Domestic Accident Risk, Cultural Context and Adoption: Proportionality in N (A Child: Placement Order: Proportionality) [2025] EWCA Civ 1541

1. Introduction

N (A Child: Placement Order: Proportionality) [2025] EWCA Civ 1541 is a significant decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) on the proportionality of care and placement orders, particularly where:

• the feared harm is largely the risk of domestic accidents and emotional dysregulation rather than any actual harm; and
• cultural factors and professional misunderstanding of a parent’s presentation have played a substantial role in the local authority’s concerns.

The case concerns L, a two-year-old boy, and his mother, a 57‑year‑old Japanese national living and working in England. Following 21 months of mother-and-baby foster placements under voluntary arrangements, the Family Court (Recorder Magennis) made both a care order and a placement order with a plan for adoption. The mother appealed.

The Court of Appeal set aside both the care and placement orders, substituted an interim care order, and remitted the local authority’s applications for rehearing in the High Court. The central holding is that, on the evidence presented at first instance, adoption was neither necessary nor proportionate; the level and nature of risk did not justify the permanent severance of the parent–child relationship, especially where:

• no actual harm had occurred;
• L had thrived in his mother’s care for nearly two years under support;
• cultural evidence explaining the mother’s responses had not been properly integrated; and
• realistic mitigating measures (nursery, nannies, community support) had not been adequately assessed.

The judgment re‑emphasises the high threshold for adoption encapsulated in the “nothing else will do” principle, and provides fresh, structured guidance on how risk of harm must be analysed and mitigated before the most draconian orders are made.

2. Overview of the Case

2.1 The parties and factual background

L was born in October 2023 following overseas assisted conception. His mother is a Japanese national in her late 50s, highly educated, professionally employed, financially stable, and a homeowner. She has no family support in the UK. Her husband died in 2015.

From birth the local authority was involved. Hospital staff doubted the mother’s ability to care independently for L and considered that she needed prompting with basic care (feeding, personal care). A social work assessment at five days old concluded she would benefit from extra support. Initially, support at home was contemplated, but concerns led to the mother entering a series of mother-and-baby style placements under s.20 Children Act 1989 (voluntary accommodation):

1. a semi‑independent placement (L aged c. two weeks to February 2024);
2. a mother-and-baby foster placement (to August 2024);
3. a further mother-and-baby foster placement (to August 2025 – the date of the final orders).

For almost two years of L’s life, the mother remained his primary carer, but always in a supported, scrutinised environment with a foster carer present. No interim public law orders were made until the final hearing in August 2025; the mother had sole parental responsibility until the care order.

2.2 The local authority proceedings and evidence at trial

The local authority issued care proceedings in August 2024 and applied for a placement order in March 2025. An application for an interim care order with separation and “early permanence” placement was refused in May 2025, and the case proceeded to a final hearing in August 2025 before Recorder Magennis.

The evidence at trial came from:

• an Independent Social Worker (ISW), Ms Liselle Harold;
• the allocated social worker;
• the current foster carer;
• a clinical psychologist, Dr Kiera Fitzsimons;
• the mother; and
• the Children’s Guardian.

The threshold criteria under s.31(2) Children Act 1989 were disputed by the mother but found proved by the recorder on the basis that L was likely to suffer significant physical and emotional harm due to:

• the mother’s inability consistently to meet his needs safely without substantial prompting;
• poor risk assessment and adaptation to L’s changing needs; and
• her angry, threatening responses towards professionals in L’s presence (including an incident described as an assault on a social worker).

Crucially, it was not alleged that L had suffered any actual significant harm; indeed, he was described by the recorder as “a delightful little boy, who is thriving”. The case rested entirely on future risk.

The evidence relied on at trial consisted of a series of mostly minor domestic-risk incidents (falls, co‑sleeping, potential choking hazards, rough handling when emotionally dysregulated) and the mother’s dismissive or hostile reactions to professional advice about these matters.

