Discovery of Third‑Party Complaints in Fraud-Based Product Defect Litigation: Commentary on KC Capital Property Group Ltd v Keegan Quarries Ltd [2025] IEHC 677

1. Introduction

This Commercial Court decision of Twomey J in KC Capital Property Group Ltd v Keegan Quarries Ltd [2025] IEHC 677 is an important development in the Irish law of discovery. The judgment clarifies two key points:

How a defendant’s plea that the plaintiff or its agents caused the loss (including a plea of novus actus interveniens) can significantly widen the scope of discovery by making third‑party complaints about the defendant’s product relevant.
That where fraud is specifically and credibly pleaded (and not merely alleged in bald terms), courts should afford greater latitude in determining relevance for discovery, extending principles previously articulated in the context of particulars to the discovery stage.

The dispute arises out of an alleged supply of understrength concrete for an office development at 45–47 Cuffe Street in Dublin (“the Greenside Building”). The plaintiff developer, KC Capital, alleges that Keegan Quarries knowingly and fraudulently supplied concrete that did not meet the specified compressive strength and did not contain the agreed components (notably GGBS), resulting in approximately €14 million in losses.

The immediate procedural question before the court was narrow but legally significant: must Keegan Quarries disclose documents evidencing complaints by other customers (third parties) who allegedly received understrength or otherwise unfit concrete, within a defined period?

Twomey J answered this in the affirmative, grounding his decision in established discovery principles, in the treatment of fraud in civil procedure, and in prior authority on third‑party complaints in product disputes. The judgment thereby refines the doctrine on discovery in fraud-based commercial litigation and product defect cases.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The construction project and alleged concrete defects

KC Capital is a property developer. For its Cuffe Street office development, it engaged Grant Fit Out Limited as its contractor (“the Original Contractor”). Keegan Quarries supplied ready‑mix concrete to that contractor for use on the project.

KC Capital alleges:

The concrete supplied did not meet the required compressive strength specified by its design team (architect Pascal Mahoney and engineer Liam Gleeson).
It was condemned by the design team as understrength.
Keegan Quarries was aware that the concrete did not meet the specification but represented otherwise.
The concrete:
- did not contain the agreed ground granulated blast furnace slag (GGBS),
- did not use the specified CEM I cement, and/or
- was adulterated with non‑reactive powder, reducing compressive strength.

KC Capital’s case is supported by expert reports from Professor Peter Robery, a forensic engineer, who opines that:

Keegan Quarries altered the concrete mixes without approval or notification to KC Capital’s engineer.
Substituted cheaper or easier‑to‑procure materials (including an “unreactive powder”) for those specified.
These changes led to the concrete failing to meet the required compressive strength when poured and cured.

KC Capital claims the defective concrete had to be removed and replaced, causing delay and consequential losses of about €14 million.

2.2 Keegan Quarries’ defence

Keegan Quarries denies that it supplied defective concrete. It advances a number of alternative causes for any compressive strength issues at the site, including:

Concrete of the wrong specification was ordered on behalf of KC Capital.
There was poor workmanship by the Original Contractor in pouring and handling the concrete.
Water was added to the concrete on site, altering the water‑cement ratio and weakening the mix.
Inadequate or defective design and supervision by KC Capital’s design team.

These points are crystallised in para. 20.7 of the Amended Defence, where Keegan Quarries:

Contends that any diminution in compressive strength or structural integrity of the building was caused by acts or omissions of third parties (the Original Contractor, the Design Team, and others), constituting a novus actus interveniens (a new intervening act breaking the chain of causation).
Specifically pleads defective workmanship and improper site practices (including adding water to the mix and ordering unsuitable concrete).

2.3 The evolution of the pleadings: from negligence to fraud

The claim originally sounded in negligence. However, following expert analysis, KC Capital sought, and obtained, leave to amend its Statement of Claim to add allegations of deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation (KC Capital v Keegan Quarries [2025] IEHC 46, Barrett J).

Key new pleas (para. 19(H) of the Amended Statement of Claim) include:

Deliberate substitution of ordinary Portland cement and/or non‑reactive material for GGBS, an essential ingredient for both performance and achieving an LEED Gold rating.
Deliberate failure to comply with the approved design mixes (and that such failure “could only have been” deliberate).
Deliberate adulteration of cement with up to 20% non‑cementitious material, reducing compressive strength.
Reliance on allegedly inaccurate batching and cube testing records to dispute independent test results.

