1. Introduction

This judgment of Ms Justice Nessa Cahill in the High Court of Ireland concerns a high‑profile defamation and malicious falsehood claim brought by Dana Rosemary Scallon against multiple media defendants, including the publisher of the Irish Times and Meta Platforms Ireland Ltd (formerly Facebook Ireland Ltd).

The decision is not a determination of liability for defamation. Instead, it resolves two important interlocutory questions:

• whether Meta should be allowed, almost ten years after proceedings were issued, to amend its defence in three significant ways; and
• whether Meta is entitled to discovery of settlement agreements and related documents from other libel proceedings brought by the plaintiff against different publishers.

The judgment is procedurally focused, but it contains substantive guidance on:

• how courts assess late amendments to pleadings, especially by defendants in long‑dormant cases;
• the potential use of concurrent wrongdoer defences under the Civil Liability Act 1961 in defamation claims, where the plaintiff has already settled with other publishers;
• when settlement agreements in other proceedings may be discoverable notwithstanding claims of confidentiality; and
• how online intermediaries like Meta may align their defences with those of primary publishers.

Because the plaintiff opposed the amendments primarily on grounds of delay and prejudice, the judgment is also a substantial restatement and development of Irish case law on amendments under Order 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, and on the respective roles and obligations of plaintiffs and defendants in progressing litigation.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The underlying publications

The plaintiff, a well‑known recording artist and former politician, sued in respect of reporting of her brother’s 2014 criminal trial in the UK on historic child sexual abuse charges (from which he was ultimately acquitted).

The impugned publications, so far as Meta is concerned, are:

• two articles in the Irish Times on 10 and 11 July 2014, headed:
  • “Dana claimed brother was ‘cured’ of feelings for children, court told”
  • “Dana ‘knew of allegations’ against brother”
• a post on the Irish Times Facebook page (Meta’s platform) containing a hyperlink to one or both of those articles, with the headline “Dana Rosemary Scallon ‘knew all along’ about sex abuse claims against her brother, court told”, and a photograph of the plaintiff holding a copy of the Bunreacht na hÉireann.

The plaintiff alleges that these publications defamed her and/or constituted malicious falsehood within the meaning of sections 6 and 42 of the Defamation Act 2009. She also contends that publication continued even after her brother’s acquittal on 24 July 2014.

2.2 Proceedings and long periods of inactivity

Key dates in the procedural history are:

• 6 July 2015 – first letter from the plaintiff’s solicitors to Meta about the Facebook post (almost a year after the posts of 10/11 July 2014).
• 9 July 2015 – plenary summons issued against Meta and the two Irish Times defendants, on the last day of the limitation period for the online publication.
• 4 April 2016 – Meta delivers its original defence, primarily contending that it was not a publisher of the relevant content.
• 2015–2019 – virtually no procedural activity against Meta. A first notice of intention to proceed is lodged in April 2019, which Meta says it did not know about.
• October 2020 – June 2024 – apart from two further notices of intention to proceed in October 2020, there are again no steps against Meta until a unilateral notice of trial is served on 24 June 2024.

During these years the plaintiff actively pursued and settled separate libel actions against other media:

• settlement in Northern Ireland against the Sunday World publisher in November 2018;
• settlements with Independent News & Media and associated titles in April 2021;
• settlements with the Daily Mail group in Dublin and Northern Ireland in November 2023;
• a strike‑out order in proceedings against The Irish Sun in November 2021.

The Irish Times defendants eventually delivered their defence on 20 May 2022, and furnished it to Meta in July 2022. That defence pleaded, inter alia, that the articles were not defamatory, that they were true, and that they were fair and accurate reports of court proceedings protected by statutory qualified privilege under s.18 of the Defamation Act 2009.

By mid‑2024, the action against Meta was, in practical terms, trial‑ready. The plaintiff served notice of trial on 24 June 2024, and the case was set down for trial. It featured in the jury call‑over in October 2024.