2.3 Professional assessments

Two psychiatrists and two psychologists had considered whether the mother might have autism spectrum disorder; all concluded she did not. However, the assessments brought out substantial cultural issues around the mother’s Japanese background, her communication style, and the power imbalance between her and professionals.

The ISW, in her “executive summary”, acknowledged warmth and affection in the mother’s care of L but concluded:

• she had serious difficulties accepting advice;
• she lacked insight into risk and developmental needs;
• she would not be able to make necessary changes within L’s timescale; and
• there was a “serious risk of physical harm” due to her poor risk assessment.

She considered that only 24/7 support could safely manage the risk and that community‑based support would be ineffective given the mother’s resistance.

By contrast, Dr Fitzsimons’ evidence was markedly more optimistic and nuanced:

• she saw L as relaxed, securely attached, and well regulated in his mother’s care;
• she assessed the risk of physical violence from the mother to L as “very low”;
• she emphasised the profound importance of understanding Japanese “indirect” communication norms and the mother’s preference for emotional restraint;
• she suggested that the mother’s “outbursts” were episodic releases of pent‑up emotion in a power‑imbalanced, highly stressful context, not a pervasive pattern across her life; and
• she saw scope for improved working relationships and support if cultural factors were properly addressed.

The Guardian described L as presenting with no developmental or psychological concerns, his relationship with his mother being “not one of concern” on observation. Nonetheless, he recommended care and placement orders, emphasising the ISW’s risk analysis and the mother’s lack of insight. This remained his position at trial, but, importantly, changed during the appeal.

2.4 The Family Court’s decision

The recorder, after correctly directing herself in law and acknowledging the mother’s many positive attributes (stable, employed, no substance misuse, no diagnosed mental illness, loving relationship with L), nonetheless concluded that:

• L was at real and significant risk of physical harm from the mother’s inability to recognise and respond to everyday risks; and
• L was at real and significant risk of emotional harm from the mother’s emotional dysregulation and aggressive interactions with professionals.

She found the feared consequences of domestic risks “potentially catastrophic” and accepted the ISW’s view that only continued 24/7 support could manage the risk—support which could not realistically be maintained in the community. She concluded that “nothing short of care and placement orders” would suffice, and dispensed with the mother’s consent to adoption.

2.5 Developments post‑judgment and the appeal

The orders had a severe effect on the mother. No stay was sought. On the day the orders were made (15 August 2025), the mother had to leave the foster home, and L and his mother were separated for the first time. No contact took place for three months.

The mother appealed, arguing essentially that:

1. the recorder’s explanation of why separation and adoption were necessary and proportionate was inadequate given the findings;
2. there was an inadequate analysis of possible mitigating protective measures, such as nursery and in‑home support; and
3. the recorder failed to reconcile or properly weigh the cultural and contextual evidence of Dr Fitzsimons against the social work evidence.

The local authority defended the judgment, inviting the Court of Appeal to read it as a whole. The Guardian, through Cafcass, initially also supported upholding the orders but, during the hearing (after further instructions), changed position and supported the appeal, highlighting shortcomings in the recorder’s risk and proportionality analysis, especially the failure fully to engage with cultural evidence and realistic support options.

3. Summary of the Court of Appeal’s Judgment

The Court of Appeal (with concurring judgments from Lord Justice Singh and Lord Justice Warby) allowed the mother’s appeal. Key conclusions were:

• Threshold was not in issue, but proportionality was.
  The finding that L was likely to suffer significant harm if cared for by his mother (threshold) was not appealed. The appeal turned on welfare and proportionality—whether the risks, as found, justified care and placement orders.
• Adoption was not necessary or proportionate on the evidence.
  The plan for adoption was “not necessary or proportionate”; the final decision was therefore wrong. The deficiencies in the mother’s parenting were not of such nature and degree as to justify permanent termination of the parent–child relationship.
• No actual harm had occurred despite nearly two years of primary care.
  L had been in his mother’s primary care, albeit with another adult present, for almost two years. He was thriving and had not suffered harm, still less significant harm. That fact should have been central to any assessment of future risk but was not properly factored into the recorder’s analysis.
• The risk of domestic accidents was overstated and unduly “elevated”.
  The recorder erred in elevating everyday domestic‑accident risk into a decisive factor for adoption, without:
  • identifying how much greater the risk was for L compared to other small children;
  • recognising that all children face such risks and that catastrophic outcomes are rare; and
  • balancing those risks against the complete absence of past harm and the strong welfare factors against separation.
• Support and risk‑mitigation options were inadequately analysed.
  The recorder accepted, largely unexamined, the ISW’s view that the mother would need indefinite 24/7 support, and that such support was unrealistic. She failed properly to engage with:
  • the mother’s stated intention and ability to use a nanny/childminder;
  • the obvious role of nursery and later school in both care and monitoring;
  • the possibility that teachers and other professionals could be a protective factor rather than inhibited by the mother’s style.
• Cultural and contextual evidence was acknowledged but not integrated.
  Although the recorder expressly recognised the complexity of the mother’s cultural background and adopted much of Dr Fitzsimons’ analysis in theory, she did not build it into her risk evaluation. This was a significant omission, especially because the psychologist considered the risk of physical violence “very low” and saw the mother’s relational difficulties as context‑specific rather than pervasive.
• Reliance on the mother’s “lack of insight” and courtroom presentation was problematic.
  The recorder placed substantial weight on her impression of the mother’s evidence and supposed lack of insight into risk and L’s emotional experience. The Court of Appeal held this was problematic in light of the acknowledged cultural and linguistic complexities: assessing future behaviour primarily through courtroom demeanour is hazardous in such a case.
• Emotional dysregulation did not justify adoption.
  The mother’s episodes of emotional dysregulation (e.g. the February 2025 incident, Leicester Square) had not resulted in demonstrable harm to L. Many children live with difficult or conflictual parents; without evidence of likely significant emotional harm, this factor could not bear the weight placed upon it.
• Post‑adoption contact expectations were unrealistic.
  On the recorder’s own assessment of the mother, it was “hard to see” how post‑adoption contact could realistically function. The subsequent breakdown of contact following the orders underlined this concern.

Although the Court of Appeal considered that, had matters not moved on (including the three‑month separation), it might have substituted a supervision order, the changed circumstances meant that only a rehearing could fairly assess the current situation. The case was therefore transferred to the High Court (Family Division) for urgent management.

4. Analysis

4.1 Precedents and authorities cited

4.1.1 Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33

Re B is the cornerstone authority on the proportionality of care and adoption orders. The Supreme Court held that:

• a care order may only be made if it is necessary in a democratic society to protect the child from harm and is proportionate to that aim (Article 8 ECHR); and
• adoption, which severs the legal relationship between parent and child, is justified only in “very exceptional circumstances” and where, in the famous formulation of Baroness Hale, “nothing else will do”.

Baroness Hale’s observation, quoted here at [198], is central:

“It is quite clear that the test for severing the relationship between parent and child is very strict: only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child's welfare, in short, where nothing else will do. In many cases, and particularly where the feared harm has not yet materialised and may never do so, it will be necessary to explore and attempt alternative solutions.”

Lord Neuberger’s emphasis that before making an adoption order “the court must be satisfied that there is no practical way of the authorities (or others) providing the requisite assistance and support” was also quoted.

In N, the Court of Appeal applied Re B in a classic way:

• Accepting that threshold was crossed—a lower hurdle focused on likelihood of significant harm.
• Reiterating that this is not the same as saying care or adoption is justified; a separate, stringent proportionality test applies.
• Highlighting that this was precisely a case “where the feared harm has not yet materialised and may never do so,” so alternative solutions needed serious exploration.

4.1.2 Re H‑W (Children) [2022] UKSC 17

Re H‑W reaffirmed that care orders must be necessary and proportionate, and that courts must carefully evaluate both risk and the possibility of mitigating that risk through support. It emphasised procedural rigour in the reasoning process. In N, the Court of Appeal explicitly ties the necessity and proportionality analysis back to Re H‑W, underscoring that it applies not only in removal decisions but acutely in adoption cases.