Barrett J held that these were clear and precise allegations supported by an expert report, and more than a bald allegation of fraud. He specifically observed that discovery and other interlocutory mechanisms would further refine the issues.

KC Capital also pleads that Keegan Quarries (and in particular Mr John Keegan) made representations about:

Keegan’s experience and credentials and the quality of its concrete.
The state‑of‑the‑art nature of its production facility.
The suitability of its offering for the specific requirements of the Cuffe Street works.

2.4 The earlier security for costs application and the “other sites”

Prior to this discovery dispute, Keegan Quarries had obtained an order for security for costs against KC Capital (KC Capital v Keegan Quarries [2024] IEHC 257, Barrett J). In resisting that application, KC Capital’s managing director, Mr David Kennan, averred that he was aware of other sites experiencing serious quality, durability and compressive strength issues with concrete supplied by Keegan Quarries within the preceding 18 months.

He identified three such sites. In response, Mr John Keegan did not deny that issues had arisen at those sites, but asserted:

The issues did not concern defective concrete supplied by Keegan Quarries.
He was reluctant to disclose the details because they involved third parties who would not want the matters aired in these proceedings.
At one site, initial cube test concerns were resolved by core sampling, which allegedly confirmed the concrete met the specified strength.

These affidavits are important because they give KC Capital a factual basis to assert that:

There are, in fact, recent third‑party complaints about Keegan Quarries’ concrete.
Keegan Quarries itself has acknowledged that issues arose, even if it disputes their cause.

2.5 The disputed discovery category: Category 6(b)

Against this background, KC Capital sought discovery of Category 6(b):

“All documents evidencing or recording any complaints, claims or disputes involving the supply by [Keegan Quarries] during the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023 of concrete alleged to be of insufficient compressive strength or otherwise unfit for purpose, including but not limited to those complaints, claims or disputes identified at paragraph 16 of the affidavit of Mr. David Kennan sworn in these proceedings on 6 December 2023.”

KC Capital argued that:

These complaints are directly relevant and corroborative of its claim that Keegan Quarries supplied defective concrete.
They may rebut Keegan Quarries’ plea that any deficiency in compressive strength at Cuffe Street was caused by the acts of KC Capital’s agents (the Original Contractor and Design Team).
KC Capital has no alternative means of accessing such documents; they are peculiarly within Keegan Quarries’ possession or power.

Keegan Quarries refused discovery of this sub‑category on the basis that:

The proceedings concern only the concrete supplied for the Cuffe Street works.
KC Capital has not pleaded that any other concrete was defective.
Complaints relating to concrete supplied to other customers are irrelevant.
Third‑party confidentiality concerns militate against disclosure.

3. Summary of the Judgment

Twomey J ordered discovery of Category 6(b), holding that documents recording third‑party complaints of understrength or unfit concrete are relevant and discoverable. The key elements of the decision can be summarised as follows:

Relevance determined by both sides’ pleadings: Following established case law, the judge emphasised that relevance for discovery is determined by the pleadings of both parties, not by the plaintiff’s case alone.
Plea of third‑party fault widens relevance: By pleading that any diminution in compressive strength was caused by acts/omissions of KC Capital’s contractor, design team and others (a novus actus interveniens), Keegan Quarries opened the door to discovery of similar complaints from other customers, because such complaints may weaken its alternative causation defence.
Enhanced latitude where fraud is credibly pleaded: Extending principles from earlier fraud cases, the court held that where there is more than a bare allegation of fraud, the plaintiff is entitled to greater latitude in what is regarded as relevant for discovery, given the necessarily clandestine nature of fraudulent conduct.
Not a fishing expedition: The court stressed that the request was tightly framed (limited by time period and subject‑matter, and grounded in evidence of three known complaints and expert opinion) and did not amount to a general fishing expedition.
Relevance to misrepresentation about quality and credentials: Third‑party complaints may also be relevant to KC Capital’s claims that Keegan Quarries misrepresented its experience, credentials, and the quality of its concrete.
Confidentiality not a bar: Consistent with higher court guidance, the judge held that confidentiality does not, by itself, justify refusal of discovery; protective measures can be adopted if necessary.
Systemic failure need not be pleaded: It was not necessary for KC Capital to plead systemic market‑wide failure to justify seeking discovery of other complaints. The absence of such a plea did not negate relevance in light of the actual issues pleaded.