2.3 Meta’s motion to amend and for discovery

Against this background, Meta:

• on 28 November 2024, sought the plaintiff’s consent to deliver an amended defence (refused on 11 December 2024);
• on 12 December 2024, requested voluntary discovery of documents relating to the plaintiff’s other libel actions and settlements; and
• on 23 December 2024, issued a formal motion seeking:
  • leave to amend its defence in three ways; and
  • an order for discovery of categories of documents relating to those other proceedings.

The plaintiff objected strongly, arguing that:

• Meta had no adequate explanation for the delay in seeking amendments;
• to allow the amendments would cause irremediable prejudice and derail a case ready for trial;
• some amendments were frivolous or bound to fail, particularly the “concurrent wrongdoer” pleas based on the Civil Liability Act 1961; and
• Meta should not get discovery of confidential settlement agreements and related documents.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court made the following principal determinations:

3.1 Amendments to Meta’s defence

Meta sought three sets of amendments:

1. Adoption of the Irish Times defences (new para 29A):
   • that the articles were not defamatory;
   • that they were true (defence of justification); and
   • that they were fair and accurate reports of court proceedings attracting qualified privilege under s.18 of the Defamation Act 2009.
   The court allowed these amendments, notwithstanding delay, holding that:
   • they did not expand the factual or legal “battleground”, as these defences were already in issue via the Irish Times defendants;
   • any prejudice flowed from having to meet those defences at all (which the plaintiff must do in any event), not from their late introduction by Meta; and
   • the delay, though real, did not justify refusing the amendment in light of the overall procedural history and long periods of inactivity as against Meta.
2. Clarification of mitigation of loss (amendment to para 43):
   • Meta sought to insert explicit reference to the plaintiff’s almost one‑year delay before requesting takedown of the material, as a failure to mitigate loss.
   The court allowed this relatively “net” amendment, noting:
   • both parties accepted the point was at least arguably encompassed by the existing general plea of failure to mitigate;
   • no substantive or logistical prejudice was shown; and
   • clarity in pleadings is desirable, particularly when other amendments are being permitted.
3. Concurrent wrongdoer and double‑recovery pleas (new para 43A):
   • Meta wished to plead that:
     • the plaintiff has already been wholly or partly compensated by settlements with other media for substantially the same alleged damage;
     • Meta and those publishers are concurrent wrongdoers within the meaning of the Civil Liability Act 1961;
     • pursuant to s.17(2), the release of the other wrongdoers either discharged Meta or requires any damages against Meta to be reduced; and
     • pursuant to s.16(1), satisfaction of the claim against others has wholly or partially discharged Meta’s liability.
   The court:
   • accepted this was the most contentious and novel set of amendments;
   • held that, although they would add complexity and some extra evidence, the plaintiff had not shown prejudice arising from lateness (as opposed to the burden of meeting the pleas themselves);
   • rejected the argument that the amendments were doomed to fail, noting that complex and novel issues under the 1961 Act cannot be disposed of at this interlocutory stage; and
   • therefore granted leave to amend, while signalling that robust case management and appropriate costs orders would be considered to address prejudice arising from further delay.

3.2 Discovery of settlement‑related documents

Meta sought discovery of three categories of documents from each of five sets of proceedings brought by the plaintiff against other publishers:

• any settlement agreements (or other documents recording the terms of settlement);
• the statement of claim or equivalent originating document; and
• the articles or posts complained of in those proceedings.

The court:

• held that this discovery is relevant and necessary to the concurrent wrongdoer and double‑recovery pleas;
• rejected the plaintiff’s argument that discovery was premature or disproportionate, emphasising the need to avoid further delay;
• refused discovery only in respect of one item: an Irish Sun article of 2 April 2014 (pre‑trial), which Meta sought merely “to see if it was relevant” — the court characterised this as “redolent of fishing”;
• confirmed that confidentiality of settlements is not, of itself, a bar to discovery; and
• held that any claim of privilege or confidentiality must be addressed by redactions or specific claims, not by a blanket refusal to disclose.

