenging a renewal.
  Even where a defendant is on notice (via a PIAB application or general recall programme), they may successfully oppose renewal if the plaintiff cannot prove special circumstances over the entire relevant period.
• Prejudice arguments will matter – but only if the gateway is passed.
  In Galvin, DePuy raised real prejudice (loss of the first defendant’s oral evidence, incomplete medical records, causation disputes). The Court did not reach those arguments because the gateway test failed. In other cases, where special circumstances exist, such prejudice arguments will be central.
• Strategic value in moving promptly to set aside renewals.
  Order 8, rule 2 applications can overturn ex parte renewals even many years after issue where the plaintiff’s explanation is inadequate. Defendants should carefully scrutinise the “special circumstances” recited in renewal orders and consider challenges where appropriate.

8.4 Doctrinal significance in Irish civil procedure

The judgment consolidates and refines several strands of Order 8 jurisprudence:

• It affirms the “special circumstances as gateway” structure from Murphy, Nolan (St Mary’s) and Power.
• It applies and illustrates the “whole or substantially the whole period” requirement from AIB v Boyd in an especially stark factual setting.
• It develops the law on solicitor conduct by:
  • recognising that extreme, deceptive misconduct may be treated as outside the scope of the usual attribution rule, but
  • stressing that this exception is narrow and time-limited: once the true position is discovered, normal principles reassert themselves.
• It introduces a clear principle that a conscious, informed decision not to seek renewal at an earlier stage is fundamentally incompatible with subsequently seeking to rely on special circumstances for the same period.

9. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

Galvin v Sharif & DePuy is a poignant example of how strict procedural rules can extinguish a seemingly meritorious claim where multiple layers of professional failure occur. The plaintiff was personally blameless, diligent, and repeatedly misled by her first solicitor. Yet, because her legal team did not bring a renewal application within a reasonable time after discovering non-service – and indeed at one stage consciously decided not to do so – the High Court held that the special circumstances requirement of Order 8 was not met over the whole relevant period.

The decision establishes and clarifies several important propositions:

1. Egregious solicitor misconduct can constitute “special circumstances” and may, in rare cases, not be attributed to the client.
   Where a solicitor systematically deceives a proactive client and obstructs the transfer of the file, the Court may treat that conduct as outside the normal scope of the solicitor–client relationship for Order 8 purposes.
2. Special circumstances must cover the entire extension period (or substantially all of it).
   It is not enough to explain only the early years of delay. Long, later gaps – particularly after the true state of affairs is known – must also be justified by special circumstances.
3. A conscious decision not to seek renewal is generally fatal to a later renewal application.
   Once a solicitor knows of non-service and deliberately decides not to apply (even on counsel’s advice), it is very difficult to invoke special circumstances to excuse that period later on.
4. The “interests of justice” and prejudice balancing only arise once the gateway is passed.
   Even compelling hardship to a blameless plaintiff, and the fact that a claim will be lost entirely, cannot override the failure to demonstrate special circumstances for the relevant period.

Against the backdrop of extensive DePuy hip litigation, the judgment is a reminder that mass-claim contexts and defendant familiarity with the issues do not dilute fundamental procedural rules. For plaintiffs and their advisers, it underscores the importance of vigilance, prompt action upon discovering procedural defects, and careful, well-documented decision-making about whether to seek renewal.

Ultimately, Galvin represents both a humane recognition of how badly a client can be let down by her lawyers, and a firm insistence that the integrity of procedural time limits – embodied in the “special circumstances” gateway – must be upheld, even at heavy cost to an individual litigant.