Cook [2025] EWCA Crim 1476: Upward Departure from Dangerous Driving Guidelines and Two‑Thirds Disqualification Uplift in Multiple‑Fatality Cases

Case: Cook, R v [2025] EWCA Crim 1476
Court: Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), England and Wales
Judgment Date: 30 October 2025
Judge giving judgment: Mrs Justice Tipples

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Cook [2025] EWCA Crim 1476, a renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence arising from a tragic incident of three deaths caused by dangerous driving in Eastbourne. The case is significant for two main reasons:

It affirms that, in exceptionally serious cases of causing death by dangerous driving, the sentencing judge is entitled to move above the top of the Sentencing Council guideline range (8–18 years for Category A culpability) and that a notional sentence of 24 years’ imprisonment after trial can be justified.
It clarifies that, where a lengthy custodial sentence is imposed for such an offence, the driving disqualification must include an “uplift” equal to two‑thirds of the custodial term, correcting an error in the original sentencing.

The case also firmly rejects a defence attempt to attribute partial responsibility for the crash to the deceased driver, where the deceased was being aggressively pursued by the offender in the context of a drug‑related dispute. The Court emphasises that on these facts such “victim culpability” arguments are misconceived.

2. Factual Background

2.1 The fatal incident

On the night of 13 February 2023, shortly after 10.30 pm, the applicant, Mr Cook, was driving a Range Rover through residential streets in Eastbourne. He was:

Travelling at high speed
In pursuit of a Citroën Berlingo driven by Jonathan Day (aged 32)
With two passengers in the Berlingo: Jon Miller and Daniel Davies

Jonathan Day was unfamiliar with the Eastbourne roads. As a result of the high‑speed pursuit and the applicant’s dangerous driving, Mr Day lost control of the Berlingo, which left the road and struck a tree. All three occupants suffered catastrophic injuries and died at the scene.

2.2 The drug‑deal background

The underlying context was a planned drug transaction involving the applicant’s stepson, Harvey Murphy:

Murphy anticipated being supplied with a significant quantity of drugs by at least one of the men in the Berlingo.
The evidence indicated that the Berlingo occupants intended to supply bogus drugs (i.e., a rip‑off), and that Murphy likely paid a substantial sum for what turned out to be counterfeit substances.
No drugs were ever recovered, supporting the conclusion that the purported drugs were fake.

The applicant accepted that he had been involved in selling drugs together with Murphy. Call logs and CCTV footage showed:

The Berlingo initially appeared to be leaving the area after the transaction.
Following a call to one of the occupants, the Berlingo returned to the vicinity of the original deal.
The applicant arrived in his Range Rover about two minutes later.
The Berlingo then drove away again, and the applicant immediately pursued it at high speed.

The sentencing judge found (and the applicant did not successfully challenge this finding) that he chased the Berlingo because he had discovered that bogus drugs might have been supplied and he was seeking to recover his drug money.

2.3 Post‑collision conduct

The applicant’s conduct after the collision was a key aggravating feature:

The applicant left his vehicle and went to the crashed Berlingo. CCTV footage (viewed both at first instance and on appeal) showed him at the scene for about three minutes.
He could hear the fatally injured occupants moaning, indicating that some were still alive or at least potentially saveable at that time.
Despite having his mobile phone with him, he did not call the emergency services.
Instead, he turned off his Range Rover’s headlights and used his phone as a torch to search around the crashed vehicle, plainly looking for drugs or money.
He then got back in his car and drove away.
Afterwards, he destroyed his phone and arranged for another person to report the crash. The emergency services were not notified until about one hour after the collision.

All three occupants of the Berlingo died at the scene. Counsel for the applicant accepted that, had emergency services been called immediately, some of those in the car might have survived.

2.4 Previous convictions

The applicant had 17 convictions for 40 offences up to October 2021, including some motoring‑related offences. However, the sentencing judge made clear that she placed little weight on this history when determining sentence; it did not drive the ultimate length of the custodial term.