The judgment therefore confirms the discoverability of third‑party complaints about a defendant’s product in a fraud‑based product defect case, where the defendant raises a broad defence attributing causation to the plaintiff’s conduct or that of its agents.

4. Precedents and Doctrinal Framework

4.1 General test for discovery relevance – O’Brien v Red Flag Consulting Ltd

The starting point is the Court of Appeal’s test in O’Brien v Red Flag Consulting Ltd [2021] IECA 172 (Donnelly J), summarised in para. 27 and quoted by Twomey J:

“A document is relevant if it may reasonably form the basis of a line of enquiry which may lead to the discovery of information that will advance the case of the seeker and/or weaken that of the party against whom it is sought. It is sufficient that a document may contain such information. It is not necessary to prove that it will. Relevance is determined on the basis of the pleadings and not the evidence.” (emphasis added)

This test has three important components:

Line of enquiry threshold: A document need only be capable of forming the basis of a line of enquiry that could help; it need not be demonstrably probative at the discovery stage.
Potential to advance or weaken a case: Relevance exists both where the documents may support the seeker’s case or may damage the opponent’s case.
Pleadings, not evidence: The scope of relevance is assessed by reference to the issues raised on the pleadings, not the evidence as it stands at the interlocutory stage.

Twomey J applies this framework rigorously, constantly returning to the question: given what each side has actually pleaded, can the third‑party complaints reasonably be seen as giving rise to a line of enquiry that may assist KC Capital or weaken Keegan Quarries’ case?

4.2 The role of pleadings – Tobin v Minister for Defence

In Tobin v Minister for Defence [2020] 1 I.R. 211, Clarke J (as he then was) emphasised that:

“Relevance is... determined by reference to the pleadings. Importantly, therefore, the scope of the issues which arise for the trial and which, thus, inform the extent of the documentation which may be considered relevant, is determined by the way in which the parties choose to plead their case.”

He noted that:

A plaintiff who pleads expansively cannot complain if this broadens discovery.
A defendant who denies or puts the plaintiff on proof of many elements inevitably expands the scope of relevant documentation.

Twomey J relies on this principle to underscore that Keegan Quarries has, by the terms of its Amended Defence, itself widened the issues in the case. It has not confined itself to denying any defect in the concrete; it positively asserts that other actors (contractor, engineer, design, site practices) are to blame. This choice directly affects what documents may be considered relevant.

4.3 Third‑party complaints and causation defences – VLM Ltd v Xerox (Ireland) Ltd

The central precedent relied upon is VLM Ltd v Xerox (Ireland) Ltd [2005] IEHC 46 (Clarke J), which concerned allegedly defective printing machines. The plaintiff sought discovery of documents relating to complaints about other machines of the same type, supplied to other customers.

Clarke J reasoned that:

If the only issue were whether the plaintiff’s own machines met contractual or implied standards, complaints about other machines would not be relevant.
However, the defendant had pleaded that the plaintiff’s own misuse of the machines was to blame.
This “complicated matters”: even if the machines were underperforming, the defendant said the cause was plaintiff misuse.
Complaints from other customers about similar machines might weaken that defence by making it less likely that non‑performance was due solely to the plaintiff’s failings.

Clarke J concluded:

“[T]he existence of similar complaints in respect of the same machine ‘might’ damage the case of the defendant by making it less likely that any failure to perform on the part of the machines was due to a lack of proper care on the plaintiff’s part. In principle, therefore, I am satisfied that some degree of documentation in relation to other machines and possible defects therein is necessary for the proper and fair disposition of these proceedings.” (emphasis added)

Twomey J treats VLM as directly analogous. He rejects Keegan Quarries’ attempt to distinguish it on the basis that VLM concerned operation of machines whereas this case concerns what was ordered. He notes:

The underlying principle is not confined to machines or “operation” as such.
In both cases, the defendant says that the plaintiff’s (or its agents’) conduct, rather than the defendant’s product, is to blame.
Evidence of similar problems experienced by independent third parties using the defendant’s product may tend to show the problem lies with the product, not solely with the plaintiff’s use or ordering of it.

4.4 Fraud and the “Catch‑22” – National Educational Welfare Board v Ryan and Kearney v J&E Davy

The second major doctrinal strand concerns how the courts treat allegations of fraud in civil pleadings and interlocutory procedures.