4.1.3 Y v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 33

The European Court of Human Rights held that family ties may only be severed in “very exceptional circumstances” and that “everything must be done” both to preserve and, where possible, rebuild the family. It is not enough that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment.

N reflects this in two ways:

• It rejects an implicit “comparative best interests” analysis (i.e. adoption might be more stable or safer) as enough by itself.
• It stresses that continued support, nursery, and other services should be fully explored as means to preserve the family unit unless clearly inadequate to protect the child.

4.1.4 Re F (A Child: Placement Order: Proportionality) [2018] EWCA Civ 2761

Re F, a previous Court of Appeal decision, set out a structured approach to analysing future risk of harm, which the Court in N expressly re‑endorses:

1. Identify the type of harm that may arise.
2. Assess the likelihood of that harm occurring.
3. Consider the severity of the consequences if it did occur.
4. Evaluate what risk reduction or mitigation measures could be implemented.

Then, having understood these matters, the court must:

• compare the welfare advantages and disadvantages of each possible outcome (e.g. rehabilitation vs. long‑term foster care vs. adoption); and
• “step back” and conduct a final proportionality cross‑check: does the risk justify the remedy?

In N, this framework is expressly applied and sharpened. The court finds that the recorder:

• over‑emphasised type and severity of harm (potentially catastrophic accidents) without:
• properly addressing the likelihood of such serious outcomes, especially given the two‑year history of no actual harm; and
• insufficiently evaluated mitigation options (nursery, nannies, structured support) before concluding that “nothing but adoption will do”.

4.1.5 Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLR 2050 (Hedley J)

Hedley J’s oft‑quoted passage is reproduced, stressing that society must tolerate:

“very diverse standards of parenting, including the eccentric, the barely adequate and the inconsistent.”

The state is not required (and could not realistically attempt) to spare children every consequence of “defective parenting”; some children will be disadvantaged but not to the threshold that justifies state removal.

Although Re L was a threshold case where the court found the threshold not crossed, the principle translates directly to welfare decisions: crossing threshold does not mean that only “good” or “optimal” parents can keep their children. In N, the Court of Appeal uses Hedley J’s statement to reinforce:

• that many of the local authority’s concerns were, when viewed proportionately, “relatively minor” (weaning, hygiene, co‑sleeping, attitude to advice); and
• that adoption based largely on such matters (plus emotional dysregulation) is an “improbable outcome” which demands exceptionally compelling justification—justification which was lacking.

4.1.6 Re L‑G (Children: Risk Assessment) [2025] EWCA Civ 60 and Re T (Children: Risk Assessment) [2025] EWCA Civ 93

These more recent Court of Appeal cases (also on risk assessment) are cited via counsel’s submissions rather than extensively analysed in the judgment. They reinforce:

• the need for forensically clear reasoning about the nature and scale of risk; and
• the central importance of considering realistic options for managing risk short of removal.

In N, those themes are applied concretely: the Court criticises the recorder’s acceptance, without robust interrogation, of the ISW’s conclusions about the need for indefinite 24/7 supervision and the dismissal of community‑based support.

4.2 The Court’s legal reasoning in depth

4.2.1 Threshold vs welfare: two distinct stages

A crucial implicit point in N is the distinction between:

• Stage 1 – Threshold: Has the child suffered, or is he likely to suffer, significant harm attributable to the care given or likely to be given by the parent (s.31(2) CA 1989)?
• Stage 2 – Welfare: Even if the threshold is crossed, what order (if any) does the child’s welfare require, having regard to the welfare checklist and Article 8 proportionality?

In N:

• The threshold finding (likelihood of significant physical and emotional harm) was accepted on appeal.
• The Court of Appeal focuses entirely on whether, given those findings, care and placement orders were a necessary and proportionate response, especially in the light of two years’ history without actual harm and the mitigating options available.