3. Procedural History and Sentences Imposed

3.1 Pleas and offences

On 23 October 2024, at a pre‑trial and preparation hearing in the Crown Court at Lewes, the applicant pleaded guilty to:

Three counts of causing death by dangerous driving, contrary to section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
One count of doing an act tending and intended to pervert the course of justice, relating to the destruction of his phone and delayed notification of the collision.

These pleas were entered at a relatively early stage, and he was given a 25% credit for his guilty pleas.

3.2 Sentence at first instance

On 22 November 2024, HHJ Laing KC sentenced the applicant as follows:

A total of 18 years’ imprisonment, comprising:
- A notional sentence of 24 years on each of the three counts of causing death by dangerous driving, reduced to 18 years (concurrent) after 25% guilty plea credit.
- 8 months’ imprisonment, concurrent, for perverting the course of justice, expressly taken into account as an aggravating feature of the main offences.
A driving disqualification of 14 years, said to consist of:
- A base disqualification of 5 years, plus
- An “uplift” of 9 years to reflect the custodial term.
An order for an extended retest before the applicant could return to driving.
The victim surcharge.

In her sentencing remarks, the judge highlighted in particular:

The fact that the dangerous driving was a pursuit motivated by enforcement of a drug debt.
The seriousness of the outcome: three deaths.
Further aggravating features, including the risk posed to other road users, the applicant’s post‑collision behaviour, and the perverting the course of justice.

She concluded that, balancing aggravating and mitigating factors, the appropriate sentence after a trial would have been 24 years, which the 25% plea discount brought down to 18 years.

3.3 Grounds of appeal

The applicant renewed his application for leave to appeal against sentence, arguing that the total sentence was manifestly excessive. The core submissions advanced by Mr Israel (for the applicant) were:

The judge’s starting point of 24 years (before plea) was too high and represented an improper step outside the guideline range.
Insufficient weight was given to mitigating factors, particularly:
- The conduct of Jonathan Day, including his speed and toxicological findings.
- The absence of (allegedly) further aggravating factors beyond multiple deaths and destruction of the phone.
- The applicant’s eventual involvement in contacting the emergency services, albeit indirectly and belatedly.

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), constituted with Mrs Justice Tipples giving the judgment, heard oral submissions and refused the application for leave. However, it corrected an error in the length of the driving disqualification.

4. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal reached the following principal conclusions:

The sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive and was not wrong in principle. The sentencing judge was entitled, given the exceptional seriousness of the case, to step outside and above the 8–18 year guideline range for Category A causing death by dangerous driving.
The argument that Mr Day’s driving and intoxication rendered him partly responsible for the collision was rejected. His speed was a direct consequence of the applicant’s high‑speed pursuit in a powerful vehicle on unfamiliar roads, seeking to enforce a drug debt. On these facts, there was no proper basis to attribute any share of responsibility to the deceased.
The Court endorsed the sentencing judge’s identification of numerous aggravating features, including:
- The drug‑related motive underpinning the pursuit.
- The serious risk to other road users.
- Post‑collision behaviour showing self‑interest and callousness (failure to summon help, searching for money or drugs).
- The count of perverting the course of justice, which was appropriately treated as aggravating the main offences.
The Court made an important observation on sentencing levels:
- Had there been only one death caused by the applicant’s dangerous driving in similar circumstances, an appropriate pre‑plea sentence would have been at least 16 years.
- Given the presence of three deaths, a 24‑year pre‑plea sentence was entirely legitimate.
The contention that the applicant’s eventual contact (through another person) with the emergency services should mitigate the sentence was rejected. The Court agreed with the sentencing judge that:
- There was no true mitigation in this point.
- The applicant’s immediate reaction was entirely self‑protective; he could have called for help during the crucial first three minutes but did not.
The only successful aspect of the appeal concerned the driving disqualification uplift:
- With an 18‑year custodial sentence, the uplift to the disqualification should have been 12 years (two‑thirds of the sentence), not 9 years.
- The Court therefore quashed the original 14‑year disqualification and substituted a total period of 17 years, made up of:
  - 5‑year base disqualification; plus
  - 12‑year uplift.
- The driving disqualifications run concurrently on each count, and a mandatory re‑test was confirmed.

