Defining “Place of Residence” for Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: Requirement of a Meaningful Connection

Introduction

This commentary examines the Court of Appeal’s decision in Mobile Telecommunications Company KSCP v HRH Prince Hussam Bin Saud Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud ([2025] EWCA Civ 681), delivered on 30 May 2025. The key issue was whether Prince Hussam had “had a place of residence in England and Wales” during the three‐year “Relevant Period” (1 June 2019–1 June 2022) under section 265(2)(b)(i) of the Insolvency Act 1986, thus giving English courts jurisdiction to entertain a bankruptcy petition. The parties were (1) Mobile Telecommunications Company KSCP, a Kuwaiti public company seeking enforcement of multi-hundreds-million-dollar LCIA arbitral awards against Prince Hussam; and (2) Prince Hussam, a member of the Saudi royal family resisting jurisdiction.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal the High Court’s dismissal of the bankruptcy petition. It upheld the finding that Prince Hussam had no place of residence in England and Wales during the Relevant Period. Although he had enjoyed student residence at York House, Kensington, until 1990, after moving permanently to Saudi Arabia he had no continuing intention or factual connection to treat any London property as his residence. Mere availability of a family‐owned flat, unrequested and unused, did not satisfy the statutory jurisdictional test.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Re Nordenfelt [1895] 1 QB 151: Established that a “dwelling‐house” ceases to be such when the owner abandons it in fact and intention.
• Re Brauch [1978] Ch 316: Early interpretation of “ordinary residence” and “place of residence.”
• Skjevesland v Geveran Trading (No 4) [2003] BCC 391: Confirmation that license to occupy can establish residence but permanence is required.
• Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP v Khan [2016] BPIR 722: A licensee may have de facto control; moral claim sufficient in family context.
• PJSC VTB Bank v Laptev [2020] EWHC 321 (Ch): Residence can exist without actual occupation if the connection is sufficiently continuous.
• Lakatamia Shipping v Su [2021] EWHC 1866 (Ch): Rejected entitlement-only approach; emphasised meaningful occupation.
• Fox v Stirk [1970] 2 QB 463: “Temporary presence” does not constitute residence.

These authorities collectively define “place of residence” as a factual state of meaningful occupation, continuity or settled purpose, not a mere entitlement or transitory presence.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court of Appeal endorsed the High Court’s approach:

1. Interpret the un-defined statutory phrase “has had a place of residence” by reference to common-sense concepts of permanence, continuity and settled purpose.
2. Require proof, on the balance of probabilities, of a de facto, meaningful connection—an expectation of continuity or settled abode.
3. Reject any rule that a once-held residence persists until “abandoned” as a standalone legal concept; instead focus on whether a residence existed during the specific three‐year period.
4. Disallow reliance on mere license or moral entitlement to occupy a property during the Relevant Period if no request was made, no intention existed, and no actual occupation occurred.

Prince Hussam’s student-era connection to York House ended in 1990. Thereafter, his intermittent visits to London hotels or family flats, without keys, personal effects or any settled plan, failed the test. His contempt conviction in 2018 further precluded re-entry.

3. Impact on Future Cases

This decision reinforces a stringent test for jurisdiction based on “place of residence” under insolvency statutes:

• Insurers, creditors and practitioners must assemble concrete evidence of meaningful occupation within the three-year window.
• Reliance on theoretical availability of a third-party-owned property will not suffice.
• Courts will examine actual intention and factual patterns of life, including address registration, possession of keys, family arrangements and physical stays.
• The decision curbs forum-shopping efforts by foreign debtors with tenuous or historic connections to England and Wales.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Centre of Main Interests (COMI): The debtor’s principal base of business or personal life. A COMI in England and Wales allows a bankruptcy petition.

Section 265(2)(b)(i) Test: Within three years before presentation, did the debtor “have a place of residence” in England and Wales? This is distinct from domicile or business-carrying on.

Place of Residence: Not a legal right but a factual state—meaningful, settled occupation with some permanence or continuity.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal’s decision confirms that “place of residence” for bankruptcy jurisdiction demands a meaningful, factual connection during the statutory Relevant Period. It rejects an entitlement-only approach and any notion that a once-held residence automatically persists absent formal “abandonment.” Practitioners must now marshal detailed evidence of actual stays, controls, intentions and settled purposes to satisfy section 265(2)(b)(i). This ruling sharpens the boundary between theoretical availability of accommodation and genuine residential ties within English insolvency law.