This is doctrinally important: many practitioners and courts can unconsciously slide from “threshold proved” to “removal justified”. N reminds us forcefully that a high‑risk threshold finding does not automatically translate into justification for adoption or even care orders.

4.2.2 Type, likelihood and severity of harm

The Court disaggregates the risk into:

• Physical risk: primarily everyday domestic accident scenarios – falls from beds, sofas, high chairs, choking hazards (finger toothbrush), potential co‑sleeping risks, etc.
• Emotional risk: principally the mother’s dysregulated outbursts towards professionals (assault on social worker, February 2025 incident, Leicester Square confrontation) and their possible impact on L’s sense of safety and emotional development.

On physical risk, the Court identifies several analytical flaws:

• The recorder began with general observations about how inherently risky early childhood can be (toddling, climbing, choking hazards, cleaning products), all of which are common to every child.
• She then said she was “in no doubt” the mother could not protect L from these risks, but:
• did not quantify or explain how much greater the risk to L was compared to risks faced by children of ordinarily imperfect parents; and
• did not weigh the fact that, despite those risks and despite supervision being non‑continuous at times, no harm had in fact occurred over nearly two years.
• She described potential consequences as “catastrophic” (serious injury, choking, ingestion of cleaning products) without acknowledging that:
• every child is potentially vulnerable to such catastrophes, but they are relatively rare; and
• there was no reason to think consequences for L would be worse than for any other child.

In essence, the Court of Appeal holds that:

“In accepting the ISW’s assessment of risk, the recorder unduly elevated the significance of this element of the welfare checklist.”

On emotional risk, the Court notes:

• The mother had undoubtedly behaved inappropriately at times (e.g. pushing L towards the foster carer such that he hit his head; shouting in public).
• However, L had shown no obvious psychological difficulties; the Guardian accepted that L’s development and affect were normal and that “his relationship with his mother… is not one of concern.”
• The incidents relied upon remained isolated within a highly unusual, stressful, and power‑imbalanced context.
• The recorder’s conclusion that emotional risk was “real and significant” lacked a robust, evidence‑based explanation of how such behaviour was likely to translate into significant emotional harm over time.

The Court crystallises this:

“Many children have difficult parents and grow up surrounded by conflict, but it was not demonstrated that behaviour of this kind would be likely to translate into harm to L, significant or otherwise.”

4.2.3 Mitigation and support: a central omission

A pivotal part of the Court’s reasoning is that the recorder failed properly to consider how risk might be reduced or managed without severing the legal relationship.

The mother had accepted extensive restrictions and supervision for nearly two years. She intended to work and had indicated that she would employ a nanny or childminder. L was already at an age where nursery was an immediate option, and school would follow.

Yet the recorder:

• treated 24/7 support, as recommended by the ISW, as the only viable protective measure;
• assumed such support was unrealistic and unsustainable; and
• from that premise concluded that adoption was the only option.

The Court of Appeal identifies several problems:

• No clear basis for concluding that 24/7 support was needed indefinitely – the ISW’s assertion was accepted largely at face value.
• Failure to examine more ordinary support measures:
  • nursery providing daily structure, stimulation, and another layer of professional oversight;
  • a nanny or childminder (as the mother proposed);
  • targeted health visiting, community support, or family support services.
• Overlooking that professional involvement had been constant for nearly two years, during which no serious harm had occurred – this suggested risks could be managed.

The Court warns against treating the most intensive form of supervision as the only alternative to adoption, and against equating the parent’s resistance to advice with an inability to adhere to protective conditions where the stakes are clear.

4.2.4 Cultural context and expert evidence

The judgment is particularly noteworthy for how it treats cultural evidence and expert psychological opinion.