5. Legal Framework and Concepts

5.1 Causing death by dangerous driving

The principal offence, causing death by dangerous driving, is created by section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The key elements are:

The defendant was driving a mechanically propelled vehicle;
On a road or other public place;
The driving was dangerous (i.e., fell far below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver, and it would be obvious to such a driver that driving in that way would be dangerous);
The driving caused the death of another person.

The maximum penalty for this offence has been increased over time and, following legislative amendments (including the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022), can now be as high as life imprisonment. Within that statutory framework, the Sentencing Council issues guidelines to promote consistency.

5.2 Sentencing Council guideline: causing death by driving

The applicable guideline for causing death by dangerous driving identifies different categories of culpability, with Category A being the most serious. For Category A:

The category range is given as 8 to 18 years’ custody.
Judges are expected to identify a starting point within that range, based on seriousness, and then adjust upwards or downwards for aggravating and mitigating features.

However, under section 125 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, sentencing courts must follow guidelines “unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so”. This allows a judge, in exceptional cases, to move outside the guideline range where the guideline does not adequately reflect the gravity of the case.

5.3 Appeals against sentence: “manifestly excessive”

On an application for leave to appeal against sentence, the Court of Appeal does not simply re‑sentence the offender afresh. Instead, it asks whether the sentence:

Was wrong in principle (for example, misapplication of law or guidelines), or
Was so manifestly excessive as to fall outside the proper range of sentences that a judge, properly directing himself or herself, could impose.

A sentence may be severe without being manifestly excessive. The appellate court is slow to interfere with a trial judge’s assessment of seriousness where the judge has carefully considered the guidelines and provided explicit reasoning.

5.4 Driving disqualification and the “uplift”

For serious motoring offences, a court may (and often must) impose a discretionary driving disqualification in addition to any custodial sentence. Where a substantial term of imprisonment is imposed, legislation and appellate practice require the court to add an uplift to the disqualification to ensure that:

The ban remains effective after the offender is released from custody; and
The overall package of punishment properly reflects the seriousness of the offence.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that for an 18‑year custodial term, the appropriate uplift was two‑thirds of that term, i.e. 12 years. This is a clear and practical rule of thumb now expressly endorsed in this context.

6. Detailed Analysis of the Judgment

6.1 Categorisation as a Category A offence

It was not disputed that the offence fell within Category A of the Sentencing Council’s guideline, the highest culpability bracket for causing death by dangerous driving. The features supporting this categorisation included:

Highly dangerous driving: a high‑speed pursuit through residential streets.
The deliberate nature of the pursuit: the applicant was not merely driving recklessly for thrill but was actively chasing the Berlingo.
The powerful nature of the applicant’s vehicle (Range Rover) and proximity to the Berlingo.
The context: an attempt to enforce a drug debt, indicating a planned and purpose‑driven course of conduct rather than a momentary lapse.

Given these factors, the applicant himself did not contend that the offence fell below Category A. The real dispute centred on whether the judge was permitted to go above the 18‑year upper guideline.

6.2 Upward departure beyond the guideline range

The Court of Appeal’s core reasoning is encapsulated in paragraph 14 of the judgment:

“In her sentencing remarks the judge was careful to have regard to all the aggravating and mitigating features and having done so, this was plainly a case where she was entitled to go outside the category range in identifying the sentences before applying the discount for guilty plea.”