3.3 Case management and costs

Recognising continuing prejudice to the plaintiff from the further deferral of trial, the court:

• stated its intention to make stringent case management directions to ensure an expeditious path to trial; and
• reserved questions of costs and directions for further submissions, listing the matter for 18 December 2025.

Overall, the court granted Meta’s amendment and discovery motions (with the narrow exception on the Irish Sun article), while emphasising the parties’ duty to now progress the case without further delay.

4. Analysis

4.1 Legal framework: amendments to pleadings

The judgment is built on well‑established principles governing amendments under Order 28, r.1 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, as synthesised in Stafford v Rice [2022] IECA 47. Key principles reiterated or applied include:

• The court has a broad and liberal power to permit amendments.
• The central question is whether prejudice would be caused by the late introduction of the amendment, as distinct from prejudice inherent in having to meet the new case itself.
• Where prejudice can be cured by terms (typically costs or directions), amendments should generally be allowed.
• “Prejudice” may be:
  • substantive (e.g. key witnesses no longer available, real difficulty in meeting new allegations); or
  • logistical/practical (disruption to trial dates, extended trial length, extra complexity).
• Given modern case management and the need for efficient use of court resources, significant logistical prejudice can, in some cases, decisively weigh against an amendment (as noted by Collins J. in Stafford and in Woori Bank v KDB Ireland Ltd [2006] IEHC 156).
• Delay per se is not fatal. Its relevance lies in whether it causes prejudice, especially if the “battleground is the same” and the amendment does not materially expand or delay the proceedings (Stafford, para 42).
• The merits of the proposed amendment are normally not examined in depth, save that an amendment should not be permitted if it is “manifest” that the claim or defence is doomed to fail — because forcing the other side to fight a hopeless claim is itself a form of prejudice.

A further, important piece of the framework is the Supreme Court’s discussion of defendant inactivity in Kirwan v Connors [2025] IESC 21, where O’Donnell C.J. (majority) stressed the asymmetry of roles:

“The essential structure of proceedings involves a plaintiff invoking the jurisdiction of the court to summon the defendant… In my view, the plaintiff has an interest in, and responsibility for, bringing that claim to trial… I think a defendant is not required to spend time, energy and resources on a claim which may never be heard and defendants should not be criticised for doing no more than is required to respond to a claim, and to be ready to meet it if and when it is prosecuted.”

This dictum is central to Cahill J.’s evaluation of Meta’s conduct: while there was clear delay in seeking amendments, the prolonged inactivity against Meta meant that it could reasonably treat the proceedings as dormant until the surprise notice of trial in June 2024.

The plaintiff relied heavily on:

• McFadden v Dundalk & Dowdallshill Coursing Club Ltd (Supreme Court, 22 April 1994, ex tempore); and
• Moorview Developments Ltd v First Active plc [2009] 2 IR 788;

to argue that late amendments close to trial should be refused, especially where they introduce new technical defences. In McFadden the defendants tried, three days before trial, to add a purely technical plea that the plaintiff, as a member of an unincorporated association, could not sue — without any affidavit explaining why this had not been pleaded earlier. The Supreme Court refused the amendment as unjust.

Cahill J. distinguishes McFadden on several grounds:

• there was no explanation at all for the timing of the amendment in McFadden— here, Meta explained that:
  • some amendments only became pertinent once the Irish Times defence was known; and
  • it reasonably regarded the action as dormant until June 2024, in light of Kirwan;
• in McFadden the amendment introduced a new technical bar which was wholly outside the existing “battleground”;
• by contrast, Meta’s adoption of the Irish Times defences falls squarely within issues already pleaded and inevitably to be litigated.