The recorder had accepted much of Dr Fitzsimons’ description of Japanese communication norms and the significance of the power dynamic with local authority professionals. However, in the Court’s view, she failed to give proper effect to it in her core analysis. Two key points emerge:

1. Misreading “hostility” and “lack of insight” through a monocultural lens
   Dr Fitzsimons explained that:
   • the mother placed a high value on emotional restraint and indirect communication, consistent with Japanese norms;
   • her apparent avoidance of direct challenge and reluctance to share emotions with people in authority was culturally mediated;
   • periodic outbursts were understandable releases of pent‑up frustration in a context where she felt disempowered and scrutinised.
   The Court notes that:
   • absent cultural understanding, the mother’s behaviour could be “erroneously or at least overly negatively evaluated”;
   • this appears to have happened: outbursts and resistance to advice were interpreted as deep‑seated, unchangeable deficits and lack of insight, rather than as situational and, to some extent, culturally contextual.
2. Failure to weigh the psychologist’s risk assessment against social work opinion
   Dr Fitzsimons:
   • assessed the risk of physical violence as “very low”;
   • did not see evidence of a “persistent and problematic pattern” of relationship difficulties across the mother’s life;
   • saw scope for improved relationships with professionals.
   Yet the recorder:
   • gave greater weight to the ISW and Guardian’s more pessimistic evaluations;
   • did not transparently explain why those views were preferred over the expert assessment on general functioning and cultural dynamics;
   • treated the mother’s evidence in court – which was inherently culturally and linguistically mediated – as a strong indicator of future behaviour, despite acknowledging “much will be lost in translation.”

The Court of Appeal implicitly lays down a standard: where credible expert evidence identifies cultural and contextual explanations for a parent’s presentation and concludes that general functioning is adequate and risk relatively low, a judge must either:

• demonstrably integrate that evidence into the risk analysis; or
• give cogent reasons for rejecting or discounting it.

In N, that did not happen.

4.2.5 The role of “lack of insight”

“Lack of insight” often features in child protection reasoning. In N, the recorder saw the mother as minimising incidents (the assault on the social worker, the February 2025 incident, Leicester Square), blaming others, and showing “no insight at all into the risks… to L’s physical safety”.

The Court of Appeal does not deny that the mother’s responses were problematic. But it emphasises that:

• the significance of lack of insight depends on:
  • the nature and validity of the underlying concerns;
  • whether protection in practice actually depends on insight (versus, say, external supervision, environmental controls, nursery care); and
  • how cultural and linguistic factors might affect a parent’s ability to verbalise insight, particularly under forensic pressure.
• over‑reliance on perceived lack of insight can mask a thin evidential basis for predicting actual future harm, especially where history demonstrates safety and child thriving.

The Court’s approach invites more disciplined thinking: lack of insight is not, in itself, a ground for adoption; its weight must be anchored to demonstrable risk and the realistic scope for managing that risk.

4.2.6 The proportionality cross‑check

Ultimately, the Court’s criticism is that the recorder did not conduct, or at least did not explain, an adequate proportionality cross‑check. Several factors should have loomed large:

• Two years of primary care without significant harm and L’s thriving development;
• Strong evidence of warmth, affection, and secure attachment;
• The particularly draconian nature of adoption, permanently ending legal family ties;
• Realistic alternative measures (supervision, support, nursery/nanny arrangements);
• Severe disruption and potential psychological impact of separation at age two;
• The inherent difficulties with post‑adoption contact in a case where the mother’s emotional reactions to separation were predictably intense.

Against that background, the Court concludes:

“Adoption on the basis of evidence of this nature was an improbable outcome and it required particularly compelling justification. Reasoning of that kind is not to be found in the evidence or in the judgment…”

Having identified multiple analytical gaps, the Court was “bound” to hold that adoption was neither necessary nor proportionate.

4.3 Impact and significance

4.3.1 Re‑emphasis of “nothing else will do” in everyday‑risk cases

N is particularly important for cases where the primary risk is of domestic accidents and low‑level physical neglect, coupled with a parent’s poor engagement with professionals. It confirms:

• that such risks, without more, will rarely justify adoption;
• that courts must be cautious not to elevate ordinary parenting imperfections into a justification for permanent severance; and
• that a long history of safe care under support is a weighty counter‑indicator against extreme measures, even where threshold is crossed.