The Court identified a number of aggravating features justifying this upward departure:

Multiple fatalities: There were three deaths, which the Court recognised as “the most serious of all” aggravating factors. The guideline treats multiple deaths as significantly worsening seriousness.
Drug‑related pursuit: The applicant’s pursuit was directly linked to a drug deal, specifically his desire to recover money for bogus drugs supplied to his stepson. This introduced an element of criminal enterprise and enforcement beyond “ordinary” motoring dangerousness.
Risk to other road users: The pursuit took place on residential streets, inevitably putting other road users and pedestrians at risk.
Post‑collision callousness: The applicant’s failure to summon medical assistance, and instead searching the wrecked car for drugs or money, demonstrated a profound lack of concern for human life.
Subsequent perversion of justice: The destruction of his phone and delayed reporting of the crash (via another person) constituted a separate offence of perverting the course of justice, which the sentencing judge rightly treated as aggravating the main offences.

Against this background, the judge chose a notional sentence of 24 years per count before plea. The Court of Appeal expressly endorsed this assessment and provided helpful comparative guidance:

“Further, in our view, if the applicant's actions had resulted in one death, we consider that before a discount for guilty plea, the appropriate sentence would have been at least 16 years. Here there were three deaths.”

This passage is significant in two ways:

It confirms that even in a single‑fatality Category A case with this level of aggravation (drug‑motivated pursuit, extreme dangerousness, post‑collision behaviour), a sentence of at least 16 years’ imprisonment (pre‑plea) is appropriate.
It shows that in multi‑fatality cases, the combination of multiple deaths plus particularly grave aggravating features can justify a sentence above the 18‑year guideline ceiling, here to 24 years.

The Court balanced this against mitigating factors (personal mitigation, early guilty plea) but found that, even allowing for those, the sentence as passed was comfortably within the proper range. The guideline is a framework, not a straitjacket; this judgment illustrates a robust willingness to exceed it where justice demands.

6.3 Rejection of “victim culpability” arguments

A central plank of the applicant’s appeal was that the sentencing judge had given insufficient weight to the conduct of Jonathan Day, specifically:

His speed at the time of the crash, and
Toxicology evidence suggesting he may have been under the influence of substances.

Counsel argued that Mr Day was “at least partly” responsible for the fatal events, and that there was little “to recommend” his behaviour. The Court of Appeal firmly rejected this line of argument:

“The reason Mr Day was driving so fast was because the applicant was driving very fast extremely close to the rear of his vehicle. This was on a road with which Mr Day was unfamiliar and the applicant was in a bigger and much more powerful car. The applicant gave Mr Day no opportunity to stop and the reason he was driving so fast behind him was because he was trying to enforce a drug debt and he wanted his money back. The submission that Mr Day was in some way responsible for what happened is, in our view, misconceived on the facts of this case.”

This reasoning is important for several reasons:

It recognises that causal responsibility cannot be shifted to a victim who is reacting to immediate danger created by the offender. Driving fast while being chased by a powerful vehicle in a threatening context is fundamentally different from voluntarily driving fast of one’s own accord.
It underscores that where an offender deliberately engineers a dangerous situation — here, a high‑speed pursuit to enforce a drug debt — the foreseeability of the victim’s panicked or erratic response rests firmly with the offender.
It sends a strong signal that attempts to reduce culpability by emphasising the deceased’s flaws (such as drug use or poor driving) will be given short shrift where the offender’s own conduct was clearly the primary driver of risk.

In effect, the Court draws a line between:

Cases where a victim’s voluntary, independent, and unforeseeable conduct may genuinely break or diminish the chain of causation or moral blameworthiness; and
Cases (like this one) where the victim’s actions are a foreseeable response to pressure created by the offender, such that no real reduction in the offender’s culpability is warranted.

6.4 Treatment of post‑collision conduct and perverting the course of justice

The Court placed substantial weight on the applicant’s behaviour after the crash:

Three minutes at the scene without calling for help, despite audible signs of life.
Using his phone as a torch to search for drugs or money instead of contacting emergency services.
Driving away, destroying his phone, and arranging delayed reporting of the crash.

