Coroner’s Duty to Review Witness Anonymity Before Inquest Closure and the Scope of Functus Officio

Introduction

This appeal arises from William Thompson’s application for judicial review challenging the coroner’s failure to reconsider the anonymity order granted to “Soldier D” after adverse findings in the inquest into Kathleen Thompson’s death. The central questions were (1) whether the coroner became functus officio—i.e., devoid of power—upon formally closing the inquest, (2) whether anonymity orders could be revisited post-closure in the same way as referrals to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), and (3) if the coroner did err, whether the court should remit the decision back for reconsideration. The Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland (Keegan LCJ, Horner LJ and Colton J) heard the appeal on 13 May 2025.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s finding that the coroner had acted unlawfully by failing to reconsider anonymity after finding that Soldier D had used unjustified lethal force. However, the court also agreed that once the inquest was formally closed—by delivery of the written ruling and verdict on 8 July 2022—the coroner was functus officio and lacked power to reopen the inquest or alter the anonymity order. The court distinguished anonymity orders (part of the inquest investigation) from the separate statutory duty to refer to the DPP under section 35(3) of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002, which can occur after closure. Because the coroner had clearly stated she would have maintained anonymity if invited to reconsider, the court declined to quash the inquest or remit the matter for further review and dismissed the appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Re McDonnell’s Application [2015] NICA 72 – held that once an inquest is formally closed under Rule 4 of the Coroners (Practice and Procedure) Rules (Northern Ireland) 1963, the coroner cannot take further steps on anonymity or screening.
• Re Officer C and others [2012] NICA 47 – confirmed that anonymity orders may be revisited if there is a material change in circumstances or new information.
• R (SSHD) v Assistant Deputy Coroner for Inner West London [2010] EWHC 3098 (Admin) – emphasized the principle of open justice and the coroner’s common-law discretion to deviate from it only for good reason.
• Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (England & Wales) Guidance – illustrates similar principles on functus officio and closure of inquests.

Legal Reasoning

1. Functus Officio and Formal Closure
Rule 4 of the 1963 Rules requires that every inquest be opened, adjourned and closed in a formal manner. The Court of Appeal agreed that the inquest in this case was formally closed when the coroner issued her full written ruling—containing findings, verdict and reasons—on 8 July 2022. At that point she became functus officio and lost any power over inquest matters, including anonymity orders.

2. Anonymity vs. DPP Referral
Anonymity orders are part of the coroner’s investigative function and must be reviewed before the inquest closes. By contrast, section 35(3) of the 2002 Act imposes a distinct, post-inquest obligation to refer a death to the DPP if an offence appears to have been committed. That obligation survives closure and does not revive the coroner’s power to alter inquest directions.

3. Duty to Revisit Anonymity After Adverse Findings
Where a coroner makes specific adverse findings against a witness under Article 2 ECHR, there is a duty to re-balance the witness’s right to life and physical integrity against the principle of open justice. The High Court found—and the Court of Appeal agreed—that in this case the coroner ought to have paused, invited submissions, and reconsidered anonymity before formally closing the inquest.

4. Relief and Discretion
Even though the coroner erred procedurally, she had expressly stated that she would have maintained anonymity if invited to reconsider. In these circumstances—where there were no real prospects of a different outcome—quashing the inquest closure would have been futile. The court therefore exercised its discretion to refuse relief.

Impact

• Clarifies that a coroner’s power to manage anonymity ends upon formal closure of the inquest—reinforcing legal certainty.
• Provides practical guidance to coroners to: (a) state clearly when they open, adjourn and close inquests; (b) invite submissions on anonymity after critical findings; and (c) give advance notice of closure to interested persons.
• Distinguishes the coroner’s inquest functions from post-inquest statutory duties (such as DPP referral), reducing confusion about procedural powers after closure.
• Sets a precedent for handling anonymity in legacy inquests, particularly those involving security-force personnel at risk.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Functus Officio: Once a decision-maker has completed a formal decision (here, closing the inquest), they lose the power to reopen or vary that decision.
• Article 2 Duty: The State’s operational obligation to protect life under the European Convention on Human Rights, which can justify anonymity and screening for witnesses at risk.
• Anonymity Order: A direction that a witness’s identity not be disclosed in open court, made to protect life or safety.
• Properly Interested Person (PIP): A party with a sufficient interest in the inquest (e.g., next of kin or a witness granted anonymity) entitled to make submissions.
• DPP Referral (section 35(3), 2002 Act): A post-inquest duty requiring the coroner to report circumstances suggesting a criminal offence to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Conclusion

Thompson’s appeal underscores two core principles. First, a coroner must formally review any anonymity order after critical inquest findings and before formally closing an inquest, ensuring a proper balance between open justice and witness safety. Second, once the inquest is closed in a formal manner, the coroner is functus officio and cannot revisit inquest directions, though separate statutory duties—such as DPP referrals—remain exercisable. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, provided clear best-practice guidance for future coronial proceedings, and reinforced the boundaries of coroners’ procedural powers.