4.3.2 Structured risk analysis is not optional

By re‑endorsing the Re F framework, N underlines that:

• judges must explicitly engage with type, likelihood, severity, and mitigation of risk;
• general statements about the dangers of early childhood or the “catastrophic” possible outcomes are insufficient; and
• a failure to factor in obvious mitigations (nursery, nannies, conditions on care, ongoing professional oversight) may render a welfare decision unsustainable.

4.3.3 Cultural competence and expert evidence

N will likely become a leading authority on:

• the proper use of cultural and psychological evidence in care and adoption decisions; and
• the dangers of misinterpreting culturally different communication and parenting styles as pathology or entrenched “lack of insight”.

The case signals to:

• Local authorities: to obtain and genuinely engage with culturally informed expert evidence before seeking draconian orders, and to adjust practice where cultural factors are salient.
• Guardians: to test, and if necessary revise, their positions in the light of such evidence and to resist drift towards adoption where proportionality is questionable.
• Judges: to articulate clearly how cultural explanations are weighed in risk assessment and to avoid using courtroom demeanour as a dominant predictive tool where cultural and language barriers are in play.

4.3.4 The practical importance of stays and contact planning

N also contains a practical warning: failure to seek a stay of care/placement orders can lead to immediate, potentially harmful separation, which may complicate the appellate and remedial landscape. Here, the lack of a stay meant:

• instant separation of mother and child after nearly two years together;
• a three‑month hiatus without contact; and
• a more complex, less predictable situation by the time of the appeal.

For practitioners, this underscores the need to:

• consider and, where appropriate, promptly apply for a stay when appealing placement orders; and
• ensure that any care plan for separation (if upheld) has a carefully thought‑out, welfare‑sensitive implementation strategy, particularly around contact.

4.3.5 Guidance for future placement order applications

Going forward, N suggests that in placement order cases:

• Courts will expect clear, evidence‑based articulation of:
  • why the level of risk is such that long‑term foster care or supervision will not suffice; and
  • why other support mechanisms cannot adequately protect the child.
• Local authorities should not assume that a pattern of low‑level incidents, even if coupled with resistance to advice, will meet the “nothing else will do” threshold for adoption where:
  • the child is thriving;
  • no serious harm has actually occurred; and
  • supportive services could realistically manage the risk.

5. Complex Concepts Explained

5.1 Care orders, placement orders and interim care orders

• Care order (Children Act 1989, s.31): Gives the local authority parental responsibility and the power to decide where the child lives, subject to court review. It does not, by itself, sever the legal relationship between child and parents.
• Placement order (Adoption and Children Act 2002, s.21): Authorises the local authority to place the child for adoption. It is a key step towards adoption and can be made even if the parents do not consent, provided the court dispenses with their consent because the child’s welfare “requires” it.
• Interim care order: A temporary order during proceedings under s.38 CA 1989, allowing the local authority to share parental responsibility while the court investigates and decides final outcomes.

In N, the Family Court made a final care order and a placement order. The Court of Appeal set these aside and substituted an interim care order to provide legal structure while the case is reheard.

5.2 Threshold and “significant harm”

Before a care or supervision order can be made, the “threshold criteria” in s.31(2) must be satisfied:

• the child is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and
• the harm is attributable to the care given (or likely to be given) by the parents, or to the child being beyond parental control.

“Significant harm” means harm which is considerable, not trivial or commonplace. It can be physical, emotional, or due to neglect. “Likely” means a real possibility, not a remote chance.

In N, the recorder found threshold crossed on the basis that L was likely to suffer significant harm in future. The Court of Appeal did not disturb that finding; it focused instead on whether, even with threshold met, adoption was justified.

5.3 Article 8 ECHR and proportionality

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees the right to respect for private and family life. State interference (e.g. removing a child) is only lawful if it is:

• in accordance with the law;
• pursues a legitimate aim (such as protecting the child’s welfare); and
• is necessary in a democratic society, meaning proportionate to that aim.

Proportionality requires that:

• the interference (e.g. adoption) is no more than is needed to protect the child; and
• less intrusive measures (e.g. supervision, foster care with parental contact, family support) are insufficient to safeguard the child.