The Court endorsed the sentencing judge’s approach to these matters, emphasising that:

The failure to call for help and self‑interested search of the vehicle were distinct aggravating features, showing marked moral culpability.
The separate count of perverting the course of justice was rightly given an 8‑month concurrent sentence, but its primary significance was as an aggravating factor on the primary dangerous driving counts.

The Court specifically rejected the suggestion that contacting emergency services later should mitigate sentence:

“The judge found there was no mitigation in this and we agree. The applicant's only thought was for himself at the scene... If he had [called the emergency services] at that time, Mr Israel conceded that some of those in the car may have survived.”

The message is clear: belated or indirect assistance cannot readily undo the harm caused by an initial failure to act when life‑saving intervention was possible. For sentencing purposes, what matters is the offender’s immediate and genuine response, not a subsequent tactical recalibration.

6.5 Mitigation and previous convictions

The Court accepted that the sentencing judge had:

Considered the applicant’s references and personal circumstances in mitigation.
Expressly stated that very little weight was attached to his prior convictions.

This is a reminder that:

Even defendants with extensive criminal histories can receive a sentence driven predominantly by the current offence, where that offence is exceptionally serious.
A sentencing judge’s careful articulation of how mitigation has been taken into account will usually insulate the sentence from appellate interference.

6.6 The two‑thirds uplift to driving disqualification

The only aspect in which the Court altered the sentence related to the calculation of the driving disqualification. The original order was:

5‑year disqualification plus a 9‑year uplift, totalling 14 years.

The Court of Appeal held that:

Given an 18‑year custodial sentence, the uplift should be 12 years, i.e. two‑thirds of the prison term.
Therefore, the correct total disqualification was 5 years + 12 years = 17 years.

This clarification is practically important:

It ensures that the disqualification remains a real and effective restriction after release, not merely overlapping with the period of imprisonment.
It confirms the two‑thirds rule for uplift in such cases, offering guidance for future sentencing courts dealing with very long custodial terms for serious driving offences.

The Court also reiterated the requirement for a mandatory re‑test, reflecting the public protection dimension of the sentencing package.

7. Impact and Future Significance

7.1 Sentencing levels for causing death by dangerous driving

Cook is likely to be cited in future as a benchmark case at the top end of sentencing for causing death by dangerous driving. In particular, it:

Confirms that the upper guideline bracket of 18 years for Category A cases does not cap judicial discretion in exceptionally aggravated, multi‑fatality cases.
Suggests that a starting point of at least 16 years (pre‑plea) is appropriate where:
- There is one death;
- The dangerous driving involves a deliberate pursuit or similar aggravating conduct; and
- There are serious additional aggravating features (e.g., drug‑related motive, post‑collision callousness).
Openly approves a 24‑year pre‑plea sentence for three deaths in such circumstances, which translates to 18 years with a full 25% plea discount.

For sentencers, the case illustrates a structured approach:

Identify the correct culpability category under the guideline (here, Category A).
Consider the starting point and range, but then ask whether the case’s features place it outside the norm even for that category.
Where justified, move above the top of the range, explaining clearly the basis for doing so (multiple deaths, particularly egregious motives, etc.).

7.2 Victim conduct and causation in driving cases

The Court’s emphatic rejection of any attempt to shift blame to Mr Day has broader implications:

It will be more difficult for defendants to rely on victim misconduct as significant mitigation where the victim’s conduct is a reasonably foreseeable response to dangerous driving initiated by the defendant.
Toxicology evidence suggesting drug or alcohol use by the deceased is unlikely, on its own, to weigh heavily in mitigation where the offender’s own driving is the clear and dominant cause of the crash.
The case encourages sentencing judges to focus on the offender’s creation of the risk, not on the moral imperfections of the deceased.

