Disentangling Allegation Information from Risk Assessments: The Beggs Principle on Parole Board “Irrelevant Considerations”

Introduction

In William Frederick Ian Beggs v Parole Board for Scotland ([2025] CSOH 63), Lady Drummond of the Outer House was asked to review a decision of the Parole Board refusing to direct the release of Mr Beggs—an indeterminate (life) prisoner whose tariff expired more than five years earlier. The petition turned on two alleged public-law errors:

• That the Board had taken into account an “irrelevant consideration”—namely, the long-quashed 1987 murder conviction concerning Barry Oldham, which persisted in professional risk-assessors’ reports;
• That it had failed to take account of a relevant consideration—an opinion of senior counsel casting doubt on the reliability of a police witness whose evidence underpinned the index (2001) murder conviction.

The Court rejected both complaints, reaffirming (1) the scope of the Parole Board’s discretion to exclude unproven allegations from its own reasoning yet still have regard to expert assessments which refer to them, and (2) the irrelevance, for parole purposes, of speculative attack on the validity of a subsisting criminal conviction.

Summary of the Judgment

Applying the “anxious scrutiny” standard articulated in Ryan and Brown, Lady Drummond held:

1. No irrelevant consideration was taken into account. The Board expressly declined to place any weight on the Oldham “allegation information” and made its risk finding on the basis of convictions alone. Use of Ms Webster’s psychological report did not vitiate that stance because she herself testified that the conviction data, standing alone, sufficed for her high-risk conclusion.
2. No relevant consideration was ignored. Senior counsel’s opinion challenging the 2001 police evidence was “wholly irrelevant” to the statutory test in Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 s 2(5)(b), absent a successful appeal overturning the underlying conviction.
3. Accordingly, the petition for reduction failed; Beggs’ pleas-in-law were repelled, those of the Parole Board sustained, and expenses awarded (mod. nil).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Ryan (2022 SLT 1319) and Brown underscored the duty of “anxious scrutiny” where an indeterminate prisoner is held beyond tariff: the longer the over-tariff detention, the clearer the Board’s demonstration of public risk must be. Lady Drummond adopted that lens.

The most influential authority was the Supreme Court decision in R (Pearce) [2023] AC 807, which examined how allegation (unproven) material could feature in parole assessments. Pearce permits the Board, in limited circumstances, to take unverified allegations into account provided procedural safeguards are met, but equally recognises situations where the Board might properly exclude the allegations entirely.

Here, the Board chose the latter course. The Court confirmed that this was within the Pearce framework.

Legal Reasoning

The decision contains two interconnected strands of reasoning.

(a) Irrelevant Consideration Allegation

• The Oldham material appeared in professional risk assessments but had been decisively quarantined by the Board (para 83).
• Paragraph 90 clarified that Ms Webster’s conclusions remained valid on convictions alone; thus, any error in her inclusion of the Oldham narrative was immaterial (de minimis non curat lex principle).
• Judicial review focuses on the decision-maker’s own reasoning, not auxiliary documents (Associated Provincial Picture Houses doctrine). The Board’s stated reasons were internally consistent and rational.

(b) Failure to Consider Relevant Material

• A subsisting conviction is incontrovertible for parole purposes (Roberts principle). The Board cannot “look behind” it.
• Senior counsel’s tentative opinion, lacking analysis and never invoked in oral submissions, carried no legal materiality. At best it pertained to potential appellate proceedings, not to risk assessment under s 2(5)(b).

Impact of the Judgment

The ruling crystallises what may be called the “Beggs Principle”:

Practically, the decision:

• Gives the Parole Board confidence that it need not excise every textual reference to disputed allegations in expert reports, so long as its own reasoning is insulated from them.
• Clarifies that defence teams must secure concrete appellate outcomes, not mere opinions, if they wish to undermine the index-offence narrative at a parole stage.
• May narrow the scope of “irrelevant consideration” challenges, shifting focus to whether the Board’s stated reasons, viewed in isolation, disclose impermissible reliance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Anxious Scrutiny: A heightened form of judicial review for liberty-impacting decisions. The court asks, “Has the decision-maker explained, with compelling clarity, why continued detention is necessary?”
• Pleas-in-law: Scottish terminology for the formal legal propositions each party invites the court to uphold.
• Reduction: Judicial act of quashing or setting aside an administrative decision.
• Allegation Information: Material about suspected misbehaviour that has not resulted in conviction and may be disputed.
• Immaterial Error: Even if a technical misstep occurred, it does not invalidate the decision because the outcome would inevitably be the same.

Conclusion

Lady Drummond’s decision fortifies the boundary between reference to allegations within expert reports and reliance on those allegations by the Parole Board itself. The Beggs Principle will guide future practitioners: exclude the allegation from the Board’s reasoning, contemporaneously ensure that conviction data sustains the risk finding, and any judicial-review challenge on “irrelevant considerations” ground is likely to fail. Meanwhile, prisoners who wish to contest the factual basis of their convictions must pursue appellate avenues rather than expecting the Parole Board to pre-emptively discount those convictions.

Beyond its immediate facts, the case balances the imperatives of public protection, procedural fairness, and administrative practicality—demonstrating how “anxious scrutiny” operates in real terms without collapsing into micromanagement of specialist tribunals.