In National Educational Welfare Board v Ryan [2008] 2 I.R. 816, Clarke J discussed the difficulty facing a plaintiff who believes they have been defrauded but lacks access to the defendant’s internal documents. He described a “classic Catch‑22”:

“It is in the very nature of fraud... that the party who is on the receiving end will not have the means of knowing the precise extent of what has been done to them until they have obtained discovery. To require them to narrow their case prior to defence (and, thus, discovery) would be to create a classic Catch‑22… Undiscovered aspects of the fraud... will, as a natural result, never be revealed. This would... be apt to lead to an unjust solution.”

He laid down a balancing approach:

No special latitude for plaintiffs who make a bare allegation of fraud without detail.
Where a plaintiff provides sufficient, albeit general, details of the alleged fraud and its consequences and establishes a prima facie case, the defendant should:
- deliver a defence,
- submit to appropriate discovery and interrogatories, and
- only then seek more detailed particulars.
At the same time, courts must avoid allowing plaintiffs to use fraud allegations as a pretext for an impermissible “trawl” through confidential documentation.

In Kearney v J&E Davy [2022] IEHC 95, Twomey J himself applied these principles in the context of a defendant’s application for further particulars in a fraud case. He emphasised that:

“From the case law, it is clear that the solution to this Catch 22 is to permit a plaintiff in fraud cases more latitude in particularising her claim, prior to discovery, than is the situation in non-fraud cases.”

In the present decision, he makes a doctrinal move of some importance: he holds that this logic applies equally to discovery. That is, where fraud has been credibly pleaded, there is:

“more latitude in determining what is relevant in discovery in fraud cases, than in non-fraud cases. However, it is important to emphasise that this latitude does not arise when there is a bare allegation of fraud. There must be some evidence of the existence of the alleged fraud.”

This is one of the key precedential contributions of the judgment: it extends the “fraud latitude” doctrine from particulars into the arena of discovery, while preserving the safeguard that allegations must be supported by some evidence (here, expert evidence and pleaded detail).

4.5 Confidentiality and discovery – Word Perfect and Ambriox

On confidentiality, Twomey J cites two strands of authority:

Word Perfect Translation Services Ltd v Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform [2020] IESC 56 (Clarke C.J.), where the Supreme Court held:
“The fact that documentation may contain confidential information does not, of itself, provide a reason for resisting its disclosure but it does provide a factor which the Court can take into account either in determining to decline disclosure or to put in place particular measures to protect the confidential information unless its disclosure should become absolutely essential.” (emphasis added)
Ambriox Ltd v Minister for the Environment (No.1) [1992] 1 I.R. 277 (Finlay J), where the court confirmed the implied undertaking that parties may not use discovered documents for any purpose other than the litigation.

These authorities collectively show that:

Confidentiality is not a trump card against discovery.
Court‑imposed or agreed protective measures (including redactions, limitations on circulation, and the inherent implied undertaking) can sufficiently protect third‑party interests.

Twomey J also references the Court of Appeal decision in Word Perfect Translation Services Ltd v Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform [2023] IECA 189 on the need for lawyers to take a “broad‑brush” approach to costs and avoid unnecessary court time – a reminder that disputes about discovery and costs should be handled proportionately.

5. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in KC Capital v Keegan Quarries

5.1 A narrowly framed request – why this is not a “fishing expedition”

A recurring concern in discovery jurisprudence is the avoidance of “fishing expeditions” – overly broad, speculative requests seeking documents in the hope something helpful might turn up. Twomey J explicitly addresses and rejects the suggestion that KC Capital’s request falls into this category.

He points to several limiting features:

Specific type of document: Only complaints, claims or disputes about concrete “alleged to be of insufficient compressive strength or otherwise unfit for purpose”.
Defined timeframe: 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2023 – a two‑year window, not an open‑ended trawl through company history.
Subject‑matter link: Only complaints about concrete quality (not all issues Keegan Quarries may have experienced).
Evidence‑based foundation: KC Capital already has evidence of three specific sites with alleged quality or strength issues (from Mr Kennan’s affidavit) and expert opinion that Keegan Quarries engaged in unusual and unapproved mix changes.

Using a metaphor often employed in discovery cases, Twomey J observes that:

This is not an attempt to net everything in the pool.
It is the equivalent of targeting a very specific type of fish in a restricted area of the pool, knowing that three such fish have already been (allegedly) caught there.