7.3 Post‑collision behaviour as an aggravating factor

The case underscores that what drivers do immediately after a collision is highly relevant to sentence:

Leaving the scene, failing to summon help, or prioritising self‑interest over injured victims will be treated as serious aggravating factors.
Subsequent attempts to cover up involvement, including destruction of evidence or delayed reporting, justify upward movement in sentence, whether charged separately (as here) or treated as aggravation of the main offence.

7.4 Practical guidance on driving disqualifications

The correction of the disqualification period provides a clear and easily applicable rule:

In very serious driving cases where a substantial custodial term is imposed, the uplift to the driving disqualification should be equal to two‑thirds of the custodial term, in addition to any base period reflecting the seriousness of the offence itself.
Sentencers should explicitly separate:
- The base disqualification period, and
- The uplift, calculated by reference to the custodial sentence.

This promotes consistency and helps avoid under‑calculated bans in the most serious cases.

8. Complex Concepts Explained

8.1 “Manifestly excessive” sentence

A sentence is “manifestly excessive” if it is:

So high that no reasonable sentencing judge, applying the law and guidelines correctly, could have imposed it, or
Clearly out of line with sentences in broadly similar cases.

The Court does not interfere just because it might personally have chosen a slightly different figure. In Cook, the Court held that 18 years was severe but not excessive in this sense.

8.2 Category A and the guideline range

In the Sentencing Council’s guideline:

Category A = highest culpability (most blameworthy forms of dangerous driving causing death).
Each category has:
- A starting point (e.g., 12 years), and
- A range (e.g., 8–18 years).

The judge begins at the starting point and then adjusts within the range. In very exceptional cases, however, the judge may move outside the range.

8.3 Perverting the course of justice

“Perverting the course of justice” is a serious common law offence. It involves doing something intended to:

Interfere with the proper administration of justice, or
Mislead a court or investigators.

Examples include:

Destroying or fabricating evidence.
Inducing witnesses to give false statements.
Falsely taking responsibility for an offence or shifting blame.

In Cook, the destruction of the applicant’s phone and orchestration of delayed reporting of the crash were treated as acts tending and intended to pervert the course of justice.

8.4 The “uplift” in driving disqualification

When a court sends someone to prison and also bans them from driving, it must ensure the ban is not meaningless because the offender is already unable to drive while in custody. The solution is to:

Impose a base disqualification that reflects the offence’s seriousness, and
Add an uplift (an extra period), so the ban continues after release.

In Cook, the Court of Appeal held that the uplift should be two‑thirds of the length of the custodial sentence, leading to a total 17‑year ban for an 18‑year prison term.

9. Conclusion

R v Cook [2025] EWCA Crim 1476 is a significant sentencing decision in the field of serious motoring offences. It establishes and confirms several important principles:

In exceptionally serious cases of causing death by dangerous driving, especially where there are multiple fatalities and extreme aggravating features (such as a drug‑motivated pursuit and callous post‑collision conduct), sentences can properly exceed the top of the Sentencing Council guideline range.
A notional sentence of 24 years’ imprisonment after trial (reduced to 18 years with guilty plea credit) is not manifestly excessive where three people are killed in such a context.
Attempts to shift responsibility onto the deceased driver, where that driver was reacting to the danger created by the offender’s pursuit, will be rejected as misconceived. The Court focuses on the offender’s creation of the risk.
Post‑collision behaviour and actions to pervert the course of justice are serious aggravating features, especially where the offender prioritises self‑protection and financial interests over urgent medical assistance.
For driving disqualifications accompanying long custodial sentences, the uplift should be calculated as two‑thirds of the custodial term, ensuring the ban remains effective beyond the period of imprisonment. In this case, that led to a correction from a 14‑year to a 17‑year ban.

Overall, Cook sends a clear message that the criminal justice system will respond with very severe penalties to the most egregious forms of dangerous driving, particularly where connected to other criminality such as drug dealing, and where the offender’s conduct after the collision demonstrates a marked disregard for human life. It is likely to become a key reference point for judges sentencing at the upper end of the scale for fatal driving offences, and for practitioners arguing appeals in this area.