In adoption cases, this has crystallised into the “nothing else will do” test from Re B: the court must be satisfied that there is no other realistic way of protecting the child’s welfare.

5.4 “Risk of harm” and domestic accidents

A risk of harm is a prediction: a real possibility that a harmful event will occur in the future. In childcare cases, it is not enough simply to point to:

• the existence of hazards (which all homes have); or
• a parent’s imperfect supervision.

The court must consider:

• What kind of harm is feared (e.g. minor bumps vs. life‑threatening injury).
• How likely is that level of harm to occur, given the child’s history and the parent’s behaviour to date.
• What support or environmental changes could meaningfully reduce that risk.

Domestic accidents are common in all families; most are minor. The law does not require “perfect” parents or zero risk. In N, the Court of Appeal stresses that:

• catastrophic outcomes from domestic accidents, though possible, are rare;
• L had had two years of largely incident‑free care without significant injury; and
• this context must be factored into any prediction of future significant harm.

5.5 Emotional harm and “emotional dysregulation”

Emotional harm refers to serious adverse effects on a child’s emotional development, such as persistent fear, anxiety, low self‑worth, or behavioural disturbance. Not every exposure to conflict or shouting amounts to significant emotional harm.

Emotional dysregulation describes difficulty controlling emotional reactions (e.g. angry outbursts, impulsive responses). In parenting assessments, episodic dysregulation may raise concern, particularly if:

• it is frequent and intense;
• directed at or witnessed by the child; and
• the child shows signs of distress or trauma.

In N, the mother had some notable episodes of dysregulation. However:

• they were relatively few, over a long period;
• they occurred in a uniquely stressful, scrutinised environment;
• the child showed no emerging psychological difficulties; and
• expert evidence suggested the mother’s general relational functioning outside this context was not persistently problematic.

The Court of Appeal therefore found that these episodes could not alone justify adoption without clearer evidence of likely significant emotional harm.

6. Conclusion

N (A Child: Placement Order: Proportionality) is a powerful reaffirmation and refinement of core principles governing care and placement orders, particularly in marginal, risk‑based cases.

The key takeaways are:

• Adoption remains an exceptional remedy. Even where threshold is crossed on the basis of likely harm, adoption requires a stringent demonstration that no lesser measure will adequately protect the child’s welfare.
• History matters. Nearly two years of safe, loving primary care with no actual significant harm must carry substantial weight when assessing future risk, especially where the child is thriving.
• Domestic accident risk is not easily elevated into a justification for adoption. Courts must distinguish between ordinary risks all children face and specific, demonstrably heightened risks that cannot be managed by realistic support.
• Risk assessment must be structured and explicit. Judges must examine the type, likelihood, and severity of harm, and rigorously evaluate mitigation options before concluding that “nothing else will do”.
• Cultural context and expert evidence must be integrated, not merely acknowledged. Where an expert gives cogent cultural and psychological explanations for a parent’s behaviour and assesses risk as low/moderate, that must be fairly weighed against social work opinions, and discrepancies must be transparently resolved.
• Lack of insight and emotional dysregulation require careful interpretation. They are not standalone grounds for adoption; their significance depends on clear evidence that they are likely to lead to significant harm that cannot be otherwise prevented.
• Procedural prudence is essential. Failure to seek a stay of drastic orders can result in rapid separation and contact breakdown, potentially compounding harm and complicating appellate remedies.

In setting aside the care and placement orders and remitting the case for urgent rehearing, the Court of Appeal emphasised the need for a sense of proportion and for keeping the “bigger picture” in view. Adoption here was “an improbable outcome” on the evidence available; making such a life‑altering decision required an analytical rigour and compelling justification that were, in the Court’s view, lacking.

N will likely become a reference point in future cases, especially those involving cultural complexity and low‑level risk of domestic accidents, reinforcing that the state’s role is not to engineer perfect parenting, but to intervene coercively only where necessary, proportionate, and when nothing else will do.