That analysis is central to justifying the order, especially in the context of a fraud allegation where greater latitude is warranted but where the court remains attentive to proportionality.

5.2 Effect of Keegan Quarries’ plea of third‑party fault and novus actus interveniens

The most immediate ground of relevance is the way Keegan Quarries has chosen to plead its Defence. As para. 20.7 illustrates, Keegan Quarries contends that:

Any underperformance (if established) is attributable to:
- defective design of the building and slabs;
- defective workmanship by the Original Contractor;
- addition of water or other on‑site practices; and
- ordering of unsuitable concrete by the contractor.
These acts/omissions amount to a novus actus interveniens – a new, intervening cause that breaks the chain of causation between any act of Keegan Quarries and the damage complained of.

Applying VLM, Twomey J reasons that:

Even if KC Capital proves that the concrete at Cuffe Street was understrength, Keegan Quarries maintains that the cause lies in the acts of KC Capital’s contractor and design team.
This “complicates matters” in the same way that allegations of plaintiff misuse complicated the Xerox case.
If there are other, independent customers who have complained that concrete supplied by Keegan Quarries was understrength or unfit for purpose, that pattern may:
- render it less likely that the problem at Cuffe Street was due purely to local workmanship, ordering or site practices; and
- correspondingly weaken Keegan Quarries’ causation defence.
Consequently, the requested documents can reasonably be seen as forming the basis of a line of enquiry that may weaken the defendant’s case, satisfying the O’Brien test.

The attempt to distinguish VLM – on the basis that this case is about what was ordered, not about how the product was used – is rejected. Twomey J notes that:

The Amended Defence is not confined to ordering; it explicitly extends to use of the concrete and on‑site practices, i.e. the equivalent of “operation” in VLM.
The principle in VLM is that once a defendant says “the real problem is what the plaintiff (or its agents) did with the product”, similar problems faced by independent third parties may be probative of where the fault lies.

5.3 Enhanced latitude where fraud is credibly alleged

The second major plank in the reasoning is the fact that fraud – specifically deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation – has been credibly pleaded by KC Capital.

Key points:

Barrett J has already held, at the amendment stage, that KC Capital’s fraud allegations are clear and precise, supported by an expert report, and more than a bald assertion.
Twomey J therefore treats this as a case in which the plaintiff has passed the threshold described in National Educational Welfare Board v Ryan.
In such a case, the courts seek to avoid the Catch‑22 where a plaintiff must narrow its allegations without having had access to discovery that could reveal the full extent of a clandestine fraud.

On this basis, Twomey J extends the “fraud latitude” principle to discovery:

In fraud cases (where there is some evidence and sufficiently detailed pleading), the concept of “relevance” for discovery purposes should be applied with greater latitude than in ordinary, non‑fraud cases.
This helps to prevent fraudsters from sheltering undisclosed aspects of their conduct behind overly restrictive views of relevance.
At the same time, the safeguard remains that the allegation cannot be purely speculative or unparticularised; there must be a foundation in evidence and expert analysis.

Applied to the facts, this means:

KC Capital’s allegation is not simply that the concrete was defective; it is that Keegan Quarries engaged in a deliberate and clandestine scheme of adulteration and substitution.
Third‑party complaints of similar problems could be powerful evidence either confirming or undermining an alleged pattern of conduct.
Keegan Quarries’ explanations, in affidavits, as to why these other complaints are said not to concern defective concrete cannot simply be accepted at face value at this stage, precisely because the alleged wrongdoing is clandestine and contested.

This is a careful, but important, shift: the court does not find that fraud has occurred; it merely recognises that where fraud is credibly in issue, the discovery net can be drawn somewhat wider than in routine negligence or contract cases.

5.4 Relevance to alleged misrepresentations about experience and quality

Beyond the defect‑and‑causation debate, Twomey J identifies another dimension of relevance. KC Capital pleads that Keegan Quarries made representations to it about:

the quality of its concrete;
its experience and credentials; and
the suitability of its product for the specific project requirements.

If Keegan Quarries was, during the relevant period, receiving complaints from other customers about understrength or unfit concrete, such documentation may:

cast doubt on the accuracy or honesty of these representations at the time they were made;
support KC Capital’s allegation that the representations were fraudulent or negligent; and
form part of a mosaic of circumstantial evidence indicating a pattern of misrepresentation or quality issues.