The judgment therefore reaffirms a nuanced approach: late amendments are not per se disfavoured, but the closer a case is to trial, the more carefully courts examine:

• whether the new pleading changes the “nature and scope” of the dispute; and
• whether any prejudice from lateness can reasonably be addressed by directions and costs.

4.2 First set of amendments: adopting the Irish Times defences

4.2.1 Nature of the amendment

By a new paragraph 29A, Meta seeks to “adopt and rely on” specific defences pleaded by the Irish Times defendants:

• that the articles are not defamatory of the plaintiff;
• that the words are true in substance and fact; and
• that the articles are fair and accurate reports of court proceedings, enjoying qualified privilege under s.18 Defamation Act 2009.

Meta’s rationale is procedural: although it denies being a “publisher” at all, if the Irish Times successfully defends on truth or privilege, the claim against Meta must also fail. The amendment is said to ensure this consequence is explicitly pleaded.

4.2.2 Objections and reasoning

The plaintiff’s objections were:

• Meta had had the Irish Times defence since July 2022; waiting until late 2024, when the case was trial‑ready, was unjustifiable delay;
• the defence of truth was already implicitly contained in Meta’s denials – new wording was “superfluous and frivolous”;
• Meta could not invoke qualified privilege under s.18 while simultaneously denying it was a publisher; and, in any event, privilege must be assessed per defendant, based on each publisher’s belief and the interest or duty of the audience.

The court’s response can be distilled into three key points:

1. Delay contextualised and partly explained.
   • There was undeniable delay: Meta could have moved to amend any time after July 2022.
   • However, in light of Kirwan, Meta was not obliged to expend resources on a case lying dormant as against it for years.
   • The more meaningful period is the six months between the June 2024 notice of trial and the December 2024 motion. Given the prior inactivity and Meta’s change of counsel team, this delay, though not ideal, did not amount to conduct warranting refusal of leave.
2. No substantive prejudice; same “battleground”.
   • The truth and privilege issues are already live due to the Irish Times defence. The plaintiff must address them to succeed against those defendants.
   • Thus, the amendment does not create a new “battlefield”, but simply clarifies that Meta stands or falls with the Irish Times on those points.
   • Any delay‑related prejudice is logistical (loss of an early trial date) rather than substantive (no evidence or witnesses are lost).
3. Qualified privilege and merits are for trial.
   • Cahill J. expressly declines to rule on whether Meta can substantively avail of s.18, or how that defence operates in the context of an online platform.
   • Those are matters of legal argument and evidence for the trial; the court’s function at this stage is simply to decide whether the defence is manifestly hopeless. It is not.

This part of the decision underlines that:

• a defendant who initially relies on a fundamental denial (e.g. “I am not a publisher”) is not precluded from later pleading alternative, conditional defences (e.g. “if I am a publisher, the matter is true or privileged”); and
• where those defences mirror existing co‑defendants’ pleas, the threshold for allowing their late adoption is comparatively low, barring specific prejudice.

4.3 Second set of amendments: explicit reliance on the plaintiff’s delay in seeking takedown

4.3.1 Nature of the amendment

Meta’s existing para 43 pleaded that any loss was due to the plaintiff’s failure to mitigate. The proposed amendment adds:

“…Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the Plaintiff delayed for a period of almost one year before requesting that the Third Named Defendant remove the material.”

In other words, the plaintiff’s own delay in notifying Meta of the alleged defamation is advanced as a specific example of failure to mitigate.

4.3.2 Court’s approach

The court accepts that:

• both parties recognise this point is at least “arguably” already encompassed by the general mitigation plea;
• Meta did not explain why the detail was not included in 2016; however, this omission is not critical given the minimal impact of the amendment;
• no concrete prejudice is shown – the plaintiff does not claim that the factual issue is new, surprising, or harder to address now.

Cahill J. nonetheless observes, in a more general cautionary tone, that late amendments merely “for the avoidance of doubt” are not to be universally encouraged. However, where:

• other, more substantial amendments are being permitted; and
• the additional change is “relatively net” and causes no incremental prejudice,

the court will not refuse leave purely on the basis that the point might already be implicit.

