EF v A Health And Social Care Trust: Triggering Appeal Time from Court Order Filing and Discretion in Contact Arrangements

Introduction

The Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland handed down its decision in EF v A Health And Social Care Trust ([2025] NICA 26) on 12 May 2025. The case arose under the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 (“the 1987 Order”) and concerned an appeal by the child’s father (“EF”) against a High Court order freeing his son (“X”) for adoption. The mother did not participate. The Trust applied for X to be placed with his paternal aunt and her husband outside Northern Ireland. The father objected, challenging both the freeing order itself and certain procedural and substantive aspects, including the timing of the appeal, the level of post-freeing contact, and the omission of sibling contact provisions.

Key issues:

Whether the court erred in extending time for a late appeal;
Whether the judge properly exercised discretion in approving indirect-only contact with an imprisoned parent;
Whether the judge provided adequate reasoning for the contact plan;
Whether the judge should have addressed sibling contact.

The appeal raises both practice and substantive points: the proper trigger date for the time to appeal, the scope of corrections to draft judgments, and the application of discretion when approving contact plans in kinship adoption settings.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal by Keegan LCJ (with Treacy LJ and O’Hara J concurring) granted an extension of time for three specified grounds of appeal, then dismissed all three grounds on the merits and affirmed the freeing order. In doing so, the court:

Clarified that the six-week appeal period under Order 59 rule 4 runs from the date a final court order is filed (in this case, 9 October 2024), not from the date of judgment publication;
Emphasized that corrections to draft judgments should be limited in scope and time (citing Re I [2019] EWCA Civ 898);
Applied the established discretionary test for contact in adoption—focusing on the child’s best interests, practical logistics, and quality of interaction—and held that indirect contact once every three months (post-freeing) and once yearly (post-adoption) was appropriate given the father’s imprisonment and past conduct;
Rejected criticisms of insufficient reasoning, holding that the judge’s judgment was clear and comprehensive (relying on Re F [2016] EWCA Civ 546);
Found no error in omitting detailed sibling contact provisions, given the lack of bonds and that the guardian raised the issue and it was noted that future life-story work would consider it.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court drew on several key authorities:

Davis v Northern Ireland Carriers [1979] NI 19: Practical guide for extension-of-time applications, considering default, prejudice, merits, and general significance;
Berisha and Berisha [2024] NICA 81: Application of Davis principles to family law appeals;
Re I [2019] EWCA Civ 898: Limited scope for post-judgment corrections and the dangers of protracted amendment processes;
Re HW [2022] UKSC 17 and Re B [2013] UKSC 33: Standard of appellate review of discretionary family law decisions—interference only if wrong in law, based on material factual misapprehension, or taking into account irrelevant considerations;
AU v Belfast HSCT [2024] NICA 1: Confirmation of the test when reviewing discretionary decisions in care and adoption contexts;
Re F [2016] EWCA Civ 546: Duty of a trial judge to give sufficient reasons without slavish repetition, ensuring parties understand who won and why.

These decisions framed both the procedural (extension of time and judgment corrections) and substantive (contact, reasoned decisions) components of the appeal.

Legal Reasoning

1. Extension of Time
The Court applied Order 59 rules 4 and 15 alongside Order 3 rule 5. It held that time began to run when the final freeing order was filed on 9 October 2024, regardless of delays in judgment corrections or website publication. The applicant’s solicitors had sought informal directions, leading to confusion but no culpable default. Balancing Davis criteria—reasonable explanations, absence of prejudice, identifiable substantive points, and adherence to rules—the court granted leave on three limited grounds.

2. Discretion in Contact Arrangements
The judge’s decision to dispense with direct contact was based on:

Logistical impracticalities: X was in Dublin; EF was imprisoned in Magilligan, entailing 7–8 hour travel;
Quality concerns: multiple Zoom contacts caused distress, nightmares, withdrawal;
Carer’s proactive role: L’s facilitation and positive approach;
Future review mechanisms: annual placement meetings and the adoption team’s post-adoption counselling obligations.

The appellate court found no legal error or material misapprehension of fact, and held that contact planning is quintessentially discretionary.

3. Adequacy of Reasons
Applying the principle in Re F, the court evaluated whether the judge’s written reasons were sufficient for both parties to know “who has won or lost and why.” Concluding that the judgment, including paragraphs [42]–[44], laid out findings clearly, the court dismissed criticism of insufficient reasoning.

4. Sibling Contact
The father never raised sibling contact in affidavits or review meetings; the guardian did raise it at trial and the judge acknowledged it, stating that life-story work would consider any future contact. Given very weak bonds and the child’s age, no error arose in omitting a detailed contact plan for half-siblings.

Impact

This decision is significant in two respects:

Procedure in Family Appeals: It establishes unequivocally that the appeal clock under Order 59 rule 4 starts on filing of the order—not judgment publication—urging practitioners to make formal and timely extension applications and reminding courts to limit correction periods.
Contact in Adoption and Kinship Placements: It reaffirms the wide discretion of trial judges in shaping contact plans when parents are incapacitated (e.g., imprisonment), focusing on best interests, logistics, quality of contact, and future review opportunities. It underscores that indirect-only contact can be appropriate in some adoption contexts.

Future cases will cite EF v A Trust for these process and substantive contact principles.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Freeing Order: A court order terminating parental rights to allow a child to be adopted;
Looked After Child (LAC) Review: A periodic meeting by social services to review the care plan for a child in state or kinship care;
Appeal Time Trigger: The date when the final court order is officially entered on file, from which prescribed appeal periods run;
Extension of Time: A court’s power to permit a late appeal if good reasons exist, assessed against criteria including default, prejudice, merits, and public interest;
Discretionary Contact Plan: Judges tailor arrangements for parent-child interaction post-freeing/adoption, considering child’s welfare, parent’s circumstances, and practicalities;
Life-Story Work: Therapeutic and educational activities to help a child understand and integrate their personal history, including family relationships.

Conclusion

EF v A Health And Social Care Trust clarifies two crucial points in adoption jurisprudence. Procedurally, it confirms that the appeal period runs from the filing of a final order and that corrections to draft judgments must be narrowly confined. Substantively, it upholds broad judicial discretion in designing contact arrangements—endorsing indirect-only contact where direct visits would harm the child or be impractical, and allowing future review by social services and the adoption team. The decision will guide practitioners in both managing appeal timetables and advising on contact strategies in kinship adoptions, ensuring child-centred outcomes in complex family situations.