The court therefore regards third‑party complaints as potentially relevant not only to the technical question of why the Cuffe Street concrete was understrength, but also to the misrepresentation and credentials aspect of the case.

5.5 Systemic failure and confidentiality objections rejected

Keegan Quarries advanced two further arguments which the court rejected.

5.5.1 No need to plead “systemic failure”

Keegan Quarries argued that third‑party complaints would only be relevant if KC Capital had pleaded that Keegan Quarries was guilty of systemic failure in supplying understrength concrete to the market at large. Since KC Capital had not done so, they said, the complaints could not be relevant.

Twomey J accepts that in a case where systemic failure is pleaded, such complaints would indeed be relevant. However, he rejects the converse proposition:

The absence of a systemic‑failure plea does not automatically render such documents irrelevant.
Relevance must be assessed by reference to the actual issues pleaded in this case – fraud, misrepresentation, defective supply, and alternative causation via third‑party acts.
For the reasons already examined, third‑party complaints may be relevant to those issues even without a systemic failure claim.

5.5.2 Confidentiality concerns

Keegan Quarries also relied on the privacy and commercial sensibilities of the third‑party complainants. Twomey J, applying Word Perfect and Ambriox, notes that:

Confidentiality does not, by itself, justify refusal to order discovery.
The implied undertaking and, if necessary, specific confidentiality measures, can adequately protect third‑party interests.
The fact that third parties “might not be best pleased” if their disputes are mentioned is not sufficient to shift the balance against disclosure where documents are otherwise relevant.

Accordingly, confidentiality concerns do not override the plaintiff’s entitlement to discovery of relevant documents.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 Discovery and relevance in Irish civil procedure

Discovery is the pre‑trial process by which each party is required to list and, where requested, produce documents that are relevant to the issues in the case. Its aims are:

to prevent surprise at trial,
to facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of proceedings, and
to enable each party to know and meet the case against them.

Under the modern O’Brien v Red Flag test:

A document is “relevant” if it may reasonably lead to a line of enquiry that could help prove or disprove some issue raised on the pleadings.
It suffices that it may assist; there is no need to prove that it will assist.
The focus is not on whether the document is directly prove‑or‑disprove; it is enough that it might lead to information which could do so.

6.2 Fraud, deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation

In civil law, deceit (or fraudulent misrepresentation) generally requires proof that:

The defendant made a representation of fact.
The representation was false.
The defendant knew it was false, or was reckless as to its truth.
The representation was intended to induce the plaintiff to act.
The plaintiff did act in reliance on it and suffered loss.

Fraud is, by nature, secretive. The wrongdoer is unlikely to leave obvious evidence of wrongdoing accessible to the victim. This is why Irish courts recognise a limited relaxation of strict pleading and discovery rules in fraud cases – but only where the plaintiff has given genuine, non‑speculative particulars and some evidence.

6.3 Novus actus interveniens and third‑party fault

Novus actus interveniens (new intervening act) is a causation doctrine. It refers to an event or conduct that:

occurs after the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing, and
is so significant and independent that it “breaks the chain of causation”,
so that the defendant is no longer legally responsible for the ultimate damage.

In this case, Keegan Quarries pleads that:

defective design by the engineer,
poor workmanship and supervision by the contractor and design team,
on‑site adding of water or ordering the wrong specification,

constitute such an intervening act. If accepted at trial, this would mean that even if Keegan Quarries’ concrete had issues, the ultimate damage might be considered too remote or attributable to others.

However, as VLM illustrates and Twomey J confirms, once a defendant advances such a defence, evidence that independent third parties have experienced similar problems with the defendant’s product may be relevant to undermining the suggestion that the plaintiff (or its agents) are solely to blame.

6.4 Security for costs

Security for costs is a protective measure available to defendants. Where there is reason to doubt that the plaintiff will be able to pay the defendant’s costs if the defendant succeeds, the court can order the plaintiff to pay a sum into court or provide another form of security.

In this case:

Keegan Quarries successfully obtained security for costs.
In resisting that application, KC Capital introduced the existence of other sites with alleged concrete issues.
Those affidavits helped later to justify the discovery request for third‑party complaints, as they demonstrated that the request was not purely speculative.

7. Likely Impact and Practical Implications

7.1 Drafting defences in product and construction disputes

One clear practical message is that the way defendants plead their case has direct consequences for discovery.