4.4 Third set of amendments: concurrent wrongdoer and double‑recovery pleas

4.4.1 The proposed new defence

The third category is the most legally significant. Meta alleges, in essence:

• the plaintiff has already received substantial settlements from at least four other media organisations for substantially similar alleged defamation about the same subject matter;
• if Meta is liable at all, it is as a concurrent wrongdoer with those publishers, within the meaning of the Civil Liability Act 1961;
• pursuant to:
  • s.16(1), once the plaintiff’s claim has been “satisfied” by one concurrent wrongdoer, the liability of the others is wholly or partly discharged; and
  • s.17(2), a release of or accord with one concurrent wrongdoer can operate to discharge or reduce the liability of the others (depending in particular on s.17(2)(a)–(c)),
  any damages against Meta must be reduced or extinguished.

This line of defence, if ultimately accepted, would prevent the plaintiff from obtaining double recovery for “the same damage” across multiple libel actions and settlements.

4.4.2 Objections: delay and prejudice

The plaintiff raised several objections:

• Delay:
  • Meta should have pleaded this earlier, particularly after 2018, when the first settlements became public.
  • Had it done so, the plaintiff might have adopted a different litigation strategy: joining all media defendants in one action, or structuring settlements differently.
• Prejudice:
  • the new pleas would “radically alter” the trial’s nature and scope;
  • they would transform the hearing into a “complex multi‑jurisdictional comparative analysis” of different articles, jurisdictions, and settlement terms;
  • expert evidence might be required; and
  • confidential settlements would have to be opened, undermining privacy and finality.
• Merits:
  • the Civil Liability Act 1961 was never intended to apply to defamation in this way;
  • the pleas were bound to fail and should be refused at the threshold.

4.4.3 The court’s reasoning

Cahill J. deals with these objections systematically.

(a) Delay and its consequences

The court accepts that some delay exists:

• the settlements occurred between November 2018 and November 2023;
• Meta raised amendment in November 2024.

However:

• the concurrent wrongdoer pleas could not have been pleaded in the original 2016 defence, as the settlements had not then occurred;
• once again, overall dormancy of the proceedings against Meta until mid‑2024 must be weighed (per Kirwan);
• while the new pleas introduce new issues of law and fact (unlike the first category of amendments), the plaintiff’s main complaints — lengthening of trial, complexity, new evidence — go to the nature of the issues, not the lateness of their introduction.

Crucially, the court finds:

“The inconvenience or undesirability of having to deal with the new pleas is not relevant prejudice… It is only prejudice arising from the lateness of their introduction… that may be weighed when deciding whether to allow the amendments…”

On that test, the plaintiff’s main asserted prejudice (complexity, extra evidence, a longer hearing) is not sufficient to refuse the amendment.

As to the claim that the plaintiff lost the chance to join other parties or structure settlements differently, the court notes:

• nothing presently prevents the plaintiff seeking to join additional parties to these proceedings (if appropriate);
• speculation as to what might have been done differently in other concluded proceedings is too remote and uncertain to count as relevant prejudice in these proceedings; and
• no authority supports the proposition that such “hindsight prejudice” in other cases justifies refusing an amendment here.

(b) Merits: is the defence bound to fail?

On the merits, the court stresses several times that the issues are:

• novel and complex – particularly the meaning of “the same damage” under s.11(5) of the 1961 Act in the context of multiple defamatory publications; and
• subject to “sharp differences” of legal interpretation between the parties.

