Dispensing with the Misuse of Article 40.4 for Fee Exemptions: A Critical Analysis of Murphy v Gloster & Ors ([2025] IEHC 171)

Introduction

The case of Murphy v Gloster & Ors ([2025] IEHC 171) before the High Court of Ireland addresses a pivotal issue regarding the dispensing of court fees in relation to the application of constitutional provisions. The plaintiff, Mr. Niall Murphy, sought an order to dispense with the requirement to pay court fees for a plenary summons and an accompanying Notice of Motion and grounding affidavit. His argument primarily relied on invoking Article 40.4 of the Irish Constitution, which is designed to protect personal liberty. Notably, his case centers on a broader dispute involving a report produced by the Health Service Executive (HSE), nicknamed "The Tennant Report", alleging significant flaws and procedural irregularities that have allegedly resulted in severe distress and damages to his family. The defendants include several individuals alongside the HSE. Ultimately, however, the court’s decision demonstrates that the factual context of Mr. Murphy’s proceedings does not satisfy the requisite criteria for fee exemption under Article 40.4.

Summary of the Judgment

In a succinct and decisive judgment delivered ex tempore by Mr. Justice Cregan on 6 February 2025, the court refused Mr. Murphy’s application to waive the court fees. The ruling clarified that statutory fee regulations under Statutory Instrument 492/2014 are mandatory and offer exemptions only in narrowly defined circumstances. In particular, the exemption under Section 5(a) – applicable solely to proceedings explicitly brought under Article 40.4 of the Constitution – was inapplicable since Mr. Murphy’s case did not, in substance, fall within this constitutional provision. Despite repeated references to Article 40.4 in the plenary summons, the factual basis of the proceedings did not involve a claim related to unlawful detention or deprivation of personal liberty. Instead, the proceedings primarily revolved around allegations of flawed procedural conduct in the HSE report concerning the care of Mr. Murphy’s son. The court’s reasoning was further supported by a recapitulation of comments and legal reasoning from Humphreys J in McGreal v. Minister for Housing, Local Government and Heritage of Ireland (No. 2) [2024] IEHC 728, which underscored that the mere invocation of Article 40.4 cannot transform the nature of proceedings for fee exemption purposes.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment places significant weight on the reasoning advanced by Humphreys J in McGreal v. Minister for Housing, Local Government and Heritage of Ireland (No. 2) [2024] IEHC 728. In that case, Humphreys J critically analyzed the notion of invoking Article 40.4 to bypass statutory fee obligations. He emphasized that:

The literal application: The statutory fee order in SI 492/2014 is explicit in its terms. It does not allow for flexible interpretation based solely on references to constitutional rights in the title or headings of the proceedings.
Substantive vs. formal invocation: The exemption is available only when the proceedings truly engage the constitutional protection regarding physical detention—a criterion not met by general or abstract assertions of liberty interests.

Humphreys J’s commentary on the procedural misuse of Article 40.4 played a fundamental role in shaping the reasoning of Mr. Justice Cregan. It established that the mere appearance of a reference to constitutional provisions does not convert a matter into one eligible for fee exemption if the substance and factual matrix do not align with the narrow statutory definition.

Legal Reasoning

Mr. Justice Cregan’s legal reasoning is anchored on a straightforward analysis of both the statutory requirements and the constitutional provisions involved. His decision can be understood through the following key points:

Mandatory Nature of the Fee Order: The text of SI 492/2014 is explicit, stating “there shall be charged” for specified documents. This language leaves no room for judicial discretion, except in cases that fall squarely within the exemptions.
Limited Scope of the Exemption: The sole exemption in question, Section 5(a), applies exclusively to proceedings under Article 40.4 as it pertains to the protection against unlawful detention. In Mr. Murphy’s case, despite his superficial references, the substantive nature of his claim—rooted in alleged procedural lapses in an HSE report—did not involve the deprivation of personal liberty as defined by the Constitution.
Interpretation Based on Judicial Precedents: The decision reinforced that legal arguments must align with established judicial interpretations, not merely the applicant’s representation. The court warned against “driving a coach and four” through established regulations by simply appending constitutional references on the document.

Consequently, the key takeaway from the court’s reasoning is that the fee exemption under Article 40.4 is a matter of substance—not form. A claim must objectively demonstrate that it is indeed a proceeding for the release from unlawful detention. In the absence of such an element, any fee exemption claim is rendered unsustainable.

Impact

The decision in Murphy v Gloster & Ors is poised to have significant implications in future cases concerning fee exemptions in judicial proceedings. Its impact can be summarized as follows:

It reinforces the strict interpretation of statutory fee orders, ensuring that exemptions are not applied in a broadly construed or inventive manner.
The judgment serves as a cautionary precedent for litigants who might attempt to use constitutional references to bypass pre-established procedural requirements. It underlines that it is the underlying substance of the case, and not merely its form, that determines the applicability of an exemption.
Future cases involving Constitutional claims related to personal liberty will now likely be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that only those proceedings genuinely addressing detention or deprivation of liberty can benefit from fee exemptions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Several legal terms and concepts featured in the Judgment may appear complex. This section aims to clarify these:

Plenary Summons: A plenary summons is a formal legal document used to commence proceedings. In this case, Mr. Murphy intended to use this document to initiate his claim but sought exemption from paying the associated fee.
Article 40.4 of the Constitution: This provision guarantees that no citizen is deprived of his personal liberty except in accordance with law. It primarily addresses issues related to detention and habeas corpus, not the broader claims of procedural injustice or general liberty infringements.
Ex Parte Orders: These are orders issued on a temporary, often urgent, basis without notifying the other party. The Judge’s reference to previous ex parte orders in related cases emphasizes that the substantive nature of the proceedings under Article 40.4 is distinct from general administrative or procedural claims.

Conclusion

In summary, the High Court’s judgment in Murphy v Gloster & Ors clarifies a crucial legal principle: the exemption from court fees under Section 5(a) of SI 492/2014 is strictly confined to proceedings that truly engage Article 40.4 of the Constitution, which focuses on the unlawful deprivation of liberty. Mr. Justice Cregan’s detailed analysis, buttressed by references to established precedents such as the McGreal case, leaves little doubt that superficial or misapplied constitutional references cannot serve as a basis to circumvent procedural fee requirements.

This decision underscores the need for litigants to ensure that their claims are substantively aligned with the statutory and constitutional frameworks governing fee exemptions. The ruling not only reinforces the mandatory nature of the fee provisions but also sets a clear precedent for future cases, ensuring that constitutional safeguards are not misused to evade standard procedural obligations.