A defendant who simply denies defect or breach may limit the relevance of third‑party complaint evidence.
However, once the defendant pleads that the plaintiff or its agents are to blame for any defect (e.g. by misuse, poor workmanship, or design failings), documents showing that other customers experienced similar problems with the same product may become discoverable.

Defence practitioners in product liability and construction disputes must now factor in that:

Raising extensive pleas of third‑party fault (novus actus, contributory negligence, improper use) will tend to widen the scope of potentially relevant documentation.
This includes records of complaints by other customers within the relevant period, particularly where the plaintiff alleges fraud or systemic issues with quality.

7.2 Strategy in fraud‑based commercial litigation

For plaintiffs:

This decision underlines the benefit of investing early in obtaining expert reports and assembling enough material to convert a suspicion of fraud into a prima facie case.
Once detailed fraud allegations are properly pleaded and supported, plaintiffs can argue for broader discovery than would be typical in non‑fraud cases.

For defendants:

Allegations of fraud can no longer be treated purely as a rhetorical escalation; they have structural consequences for discovery.
Where a defendant credibly faces fraud allegations and has pleaded broad defences attributing blame to others, it should expect that courts will be less sympathetic to narrow notions of relevance.

At a systemic level, the judgment reinforces a cautious but real shift: Irish courts will tolerate somewhat wider discovery in fraud cases, but only once satisfied that the plaintiff’s allegations are substantiated by more than bare assertion.

7.3 Handling third‑party confidentiality and complaint data

Suppliers and service providers should note that:

Internal records of complaints and disputes with customers may well become discoverable in subsequent litigation involving a different customer, particularly where similar alleged defects are in issue and the defendant pleads third‑party fault.
Confidentiality clauses with customers do not immunise such records from discovery, though they may influence the protective measures ordered by the court (e.g. redactions, limited inspection, or confidentiality rings).
Robust and accurate complaint handling and record‑keeping are critical, as such records may become central evidence in litigation concerning both the quality of products and the fairness of representations made to other customers.

7.4 Evidential and expert foundations for discovery in fraud cases

The judgment highlights the importance of building a solid evidential base before seeking broad discovery in a fraud context:

KC Capital relied on:
- expert forensic engineering reports from Professor Robery; and
- specific evidence of three sites where concrete quality issues had arisen, drawn from affidavits in the security for costs application.
This evidential groundwork enabled the court to find that the fraud allegations were more than speculative and justified giving KC Capital additional latitude in discovery.

Future plaintiffs seeking similar discovery should expect courts to scrutinise whether:

There is a credible evidential and expert basis for alleging fraud.
The discovery category is tailored in time and subject‑matter.
The request targets specific types of documents that logically bear on the pleaded fraud and any causation defences.

8. Conclusion: Significance within the Irish Law of Discovery

KC Capital Property Group Ltd v Keegan Quarries Ltd [2025] IEHC 677 makes two significant contributions to Irish civil procedure and commercial litigation:

It confirms and applies the VLM v Xerox principle to construction materials: where a defendant to a product defect claim pleads that the plaintiff or its agents are to blame, third‑party complaints about similar defects in the defendant’s product may be relevant and discoverable, as they can weaken that causation defence.
It explicitly extends the “fraud latitude” doctrine from particulars to discovery: where fraud is credibly and specifically pleaded, and supported by evidence, courts should adopt a more generous view of what is relevant for discovery, while still guarding against fishing expeditions and requiring precision in the requested categories.

The judgment also:

Reaffirms that relevance is shaped by how both parties plead their cases, underscoring the strategic importance of pleading choices.
Clarifies that systemic failure need not be pleaded to justify discovery of third‑party complaint records.
Reiterates that confidentiality concerns, including those of third parties, do not on their own bar discovery, though they may warrant protective measures.

In practical terms, the decision will influence:

how suppliers of goods (particularly in construction and other technical sectors) manage and record quality complaints;
how defendants draft defences where they wish to rely on third‑party fault without unduly enlarging the scope of discovery against themselves; and
how plaintiffs in fraud‑based commercial litigation structure their pleadings and evidential foundations to unlock broader discovery.

Overall, KC Capital v Keegan Quarries is a carefully reasoned application of established principles, but it also marks a clear incremental step: it recognises that the clandestine nature of fraud and the reality of complex product disputes justify a somewhat wider, though still controlled, ambit of discovery where the pleadings and evidence warrant it.