Where the law is unsettled and serious arguments exist on both sides, it is almost impossible to say that a proposed pleading is “manifestly” doomed to fail. That is the situation here. The court notes:

“Given the accepted complexity and novelty of these questions, I cannot decide that Meta is bound to fail on these issues…”

The plaintiff also argued that Meta had not provided a sufficient factual foundation for the new pleas, citing Cuttle v ACC Bank [2012] IEHC 105 (where Kelly J. discussed the evidential basis needed to plead fraud). Cahill J. answers:

• Cuttle involved an allegation of fraud, which attracts a higher pleading and proof threshold;
• even there, Kelly J. recognised that an amendment motion requires only a “low threshold of proof”;
• in the present case no allegation of fraud arises, and Meta’s references to the fact and general scale of settlements provide a sufficient “factual matrix” at this interlocutory stage.

The court does, however, draw on Cuttle in a procedural sense: if a party amends to add a significant new line of case and later fails on that line, it may be appropriate to make particular costs orders (e.g. that it bear the costs of that aspect regardless of the overall outcome).

(c) Balancing fairness and case management

Finally, the court returns to the broader themes of fairness and case management:

• Meta has caused additional delay by its late motion; this creates real, if not decisive, prejudice;
• the best way to address that prejudice is through:
  • strict directions to move the case towards trial; and
  • careful consideration of costs at a later stage.

In that sense, the decision strikes a pragmatic balance: it preserves Meta’s right to raise a potentially powerful statutory defence grounded in the Civil Liability Act 1961, while seeking to minimise further harm to the plaintiff from procedural slippage.

4.5 Discovery of other proceedings and settlements

4.5.1 Relevance, necessity and proportionality

Under Irish discovery principles, a party is entitled to documents that are:

• relevant to issues on the pleadings;
• necessary for the fair disposal of the case or for saving costs; and
• proportionate in scope and burden.

Once the concurrent wrongdoer amendments were allowed, the requested documents — settlement agreements, statements of claim, and the impugned articles in the other proceedings — obviously met these criteria:

• they bear directly on whether the same or substantially similar alleged defamatory meanings and damages were in issue elsewhere;
• they are needed to assess “the same damage”, satisfaction, and the effect of releases under ss.16 and 17 of the 1961 Act; and
• the categories are narrow and finite, not open‑ended trawls.

The only exception was the Irish Sun article of 2 April 2014. The court refused discovery of that article because Meta’s stated reason — to inspect it in order to see whether it might be relevant — amounted to a “fishing” justification. Without more, this did not satisfy the relevance and necessity test.

4.5.2 Prematurity and efficiency

Technically, the discovery request pre‑dated any order permitting the amending of Meta’s defence. The plaintiff argued that such a request was premature.

Cahill J. accepts that, in strict sequence, discovery should ordinarily follow once the issues are formally defined in the pleadings. However, she adopts a pragmatic stance:

• given the age of the proceedings and the need to avoid further delay, it would be inefficient to force a fresh, sequential discovery application after the amendment ruling;
• the plaintiff did not contest (save for the single Irish Sun article) that the categories were relevant, necessary and proportionate;
• the court is therefore willing to treat the discovery motion as if brought after the amendments, and determine it on that basis.

4.5.3 Confidentiality and privilege: limits and safeguards

The plaintiff’s principal substantive objection to discovery was that settlement agreements are confidential and that correspondence leading to settlement may be privileged, relying on Purcell v Central Bank [2016] IECA 50.

The court’s approach can be summarised as follows:

• Confidentiality is not an absolute shield.
  • Confidential documents are frequently discoverable where they are relevant and necessary. Confidentiality can be protected by:
    • limiting who may inspect them (e.g. legal teams only); or
    • appropriate redactions.
• Privilege must be specifically asserted.
  • If the plaintiff claims litigation privilege over parts of a settlement agreement or related documents, she:
    • may withhold or redact only those parts strictly necessary to protect privilege; and
    • must properly particularise the claim of privilege if challenged.
• Public disclosures undermine blanket privilege claims.
  • The court notes that public statements have already been made about the existence and scale of some settlements.
  • In that light, it is “difficult to see” how the entire contents of the settlement agreements could be privileged.
  • Moreover, Purcell concerned correspondence leading to settlement, not the settlement agreements themselves, which are what Meta seeks.

Overall, the court orders discovery of the requested categories (minus the pre‑trial Irish Sun article) and encourages the parties to resolve privilege and confidentiality questions cooperatively, without spawning further satellite disputes.

5. Impact and Significance

5.1 Defamation and the Civil Liability Act 1961: towards concurrent wrongdoer analysis

One of the most significant aspects of this judgment is the court’s willingness to permit, in a defamation context, detailed pleadings based on the concurrent wrongdoer regime of the Civil Liability Act 1961.

Although the court does not decide the ultimate merits, allowing Meta to plead that:

• multiple publishers are concurrent wrongdoers for “the same damage”; and
• settlements with some of them either discharge or reduce Meta’s liability under ss.16 and 17,

strongly signals that:

• the 1961 Act may have real, substantive application in defamation cases involving multiple media outlets or platforms; and
• plaintiffs who litigate sequentially against different publishers for substantially the same publications will increasingly face double‑recovery objections based on the Act.

Practically, this will likely:

• encourage defendants (especially online intermediaries) to scrutinise plaintiffs’ other suits and settlements; and
• push plaintiffs to consider:
  • multi‑party actions where possible; and
  • settlement wording that anticipates potential concurrent wrongdoer effects.

5.2 Online platforms and “piggy‑backing” on publishers’ defences

For online platforms, the decision is notable in two respects:

• It confirms that a platform that denies primary publisher status may nonetheless plead, in the alternative:
  • that if the underlying content is found not defamatory, true, or privileged as regards the original publisher, the same finding must logically defeat the claim against the platform.
• It illustrates a judicial willingness to see such “piggy‑backing” as procedurally legitimate and not inherently prejudicial, particularly where:
  • the substantive defences will be litigated anyway; and
  • no new factual terrain is opened up by the platform’s adoption of those defences.

This is likely to become increasingly important as claims attempt to hold intermediaries liable for the online dissemination of content originated by professional publishers.

5.3 Litigation conduct and delay: clarifying the roles of plaintiffs and defendants

The judgment is also a practical restatement of the distinct roles of plaintiffs and defendants in progressing litigation:

• It reinforces, via Kirwan, that the primary burden of progressing a case lies with the plaintiff. A defendant is entitled, to some degree, to be reactive rather than proactive.
• Where a plaintiff allows a case to lie dormant for years, their later claims of prejudice from a defendant’s late amendment will be assessed in that context. Prolonged inactivity undermines the weight of such complaints.
• At the same time, defendants are not given a free pass: Meta’s delay is acknowledged, and the court makes clear that strong case management and potential costs consequences are appropriate responses.

The message for practitioners is twofold:

• plaintiffs should not assume that “sitting on” claims while litigating elsewhere will insulate them from late but otherwise legitimate defence amendments; and
• defendants should recognise that dormancy may justify a slower reaction, but once the plaintiff signals real intent to go to trial (e.g. by serving a notice of trial), delays in bringing amendment motions must be clearly justified and minimised.

5.4 Discovery of settlements: confidentiality versus relevance

The discovery ruling establishes — or at least strongly re‑affirms — that:

• settlement agreements are discoverable where they are directly relevant to pleaded issues, such as double recovery or concurrent wrongdoers;
• general assertions of confidentiality will not prevent discovery; and
• litigation privilege may justify targeted redactions, but not wholesale refusal, especially where some details are already publicly acknowledged.

This has clear implications beyond defamation:

• Parties settling multi‑defendant or multi‑action litigation should draft with the expectation that other defendants may seek disclosure of the terms.
• Public announcements about settlement amounts or terms may weaken later privilege arguments over the agreements themselves.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 Amendment of pleadings

In civil litigation, each side sets out its case in formal documents: the statement of claim, defence, reply, etc. To amend a pleading is to change it — for example, by adding a new defence or clarifying an existing one.

The court generally allows amendments to ensure the real dispute is decided, but may refuse if:

• the amendment comes very late; and
• that lateness causes unfairness (for example, key evidence has vanished, or a fixed trial date would have to be vacated).

6.2 Prejudice

“Prejudice” in this context means unfair harm. It may be:

• Substantive prejudice – the party’s ability to win or lose the case is compromised (e.g. witnesses no longer available, key documents lost).
• Logistical prejudice – the case becomes longer, more expensive, or loses a scheduled trial slot.

Courts are more concerned with prejudice caused by the lateness of an amendment than by the mere fact that the other side has more to argue against.

6.3 Concurrent wrongdoers

Under the Civil Liability Act 1961, concurrent wrongdoers are two or more persons whose separate wrongful acts combine to cause “the same damage” to a plaintiff. Classic examples include different drivers each contributing to a road accident, or successive negligent doctors aggravating an injury.

The Act then regulates:

• how liability is shared between them;
• what happens if the plaintiff settles with one wrongdoer; and
• how to prevent the plaintiff recovering more than 100% of their loss across multiple proceedings.

The novelty in Scallon is the proposed application of this framework to defamation cases where different media outlets publish similar material about the same event.

6.4 Double recovery and “the same damage”

A plaintiff is entitled to be fully compensated for their loss — but not to profit from it. “Double recovery” occurs if they receive compensation from multiple sources for the same harm.

Section 11(5) of the 1961 Act uses the phrase “the same damage”. In defamation, difficult questions can arise:

• Are separate articles in different papers, on different dates, about the same trial, causing reputational harm of the same kind, “the same damage”?
• Or does each publication cause distinct damage?

These are the issues the court recognises as “complex and novel” and leaves for trial.

6.5 Qualified privilege for court reporting (Defamation Act 2009, s.18)

Qualified privilege is a defence that protects certain communications made on occasions where the publisher has a duty or interest to publish and the recipient has a corresponding interest in receiving the information, provided the publication is not made maliciously.

Section 18 of the Defamation Act 2009 grants a form of statutory qualified privilege to fair and accurate reports of certain proceedings, including court proceedings. If a newspaper (or possibly a platform) can prove that:

• its report of a trial was fair and accurate; and
• published without malice,

then, even if the report harms someone’s reputation, it may be protected.

The question whether an online platform sharing or hosting a link can itself claim this protection, and on what evidential basis, is left open by the present judgment.

6.6 Mitigation of loss

A plaintiff who suffers loss is expected to take reasonable steps to limit that loss. If they unreasonably fail to do so, the damages they can recover may be reduced.

In defamation cases involving online material, a common mitigation issue is: how quickly did the plaintiff ask for the material to be removed? If they wait many months or years, a defendant may argue that ongoing damage to reputation was avoidable and should not be laid entirely at the defendant’s door.

7. Conclusion

Scallon v The Irish Times Trust Ltd & Meta Platforms Ireland Ltd is a procedurally focused but doctrinally important judgment. It reaffirms the liberal approach to amendments under Order 28 RSC, while emphasising:

• that the key question is prejudice from lateness, not just the difficulty or complexity of the new pleading;
• that prolonged inactivity by a plaintiff weakens later objections to defendants’ reasonable, if delayed, amendment applications; and
• that courts will use case management directions and costs as tools to balance fairness and efficiency.

Substantively, the judgment:

• opens the door to more systematic use of concurrent wrongdoer and double‑recovery arguments under the Civil Liability Act 1961 in defamation cases involving multiple publishers;
• confirms that online platforms may, in principle, align their defences with those of primary publishers, even while disputing their own status as publishers; and
• clarifies that settlement agreements and related documents are discoverable, notwithstanding confidentiality, where they are directly relevant to pleaded statutory defences.

The case thus stands as a significant precedent at the intersection of defamation, civil liability apportionment, and modern case management, and will inform both strategic pleading and settlement practices in complex multi‑defendant media litigation.